The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
STEPHANIE COLLINS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CIVIL CASE NO. 1:20-cv-296-ECM
) (WO)
KELVIN MITCHELL ANDREWS, )
and ALLIED COMPANY OF THE )
WIREGRASS d/b/a ALLIED FENCE )
COMPANY, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Now pending before the court is Plaintiff’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees and
costs.1 (Doc. 25). For the reasons that follow, the Court will award $34,400.00 in attorney’s
fees and $400.00 in costs.
The Plaintiff, Stephanie Collins (“Collins”), was employed for approximately eight
years by Kelvin Andrews (“Andrews”) at Allied Company of the Wiregrass, doing business
as Allied Fence Company. She brought claims of race discrimination, hostile work
environment and retaliation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as well as state law claims of outrage
and invasion of privacy. (Doc. 1). On September 28, 2022, the Court entered default
judgment against the Defendants on the Plaintiff’s § 1981 claims and awarded her damages
1 Also pending before the Court is the Plaintiff’s motion for entry of final judgment (doc. 28) filed on December
12, 2022. The Court entered final judgment on September 28, 2022 (doc. 24). This motion will be denied as
moot.
in the amount of $222,759.69. (Doc. 23). The Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment on her
state law claims was denied. (Id.).
The Plaintiff now moves for an award of attorney’s fees and costs under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988. (Doc. 25).
II. DISCUSSION
The Plaintiff has been represented by attorneys Ashton Ott and Valerie Judah pursuant
to a contingency fee agreement that contemplates attorney’s fees in the amount of 40% of any
amount awarded in damages. Thus, under the agreement, the Plaintiff requests $89,103.88 in
attorney’s fees. “In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section[] 1981, ... the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of
the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (alteration added). “The proper approach in applying a federal
fee-shifting statute like § 1988 is to take a reasonable number of hours and multiply it by a
reasonable fee and thereby create a ‘lodestar.’” Johnston v. Borders, 36 F.4th 1254, 1282
(11th Cir. 2022). Although the Plaintiff requests attorney’s fees pursuant to the contingency
fee agreement, she points the Court to no authority that would support awarding fees on that
basis. Consequently, the Court will utilize the lodestar approach when considering the
Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees.
It is undisputed that Collins is a prevailing party in this case. The Court entered default
judgment against the Defendants and awarded damages in the amount of $222,759.69. After
being given an opportunity, the Defendants have filed nothing in opposition to the motion for
attorney’s fees. Thus, the Court finds that Collins is entitled a reasonable attorney’s fee as
part of her costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Ms. Ott claims an hourly rate of $350 and seeks compensation for 26.5 hours for an
award of $9,275.00. McDavid Flowers, an attorney who practices with Ms. Ott, claims an
hourly rate of $250 and seeks compensation for 59.90 hours for an award of $14,975.00. Ms.
Judah claims an hourly rate of $250 and seeks compensation for 41.30 hours for an award of
$10,325.00. Thus, the Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees in the amount of $34,575.00.2 (Doc.
25). In addition, the Plaintiff claims $400 as the filing fee and only recoverable cost in this
case. (Doc. 25 at 4).
A. Reasonable Attorney’s Fee
“The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the
number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly
rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). “The product of these two figures is
the lodestar and there is a strong presumption that the lodestar is the reasonable sum the
attorneys deserve.” Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “The fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement and
documenting the appropriate hours and hourly rates.” Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ga. v.
Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted). “That burden
includes supplying the court with specific and detailed evidence from which the court can
determine the reasonable hourly rate.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
2 Included in the motion for attorney’s fees is an entry for Bethany L. McGhee in the amount of $610.00 which
constitutes an hourly rate of $100 for 6.10 hours of work. However, the motion for attorney’s fees contains no
affidavit from Ms. McGhee nor does the motion in any way identify Ms. McGhee. Accordingly, the Court
declines to award any fees for work performed by Ms. McGhee.
1. Reasonable Hourly Rate
“A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community
for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.”
Norman v. Housing Auth. of the City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988).
In support of her motion, the Plaintiff’s attorneys submitted affidavits detailing their expertise
and experience in litigating discrimination claims. In addition, the attorneys submitted the
affidavit of M. Adams Jones, an attorney in Dothan, Alabama. Attorney Jones is
knowledgeable in the local market, the arena of civil rights litigation, and the reasonableness
of rates in these types of cases. (Doc. 25-6). Mr. Jones concludes that “the hourly rates billed
in the present case by each of the attorneys at their respective skill levels is consistent with
the applicable range of such prevailing hourly rates.” (Id. at p. 5). This is based on his
knowledge of the attorneys’ skill, ability, and experience and his view of the factors in
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974). Thus, the
Court finds that $350 is a reasonable hourly rate for Ms. Ott and $250 is a reasonable hourly
rate for Mr. Flowers and Ms. Judah.
2. Reasonable Number of Hours
The Court now turns to determining how many hours were reasonably expended on
this litigation. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301. This requires the Court to exercise billing judgment
to exclude “excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary” hours. Id. (quoting Hensley, 461
U.S. at 434). “Cases may be overstaffed, and the skill and experience of lawyers vary widely.
Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request
hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
Ms. Ott performed 26.50 hours of work while Mr. Flowers performed 59.90 hours of
work. Ms. Judah performed 41.30 hours of work. Between the three attorneys, they
performed 127.70 hours of work on a case that was resolved on a motion for default judgment.
In addition, the bills submitted contain entries from which the Court is unable to determine
whether the work was in this case or is duplicative. For example, on June 29, 2021, Ms. Ott
billed .30 hours ($105.00) for an alias summons for Mike Magrino. On October 14, 2021,
Mr. Flowers billed 1.60 hours ($400.00) for drafting affidavits for Mr. Magrino and Ms.
McGhee. As previously noted, there is no affidavit for Ms. McGhee, nor is there an affidavit
for Mr. Magrino. There is no way for the Court to discern from the record the role of Mr.
Magrino in this litigation. Mr. Flowers also billed .40 hours ($100.00) for “research – Diaz
Tesla docket.” (Doc. 25-2 at p.3). The Court is unable to discern the relevance of this entry.
Ms. Judah also appears to have double billed some work. For example, on June 18, 2020,
Ms. Judah twice billed .30 and .20 hours ($125.00) for “efile – delivered to clerk for review.”
(Id. at p.11). On February 4, 2021, Ms. Judah billed .20 hours ($50) and .30 hours ($75)
respectively for “final motion for default – efile.” (Id.) Ms. Judah has numerous entries at
.20 hours or .30 hours that merely state filing and then describe a document. The time entries
make it hard to determine whether the hours were reasonably expended. Thus, the Court
concludes that a reduction of hours is appropriate because the entries are vague, duplicative
or otherwise unclear regarding their relevance to this action. “When a district court finds the
number of hours claimed is unreasonably high, the court has two choices: it may conduct an
hour-by-hour analysis or it may reduce the requested hours with an across-the-board cut.”
Bivins, 548 F.3d at 1350. Based on the Court’s review of the course of litigation and a review
of the record, the Court concludes that reducing the number of claimed hours by each attorney
by approximately eight percent corrects for overbilling and vague entries. Thus, Ms. Ott will
be compensated for 24 hours of billable time; Mr. Flowers will be compensated for 65 hours
of billable time; and Ms. Judah will be compensated for 38 hours of billable time. That is
reasonable under the circumstances.
3. No Reduction for Partial Success
Although the Plaintiff did not succeed on her state law claims, the Court declines to
reduce the amount of fees on this basis. First, the Defendants did not object to the Plaintiff’s
motion for attorney’s fees. More importantly, however, the Plaintiff succeeded on her
primary § 1981 claims of race discrimination, hostile work environment and retaliation. The
relief achieved is meaningful, and the Court determines that no reduction is appropriate in this
case. Thus, this results in an award of attorney’s fees to Ms. Ott in the amount of $8,400.00;
an award to Mr. Flowers in the amount of $16,500.00; and an award to Ms. Judah in the
amount of $9,500.00 for a total award of $34,400.00.
B. Bill of Costs
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) allows the Plaintiff to recover costs in
addition to attorney’s fees. See Arcadian Fertilizer, L.P. v. MPW Indus. Servs., 249 F.3d
1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001). In addition, section 1988 permits the Court to award “a
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (emphasis added). Thus,
the Court may tax the following under 28 U.S.C. § 1920:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts
necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of
any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in
the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; [and]
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of
interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special
interpretation services under section 1828 of this title.
The Plaintiff seeks costs in the amount of $400.00 as the filing fee paid in this case
which is clearly taxable under the law. “The presumption is in favor of awarding costs.”
Arcadian, 249 F.3d at 1296. This cost will be awarded.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons as stated and for good cause, it is
ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs (doc. 25) is
GRANTED to the extent that the Plaintiff is awarded $34,400.00 as a reasonable attorney’s
fee for this case and costs in the amount of $400.00. In all other respects, the motion is
DENIED. It is further
ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s motion for entry of final judgment (doc. 28) is DENIED
as moot.
Done this the 8th day of May, 2023.
/s/ Emily C. Marks
EMILY C. MARKS
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE