Hampton v. Oliver

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER HAMPTON and )

CORTNEY ROLLEY, )

on behalf of themselves )

individually, and all )

others similarly ) CIVIL ACTION NO.

situated, )

) 2:20cv742-MHT

Plaintiffs, ) (WO)

)

v. )

)

ULYSSES OLIVER, JR., )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Christopher Hampton and Cortney Rolley,

two inmates in an Alabama Department of Corrections

facility, have sued and named as defendants four

corrections officers allegedly responsible for a severe

beating they suffered. They assert that the corrections

officers violated their Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights and conspired to coverup that violation.

They also bring state claims against the corrections

officers for battery, assault, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, and negligence. They seek

compensatory damages from the officers.

Hampton and Rolley have also named as a defendant

the facility’s warden Joseph H. Headley, in his official

capacity. They made the broad claim that he violated

their “Constitutional rights,” Pls.’ Compl. (Doc. 1) at

¶ 105, and they sought only injunctive relief from him.

Jefferey Baldwin replaced Headley as the warden at the

facility and was substituted for Headley in this

litigation.

Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331

(federal question), 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights), and

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (supplemental jurisdiction).

This litigation is before the court on Warden

Baldwin’s partial motion to dismiss as to injunctive

relief. For the reasons set forth below, the motion will

be granted.

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I. LEGAL STANDARD

While the parties reference subpart (b)(6) of Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12, it is clear that the

subject-matter jurisdiction issue should be addressed

under subpart (b)(1) of Rule 12. Subpart (b)(1) permits

a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction.

“[B]ecause a federal court is powerless to act beyond

its statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction, a

court must zealously [e]nsure that jurisdiction exists

over a case, and should itself raise the question of

subject matter jurisdiction at any point in the

litigation where a doubt about jurisdiction arises.”

Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2002).

Therefore, one of a court’s first duties is to determine

whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fla.

Wildlife Fed’n Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 859

F.3d 1306, 1322 (11th Cir. 2017) (Tjoflat, J.,

concurring).

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Parties may assert lack of subject matter

jurisdiction through either a “facial attack” on the

pleadings or a “factual attack.” Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919

F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). “Facial

challenges to subject matter jurisdiction are based

solely on the allegations in the complaint.” Carmichael

v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271,

1279 (11th Cir. 2009). “When considering such

challenges, the court must, as with a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, take the complaint’s allegations as true.” Id.

A factual attack, however, permits “the trial court [to]

proceed as it never could under 12(b)(6).” Lawrence, 919

F.2d at 1529 (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404,

415 (5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981)).

The court is permitted to undertake its own investigation

and look beyond the pleadings and review or accept any

evidence submitted by the parties. Id.

Here, Warden Baldwin’s dismissal motion may be

resolved on the pleadings, as with a facial attack.

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II. BACKGROUND

The allegations in Hampton and Rolley’s complaint

are as follows.

In or around February 2019, Hampton and Rolley were

incarcerated at the Elmore Correctional Facility when

they were severely beaten by one correctional officer in

the presence of three other correctional officers. More

specifically, Hampton and Rolley each allege that one

correctional officer repeatedly kicked and punched them

while they were handcuffed, and that none of the other

three correctional officers who witnessed the beatings

made any attempt to intervene. Hampton and Rolley say

they suffered broken bones, required stitches, and were

hospitalized. They further alleged that the correctional

officers threatened them with further violence is they

refused to misrepresent the events in an affidavit.

Hampton and Rolley filed this lawsuit in September

2020. They sued the four corrections officers and the

warden of the Elmore Correctional Facility. With regard

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to the warden, they asserted that he “had a duty to

implement policies that would protect the inmates under

[his] care and supervision from abuse, neglect or other

harm at the hands of the correctional officers [he}

employed”; that he “breached these duties by failing to

implement and/or enforce such policies”; and that, “[a]s

a direct and proximate result of the breaches of duty

alleged herein, both Plaintiffs suffered serious and

painful physical injuries and emotional distress.” Pls.’

Compl. (Doc. 1) at ¶¶ 102-104

III. DISCUSSION

In his motion to dismiss, Warden Baldwin argues that

the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Hampton

and Rolley’s complaint to the extent they seek injunctive

relief from him, because the two inmates are no longer

incarcerated at the correctional facility where they were

allegedly beaten and where he is the warden. His

subject-matter jurisdiction argument is at times

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confusing, for it seems to conflate the two concepts of

standing and mootness.

“The standing inquiry asks whether such a dispute

exists at the beginning of the litigation, as compared

to the mootness inquiry, which asks whether such a

dispute remains throughout the litigation.” Dunn v.

Dunn, 148 F. Supp. 3d 1329, 1334 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 6, 2015)

(Thompson, J.) (emphasis in original) (citing Focus on

the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 344 F.3d

1263, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003)). As explained above,

Hampton and Rolley’s claims stem from injuries they

received during their incarceration at the Elmore

Correctional Facility where Baldwin was warden. In order

to receive injunctive relief, they would need to show

that they would likely be subject to unlawful conduct in

a similar matter by the same actor in the future, here

Warden Baldwin. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461

U.S. 95, 104-06 (1983).

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Here, taking all allegations in the complaint as

true, Hampton and Rolley have not shown this likelihood.

They acknowledged in their complaint that they were no

longer incarcerated at the Elmore Correctional Facility

at the beginning of the litigation. See Pls.’ Compl.

(Doc. 1) at ¶ 22 (“Plaintiffs Christopher Hampton and

Cortney Rolley are former inmates at Elmore.”). In fact,

the complaint alleges that they were incarcerated at a

different corrections facility at the start of the

litigation. See id. at ¶ 23. Moreover, there is nothing

in the complaint reflecting that they will likely be

returned to the Elmore Correctional Facility. Hampton

and Rolley cannot simply rely on a past injury to obtain

prospective injunctive relief that has no foreseeable

likelihood of recurring. See Russell v. United States,

845 Fed. Appx. 818, 821 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).

The fact Hampton and Rolley pleaded facts that alleged

they were harmed at the Elmore Correctional Facility,

without more, would only establish a live controversy for

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money damages. See Adler v. Duval County School Bd., 112

F.3d 1475, 1477 (11th Cir. 1997). Depending on whether

the transfer or release happens before or after the start

of the litigation, the general rule is that the prisoner

either lacks standing to bring a claim for declaratory

and injunctive relief or their claim becomes moot upon

his change in status. See McKinnon v. Talladega Cnty.,

Ala., 745 F.2d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 1984) (“The general

rule is that a prisoner’s transfer or release from jail

moots his individual claim for declaratory and injunctive

relief.”); Holland v. Purdy, 457 F.2d 802, 802-03 (5th

Cir. 1972)* (remanding with instructions to dismiss the

prisoners declaratory and injunctive claims because the

prisoner had been transferred to another jail prior to

the filing of his pleadings).

* In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209

(11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit Court

of Appeals adopted as binding precedent all decisions of

the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1,

1981.

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Warden Baldwin also argued that the court lacks

subject-matter jurisdiction to award injunctive relief

because the correctional officers responsible for

Hampton’s and Rolley’s beating are no longer employees

of the Alabama Department of Corrections. He further

argues that the injunctive relief sought should be

dismissed because it would be duplicative of the relief

sought by the United States Department of Justice in a

separate suit against the Alabama Department of

Corrections. See United States of America v. the State

of Alabama, 2:20-CV-01971-RDP (N.D. Ala. 2020). The

court need not reach these arguments.

The court, therefore, holds that Hampton and Rolley

lack standing to pursue their request for injunctive

relief from Warden Baldwin.

***

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that

defendant Jefferey Baldwin’s partial motion to dismiss

(Doc. 64) is granted, and plaintiffs Christopher Hampton

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and Cortney Rolley’s request for injunctive relief from

defendant Baldwin is dismissed.

The court is unsure whether defendant Baldwin should

now be dismissed. If he believes he should be, he should

file a motion asking for such.

DONE, this the 31st day of March, 2022.

/s/ Myron H. Thompson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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