Ebert v. Kijakazi (CONSENT)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

KAREN EBERT obo SE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 3:21-cv-35-JTA

)

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, ) (WO)

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), the plaintiff, Karen Ebert (“Ebert”)

on behalf of her minor daughter, SE, brings this action to review a final decision by the

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). (Doc. No. 1.)1 The Commissioner

denied Ebert’s claim for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). The parties have

consented to the exercise of dispositive jurisdiction by a magistrate judge pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(c). (Docs. No. 10, 11.)

After careful scrutiny of the record and the briefs submitted by the parties, the Court

finds that the decision of the Commissioner is due to be REVERSED and REMANDED.

1 Document numbers, as they appear on the docket sheet, are designated as “Doc. No.”

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS

SE was born on June 1, 2011 and was a school aged child at the time of the

administrative hearing held on April 1, 2020. (R. 100, 101.)2 She is currently in the third

grade. (R. 106.) She has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the application

date of November 13, 2018. (R. 101.) She alleges a disability onset date of August 1,

2014, due to attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), asthma, heart murmur, and

high QT. (R. 106, 328.)

On November 13, 2018, Ebert, on behalf of SE, applied for a period of SSI under

Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“the Act”) (42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq.). (R. 100,

265.) The application was denied on February 13, 2019 (R. 100, 222-225), and Ebert

requested an administrative hearing (R. 100, 227).

Ebert and SE participated in a telephonic administrative hearing on April 1, 2020.

Because Ebert was unrepresented, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) explained her

right to have an attorney or non-attorney representative. (R. 117.) After Ebert stated that

she understood those rights and “chose not to [have a representative],” the ALJ proceeded

to the hearing. (R. 117-18.) The ALJ denied Ebert’s request for benefits in a decision

dated August 4, 2020. (R. 97-112.) On August 27, 2020, Ebert, then represented by

counsel, sought review by the Appeals Council on the grounds that the record was not

completely developed on the date of the administrative hearing. (R. 263.) On August 31,

2 Citations to the administrative record are consistent with the transcript of administrative

proceedings filed in this case. (See Doc. No. 19.)

2020, the Appeals Council informed Ebert that it would accept additional evidence that

would be considered if it was new, material, and related to the period on or before the date

of the ALJ’s decision. (R. 89.)

Ebert submitted the following documents to the Appeals Council.

(1) September 18, 2020 - Child’s RFC Questionnaire, completed by Dr. Christy

McNair on September 12, 2020 (R. 27-28);

(2) October 6, 2020 - Records from the Sibley Heart Center dated September 18 and

19, 2020 (R. 9-26);

(3) (a) November 10, 2020 - School records from L.K. Moss Elementary School in

Buena Vista, Georgia, dated September 9, 2020 through October 28, 2020 (R.

34-73);

(b) November 10, 2020 - Psychological evaluation conducted on September 9,

2020 and September 15, 2020 by the Chattahoochee-Flint Regional Educational

Service Agency (R. 74-88);

(4) November 30, 2020 – Medical records from Zoe Pediatrics dated October 22,

2019 through October 21, 2020 (R. 131-81);

(5) September 29, 2020 – School records from the Marion County (Georgia) Board

of Education dated October 9, 2019 through October 31, 2019 (R. 182-96); and

(6) September 29, 2020 – Medical records from Rivertown Psychiatry dated

October 17, 2017 through July 26, 2018 (R. 198-204).

On December 14, 2020, the Appeals Council found no reason to review the ALJ

decision and informed Ebert that the ALJ decision was the final decision of the

Commissioner.3 (R. 1-3.) On January 15, 2021, Ebert filed the instant action appealing

the decision of the Commissioner. (Doc. No. 1.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Judicial review of SSI claims is limited to whether the Commissioner's decision is

supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied.

3 “When, as in this case, the ALJ denies benefits and the [Appeals Council] denies review, [the

court] review[s] the ALJ's decision as the Commissioner's final decision.” Doughty v. Apfel, 245

F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). “The Commissioner's factual

findings are conclusive” when “supported by substantial evidence.” Doughty, 245 F.3d at

1278. “Substantial evidence” is more than a mere scintilla and is “such relevant evidence

as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Crawford v.

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan,

125 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 1997)). Even if the Commissioner's decision is not

supported by a preponderance of the evidence, the findings must be affirmed if they are

supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 1158-59; see also Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d

1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). The court may not find new facts, reweigh evidence, or

substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Bailey v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,

Comm’r, 791 F. App’x 136, 139 (11th Cir. 2019); Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232,

1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004); Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210. However, the Commissioner's

conclusions of law are not entitled to the same deference as findings of fact and are

reviewed de novo. Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir.

2007).

III. STANDARD FOR DETERMINING DISABILITY

A claimant (or his parent or guardian) bears the burden of providing evidence that

he is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A);

20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a), (c); Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003). A

child under the age of 18 is considered disabled and eligible for SSI under the Act if the

child has a “medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in

marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i). See Rodriguez obo R.C. v. Berryhill, No. 20-

14458, 2021 WL 5023951, at *3 (11th Cir. Oct. 29, 2021) (“A child under the age of

eighteen is considered disabled, and thus entitled to benefits including supplemental

security income, if the child has ‘a medically determinable physical or mental impairment

or combination of impairments that causes marked and severe functional limitations ... that

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.’ ”)

(quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.906). A “marked and severe functional limitation” is one that

has “a level of severity that meets, medically equals, or functionally equals” the Listing of

Impairments (“Listing”) found at 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpart P, appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §

416.902(h), (o).

Disability under the Act is determined under a three-step sequential evaluation

process. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a). At step one, the Commissioner determines whether the

claimant is performing substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.972. If the

individual is not, the analysis proceeds to the second step. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(b).

At the second step, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant has a

medically determinable impairment or a combination of impairments that is severe. See

20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a). A medically determinable impairment or combination of

impairments is not severe if it is a slight abnormality or a combination of slight

abnormalities that causes no more than minimal functional limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §

416.924(c). If the child claimant does not have a severe medically determinable

impairment or combination of impairments, he is not disabled. If the child claimant has

a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the analysis proceeds to the third

step. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a).

At step three, the Commissioner determines whether the child claimant has an

impairment or combination of impairments that meets, medically equals, or functionally

equals the severity of a Listing. Id. Here, the Commissioner considers the combined

effect of all medically determinable impairments, including those that are not severe. See

20 C.F.R. §§ 416.923, 416.924a(b)(4), 416.926a(a), (c). If the child claimant has an

impairment or combination of impairments that meets, medically equals, or functionally

equals the severity of a Listing, and it has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous

period of at least 12 months, he is presumed to be disabled. If not, the child claimant is

not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(d).

A claimant's impairment meets or medically equals a Listing only where it “satisfies

all of the criteria of that [L]isting, including any relevant criteria in the introduction

[section].” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(c)(3). To satisfy all the criteria of a Listing, a claimant

must (1) have a diagnosis included in the Listings and (2) provide medical reports

documenting that the conditions meet the specific criteria of the Listings and the duration

requirement. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002) (citations

omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.925, 416.926. “For a claimant to show that his

impairment matches a [L]isting, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria. An

impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not

qualify.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990).

If a child's impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or medically

equal a Listing, the ALJ will evaluate whether a child's impairment functionally equals a

Listing by considering the following six broad functional areas, called domains: (1)

acquiring and using information; (2) attending and completing tasks; (3) interacting and

relating with others; (4) moving about and manipulating objects; (5) caring for yourself;

and (6) health and physical well-being. Shinn ex rel. Shinn v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 391

F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1). “A child’s impairment is

‘of listing-level severity,’ and so ‘functionally equals the listings,’ if as a result of the

limitations stemming from that impairment the child has ‘ “marked” limitations in two of

the domains [above], or an “extreme” limitation in one domain.’ ” Shinn, 391 F.3d at

1279 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.924a(d)).

In reaching their conclusions, the ALJ considers “all evidence in [the child's] case

record,” including “information from medical sources (such as [the child's] pediatrician

or other physician; psychologist; qualified speech-language pathologist; and physical,

occupational, and rehabilitation therapists) and nonmedical sources (such as [the child's]

parents, teachers, and other people who know [the child]).” 20 C.F.R. § 416.924a(a).

Medical evidence may include “formal testing that provides information about [the

child's] development or functioning in terms of percentiles, percentages of delay, or age

or grade equivalents,” and the ALJ evaluates these scores together with information like

reports of classroom performance and observations by teachers. Id. at § 416.926a(e).

The ALJ also considers whether the child does activities that other children that age

typically do, how much assistance the child requires from family members or teachers,

and the combined effects of multiple impairments on the child's day-to-day functioning.

Id. at § 416.924a(b).

Further, the ALJ considers the child’s symptoms, including pain, and the extent to

which the symptoms can “reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical

evidence and other evidence.” Id. at § 416.929(a). The regulations require that there be

“objective medical evidence from an acceptable medical source that shows [the child has]

a medical impairment(s) which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other

symptoms alleged” and that the ALJ consider statements about the intensity and

persistence of [the child’s] pain or other symptoms “which may reasonably be accepted

as consistent with the medical signs and laboratory findings.” Id. The ALJ uses this

evidence to decide how symptoms affect the child’s functioning. Id. If the impairments

do not meet, medically equal, or functionally equal one of the listings, a finding of not

disabled is reached, and the claim is denied.

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION

Applying the childhood standard, the ALJ found that SE had “not engaged in

substantial gainful activity” since the date her application was filed. (R. 101.) The ALJ

also found that SE has the following severe impairments: learning disability, ADHD,

oppositional defiant disorder, and asthma. (Id.) The ALJ also found that SE has the

following non-severe impairments: tinea corpuses, acute bronchitis, acute otitis media,

paronychia (skin infection/nails), bacterial conjunctivitis of the right eye, and atrial septal

defect. (R. 102.) The ALJ concluded, however, that SE has no impairment or combination

of impairments that meet or medically equal the severity of one of the listed impairments

in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. 104.) Additionally, the ALJ found that

none of SE’s impairments, individually or in combination, functionally equal the listings.

(R. 105.)

The ALJ stated that she “considered all of the relevant evidence in the case record”

including: objective medical evidence and other relevant evidence from medical sources,

information from sources such as school teachers and family members, SE’s statements,

and those of her parents and caregivers. (R. 105.) The ALJ determined SE had no marked

limitations4 in any of the six domains of functioning. (R. 106.) Specifically, the ALJ found

a less than marked limitation in (1) acquiring and using information, (2) attending and

completing tasks, (3) interacting and relating with others, and (4) health and physical well-

being. (Id.) The ALJ found that SE had no limitations in the remaining two domains which

are moving about and manipulating objects, and the ability to care for herself. (Id.) Based

on the absence of an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or functionally

equal the listings, the ALJ found that SE is not disabled. (R. 108.) The ALJ specifically

stated that, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920b, she did not discuss evidence that was neither

valuable nor persuasive. (Id.)

4 A “marked” limitation in a domain indicates that an impairment or combination of impairments

interferes seriously with the ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities. 20

C.F.R. § 416.926a. A “marked” limitation is “more than moderate” but “less than extreme” and

would be expected to result in standardized testing with scores that are at least two, but less than

three, standard deviations below the mean. Id.

V. DISCUSSION

Ebert presents two arguments on appeal. First, Ebert challenges the ALJ’s findings

of less than marked limitation in the domains of acquiring and using information and

attending and completing tasks. (Doc. No. 15 at 1.) Second, Ebert asserts that the Appeals

Council erred by disregarding two evidentiary submissions and improperly evaluating the

others. (Id.) Upon a thorough review of the record and the parties’ submissions, the Court

finds that Ebert’s first assertion of error warrants reversal and remand for further

proceedings.

A. ALJ’s determination of SE’s functional limitations

Ebert argues that the ALJ’s findings of less than marked limitations in the domains

of acquiring and using information and attending and completing tasks are not based on

substantial evidence. (Doc. No. 15 at 11.) Specifically, Ebert challenges (1) the ALJ’s

reliance on SE’s Weschsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-5th edition, or “WISC-

5”) without analysis of other standardized test scores in the record (id.); and (2) the ALJ’s

designation of the questionnaire completed by SE’s teacher, Janet Adamson, as “somewhat

persuasive” although the ALJ appears to have neither relied on it nor discredited it in her

findings (id. at 14-15).

The Commissioner responds that the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial

evidence and sufficient detail to allow subsequent reviewers to understand how she reached

her conclusions. (Doc. No. 18 at 7.) The Commissioner notes that in addition to the WISC-

5, the ALJ considered other testing, report card grades, SE’s Individualized Education

Program (“IEP”), and the testimony of SE and her mother. (Id.) The Commissioner further

argues the ALJ was not required to give more weight to various standardized test scores,

noting that the determination of functional equivalence is not based on test scores alone.

(Id. at 8.) Finally, the Commissioner reminds the Court that the issue is not whether there

is evidence to support SE’s allegations but rather whether the ALJ’s findings are supported

by substantial evidence. (Id. at 9.)

Acquiring and using information5 reflects the claimant’s ability to acquire or learn

information and how well she uses the information she has learned. Jackson ex rel. K.J. v.

Astrue, 734 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1370 (11th Cir. 2010). This requires consideration of more

than just assessments of cognitive ability as measured by intelligence tests, academic

achievement instruments, or grades in school. Jackson, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 1370 (quoting

SSR 09-3p). Some examples of limited functioning are: difficulty recalling important

things learned the day before; difficulty solving mathematics questions or computing

arithmetic answers; talking only in short, simple sentences; and difficulty explaining one’s

5 Functioning in the domain of acquiring and using information is described as follows:

When you are old enough to go to elementary and middle school, you should be

able to learn to read, write, and do math, and discuss history and science. You will

need to use these skills in academic situations to demonstrate what you have

learned; e.g., by reading about various subjects and producing oral and written

projects, solving mathematical problems, taking achievement tests, doing group

work, and entering into class discussions. You will also need to use these skills in

daily living situations at home and in the community (e.g., reading street signs,

telling time, and making change). You should be able to use increasingly complex

language (vocabulary and grammar) to share information and ideas with individuals

or groups, by asking questions and expressing your own ideas, and by

understanding and responding to the opinions of others.

20 C.F.R. § 416.926a (g)(2)(iv).

thoughts. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a (g)(3). In this case, the ALJ found that SE had a less than

marked limitation in this domain, but did not discuss how she reached that finding. (R.

106-108.)

Attending and completing tasks “looks at how well a child can focus and maintain

attention; begin, carry through, and finish activities; avoid impulsive thinking; and manage

her time.” Holland on behalf of West v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 842 F. App’x 344, 348 (11th

Cir. 2021) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(h)). Regulations provide that a child of SE’s age

should be able to focus [her] attention in a variety of situations in order to

follow directions, remember and organize [her] school materials, and

complete classroom and homework assignments. [She] should be able to

concentrate on details and not make careless mistakes in [her] work (beyond

what would be expected in other children your age who do not have

impairments). [She] should be able to change [her] activities or routines

without distracting [he]rself or others, and stay on task and in place when

appropriate. [She] should be able to sustain [her] attention well enough to

participate in group sports, read by [her]self, and complete family chores.

[She] should also be able to complete a transition task (e.g., be ready for the

school bus, change clothes after gym, change classrooms) without extra

reminders and accommodation.

20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(h)(2)(iv). Again, in this case, the ALJ found that SE had a less than

marked limitation in this domain, but did not discuss how she reached that finding. (R.

106-108.)

As the Commissioner correctly argues, the ALJ “will not rely on any test score

alone.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(4). Yet, the ALJ is directed to “consider [the child's] test

scores together with the other information [the Commissioner] has about [the child's]

functioning, including reports of classroom performance and the observations of school

personnel and others.” Id. Further, the regulations state that the ALJ, when declining to

rely on a child's test scores, “will explain [the ALJ's] reasons for doing so in [the child's]

case record or in [the ALJ's] decision.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(4)(iii)(B). The ALJ failed

to do so in this case.

The ALJ cited SE’s test scores, IEP, report card for the first and second quarter of

the 2018-19 school year, and the questionnaire completed by SE’s second grade teacher,

Janet Adamson. (R. 107.) Specifically, in regarding to testing, the ALJ discussed SE’s

WISC-5 scores and then generally noted “[a]dditional testing in September 2018 revealed

that [SE] is performing at the kindergarten level in math and reading.” (Id.) She also noted

that Adamson’s questionnaire was “somewhat persuasive” because she had first hand

knowledge of SE’s day-to-day performances. (Id.) Further, the ALJ considered the third

party function report given by SE’s grandmother. (R. 108.) The ALJ indicated that she

gave the statements of SE’s grandmother only partial weight because she is not a neutral

third-party witness. (Id.)

SE had multiple standardized test scores in the record demonstrating her inability to

read, write, and perform arithmetic at the appropriate grade level. She took standardized

assessments in reading, math and written language in 2018. (R. 382.) Her scores on the

Woodcock Johnson Tests of Achievement, Fourth Edition totaled 76, which was comprised

of scores in the 70s range for oral reading fluency, broad reading, math facts fluency, broad

math and spelling. (Id.) She scored in the 80s range for letter word identification, passage

comprehension, calculation, sentence writing fluency and broad written language. (Id.)

During the same time, she took the Adequate Achievement to Meet State Standards test

where, as a second grader, she performed “comparable to that of an average

kindergarten[er] after the second month of school” in the math portion of the test. (Id.) In

the reading portion of the test, her performance was “comparable to that of an average

kindergartener after the start of the school year.” (Id.) It was noted that “she will be best

. . . served by instructional material prepared at the pre-kindergarten level.” (Id.) SE was

also administered a Behavior Assessment System for Children – Third Edition that

indicated the areas of concern were learning problems, atypicality and functional

communication. (R. 383.) She was administered the Adaptive Behavior Rating Scale and

received a standard score of 77. (Id.) Further, the school records show that SE qualifies

for special education services under the Alabama Administrative Code. (R. 391.)

However, the ALJ did not specifically reference these tests in her decision denying

benefits. Nor did the ALJ explain her reasoning in her decision as to why she declined to

rely on these test scores as required under the regulations. Such failure to consider a child-

claimant’s formal test scores generally amounts to a failure to develop a full and fair record

that warrants remand for further consideration. Person v. Kijakazi, Civil Action Number

1:20-CV-01185-AKK, 2021 WL 4220357, at * 6 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 16, 2021) (listing cases).

“Because the ALJ failed to address a variety of formal tests that may implicate and

reinforce [SE’s] limitations, especially in the domains of ‘acquiring and using information’

and ‘attending and completing tasks,’ remand is warranted here so the ALJ can consider

[SE’s] limitations, if any, in light of [her] formal testing.” Id. The Court is mindful that it

is not to reconsider the facts, reevaluate the evidence, or substitute its judgment for the

ALJ’s, thus “[w]hether the formal test scores are sufficient to change the ALJ’s ultimate

finding is for the ALJ to decide.” Id.

As to Ebert’s challenge to the ALJ’s lack of discussion explaining her finding that

the questionnaire completed by Adamson was “somewhat persuasive,” the Court finds no

error. Courts have noted that “categories of issues or observations listed within a school-

personnel questionnaire may not necessarily correspond to the ‘less than marked,’

‘marked,’ or ‘extreme’ ratings used in the Social Security regulations.” Person, 2021 WL

4220357 at *7 (citing Beavers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 601 F. App’x 818, 823 (11th Cir.

2015)). The Court is mindful of revised regulations (applicable to claims filed after March

27, 2017) which do not require detailed discussion of evidence that an ALJ deems to be

“inherently neither valuable nor persuasive.” See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920b(c). Further, the

ALJ is permitted to accord lesser weight to the opinions of educators than the opinions of

medical professionals. Holland, 842 F. App’x at 349. Accordingly, Court finds that

remand is not warranted on this issue.

B. The Appeals Council

Ebert argues that the Appeals Council erred in refusing to review properly presented

new and material evidence. (Doc. No. 15 at 7-8.) First, Ebert takes issue with the Appeals

Council’s failure to acknowledge educational records from L.K. Moss Elementary School

(the “Moss Records”) and medical records from Zoe Pediatrics (the “Zoe Records”). (Id.

at 8.) Second, Ebert asserts that the Appeals Council erroneously determined that the

medical source statement from Dr. Christy McKay did not relate to the period at issue. (Id.

at 10.)

The Commissioner admits that the Moss and Zoe Records were submitted to the

agency but were “apparently not associated with [Ebert’s] claim until after the Appeals

Council had denied her request for review.” (Doc. No. 18 at 12.) The Commissioner

acknowledges that a failure to review new, material, and chronologically relevant evidence

is legal error, but asserts that Ebert has not argued that the material is new, material, and

chronologically relevant. Id. Finally, the Commissioner asserts that even if Dr. McKay’s

opinion was chronologically relevant, Ebert did not show that the evidence raised a

reasonable probability of changing the ALJ’s decision.

The Court is concerned about the Appeals Council’s failure to properly “associate”

Ebert’s submissions with her appeal. Nonetheless, the Court need not address this issue

presented because the case is being remanded to the Commissioner for further

consideration. See, e.g., Demench v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 913 F.2d

882, 884 (11th Cir. 1990) (declining to address plaintiff's remaining arguments due to

conclusions reached in remanding the case); Jackson v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 1291, 1294 n.2

(11th Cir. 1986) (stating that it is unnecessary to review other issues raised on appeal where

remand is required and such issues will likely be reconsidered in the subsequent

proceedings).

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the decision of the Commissioner is

not in accordance with applicable law. Therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED pursuant

to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and this matter is REMANDED for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A separate judgment will be issued.

DONE this 27th day of June, 2022.

USHA T. ADAMS

ITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

17