Gideon v. Camus

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

HEATHER GIDEON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case. No: 3:22-cv-176-RAH-SMD

) [WO]

AUBURN UNIVERSITY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In March 2021, Plaintiff Heather Gideon, an employee in the College of

Veterinary Medicine at Auburn University, was terminated for watching a

confidential meeting that was showing on an exam-proctoring computer screen.

Gideon claims the termination was actually because of her age and race and in

retaliation for previously complaining about age discrimination in compensation.

Gideon also alleges a violation of her procedural due process rights.

Pending before the Court is the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, which has

been fully briefed and is ripe for consideration. For the following reasons, it is due

to be granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

Gideon, who was 53 years old when this lawsuit was filed on April 14, 2022,

was terminated from her role as Coordinator of Student Services for the College of

Veterinary Medicine, Office of Academic Affairs in 2021. (Doc. 1 at 4, 6, 9.) She

was initially hired for the role in September 2014. (Id. at 6.) While she received

exemplary performance reviews and numerous promotions over the years, and even

a staff recognition award, she claims to have witnessed and been subjected to a

pattern of age discrimination at the college. (Id.) She observed younger employees

being given abnormally high starting salaries and receiving permission to skip

certain after-hours events. (Id. at 7.) On several occasions, she overheard

management making what she perceived to be age-based statements, such as “older

employees were unwilling to change and needed to go” and “younger people were

more in tune with what needed to be done, while older people were set in their ways.”

(Id.) As to her, she claims that younger employees would ignore and not

communicate with her and would treat her and the other older employees with

contempt. (Id. at 8.) Management took no corrective action after Gideon and other

older employees complained. (Id.)

On March 4, 2021, Gideon stopped by the office desk of co-employee Jerri

Turnbough to let her know that Gideon had finished a meeting and could resume

video-proctoring any students who were taking exams. (Id. at 8.) Instead of showing

students who were taking an exam, Turnbough’s screen actually showed a

confidential meeting. (Id.)

The following day, March 5, 2021, Dr. Melinda Camus placed Gideon on

administrative leave on the stated basis that Gideon had watched a confidential

meeting on Turnbough’s computer in the public office area. (Id. at 9.) Gideon was

terminated for the video incident twelve days later, on March 17, 2021. (Id.)

Gideon contested her termination. During a grievance hearing, it was

disclosed to Gideon that Gideon’s termination was based on statements provided by

an unidentified witness. (Id. at 10.) Gideon believed this witness to be Dr. Tajuan

Sellars, a person who previously had made age-based comments about the older

employees in the college and who had no first-hand knowledge about the video

incident. (Id. at 7, 10.) The grievance committee upheld the termination.

Gideon then filed this lawsuit against Auburn University, Dr. Tajuan Sellars,

and Dr. Melinda Camus.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

tests the sufficiency of a complaint against the legal standard articulated by Rule 8:

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). A district court accepts a plaintiff’s factual allegations

as true, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), and construes them “in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th

Cir. 1993).

“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss,

a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations.” Id. Instead, it must

contain “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id.

at 570. Still, the factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level.” Id. at 555. A claim is “plausible on its face” if “the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009).

DISCUSSION

In their motion to dismiss, the Defendants attack only three of Gideon’s four

claims. The Court will address those in turn. Upon consideration of the arguments

presented in the motion, the Court finds that Counts One and Three are due to

proceed against Camus in her official capacity only. Counts Two and Four are due

to be dismissed without prejudice, and Auburn University and Sellars are due to be

dismissed as defendants.

Count One - Violation of the ADEA

In Count One, Gideon claims that the Defendants discriminated against her

because of her age when she was terminated. This claim is brought under the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (ADEA) against

Auburn, as well as Sellars and Camus in their individual and official capacities, and

seeks reinstatement and costs. All three defendants move to dismiss the claim,

asserting their entitlement to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.

See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (concluding that Congress

did not validly abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity from suit by private

individuals for money damages under the ADEA).

In her response, Gideon acknowledges that Auburn is entitled to sovereign

immunity, including for the injunctive relief sought in the ADEA claim. She also

acknowledges that state officials (presumably referring to Sellars and Camus) are

entitled to sovereign immunity for official capacity claims seeking monetary

damages. She does not address, however, whether Sellars and Camus are entitled to

sovereign immunity for the claims asserted against them in their individual

capacities.

Instead, citing the Ex parte Young exception, Gideon solely argues that she

can pursue her ADEA claim for prospective and injunctive relief—that is,

reinstatement—against Camus in her official capacity. As such, the Court will

confine its analysis to that issue, deeming all other claims in Count One as either

conceded or abandoned. The Court concludes that Gideon’s ADEA claims against

Camus in her official capacity for prospective and injunctive relief are not barred by

sovereign immunity. Therefore, her motion to dismiss Count One is due to be

denied.

Under Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court held that private individuals can

sue state officers for injunctive relief despite sovereign immunity because

“individuals, who, as officers of the State, are clothed with some duty in regard to

the enforcement of the laws of the State, and who threaten and are about to

commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce against parties

affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution, may be enjoined

by a Federal court of equity from such action.” 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908). The

Eleventh Circuit has accordingly held: “[The Ex parte Young] doctrine provides an

exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity for lawsuits against state officials as

long as the plaintiffs seek only prospective injunctive relief to stop ongoing

violations of federal law.” Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist.,

570 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added) (citing Fla. Ass’n of Rehab.

Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1219 (11th

Cir. 2000)); see also Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1337 (11th

Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officials in federal

court seeking retrospective or compensatory relief, but does not generally prohibit

suits seeking only prospective injunctive or declaratory relief.”) (citation omitted).

Camus argues that the Ex parte Young exception does not apply to ADEA

claims and this Court should not follow the nonbinding cases that have concluded

that it does. This argument misconstrues the applicability of the Ex Parte Young

doctrine to federal statutory frameworks. The Ex parte Young exception has been

extended to other federal statutory causes of action, including those under Title I of

the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. See Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v.

Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001). As it concerns ADEA claims, the Supreme

Court has not spoken directly to the issue. The Eleventh Circuit has addressed the

matter in an unpublished opinion, reasoning that the Ex parte Young exception

covers injunctive relief claims arising under the ADEA. See Cooper v. Ga. Dep’t of

Transp., 837 F. App’x 657, 669 (11th Cir. 2020) (permitting a cause of action

seeking reinstatement following an alleged violation of the ADEA to proceed against

state officials in their official capacity, as reinstatement is the sort of prospective

injunctive relief that is not barred under the Eleventh Amendment).

Other circuit courts and several Alabama district courts have addressed the

issue as well. All have either strongly suggested or concluded that the Ex parte

Young exception indeed extends to claims arising under ADEA. See, e.g., State

Police for Automatic Ret. Ass’n v. DiFava, 317 F.3d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Kimel

involved a private action for monetary damages [under the ADEA]. Neither Kimel,

nor Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, prevents individuals . . . from obtaining

injunctive relief against a state based upon the ADEA pursuant to Ex parte Young. .

. .”); McGarry v. Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr., 355 F. App'x 853, 856 (5th Cir. 2009)

(suggesting that a suit seeking prospective injunctive relief against a state entity for

violations of the ADEA is permissible under Ex parte Young); Meekison v.

Voinovich, 67 F. App'x 900, 901 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[P]rivate individuals may sue for

injunctive relief to enforce the standards of … the ADEA.” (citing DiFava, 317 F.3d

at 12)); Jurriaans v. Ala. Coop. Extension Sys., No. 3:17-CV-124-MHT, 2018 WL

3631892, at *1 (M.D. Ala. July 31, 2018); Key v. Morgan Cnty. Sheriff's Office, No.

5:12-CV-0314-NE, 2012 WL 1340099, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 12, 2012); Moore v.

Ala. Dep't of Hum. Res., No. 2:09-CV-1167-RDP, 2010 WL 11565274, at *6 (N.D.

Ala. Feb. 16, 2010) (“[T]he court concludes that a private plaintiff may pursue

prospective injunctive relief against a state officer pursuant to Ex parte Young and

in order to vindicate rights provided under the ADEA.”).1 The Defendants have

1 Defendants claim that DiFava, Moore, and Key were erroneously decided in part because they

relied on the Supreme Court’s holding that the ADA did not waive state sovereign immunity for

monetary damages, but that actions for injunctive relief under the Ex parte Young exception

seeking enforcement of the ADA may proceed against state governments. See Garrett, 531 U.S.

at 374 n.9. Aside from asserting that this claim is dicta, Defendants also appear to assert that a

different statutory framework requires a distinct analysis for Ex parte Young purposes. Despite

their criticisms of this argument, Defendants point to no statutory or jurisprudential rationales for

distinguishing the availability of prospective injunctive relief to seek enforcement of the ADA as

compared to the ADEA. Furthermore, Defendants do not engage with the fact that the Supreme

Court only addressed claims for monetary damages in finding that the ADEA had not waived the

pointed to nothing unique about the ADEA that prevents Gideon from seeking

prospective injunctive relief from state officials through the Ex parte Young

exception to sovereign immunity, even though she cannot seek monetary damages

from the same officials. Nor have Defendants pointed to any case law suggesting

that the Ex parte Young exception does not apply in the ADEA context. This Court

agrees with the analysis supplied by the above-cited courts.

The Court also finds that reinstatement is a form of prospective injunctive

relief which may be sought against Camus in her official capacity under the Ex parte

Young exception. The Eleventh Circuit has held that “requests

for reinstatement constitute prospective injunctive relief that fall within the scope of

the Ex parte Young exception and, thus, are not barred by the Eleventh

Amendment.” Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., 772 F.3d 1349, 1351 (11th Cir. 2014).

sovereign immunity of the states. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66. There is little to suggest that the

Supreme Court envisioned that the Ex parte Young exception would be inapplicable in the ADEA

context, even if Congress otherwise failed to abrogate state sovereign immunity in drafting the

statute.

Ex parte Young is a broad exception to a grant of sovereign immunity conferred on the states by

the Eleventh Amendment. See Pryor, 180 F.3d at 1336. At the end of the day, there is no dispute

that the states are immune from suit under the ADEA and the Eleventh Amendment. The question

is whether the wide-reaching Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity (which is presumed

under the Eleventh Amendment, after all) permits private individuals to seek prospective

injunctive relief for alleged violations of the act. The Court is unpersuaded by Defendants’

arguments and, finding no reason to dispute the applicability of the Ex parte Young exception to

this matter, will permit this cause of action to proceed.

Defendants do not dispute that this form of relief is available under Ex parte Young.2

Accordingly, Gideon’s ADEA claim seeking reinstatement against Camus in her

official capacity may proceed as a matter of law.

Count Two –Title VII, § 1981, and ADEA Retaliation

In Count Two, Gideon claims the Defendants terminated her in retaliation for

“interceding on behalf of Ms. Robbi Beauchamp who was raising issues of age and

race discrimination in the College of Veterinary Affairs of Defendant Auburn

University” in violation of the ADEA, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (Doc. 1 at

20–21.) The Defendants move to dismiss this claim, alleging several bases — there

is no evidence that Gideon properly exhausted her Title VII claim with the EEOC,

the application of Eleventh Amendment immunity to the ADEA retaliation claim,

and the failure to sufficiently plead facts supporting retaliation for engaging in

protected conduct.

2 Furthermore, contrary to Defendants’ assertions, Gideon may bring her ADEA claim for

prospective injunctive relief against Camus in her official capacity. Defendants are correct that

Camus was not herself Gideon’s employer for ADEA purposes, and individuals cannot be held

liable under the ADEA. See Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 830 (11th Cir. 2007). However,

when Camus is sued in her official capacity, she instead represents the employer, Auburn

University. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, n.55 (1978)) (“Official-capacity suits … ‘generally represent

only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’”); Cooper,

837 F. App’x at 669 (finding that plaintiff’s ADEA claims seeking prospective equitable relief are

not barred by sovereign immunity against two officials in their official capacity, even when barred

against them in their individual capacity and the institution itself).

Gideon does little to defend this count other than quoting her Complaint and

relying upon her arguments that she made in response to the Defendants’ request to

dismiss Count One. Gideon then concludes by stating that the ADEA retaliation

claim, like with Count One, should proceed against Dr. Camus in her official

capacity.

Retaliation against an employee who engages in statutorily protected activity

is prohibited under ADEA, Title VII, and § 1981. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–

3(a); CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008) (concluding that §

1981 encompasses retaliation claims); Chapter 7 Tr. v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683

F.3d 1249, 1257–58 (11th Cir. 2012); Stone v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 279 F. App'x

821, 822 (11th Cir. 2008). Claims for retaliation under each of these statutes, as in

substantive discrimination cases, proceed under the same prima facie

framework. Chapter 7 Tr., 683 F.3d at 1258; Brown v. Ala. Dep't of Transp., 597

F.3d 1160, 1174, n.6 (11th Cir. 2010); Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1307–08

(11th Cir. 2009); Stone, 279 F. App'x at 822. A plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie

case of retaliation by showing that (1) she engaged in protected conduct; (2) she

suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection

between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action. Crawford v.

Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008). Once the plaintiff meets this burden,

the employer has an opportunity to articulate a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for

its employment action, which the plaintiff can rebut with evidence of pretext.

Bryant, 575 F.3d at 1308.

From a pure factual pleading basis, Count Two utterly fails to state a claim for

retaliation. Gideon provides no facts or substance to the vague and conclusory

assertion that she engaged in protected conduct by interceding on behalf of another

employee. No protected conduct nor causation between alleged retaliation and an

alleged adverse employment action are discernable in this Complaint. Gideon’s

pleadings here fall woefully short of the pleading standards required under

Twombly/Iqbal and fail to place the Defendants on notice of the claims against them.

See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Count Two of Gideon’s

Complaint is due to be dismissed.

Count Four – §§ 1981 & 1983

In Count Four, Gideon alleges that Sellars and Camus racially discriminated

against her in terminating her employment with Auburn, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §

1981. Her only other factual assertions under this claim are that Sellars made

statements referring to his own race and how he preferred to be referenced and that

the college placated Sellars so as to discourage him from making public accusations

of discrimination about the college. And as to Camus, Gideon alleges virtually

nothing from a discrimination standpoint, other than referencing Camus’s action in

terminating Gideon. As the Court understands the claim, Gideon does not contest

that she viewed a confidential meeting on a remote video link; instead, she says that

her subsequent termination based on that stated reason was actually based on her

race and not the fact that she actually watched the video. Sellars and Camus move

to dismiss this claim, arguing that it is conclusory and conjectural and therefore

violative of Twombly/Iqbal, and that the referenced statements by Sellars do not

plausibly support a claim of a race-based termination rather than for some other

reason such as the video issue.

To establish a prima facie case of race-based treatment, a plaintiff generally

must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse

employment action, (3) the employer treated similarly-situated employees outside

her protected class more favorably, and (4) she was qualified to perform the duties

of her job. Scott v. Suncoast Beverage Sales, Ltd., 295 F.3d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir.

2002); Crapp v. City of Miami Beach, 242 F.3d 1017, 1020 (11th Cir. 2001). “In

cases involving alleged racial discrimination in the application of work rules to

discipline an employee, the plaintiff must show either” (a) no violation of the work

rule, or (b) the misconduct was similar to that of another employee outside the

protected class, and she suffered disciplinary measures more severe than those

enforced against the other persons outside the protected class who engaged in similar

misconduct. Moore v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 137 F. App’x 235, 238 (11th Cir. 2005)

(citing Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1540 (11th Cir. 1998)). A plaintiff can

overcome the lack of a similarly situated comparator where other indicia of an

employer's discriminatory intent exist. Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d

1321, 1327–28 (11th Cir. 2011).

“Although a Title VII complaint need not allege facts sufficient to make out a

classic McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, it must provide ‘enough factual matter

(taken as true) to suggest’ intentional race discrimination.” Davis v. Coca–Cola

Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 974 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted).

“In addition to containing well-pleaded factual allegations, complaints must also

meet the ‘plausibility standard’ set forth in Twombly and Iqbal.” Bowers v. Bd. of

Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 509 F. App’x 906, 910 (11th Cir. 2013).

Here, the Complaint is woefully deficient. It does not identify Gideon’s

protected class, and it does not allege that Sellars and Camus are outside her

protected class. It also does not allege any comparators, or anyone of a different

race that replaced Gideon or were treated differently for the same or similar conduct.

The Complaint offers nothing more than the conclusory statement that Gideon was

discriminated against based on her race. And when it comes to Camus, the

Complaint provides no factual allegations of discrimination based on race at all,

other than that Camus relied on information (which Gideon does not dispute)

provided by Sellars. Although the failure to adequately identify a similarly situated

comparator is not fatal at the motion to dismiss stage, see Davis, 516 F.3d at 974,

the Complaint is devoid of facts to even infer intentional discrimination based on

Gideon's race or national origin. Because Gideon’s Complaint is completely devoid

of factual assertions that the Court can construe in her favor to suggest intentional

discrimination on the part of Sellars and Camus, especially in the absence of any

contest by Gideon that she did exactly what she was accused of doing, Gideon’s

claims of race discrimination are due to be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

(1) The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17) is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part;

(2) Count One shall proceed against Dr. Melinda Camus in her official

capacity for prospective injunctive relief. In all other respects, Count One

is dismissed;

(3) Counts Two and Four are dismissed without prejudice;

(4) As the Defendants did not move to dismiss Count Three, Count Three will

proceed as pleaded;

(5) Defendants Auburn University and Tajuan Sellars are dismissed as parties.

DONE on this the 28th day of November, 2022.

/s/R. Austin Huffaker, Jr.

R. AUSTIN HUFFAKER, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE