Scott v. McClain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

DARRYL ELTON SCOTT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:21cv573-MHT

) (WO)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as the )

Commissioner of the )

Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION

Plaintiff Darryl Elton Scott, a prisoner in the

custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC),

filed this lawsuit naming as defendants former ADOC

Commissioner Jefferson S. Dunn in his ‘official’ capacity

and the following ADOC employees at Bullock County

Correctional Facility in both their ‘official’ and

‘individual’ capacities: Antonio McClain, Chermaine

Baskin, Terrell Holcey, Brandon Boyd, and Jacquelyn

Urquhart. He asserts claims under the First, Fourth

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments as enforced through 42

U.S.C. § 1983. The court has jurisdiction over these

claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

This lawsuit is now before the court on the

defendants’ motion to dismiss. For the reasons explained

below, the motion will be denied as to Scott’s Eighth

Amendment claims to the extent he has sued McClain,

Holcey, and Baskin in their individual capacities for

allegedly failing to protect him from being repeatedly

raped by another prisoner, and to the extent he has sued

Holcey and Baskin in their individual capacities for

allegedly using excessive force against him. The motion

will be granted in all other respects.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At this stage of the litigation, this court confines

itself to Scott’s amended complaint and accepts his

allegations, and the inferences that could be reasonably

drawn from them, as true. This “court may dismiss [the]

complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be

granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations.” Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).

In September 2019, Scott, a non-violent prisoner at

Bullock County Correctional Facility, told Warden McClain

that another prisoner, Larry White, had threatened to

hurt him. At that time, White, a gang member who had

allegedly raped other inmates, was categorized as posing

a credible threat to other inmates. However, McClain

laughed when he received Scott’s report and transferred

Scott out of his cell and into the dormitory where White

resided.

Officers Holcey and Baskin, while transferring

Scott, repeatedly kicked him for no reason. Holcey told

Scott that he was going to be “fucked in the ass and

stabbed white boy, and maybe they will kill your retarded

cracker ass.” First Amended Complaint (Doc. 46) at 5.

Baskin laughed. Then, Holcey threatened to spray Scott

with mace. A witness observing Scott’s transfer

confirmed that Holcey and Baskin were laughing at Scott,

saying they were going to watch him get abused, and that

there was nothing Scott’s “stupid white ass could do

about it.” Id. at 5.

Inside the dormitory, as Officers Holcey and Baskin

had portended, White made good on his threats. While

being observed by Holcey and Baskin, White dragged Scott

to a bunkbed. The bunk was covered with a sheet to

obstruct what happened inside. There, White forcibly

raped Scott.

After the rape, Scott was taken to an outside

facility for treatment. After being treated, he was then

brought back to Bullock, where he was placed in the same

dormitory as before. There, he was beaten and raped by

White a second time.

As a result, Scott suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress

Disorder, Chronic Depression, tears in his rectum from

being raped, hearing loss from being kicked, chronic

pain, flashbacks, and nightmares.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Official-Capacity Claims

As stated, Scott sues McClain, Holcey, Baskin, Boyd,

and Urquhart in both their individual and official

capacities, and he sues Dunn in only his official

capacity. Because the defendants have been sued in their

official capacities, the court will take up the Eleventh

Amendment issue first.

To the extent that Scott seeks monetary damages from

defendants in their official capacities, such relief is

unavailable because his claims are considered as being

against the State, and the Supreme Court has held that

the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for monetary damages

against the State. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,

169 (1985). However, the Eleventh Amendment poses no

obstacle to Scott’s claims for damages against a

defendant in his individual capacity. Therefore, Scott’s

claims to the extent his seeks money damages from the

defendants in their official capacities must be

dismissed.

However, Scott also seeks injunctive and declaratory

relief from the defendants in their official capacities.

Because Dunn no longer serves as ADOC Commissioner, the

court cannot order him to “do something or refrain from

doing something in [his] capacity as a government actor.”

Mitchell v. Town of Hayneville, Alabama, 2020 WL 7480551,

at *10 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 18, 2020) (Thompson, J.) (noting

that “[o]fficial-capacity claims are used to seek

equitable relief against current government

officials.”). And, because Dunn is sued in only his

official capacity and because no relief is available

against Dunn in that capacity, Dunn is due to be dismissed

altogether.

The remaining defendants are also due to be dismissed

to the extent Scott seeks declaratory and injunctive

relief from them in their official capacities. Scott

asks that they be required to take and refrain from taking

many actions, including that he “be moved forever from

Bullock County Correctional Facility.” First Amended

Complaint (Doc. 46) at 15. Defendants assert that Scott

“lack[s] standing to prevail on any injunctive relief,”

because he is no longer at the Bullock facility and his

amended complaint does not establish that there is a

“strong likelihood that the injury he suffered previously

will be repeated in a very similar manner by the same

actors in the future.” Brief in Support (Doc. 55) at 13.

“In order to demonstrate that a case or controversy

exists to meet the Article III standing requirement when

a plaintiff is seeking injunctive and declaratory relief,

a plaintiff must allege facts from which it appears there

is a substantial likelihood that he will suffer injury

in the future.” Malowney v. Fed. Collection Deposit

Grp., 193 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir. 1999). Because

Scott is no longer at Bullock and because there is nothing

in the amended complaint indicating that defendants will

injure him again under similar circumstances, he lacks

standing to pursue his official-capacity claims for

injunctive and declaratory relief against McClain, Boyd,

Urquhart, Holcey, and Baskin. Accordingly, Scott’s

claims to the extent his seeks injunctive and declaratory

relief from these defendants in their official capacities

must be dismissed.

In conclusion, Dunn, McClain, Boyd, Urquhart,

Holcey, and Baskin will be dismissed to the extent they

have been sued in their official capacities, and, because

Dunn has been sued in only his official capacity, he will

be dismissed altogether.

B. Shotgun Pleading

The remaining defendants--McClain, Boyd, Urquhart,

Holcey, and Baskin--further argue that the amended

complaint violates Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

8(a)(2) and 10(b). They contend that the complaint is

an impermissible “shotgun pleading.” A complaint

violates pleading rules when it presents claims in a

manner where the defendant cannot “discern what [the

plaintiff] is claiming and frame a responsive pleading.”

T.D.S. Inc. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.2d 1520, 1544

n.14 (11th Cir. 1985). At bottom, the complaint “must

give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against

them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.”

Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 792 F.3d

1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015).

Here, as defendants point out, Scott’s amended

complaint commits several of the “sins” that define a

shotgun pleading, including, “not separating into a

different count each cause of action” and “asserting

multiple claims against multiple defendants without

specifying which of the defendants are responsible for

which acts or omissions.” Id. at 1322–23.

In Count I, the amended complaint’s only denominated

count, Scott alleges violations of the First, Fourth, and

Fourteenth Amendments, as well as unconstitutional race

discrimination.1 See First Amended Complaint (Doc. 46)

1. The court notes that, as explained later, Scott

also asserts Eighth Amendment claims, which would be

brought through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687

(2019) (“With only a handful of exceptions, [the Supreme

Court] has held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause incorporates the protections in the Bill

at 11–13. To be sure, after careful review of Count I,

the court cannot discern specifically what causes of

action Scott is alleging under these amendments, and even

whom Scott is alleging them against. Indeed, “it is

virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact

are intended to support which claims” brought under the

First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Weiland, 792

F.3d at 1325 (citations omitted). However, rather than

require Scott to replead claims under the First, Fourth,

and Fourteenth Amendments, the court will dismiss his

amended complaint to this extent, for one simple reason:

the factual allegations in the complaint do no set forth

claims under these amendments, so as to survive Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). However, if Scott

still wants to pursue claims under these amendments, he

can file a motion to amend, with a proposed new amended

of Rights, rendering them applicable to the States.”).

However, the court understands Scott to also be asserting

Fourteenth Amendment violations separate from the Eighth

Amendment. Therefore, when the court refers to the

Fourteenth Amendment in this opinion, it is not referring

to Scott’s Eighth Amendment claims.

complaint attached that not only cures the

shotgun-pleading defect but also sets forth factual

allegations that would support a finding of one or more

violation of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth

Amendments.

However, Scott’s amended complaint’s allegations,

while not explicitly employing the legal terms of art,

do clearly set forth two causes of action against these

defendants under the Eighth Amendment: failure to protect

and excessive force. Indeed, defendants respond to both

these types of claims. Because the complaint is

“informative enough to permit [the] court to readily

determine if [these causes of action] state a claim upon

which relief can be granted,” the court must make such a

determination, and dismissal under Rules 8(a)(2) and

10(b) is inappropriate. Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1326.

Accordingly, the court will take up the defendants’

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion for

failure to state a claim as to Scott’s Eighth Amendment

failure-to-protect and excessive-force claims; all other

claims are dismissed without prejudice as indicated

above.

C. Statute of Limitations

Before turning to Scott’s failure-to-protect and

excessive-force claims individually, the court will first

address McClain, Boyd, Urquhart, Holcey, and Baskin’s

argument that the applicable two-year statute of

limitations under 42 U.S.C § 1983 bars these damages

claims against them in their individual capacities,

because, according to these defendants, “the original

complaint was filed on August 27, 2021” and “[i]t appears

that the conduct complained of by [Scott] might have

occurred prior to August 27, 2019.” Brief in Support

(Doc. 55) at 18. However, Scott alleges that he reported

White’s threats in September 2019 (after August 27, 2019)

and was then transferred into the dormitory where he was

raped by White for the first time. Accordingly, the

statute of limitations does not clearly bar White’s

§ 1983 claims, and dismissal on statute-of-limitations

grounds is inappropriate at this stage.

D. Individual-Capacity Claims

As a result of the above discussion, Scott has only

two remaining claims: Eighth Amendment

failure-to-protect and excessive-force claims. And they

are against only McClain, Boyd, Urquhart, Holcey, and

Baskin in their individual capacities.

1. Individual-Capacity Failure-to-Protect Claim

Scott alleges that McClain, Boyd, Urquhart, Holcey,

and Baskin unconstitutionally failed to protect him. The

Eighth Amendment prohibits state governments from

inflicting “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const.

amend. VIII. The prohibition on cruel and unusual

punishments requires prison officials to “take reasonable

measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The duty to protect encompasses

“protect[ing] prisoners from violence at the hands of

other prisoners.” Id. at 833 (internal quotation marks

omitted). When a plaintiff invokes this principle in a

lawsuit against prison officials, plaintiff's claims are

referred to as “failure-to-protect” claims. See Cox v.

Nobles, 15 F.4th 1350, 1357–58 (11th Cir. 2021).

To succeed on his failure-to-protect claim, Scott

must satisfy three elements. See id. at 1358. First,

he must show that he was “incarcerated under conditions

posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. (quoting

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832). Second, he must show that the

“prison official [had] a sufficiently culpable state of

mind,” amounting to “deliberate indifference.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). Third, and finally,

he must demonstrate causation, that is, that the

constitutional violation caused his injuries. Id.

(citing Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090,

1099 (11th Cir. 2014)).

In response, McClain, Boyd, Urquhart, Holcey, and

Baskin invoke qualified immunity. Qualified immunity

“protects government officials ‘from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which

a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Once the

defendant officials establish that they were acting

within their discretionary authority, the court engages

in two distinct inquiries to determine if qualified

immunity applies: (1) whether the plaintiff’s allegations

“make out a violation of a constitutional right,” and (2)

whether “the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at

the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Id. at

232 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).

A right is clearly established if there is: (1) factually

indistinguishable caselaw from the Eleventh Circuit or

Supreme Court, (2) broad statements of legal principles

that apply with “obvious clarity to the circumstances,”

or (3) “conduct so egregious that a constitutional right

was clearly violated, even in the total absence of case

law.” Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir.

2021).

Applying this qualified-immunity framework, and for

the following reasons, Scott’s Eighth Amendment

failure-to-protect claim will proceed against McClain,

Holcey, and Baskin; it will be dismissed without

prejudice as to Boyd and Urquhart.

a. McClain, Holcey, and Baskin

Scott’s allegations state a clearly established

Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against

McClain, Holcey, and Baskin.

First, Scott sufficiently pleads that White

specifically posed a substantial risk of serious harm to

him. He alleges that he reported to McClain that White

had threatened his safety multiple times, that White was

known to pose a danger to vulnerable inmates like him,

and that White had performed acts of violence on other

inmates. Additionally, Holcey and Baskin essentially

told Scott that he was going to be raped in the dormitory

they were transferring him to (and that they were not

going to do anything about it). These allegations are

sufficient to establish objectively that the risk White

specifically posed to Scott constituted the requisite

“strong likelihood” of injury necessary to establish a

substantial risk of serious harm. Brown v. Hughes, 894

F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990).

Second, Scott alleges facts sufficient to establish

deliberate difference. Deliberate indifference has both

a subjective and objective component. Marbury v. Warden,

936 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2019). Subjectively, the

“official must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of

serious harm exists, and ... also draw the inference.”

Id. Objectively, the official must have responded to the

known risk in an unreasonable manner, in that he or she

“knew of ways to reduce the harm” but knowingly or

recklessly declined to act. Id.

McClain, Holcey, and Baskin were all subjectively

aware of the risk posed to Scott. McClain was expressly

informed of White’s repeated threats to Scott. Holcey

and Baskin, as they transferred Scott to White’s

dormitory, not only laughed at Scott, they threatened to

stand by and watch Scott be raped, and they told him that

there was nothing his “stupid white ass could do about

it.” First Amended Complaint (Doc. 46) at 5. If true,

Holcey and Baskin’s own statements evidence that they

were subjectively aware of the threat of rape posed

against Scott, a threat that became reality.

Additionally, McClain’s response to the known risk

of harm was objectively reckless--he laughed in Scott’s

face and then transferred Scott to reside with the very

person Scott said was threatening him. Similarly, Holcey

and Baskin responded to the known risk by executing the

transfer, while beating Scott, and laughing while Holcey

said that Scott was going to be “fucked in the ass and

stabbed white boy, and maybe they will kill your retarded

cracker ass.” Id. Further, Holcey and Baskin observed-

-or, at least, were aware of--the first rape and did

nothing to stop it. Finally, McClain placed Scott back

into the dormitory after he was treated for the initial

rape, where he was raped by White again. All of which,

if true, constitutes deliberate indifference and a

reckless disregard to a substantial risk of serious harm.

Third, and finally, Scott sufficiently alleges

causation. Causation is met in the failure-to-protect

context where a defendant is “in a position to take steps

that could have averted [the serious injury] ... but,

through [deliberate] indifference, failed to do so.”

Rodriguez v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 622

(11th Cir. 2007). Here, McClain could have averted the

injury by not transferring Scott to live with the very

person Scott told McClain was threatening him. Moreover,

McClain could have transferred Scott out of the dormitory

after the first rape. Meanwhile, Holcey and Baskin could

have attempted to stop the initial transfer, they could

have not executed the transfer while beating and

threatening to watch Scott be raped, and they could have

intervened instead of standing by and observing while

White forced Scott into a covered bunk.2

Accordingly, because Scott pled facts that clearly

show all elements of a failure-to-protect claim, both as

a matter of binding caselaw and obvious clarity, McClain,

Holcey, and Baskin are not entitled to qualified immunity

at this stage and the motion to dismiss this claim will

be denied to this extent.

b. Boyd and Urquhart

To the extent that Scott brings an Eighth Amendment

failure-to-protect claim against Boyd and Urquhart, the

2. Courts often separately denominate deliberate

indifference failure-to-protect and failure-to-intervene

claims; however, the elements are the same, and a

failure-to-intervene claim is a type of

failure-to-protect claim. See Murphy v. Turpin, 159 F.

App'x 945, 948 (11th Cir. 2005). Failing to intervene

is just one way in which an official can recklessly

respond to a substantial risk of serious harm so as to

constitute deliberate indifference. Here, Scott

sufficiently alleges that Holcey and Baskin responded

recklessly to the threat posed by White in multiple ways,

including by failing to intervene once Scott was forced

to the bunk by White.

claim will be dismissed without prejudice. Unlike the

other defendants, Scott does not specifically allege that

Boyd or Urquhart were aware of Scott’s initial or

subsequent placement in the dormitory with White.

Indeed, Boyd is not identified whatsoever in Scott’s

factual allegations. And Urquhart is mentioned only

once, when Scott alleges that “[d]efendant Urquhart was

warned and aware that [Scott] could or would be

attacked.” First Amended Complaint (Doc. 46) at 6.

However, this bare allegation does not specify when

Urquhart was aware that Scott could be attacked or who

might attack him, nor does it allege that Urquhart

participated in the decision to transfer Scott or in the

execution of the transfer itself, or that Urquhart

observed White attacking Scott. Accordingly, Boyd and

Urquhart are entitled to qualified immunity, and Scott’s

failure-to-protect claim will be dismissed without

prejudice as to them.

c. Another Matter

There are generally two categories of threats for

failure-to-protect claims: ‘individualized threats’ and

‘general threats.’ See Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1233–36

(delineating between types of threat).

Individualized-threat claims deal with specific threats

made against a plaintiff, while general-threat claims

deal with factual allegations that conditions of

confinement generally create a substantial risk of

serious harm from inmate-on-inmate violence to the

plaintiff. Here, as explained above, the amended

complaint’s framing clearly advances an individualized

claim against McClain, Holcey, and Baskin based on

specific threats. However, while it appears in his

amended complaint that Scott seeks systemic relief for

inmate-on-inmate violence, it does not sufficiently

allege a “general threat posed by inmate-on-inmate

violence” resulting from the conditions of confinement

at the Bullock facility, the dormitory, or any other

prison. Id. at 1233. Accordingly, to the extent that

Scott seeks relief for general threats of

inmate-on-inmate violence due to conditions of

confinement, his failure-to-protect claim will be

dismissed without prejudice.

2. Individual-Capacity Excessive-Force Claim

Scott also alleges that he was “beaten [and]

humiliated” with deliberate indifference by McClain,

Boyd, Urquhart, Holcey, and Baskin. First Amended

Complaint (Doc. 46) at 10. However, the amended

complaint factually alleges that only Holcey and Baskin

beat him. Accordingly, McClain, Boyd, and Urquhart will

be dismissed as to this claim.

As to the excessive-force claim to the extent it is

against Holcey and Baskin, Scott alleges that, while he

was being transferred from a cell to a dormitory, they

repeatedly kicked him while laughing at him and saying

that they were going to watch him get “fucked in the ass

and stabbed white boy,” and saying that there was nothing

his “stupid white ass could do about it.” Id. at 5.

Scott further alleges that the kicks caused hearing loss

in his right ear. Id. at 8.

These allegations sufficiently state a clearly

established violation of the Eighth Amendment right to

be free from excessive force. Eighth Amendment

excessive-force claims have two components. First,

objectively, the force used must be “sufficiently

serious” to “offend[] contemporary standards of decency.”

Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1265 (11th Cir.

2020). Second, the force must “have been sadistically

and maliciously applied for the very purpose of causing

harm.” Id.

Scott’s allegations, if true, clearly satisfy both

prongs. He alleges that he was sadistically beaten for

no plausible reason and that the assaulters taunted him

with racial epithets while threatening to stand by and

do nothing while another prisoner raped him. He also

alleges that the beating resulted in hearing loss. This

alleged use of force is precisely the type that is

“repugnant to the conscience of mankind” as can state a

clearly established violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Id. (quoting Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010)).

Accordingly, accepting the complaint’s allegations

as true, Holcey and Baskin are not entitled to qualified

immunity as to Scott’s Eighth Amendment excessive-force

claim against them and their motion to dismiss will be

denied as to these claims. However, as discussed, the

excessive-force claim to the extent it is brought against

the other defendants will be dismissed without prejudice.

***

Accordingly, in light of the above discussion, only

the following claims will proceed: Scott’s Eighth

Amendment claim for failure to protect against McClain,

Holcey, and Baskin in their individual capacities, and

his Eighth Amendment claim for excessive force against

Holcey and Baskin in their individual capacities.

All other claims and defendants will be dismissed as

follows: all claims to the extent they seek damages from

defendants in their official-capacities will be dismissed

with prejudice; all claims to the extent they seek

injunctive and declaratory relief from defendants in

their official capacities will be dismissed without

prejudice; all claims to the extent they are based on the

First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments will be

dismissed without prejudice; the Eighth Amendment

failure-to-protect claim will be dismissed as to Boyd and

Urquhart without prejudice; the Eighth Amendment

failure-to-protect claim, to the extent relief is sought

for a “general threat,” will be dismissed without

prejudice; the Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim

will be dismissed as to McCain, Boyd, and Urquhart

without prejudice; and, because no claims remain against

Dunn, Boyd, and Urquhart, these defendants will be

dismissed entirely.

An judgment consistent with this opinion will be

entered separately.

DONE, this the 14th day of March, 2023.

/s/ Myron H. Thompson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE