Murdock v. Robinson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

CARL M. MURDOCK, JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No.: 2:16-cv-444-RAH

) (WO)

MONTGOMERY COUNTY, )

ALABAMA, et al, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

This lawsuit arose following a series of troubling events that resulted in

Plaintiff Carl M. Murdock, Jr.’s prolonged detention in the Montgomery County

Detention Facility. After his arrest on an outstanding, four-year-old warrant,

Murdock was placed into custody and—despite numerous written and verbal

complaints to detention facility staff—was denied a court appearance until his 48th

day in custody.1 When Murdock finally appeared before a Montgomery County

circuit court judge, the judge explained that the warrant had been mistakenly issued

due to a “clerical error” and ordered Murdock’s immediate release. In this 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 action, Murdock contends that his 48-day detention violated his civil rights.

1 Rule 4.3(b)(2) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a pretrial detainee receive an initial

appearance before a judge within 72 hours (3 days) of arrest.

Murdock names as defendants: the City of Montgomery; former Montgomery

Police Department (MPD) Chief Kevin Murphy; 2 MPD Officers Jeremy Lewis and

Nickie Givan; Montgomery County; former Montgomery County Chief Deputy

Sheriff Derrick Cunningham;3 Montgomery County Detention Facility Director of

Detention Colonel Wanda Robinson; and Montgomery County Detention Facility

Assistant Director of Detention Major Barbara Palmer. (Doc. 32.)

In his First Amended Complaint, the operative one here, Murdock asserts both

federal constitutional and state law claims against the Defendants. Pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983, he asserts the following constitutional claims:

(1) All Defendants deprived Murdock of his constitutionally protected rights

under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, including the right

to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and the right not to be

deprived of liberty or property without due process of law. (Doc. 32 at 10-

11 (Count I).)

(2) Montgomery County, Cunningham, Robinson, and Palmer, along with the

City of Montgomery and Murphy, acted with deliberate indifference by

2 Murphy was Chief of Police for the City of Montgomery until June 12, 2014. (Doc. 46-7 at 3.) After that date, John

Brown became the Chief of Police. Murphy was appointed as Deputy Sheriff of the Montgomery County Sheriff’s

Department in 2015. However, all claims against Murphy relate to his time at the Montgomery Police Department.

3 In June of 2014, Cunningham’s duties included overseeing the day-to-day operations of the Sheriff’s Department,

including supervising Robinson in her role as the director of the Montgomery County Detention Facility. (Doc. 49-7

at 3-4.)

promulgating a custom or policy of inadequate training and supervision,

thereby causing Murdock’s wrongful arrest and 48-day detention without

a court appearance, in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendments. (Id. at 11-12 (Count II).)

(3) Montgomery County, Cunningham, City of Montgomery, and Murphy

failed to implement and/or use appropriate policies, customs, and practices

in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 12-

13 (Count III).)

(4) Robinson and Palmer failed to implement or use appropriate policies,

customs, and practices in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendments. (Id. at 14 (Count IV).)

(5) Montgomery County acted with deliberate indifference to Murdock’s

constitutional rights by failing to fund and provide appropriate equipment

to ensure proper functioning of the jail, timely release of prisoners, timely

criminal procedure, and adequate functioning of the Montgomery County

Detention Facility. (Id. at 14-16 (Count V).)

With respect to the § 1983 claims, Murdock seeks injunctive relief against the

individual Defendants in their official capacities and monetary relief in their

individual capacities. He also seeks monetary relief against the City of Montgomery

and Montgomery County.

In addition to his federal constitutional claims, Murdock advances the

following state law claims:

(1) Montgomery County negligently breached its statutory duties by failing to

fund adequate equipment for the detention facility and failing to “ensure

the circuit court system was adequate and commodious,” thereby causing

Murdock’s wrongful imprisonment and prolonged detention. (Id. at 16-17

(Count VI).)

(2) Cunningham, Robinson, Palmer, Murphy, Lewis, and Givan all subjected

Murdock to false imprisonment. (Doc. 32 at 17-18 (Count VII).)

(3) Lewis and Givan engaged in an abuse of process. (Id. at 18 (Count VIII).)

(4) Lewis and Givan maliciously prosecuted Murdock. (Id. at 19 (Count IX).)

(5) Cunningham, Murphy, Lewis, and Givan engaged in a conspiracy to arrest

Murdock and deprive him of due process. (Id. at 19-20 (Count X).)

(6) The City of Montgomery is responsible for the negligence of its agents,

including Cunningham, Robinson, Palmer, Murphy, Lewis, and Givan

pursuant to § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975. (Id. at 20 (Count XI).)

With respect to the state law claims, Murdock seeks injunctive relief against

the Defendants in their official capacities, and monetary relief against them in their

individual capacities.

Pending before the court are two motions for summary judgment. Defendants

City of Montgomery, Murphy, Lewis, and Givan (collectively, the City Defendants)

filed a motion for summary judgment on June 16, 2017. (Doc. 46.) Defendants

Montgomery County, Cunningham, Robinson, and Palmer (collectively, the County

Defendants) filed a motion for summary judgment on June 19, 2017. (Doc. 48.) Both

motions have been fully briefed by the parties and are ripe for review. (Docs. 47, 50,

53, 54, 55, 57.)

For the reasons that follow, the City Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is due to be GRANTED as to the federal claims. The County Defendants’

motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

II. JURISDICTION

The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367. Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is proper if the evidence shows ‘that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.’” Hornsby-Culpepper v. Ware, 906 F.3d 1302, 1311 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “[A] court generally must view all evidence and make all

reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Fla. Int’l

Univ. Bd. Of Trs. v. Fla. Nat’l Univ., Inc., 830 F.3d 1242, 1252 (11th Cir. 2016).

However, “conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no

probative value.” Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 981 F.3d 911, 924-25 (11th Cir.

2018). If the record, taken as a whole, “could not lead a rational trier of fact to find

for the non-moving party,” then there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.

Hornsby-Culpepper, 906 F.3d at 1311 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact, and the movant must identify the portions of the

record which support this proposition. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986)). Moreover, the movant may carry this burden “by demonstrating

that the nonmoving party has failed to present sufficient evidence to support an

essential element of the case.” Id. The burden then shifts to the non-moving party

to establish, by going beyond the pleadings, that a genuine issue of material fact

exists. Id. at 1311-12.

A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the plaintiff produces evidence

that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in his favor such that

summary judgment is not warranted. Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498

F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007); Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cnty., 495

F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will

not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue

affecting the outcome of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d

1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). However, disputes involving

material facts are relevant and materiality is determined by the substantive law

applicable to the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

“[T]here must exist a conflict in substantial evidence to pose a jury question.” Hall

v. Sunjoy Indus. Group, Inc., 764 F.Supp.2d 1297, 1301 (M.D. Fla. 2011).

“[T]he judge’s function [at the summary judgment stage] is not himself to

weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether

there is a genuine [dispute] for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In addition, when

determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the law requires a court to

accept as true “statements in [the plaintiff’s] verified complaint, sworn response to

the officers’ motion for summary judgment, and sworn affidavit attached to that

response.” Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2019); see also United

States v. Stein, 881 F.3d 853, 857 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that a plaintiff’s purely

self-serving and uncorroborated statements “based on personal knowledge or

observation” set forth in a verified complaint or affidavit may create an issue of

material fact which precludes summary judgment).

“As a general principle, a plaintiff’s testimony cannot be discounted on

summary judgment unless it is blatantly contradicted by the record, blatantly

inconsistent, or incredible as a matter of law, meaning it relates facts that could not

have possibly been observed or events that are contrary to the laws of nature.” Sears,

922 F.3d at 1208 (quoting Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1253

(11th Cir. 2019)).

IV. BACKGROUND

The facts, taken in the light most favorable to Murdock as the non-movant,

are as follows:

A. Murdock’s Arrest

On May 4, 2006, Murdock pleaded guilty in the Montgomery County Circuit

Court to second-degree theft of property and was sentenced to a term of

imprisonment, followed by three years of probation. (Doc. 49-5 at 2, 39.) Upon his

release from Kilby Correctional Facility in January 2010, the circuit court placed

Murdock on court-supervised probation. (Doc. 46-8 at 2.)

Several months later, for reasons which remain unclear, the circuit court

clerk’s office issued an arrest warrant based on Murdock’s purported “failure to

appear” at a probation court appearance.4 (Doc. 32 at 6; Doc. 46-8 at 2, Doc. 49-5 at

41.) Shortly thereafter, Murdock’s daughter told him that she saw a local television

news program that identified Murdock as an individual with an outstanding arrest

warrant. (Doc. 49-1 at 14.) Concerned and confused, Murdock went to the probation

4 Although circuit court Judge Tracy S. McCooey’s name is typed at the top of the alias warrant, it was signed by the

Clerk of Court, Melissa Rittenour. (Doc. 49-5 at 41.)

office to inquire about the warrant. (Id. at 15.) There, Murdock’s probation officer

assured Murdock that “everything is squared away, you’re free to go.” (Id.)

The warrant, however, remained active. Between 2011 and 2013, various

court personnel and Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department officials entered

notations on a warrant log indicating that the warrant against Murdock was still

outstanding. For example, on April 13, 2011, court personnel noted that the warrant

was “still good.” (Doc. 46-2 at 2.) Another official noted on May 23, 2011, that the

warrant had been entered into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC)

database. (Id.) Other notations reflected the warrant’s active status on October 23,

2011, October 23, 2012, and September 20, 2013. (Id.)

At some point in May of 2014, four years after the warrant’s issuance, Officer

Nickie Givan received a list of outstanding warrants from the Montgomery County

Sheriff’s Department. Among the warrants included on the list was the warrant for

Murdock’s arrest. (Doc. 46-1 at 6, 9.)

Prior to serving the arrest warrant, Givan searched for and found Murdock’s

name and photograph on the “LET” computer system. (Id. at 6.) She then contacted

the Sheriff’s Department warrant clerk and received confirmation that the warrant

remained outstanding. (Id. at 6-8.) Givan also contacted the City dispatcher who

confirmed there were no other active warrants in Murdock’s name. (Doc. 46-1 at 9.)

On June 19, 2014, Givan began serving the outstanding warrants. Givan,

Lewis, and a third officer took separate patrol cars and met at Murdock’s residence.

There, Lewis and the third officer approached the back door of Murdock’s home

while Givan knocked on the front door and waited on the porch. (Doc. 46-1 at 8.)

When Murdock opened the back door, one of the officers told him there was an

outstanding warrant for his arrest. (Doc. 49-1 at 17.) Murdock asked the officer to

tell him what the arrest warrant said, but the officer said nothing. (Id.) Murdock

insisted that he had done nothing wrong and told the officers “[a]ll I do is go to work

and come home.” (Doc. 49-2 at 29.) The two officers walked with Murdock to the

front of the house while Murdock again protested that the warrant must be a mistake.

(Doc. 46-1 at 8.)

Murdock was handcuffed and as the officers escorted him to the patrol car,

Murdock asked Givan to tell him what the arrest warrant said, but she did not answer.

(Doc. 49-1 at 17.) Once inside the patrol car, Lewis showed Murdock his computer

screen which displayed the outstanding warrant. (Doc. 49-1 at 17.) Murdock again

told Lewis and Givan that the warrant was a mistake. (Id.) The officers confirmed

once more with the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department that the warrant was

active, and then transported Murdock to the Montgomery County Detention Facility

for booking. (Doc. 46-1 at 8.)

After turning Murdock over to the facility, Lewis walked across the street to

the Montgomery County Circuit Courthouse, obtained the physical warrant and a

detention order from the county warrant clerk, and returned the documents to the

detention facility. (Doc. 46-1 at 8.) On its face, the warrant reflected that it was

issued by Montgomery County Circuit Court Judge Tracy S. McCooey and was

signed by the Clerk of Court, Melissa Rittenour, on May 6, 2010. The warrant read

as follows:

TO ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER:

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED TO ARREST: MURDOCK

CARL MURRY AND BRING HIM/HER BEFORE THIS COURT TO

ANSWER THE STATE FOR THE CHARGE OF FAILURE TO

APPEAR ON THE CHARGE OF: THEFT OF PROP 2ND –

FELONY.

(Doc. 46-6.) The warrant was signed by Lewis on June 19, 2014, with a check

mark acknowledging “defendant arrested by law enforcement, in jail.” (Id.)

The detention order commanded the jailer to receive “Carl Murry Murdock”

into custody without bond. (Doc. 46-6 at 3.) Left blank was the section of the form

that directed when a hearing would be held before a circuit court judge, as was the

signature line for a “Circuit Court of Montgomery County” representative. (Id.)

Instead, handwritten across the top of the form were the words “Judge McCooey,”

and along the lower half of the form was “D. Givan.” (Id.)

After handing both the warrant and detention order to a detention facility

officer, Lewis and Givan left Murdock at the facility. These two officers had no

further dealings with Murdock.

B. Murdock’s Confinement

Upon receiving the arrest warrant and detention order, a booking officer at the

Montgomery County Detention Facility took Murdock into custody. Murdock

completed various intake forms, was fingerprinted, and received a copy of the

facility’s Inmate Handbook. (Doc. 49-1 at 27.) This handbook advised detainees

and inmates of the procedure for communicating with court personnel and jail

administration, such as submitting inmate request forms, grievance forms, and court

request forms. (Doc. 50 at 5-6.)

At the time Murdock was taken into custody, detention facility staff and court

personnel were to undertake several steps to ensure that Murdock received an initial

appearance before a judge within 72 hours of his arrest. (Doc. 49-7 at 5; Doc. 49-8

at 6-8.) These steps were mandated not only by the facility’s procedures, but also

ensured compliance with the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure.

First, all booking paperwork, such as the arrest warrant and detention order,

were to be “clocked,” i.e., time-stamped, when received by the detention facility

clerk. (Doc. 49-8 at 7-9.) The following morning, the detention facility clerk would

compile an arrest report listing every detainee, including Murdock, who had been

booked into the facility the previous day. (Doc. 49-7 at 5-6; Doc. 49-8 at 6-7.) The

detention facility clerk was then to walk to the county courthouse with the booking

documents and arrest reports and deliver them to the Montgomery County Circuit

Clerk’s Office. (Doc. 49-7 at 5-6; Doc. 49-8 at 7-8.)

Upon receiving the report and paperwork, the circuit clerk’s office was tasked

with preparing a “first call list” of pretrial detainees set to appear on the court docket

for the day and deliver this list to the detention facility clerk. (Doc. 49-8 at 7.)

Detention facility personnel would then move the court-designated detainees to a

holding area where they would be handcuffed and escorted to the Montgomery

County Courthouse to await an appearance before a judge. (Id.) Following their

appearances, the detainees would be returned to the facility. (Id.)

According to the evidentiary record, Murdock’s arrest warrant and detention

order were received and filed by then-Montgomery County Circuit Clerk Tiffany

McCord at 7:00 a.m. on June 20, 2014 (Doc. 49-5 at 41-43). After this, the process

appears to have broken down. Because Murdock was not scheduled for a court

appearance and did not appear before a judge within the requisite 72 hours of his

arrest, Murdock presumes that, for some unknown reason, his name never appeared

on the first call list. (Doc. 86 at 12.)

During the first few days of his detention, Murdock assumed that he

eventually would be scheduled for a court appearance. (Doc. 49-1 at 28.) But in late

June, having been detained for almost two weeks without a hearing, Murdock

became concerned. He completed an inmate request form and “stated what [his]

situation was” and that he “needed to talk to somebody.”5 (Doc. 49-1 at 27–28.) He

addressed the form to Colonel Robinson, the director of the detention facility6 (Doc.

49-2 at 34) and placed the form into an inmate mailbox designated for receiving

inmate requests. (Doc. 49-1 at 27-28.) Murdock never received a response to this

request.7 (Doc. 49-1 at 28.)

In early July, after receiving no follow-up or response to his request form,

Murdock began asking detention facility staff for other forms. (Doc. 49-1 at 22, 23,

24, 25, 26, 28; Doc. 49-2 at 74.) He asked various facility officers for grievance

forms on up to six occasions and control booth operators on at least three occasions.

(Doc. 49-1 at 23.) Murdock does not remember the names of the officers or control

booth operators to whom he spoke. According to Murdock, multiple employees

either ignored his requests or told him that they did not have forms to give him. (Doc.

49-1 at 28.)

5 When reading the deposition testimony in its full context, it appears that the “situation” Murdock described in the

request form was his continued detention without a court appearance, appointment of counsel, or bond hearing. (See

generally Doc. 53-4.)

6 In his deposition, Murdock initially stated that he submitted an inmate request form in June. Later in his deposition,

Murdock stated that he submitted a request form to Robinson but was unsure when he submitted it. When reading the

deposition in full, it appears Murdock is referring to the same inmate request form during both discussions.

7 The County officials maintain they are unaware of any such request submitted by Murdock. (Doc. 49-11 at 7.)

Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Murdock as the non-movant, the court assumes for purposes of

summary judgment that Murdock did submit such a form.

Undeterred, Murdock persisted in his efforts. Every two or three days,

Murdock asked the officer performing the head count in his cellblock, “[W]hy am I

here? Can you tell me why I’m here? Can you tell me what I’m doing here? Can you

tell me why I have no bond?” (Doc. 49-1 at 22.) Each time, the officer working the

shift said he would “get back to [Murdock],” but none of the officers ever followed

up as promised.8 (Id.)

Eventually, Murdock encountered a former junior college classmate, Officer

Elder. (Doc. 49-2 at 35.) During an initial encounter in June, Elder recognized

Murdock and asked why he had been detained. (Doc. 49-1 at 21; Doc. 49-2 at 34-

35.) Murdock responded that he did not know. (Doc. 49-1 at 21.) Because Elder

appeared busy and because Murdock expected he would soon appear in court,

Murdock did not initially ask Elder for help. (Doc. 49-2 at 34.)

But during a second encounter in mid-July, Murdock asked Elder to help him

find out why he was in jail and asked Elder for a “court notice” form. (Doc. 49-1 at

21; Doc. 49-2 at 35.) Several days later, Elder returned with the form and told

Murdock that “[his] judge was Judge McCooey and she was actually on vacation for

the month of July, and so if [he] didn’t see her in a couple of days then it would be

August before . . . she would be back.” (Doc. 49-1 at 21, 24, 26; Doc. 49-2 at 34.)

8 Murdock does not identify by name the officers from whom he requested assistance.

On July 14, 2014, with Officer Elder’s assistance, Murdock filled out a motion

to the circuit court requesting an attorney, a bond hearing, and a preliminary hearing.

(Doc. 49-3 at 7.) On that same day, another detention facility officer, whose name

is unknown, also gave Murdock a grievance form. (Doc. 49-1 at 24.) Murdock

recalled writing “something in [the grievance] about this is Gestapo-tactics to pick

me up off the street and hold me,” and he placed both the grievance form and the

motion into the inmate mailbox. (Doc. 49-1 at 24-25.) Although facility policy

required officers to check the mailbox each weekday (Doc. 49-6 at 51; Doc. 50 at

5), Murdock testified that he observed his grievance form remain in the box for three

days before it was picked up by a detention facility officer (Doc. 49-1 at 25). Once

again, Murdock never received a response to the grievance form.9

The circuit court, however, did respond to Murdock’s motion. On July 18,

2014—one month after Murdock’s arrest—Montgomery County Circuit Court

Judge Tracy McCooey entered an order setting a hearing for August 6, 2014. (Doc.

49-1 at 22.) Upon learning that this hearing had been scheduled, Murdock ceased

his efforts to obtain assistance from the detention facility officers. (Doc. 49-1 at 22;

Doc. 49-2 at 36.)

9 The County Defendants assert they have no record of a grievance submitted by Murdock. (Doc. 50 at 10.) However,

because the court must construe disputes of fact in favor of the non-movant, the court assumes for purposes of

summary judgment that Murdock did submit a grievance form.

C. The Court Proceeding

On August 6, 2014, Murdock appeared before Judge McCooey.10 Puzzled by

Murdock’s arrest, the court attempted to ascertain what happened. According to

Murdock, he overheard a circuit clerk employee tell Judge McCooey that “she

[thought] the warrant was issued in error when [the court] changed from one filing

system to another,” specifically “a blue file to another file.” (Doc. 49-1 at 32.)

During the proceeding, Judge McCooey entered an order for Murdock’s

immediate release and, concerned that Murdock may have lost his job as a result of

his detention, provided him with a letter addressed to his employer, which stated:

Dear Ms. Marvalene Fletcher,

Carl Murdock was picked up on June 19, 2014 due to a clerical error.

A warrant should never have been issued in this case. I am personally

writing this letter to make you aware that none of this was his fault. All

fines in this case have been set aside and Mr. Murdock is ready to return

to his job. If you have any questions, please call my office at (334) 832-

1365.

Sincerely,

Honorable Tracy McCooey

(Doc. 49-1 at 32; Doc. 53-6.)

Upon his release, Murdock discovered that numerous personal misfortunes

occurred during his 48-day detention. Because he missed at least three paychecks

10 No transcript was included in the evidentiary materials, and the court is unable to discern whether this proceeding

was transcribed.

during his detention, Murdock was unable to make monthly payments on a loan,

which forced him to file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection. (Doc. 49-2 at 7, 16.)

Murdock’s car was also repossessed, he lost his apartment, and his roommate sold

his personal belongings. (Doc. 49-2 at 14-16.)

V. ANALYSIS

A. Applicable Constitutional Provision

“The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit” is “to isolate the precise constitutional

violation with which [the defendants are] charged.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.

137, 140 (1979). As the Eleventh Circuit has noted, identifying the particular

constitutional right alleged to have been violated is “crucial to resolving . . . § 1983

claims” because “different rights prescribe different legal analyses . . . .” Alcocer v.

Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 947 (11th Cir. 2018). While Murdock has asserted claims

against all Defendants under both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,11 the

County Defendants argue that Murdock’s claims are properly analyzed pursuant to

the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 50 at 27.)

Deciphering between Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims requires

careful consideration of the facts. The Fourth Amendment protects the right to be

free from unreasonable seizures, Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1326 (11th Cir.

2009), while the Fourteenth Amendment protects, inter alia, the right to be free from

11 As noted, infra, Murdock is no longer pursuing his Fifth Amendment claim.

prolonged deprivations of liberty without due process of law, Baker, 443 U.S. at 145.

The Supreme Court has held that pretrial detention is a type of seizure to

which Fourth Amendment protections attach. Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S.

Ct. 911 (2017). In Manuel, a pretrial detainee who was held in custody for 48 days

following a probable cause hearing, filed a § 1983 malicious prosecution suit,

alleging that his arrest and subsequent detention were based on evidence fabricated

by city officers. Id. In its discussion of Manuel’s claim, the Supreme Court

explained that the Fourth Amendment established the minimum constitutional

standards for seizures, “including the detention of suspects pending trial.” Id. at 917

(quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 106 (1975)). The Fourth Amendment,

“standing alone, guarantees ‘a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a

condition for any significant pretrial restraint.’” Id. at 917-18 (quoting Gerstein, 420

U.S. at 125). Accordingly, pretrial detainees who have not been afforded such a

finding can “appeal to ‘the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unfounded

invasions of liberty.’” Id. at 918 (quoting Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 112).

While the Supreme Court did not ultimately reach the full merits of Manuel’s

case,12 it did note that Manuel’s detention pursuant to a judicial order that lacked any

proper basis “violated his Fourth Amendment rights.” Id. In doing so, the Court

12 Manuel’s case was remanded back to the Seventh Circuit for a determination of when his claim accrued. Manuel,

137 S. Ct. at 921-22.

made clear: if a plaintiff’s complaint is that his pretrial detention is unsupported by

probable cause, then “the right allegedly infringed lies in the Fourth Amendment.”

Id.

In the instant case, although Murdock does challenge the warrant to the extent

that he argues the Defendants did not follow the warrant’s written mandate, failed to

properly investigate the warrant given its age, and should have adopted policies to

ensure its recall, he does not allege that the warrant was insufficient to provide

probable cause for either his arrest or detention. Nowhere in Murdock’s filings does

he mention probable cause. In fact, he acknowledges that the warrant appeared to

be facially valid. (Doc. 54 at 13; Doc. 86 at 8.) Instead, Murdock’s First Amended

Complaint, brief in response to summary judgment, and contentions during oral

argument focus on his prolonged detention without the process to which he claims

he was constitutionally entitled; that is, an initial appearance, appointment of

counsel, and a bond determination.

When a pretrial detainee challenges the constitutional sufficiency of the

process he received—or failed to receive—while detained, courts within the

Eleventh Circuit have joined various other circuit courts in analyzing these claims

pursuant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See West v.

Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007); Alexander v. City of Muscle Shoals,

Ala., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1229 (N.D. Ala. 2011) (“[T]he right to an initial

appearance is secured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”);

Jackson v. Hamm, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1241 (M.D. Ala. 1999); Lewis v. City of

Birmingham, Ala., Case No. 2:18-cv-879-GMB, 2020 WL 5057765, at *3 (N.D. Ala.

Aug. 27, 2020); Barnes v. Cullman County District Court, Case No. 5:16-cv-1691-

AKK, 2017 WL 1508239 at *2 (N.D. Ala. 2011); see also Jauch v. Choctaw Cnty.,

874 F.3d 425, 427 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding 96-day detention without initial

appearance violated procedural due process); Hayes v. Faulkner Cnty., 388 F.3d 669,

673 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding 38-day detention without initial appearance violated

substantive due process); Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 573 (7th Cir. 1998)

(holding 57-day detention without initial appearance violated substantive due

process); Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that 114-

day detention without initial appearance violated procedural due process).

This court finds the reasoning within these opinions persuasive. Because

Murdock alleges a deprivation of liberty without due process, not a lack of probable

cause to support his arrest or detention, his claims sound in the Fourteenth

Amendment rather than the Fourth Amendment.

Where a plaintiff alleges that an official’s arbitrary or conscience-shocking

conduct deprived him of a due process right in the context of his prolonged detention,

courts within the Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have treated these

allegations as substantive due process claims.13 See Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 570-73;

Hayes, 388 F. 3d at 673; Cannon v. Macon Cnty., 1 F.3d 1558 (11th Cir. 1993);

Alexander, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1229, 1231-33; Jackson, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1239-41.

Because Murdock alleges that City and County officials were deliberately indifferent

to his constitutional right to be free from prolonged detention without a court

appearance, this court will apply a substantive due process analysis to his claims.

B. Fifth Amendment Claim

In Count I of the Complaint, Murdock asserts that all of the Defendants

violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process. In his response to the summary

judgment motions, Murdock concedes that he is no longer pursuing his Fifth

Amendment claim (Doc. 53 at 15; Doc. 54 at 11), therefore summary judgment is

due to be GRANTED as to the Fifth Amendment claim in Count I.

C. Injunctive Relief

The transfer or release of an inmate renders moot any claims for injunctive or

declaratory relief. See Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979); see

also Jacoby v. Baldwin Cnty., 835 F.3d 1338, 1342 n.1 (11th Cir. 2016) (“since Mr.

Jacoby is no longer an inmate at the Baldwin jail, his claims for injunctive relief are

13 Extended detention claims have also been analyzed pursuant to procedural due process, but generally in

circumstances where a county’s statutory scheme denied a criminal defendant his enumerated constitutional rights, a

claim Murdock does not raise in this case. See Jauch, 874 F.3d 425; Oviatt, 954 F.2d 1470. For a more in-depth

discussion of why claims such as Murdock’s, where an official’s arbitrary or conscience-shocking conduct is at issue,

are treated as substantive, rather than procedural, due process claims, see Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 570-73, and Jackson,

78 F. Supp. 2d at 1239-45.

moot”); Cotterall v. Paul, 755 F.2d 777, 780 (11th Cir. 1985) (past exposure to even

illegal conduct does not in and of itself show a pending case or controversy regarding

injunctive relief if unaccompanied by any continuing present injury or real and

immediate threat of repeated injury).

The record reveals that Murdock is no longer detained in the Montgomery

County Detention Facility. Therefore, to the extent Murdock seeks injunctive relief

with respect to any of his § 1983 claims, Murdock's requests for equitable relief are

moot and therefore due to be DISMISSED.

D. Claims Against the City Defendants

1. Officers Lewis and Givan

In Count I, Murdock asserts that Lewis and Givan violated his rights under

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, including his right to be free from

unreasonable searches and seizures and his right not to be deprived of liberty without

due process of law. (Doc. 32 at 10.) Although it is not clear from the First Amended

Complaint, when reading Count I in conjunction with Murdock’s other allegations,

along with arguments made by Murdock’s counsel in response to summary judgment

and during oral argument, it appears that Murdock is asserting federal claims of

wrongful arrest and false imprisonment against these officers. (Doc. 32 at 2, 10.)

Murdock contends that Lewis and Givan violated his civil rights by arresting him on

a warrant they should have suspected was erroneous given its age and by further

failing to follow the specific instructions set forth in the warrant. He alleges that the

officers’ conduct ultimately led to his prolonged detention at the hands of the County

Defendants, stating that his “wrongful arrest and subsequent false imprisonment

could have been prevented if the officers had further investigated after he informed

them that the warrant was invalid” and “had the officers followed the instructions on

the warrant, the violation could have been minimized or even prevented because [he]

could have been released that day had he been before Judge McCooey when

arrested.” (Doc. 53 at 3.)

Lewis and Givan counter that they are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, or

in the alternative, qualified immunity. (Doc. 47 at 14, 17.) Although “[o]n its face,

§ 1983 admits no immunities,” the Supreme Court has “consistently recognized that

substantive doctrines of privilege and immunity may limit the relief available in §

1983 litigation.” Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984). As a result, both

qualified and absolute immunity defenses are available. Id.

“Absolute quasi-judicial immunity derives from absolute judicial immunity.”

Roland v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1994). Judges are immune from civil

liability under § 1983 for any act performed in their judicial capacity, provided such

acts are not done in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Stump v.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978)). This protection extends to non-judicial

officers when they are acting to enforce a judicial order, including effectuating an

arrest warrant. “Nonjudicial officials are encompassed by a judge’s absolute

immunity when their official duties have an integral relationship with the judicial

process” so long as these individuals act within the scope of their authority. Id.

“[T]he absolute quasi-judicial immunity of a nonjudicial official ‘is determined’

through a functionary analysis of the action taken by the official in relation to the

judicial process.” Id. (emphasis removed).

“[W]hether there was a facially valid warrant in place determines whether the

defendants may be entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity or qualified

immunity.” Byrd v. Jones, Case Nos. 7:14-cv-01469-TMP and 7:14-cv-01537-TMP,

2015 WL 2194697 at *8 (N.D. Ala. May 11, 2015) (aff’d Byrd v. Jones, 673 F.

App’x 968 (11th Cir. 2016)). The Eleventh Circuit has determined that “law

enforcement personnel, acting in furtherance of their official duties and relying on a

facially valid court order, are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from suit

in a § 1983 action.” Roland, 19 F.3d at 556. Specifically, when the plaintiff

“acknowledges that [an officer] acted pursuant to a warrant, [that officer] has quasi-

judicial immunity from suit based on [the plaintiff’]s arrest, as [the officer] was

acting in furtherance of his official duties and in reliance on a valid judicial order.”

Bias v. Crosby, 346 F. App’x 455, 458 (11th Cir. 2009)

“A warrant does not have to be correct or even lawful, to be facially valid.”

Id. When implementing “a writ which is fair on its face, issued from a court which

had jurisdiction [over] both of the parties and of the subject-matter of the suit . . .

which was issued in the regular course of judicial proceeding . . . and which the

officer of the court . . . is bound to obey,” the executing officer is protected in

carrying out the court's mandate. Matthews v. Densmore, 109 U.S. 216, 218 (1883).

Further, immunity is not lost even where the charges were ultimately

dismissed or where the charges upon which the warrant was issued are found to be

erroneous. Byrd, 2015 WL 2194697 at *8. Where an arrest warrant is facially valid

at the time a plaintiff is arrested, the officer effectuating the arrest is entitled to quasi-

judicial immunity.

Here, there is no dispute that Lewis and Givan were executing a facially valid

arrest warrant. (Doc. 86 at 8.) Although Murdock argues that the officers should

have investigated the warrant further based on its age (Id. at 8-9) and Murdock’s

repeated claims of innocence, their purported failure to do so did not render the

warrant invalid on its face. See Chapman v. City of Atlanta, 192 F. App’x 922, 924-

25 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding “an official executing an arrest warrant is not required

by the Constitution to investigate independently every claim of innocence.”).

Further, Murdock contends the officers did not follow the directives on the

warrant because they delivered him to the detention facility rather than to a judge.

(Doc. 53 at 3, 9, 10.) Lewis and Givan respond that the warrant ordered Murdock

to be held without bail, which required that they transport him to the detention

facility. Moreover, the Clerk of the Montgomery County Circuit Court provided the

officers a detention order commanding that Murdock be placed into custody. (Doc.

49-5 at 43.) Lewis and Givan followed these directives.

Because Lewis and Givan were executing a facially valid warrant at the time

they arrested Murdock, the court concludes the officers are entitled to quasi-judicial

immunity.14 Consequently, the City Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

due to be GRANTED with respect to the § 1983 claims against Lewis and Givan.

Because the court has found that Lewis and Givan are entitled to immunity as

to the federal claims, the court elects not to exercise pendent jurisdiction as to

Murdock’s state law claims against these defendants. See United Mine Workers v.

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed

before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims

should be dismissed as well.”). Accordingly, the state law claims against Lewis and

Givan will be DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. City of Montgomery and Chief Murphy

Murdock asserts three claims against the City and Murphy. In Count I, as he

did with the officers, Murdock claims both the City and Murphy violated his

constitutional rights during his arrest and detention.

14 As the Eleventh Circuit has noted, once the court determines that the defendants are entitled to quasi-judicial

immunity, their alternative qualified immunity defense becomes moot. Roland, 19 F.3d at 557 n.6 (citing Valdez, 878

F.2d at 1288).

In Count II, Murdock asserts that the City, through Murphy, acted with

deliberate indifference by promulgating a “custom or policy of inadequate training

and supervision” related to the officers’ execution of the warrant and by failing to

intervene to prevent the violation of Murdock’s constitutional rights. (Doc. 32 at 12.)

In Count III, Murdock asserts that the City, through Murphy, “condon[ed]

and/or implemented official policy, written or unwritten, which caused the

unconstitutional violations of Plaintiff in the manner in which the four (4) year old

warrant was executed by Defendants Lewis and Givan.” (Doc. 32 at 12-13.)

a. Chief Murphy – Individual Liability

To the extent Murdock attempts to hold Chief Murphy liable for his arrest and

detention based on a supervisory theory, his efforts fail. Supervisory officials are

not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis

of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1360 (11th

Cir. 2003), abrogated in part on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701

(11th Cir. 2010). Instead, to hold a supervisor liable, a plaintiff must show that the

supervisor either directly participated in the unconstitutional conduct or that a causal

connection exists between the supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional

violation. Id.

Although the First Amended Complaint names Murphy as a defendant on the

basis that “at all time material to this complaint” he “was the commanding officer of

Defendants Lewis and Givan and was responsible for their training, supervision, and

conduct” (Doc. 32 at 5), there is no dispute that Murphy left the Montgomery Police

Department on June 12, 2014. (Doc. 46-7 at 3.) Murdock was arrested on June 19,

2014, one week after Murphy’s departure.

Murphy was neither employed by the City of Montgomery on the day the

warrant was executed nor was he personally involved in effectuating the arrest. He

could not have directly participated in the conduct alleged in the First Amended

Complaint because he was not employed with the City at the time of the arrest, and

Murdock has not otherwise shown a causal connection between Murphy’s own

actions and the alleged constitutional violations. Therefore, the City Defendants’

motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED as to the federal claims

against Murphy related to his individual liability for the execution of the arrest

warrant on June 19, 2014.

b. City of Montgomery – Municipal Liability

The court now turns to Murdock’s claims of municipal liability under § 1983.

In Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, the United States

Supreme Court held that a municipality can be liable for deprivations of

constitutional rights under § 1983. 486 U.S. 658 (1978). However, the Court placed

limitations on the circumstances in which liability may be imposed.

Under § 1983, there can be no respondeat superior liability because a

municipality cannot be sued for the acts of others, including employees of the

municipality. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-94; see also Gold v. City of Miami, 151

F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 870 (1998). Instead,

“municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually

responsible.” Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., Fla., 604 F.3d 1248, 1263 (11th Cir.

2010) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479–80 (1986)).

Thus, to prevail on a § 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff is required

to satisfy a two-prong test for municipal liability. A plaintiff must (1) “identify

conduct attributable to the municipality,” and (2) “show that it ‘was taken with the

requisite degree of culpability, i.e., that the municipal action was taken with

deliberate indifference to its known or obvious consequences.’” Doe v. City of

Demopolis, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1313 (S.D. Ala. 2011) (quoting Sch. Bd. of

Broward Cnty., Fla., 604 F.3d at 1263).

Regarding the test's first prong, conduct is attributable to a municipality only

if it “result[s] from an official government policy, the actions of an official fairly

deemed to represent government policy, or a custom or practice so pervasive and

well-settled that it assumes the force of law.” Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., Fla., 604

F.3d at 1263 (quoting Denno v. School Bd. of Volusia Cnty., Fla., 218 F.3d 1267,

1276 (11th Cir. 2000)). As to the second prong, the Supreme Court has held that

deliberate indifference “is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a

municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Bd. of

Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997).

Under either avenue, a plaintiff (1) must show that the local

governmental entity . . . has authority and responsibility over the

governmental function in issue and (2) must identify those officials who

speak with final policymaking authority for that local governmental

entity concerning the act alleged to have caused the particular

constitutional violation in issue.

Grech v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003).

i. Count I

In Count I of the First Amended Complaint, Murdock alleges that the City and

Murphy’s “actions and inactions” deprived him of his constitutional right to be free

from unreasonable searches and seizures and deprived him of liberty without due

process. (Doc. 32 at 10-11.) The allegations in Count I are rather broad, alleging

general constitutional violations on the part of all Defendants. But in his brief in

response to the City Defendant’s summary judgment motion, and during oral

argument, Murdock refines his argument, taking issue with the City’s policies and

procedures for verifying warrants and effectuating arrests based on those warrants.

(See Doc. 53 at 12-14.) Murdock contends that his 48-day detention would have

never occurred but for the actions of the City officers (Doc. 86 at 10, 18) and argues

that the policies Lewis and Givan followed when executing the arrest warrant were

ineffective to prevent a violation of Murdock’s constitutional rights.

Specifically, Murdock points to deposition testimony from the officers

regarding the policies followed during his arrest. Givan testified that she received

the warrant list with Murdock’s name “a month or so” before arresting him (Doc.

53-2 at 43) and failed to obtain an updated list before serving the warrant. She also

testified that City officers sometimes “make contact” with an individual who has an

outstanding warrant, then “call and verify” the warrant later. (Doc. 53-2 at 50.) For

his part, Lewis testified that the actions taken at the time Murdock was arrested were

in compliance with the “policies and training and procedures” required of all City

officers (Doc. 53-3 at 29) and that he was unaware of anything further the officers

could have done to investigate the warrant (Doc. 53-3 at 33).

It is well-established that a city or its officials “may only be liable under §

1983 “if an action pursuant to official policy of some nature caused a constitutional

tort.” Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th Cir. 1994). There is no

dispute that the procedures followed by Lewis and Givan are official city policies

and practices. (Doc. 47 at 7; Doc. 55 at 3.) But “to show an unconstitutional policy

or custom, Plaintiff must identify the policy or custom, connect the policy or custom

with the government entity itself, and show that the particular injury was incurred

because of the execution of that policy.” Bennett v. City of Slidell, 782 F.2d 762, 767

(5th Cir. 1984).

The “first inquiry in any case alleging municipal liability under § 1983 is the

question whether there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom

and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,

385 (1989). Here, the evidence does not demonstrate the causation necessary for

Murdock to succeed on his claim. The unfortunate events at issue here were

triggered by the warrant’s erroneous issuance, not the policies followed during its

execution. And Murdock’s prolonged detention was at the hands of County

employees—not City officials. Murdock has not shown that the City’s policies

caused the warrant to be issued in error. The fault for that mistake arguably lies with

the Montgomery County Circuit Court or the court clerk’s office, entities not named

as defendants in this lawsuit. Likewise, there is no causal link between the City’s

policies for effectuating arrest warrants and Murdock’s subsequent 48-day detention

in the Montgomery County Detention Facility.

Although Murdock contends the City officers should have done more to

investigate the warrant given its age and Murdock’s protestations, it is uncertain that

any further investigation would have revealed the warrant’s erroneous origin.

Before taking Murdock to the detention facility, Lewis and Givan, following City

policy, received numerous confirmations that the warrant was valid and active. (Doc.

46-1 at 8; Doc. 49-1 at 17.) While the City’s policies did not uncover the erroneous

nature of the warrant, those policies are not the cause of any constitutional violation

suffered by Murdock. Accordingly, as to Count I, summary judgment is due to be

GRANTED in favor of the City.

ii. Count II

In Count II, Murdock asserts that the City, through Murphy, failed to

adequately train the City’s officers. (Doc. 32 at 11-12.) The City is entitled to

summary judgment as to this claim.

A plaintiff must show that the “failure to train reflects a ‘deliberate’ or

‘conscious’ choice by a municipality.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. Without

notice of a need to train or supervise in a particular area, a municipality is not liable

for any failure to train and supervise. Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1351

(11th Cir. 1998). To determine whether a failure to train amounts to a deliberate or

conscious choice by a municipality, courts are instructed to look at the “degree of

fault” of a municipality's failure to train and determine whether it “amounts to

deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into

contact.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. With respect to police officer training,

the deliberate indifference standard is a high threshold. Id. at 391; see also Connick

v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 70 (2011).

Ordinarily, to meet this high standard, a plaintiff must allege a pattern of

widespread constitutional violations that would put the municipality on notice of its

inadequate training. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 62. To establish lack of adequate

training based on an isolated incident, rather than a widespread pattern, “the

likelihood for [a] constitutional violation [must be] so high that the need for training

would be obvious.” Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th

Cir. 2009).

The court cannot conclude that the facts of this case, as they apply to the City,

fit the “obvious” standard. The evidence demonstrates that Lewis and Givan

exercised diligence and followed their training on City policies when executing the

warrant. On the day of Murdock’s arrest, the officers confirmed with a dispatcher,

the sheriff’s department warrant clerk, and their police vehicle’s dashboard

computer that the warrant was active. (Doc. 46-1 at 8.) And after arresting Murdock,

Lewis obtained both the written warrant and a detention order from the circuit court.

(Doc. 49-1 at 17.) Each of these actions confirmed the warrant was valid and active.

Further, the parties agree that they are not aware of any other instances where

a warrant was issued because of a clerical error, much less an instance where an

erroneous warrant resulted in the arrest of a person who was then detained for weeks

without an appearance before a judge. (Doc. 86 at 33, 47.) Murdock acknowledges

that, from all the information available at the time, the officers had no reason to

know the warrant was not valid other than the fact that the underlying charge was

four years old. (Doc. 86 at 8.) But a warrant’s age alone does not render it invalid,

expired, or ineffectual on its face. See Pickens v. Hollowell, 59 F.3d 1203, 1207-08

(11th Cir. 1995).

Nor did the fact that the warrant had been outstanding for some time put the

City on notice of an “obvious” need to require its officers to continue investigating

a warrant after receiving multiple confirmations of its validity. This court cannot

say that a City official who implements policies to verify and execute arrest warrants

should have foreseen a series of events such as those present here.

What happened to Murdock is extremely troubling. His allegations regarding

the failure to train City officers, though, are not the sort which “rise to the level of

obviousness reserved for ‘a narrow range of circumstances [where] a violation of

federal rights may be a highly predictable consequence’ of a failure to provide

adequate training.” Lewis, 561 F.3d at 1293. As a result, the court will GRANT

summary judgment on Count II in favor of the City.

iii. Count III

In Count III, Murdock asserts that the City, through Chief Murphy, failed to

implement policies between 2010 and 2014 to ensure the recall of the unexecuted

warrant issued by the circuit court. (Doc. 32 at 12-13.) This claim fails factually and

as a matter of law.

Applying the test for municipal liability, the failure to recall the warrant is not

conduct attributable to the City of Montgomery. Neither the City nor its officials had

the legal authority to direct the circuit court to recall Murdock’s warrant. Only

circuit court Judge Tracey McCooey had this authority. See Ex parte Greensboro,

948 So. 2d 540 (Ala. 2006) (acts performed by municipal court clerk/magistrate to

ensure that arrest warrants are recalled is a judicial function); see also State of

Alabama Unified Judicial System Form CR-59.15

On this issue, the evidence does not demonstrate that the City’s policies or

Murphy’s actions were legally insufficient or improper. City officials did not have

“authority and responsibility over the government function in issue” here nor “final

policymaking authority for that local governmental entity concerning the act alleged

to have caused the particular constitutional violation in issue.” Grech, 335 F.3d at

1329. Consequently, summary judgment is due to be GRANTED in favor of the

City as to Count III of the First Amended Complaint.

Because the court has granted summary judgment in favor of the City of

Montgomery as to all federal claims, the court declines to exercise pendent

jurisdiction as to Murdock’s state law claims against the City and Murphy. See

Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. Accordingly, these claims will be DISMISSED without

prejudice.

15 Warrant recall order available at: https://eforms.alacourt.gov/criminal-forms/.

E. Section 1983 Claims against the County Defendants

1. Montgomery County

During oral argument on the motions for summary judgment, Murdock’s

counsel conceded that all the claims against Montgomery County are due to be

dismissed. (Doc. 86 at 3-4.) Based on this assertion, the § 1983 claims against the

County in Counts I, II, III, and V, and the state law claim asserted in Count VI, are

due to be DISMISSED with prejudice.

2. Individual County Defendants

In Count I of his First Amended Complaint, Murdock alleges a general claim

that all Defendants, including Cunningham, Robinson, and Palmer, violated his

constitutional rights, and in Counts II, III, and IV, Murdock alleges the County

Defendants failed to train detention facility officers, failed to implement appropriate

policies, and adopted and implemented unconstitutional policies, customs, and

practices. (Doc. 32 at 11-14.) The crux of these claims is Murdock’s contention that

the individual County Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his right to be free

from prolonged detention. (Doc. 54 at 14-15.) Murdock argues that his 48-day

detention could have been prevented had detention facility staff acknowledged his

repeated requests for a hearing.

a. Chief Deputy Sheriff Cunningham

i. Count I

In Count I, Murdock lists Cunningham among the defendants he claims

violated his constitutional rights, but the First Amended Complaint does not specify

which of Cunningham’s actions deprived Murdock of any particular right. (See Doc.

32 at 10.) In his brief in response to summary judgment, Murdock groups

Cunningham with defendants Robinson and Palmer, arguing that Cunningham’s

failure to follow the warrant’s directive to immediately bring Murdock before the

circuit court violated Murdock’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc.

54 at 12-14.) Murdock does not, however, allege any facts or present any evidence

of Cunningham’s personal involvement in Murdock’s detention.16

Section 1983 does not generally recognize respondeat superior liability.

Braddy v. Florida Dept. of Labor & Employment Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 802 (11th Cir.

1998). Instead, supervisory defendants are liable only if they personally participated

in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct or if there is “a causal connection between

16 Murdock does contend that Alabama law imposes a personal duty on Cunningham related to the detention of

probation violators, and that this duty was breached when Cunningham detained Murdock on a probation violation in

excess of 20 days. (Doc. 54 at 16-17.) Section 15-22-54(c) of the Code of Alabama provides that “no probationer

shall be held in jail awaiting [a] violation hearing for longer than 20 business days, unless new criminal charges are

pending. If the hearing is not held within the specified time, the sheriff shall release the probation violator unless

there are other pending criminal charges.” Ala. Code § 15-22-54(c). What Murdock alleges here is a violation of state

law. A state law violation alone cannot support a claim of liability under § 1983; instead, there must be some federal

statutory or constitutional component to the claim. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980). What’s more, this

statute applies to sheriffs. Cunningham was a chief deputy sheriff, not sheriff, at the time of the events alleged in the

First Amended Complaint. The sheriff is not named as a defendant in this lawsuit.

[their] actions . . . and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at

1360. At the time of Murdock’s detention, Cunningham was chief deputy sheriff of

Montgomery County, later becoming sheriff. (Doc. 49-7 at 9; Doc. 86 at 25.) Unlike

Defendants Robinson and Palmer, as discussed infra, Murdock does not allege that

Cunningham was ever present at the detention facility during Murdock’s detention

or that Cunningham was ever on notice that Murdock had been detained for weeks

without an appearance before a judge. Cunningham testified during his deposition

that he does not recall meeting Murdock and was not aware of Murdock’s detention

in the facility until the present lawsuit was filed. (Doc. 49-7 at 6, 7, 11.) Under these

circumstances, Cunningham did not possess the level of personal knowledge

typically required to hold an official liable in his individual capacity. Absent

Cunningham’s personal involvement or a causal connection between his actions and

the alleged constitutional violations, summary judgment is due to be GRANTED in

Cunningham’s favor as to Count I.

ii. Count II

As to Count II, Murdock alleges that Cunningham breached a duty to

adequately train and supervise detention facility employees and breached a duty to

intervene when an individual’s constitutional rights are being violated. (Doc. 32 at

12.) In order to survive the County Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to

Count II, Murdock must present sufficient evidence of either a “custom or policy

[that] result[s] in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights,” facts that support

an “inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew

that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so,”

or “a history of widespread abuse [that] put[ ] the responsible supervisor on notice

of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fail[ed] to do so.” Cottone, 326

F.3d at 1360. “The deprivations that constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify

the supervising official must be obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued

duration, rather than isolated occurrences.” Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269

(11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Here, although Cunningham acknowledged that facility director Robinson

reported to him, there are no other allegations or evidence that Cunningham had any

involvement in training or directing staff at the detention facility to support an

inference that he “directed . . . subordinates to act unlawfully” or knew they would

do so and failed to stop them. Id. When questioned during his deposition about the

specifics of detention facility policies, procedures, and training, Cunningham

repeatedly deferred to Robinson for answers to those questions. (Doc. 49-7 at 7, 8,

9, 10, 11.)

Nonetheless, Murdock contends that Cunningham “promulgated a custom or

policy of inadequate training and supervision that demonstrated deliberate

indifference . . . .” (Doc. 32 at 11.) But as previously noted, the parties agree that

they are unaware of any other instances of detainees at the detention facility being

held for weeks without a court hearing. “Evidence that the Jail staff occasionally

erred and failed to fulfill their duties as instructed is insufficient to satisfy the high

standard for supervisory liability.” West, 496 F.3d 1331. Absent a showing of a

history of widespread abuse that would have put Cunningham on notice of the

obvious need for further training, summary judgment is due to be GRANTED in

favor of Cunningham as to Count II.

iii. Count III

With regard to Murdock’s claim in Count III that Cunningham adopted

policies that failed to recall a four-year-old warrant (Doc. 32 at 13), as the court has

already discussed in its analysis of this claim against the City Defendants, only

Circuit Judge Tracey McCooey had the authority to recall a warrant issued by her

office. See Ex parte Greensboro, 948 So. 2d at 543 (recalling warrants is a judicial

function). Cunningham did not have “authority and responsibility over the

government function in issue” in Count III nor did he have “final policymaking

authority . . . concerning the act alleged to have caused the particular constitutional

violation in issue.” Grech, 335 F.3d at 1329. Summary judgment is due to be

GRANTED in favor of Cunningham on Count III.

Having granted summary judgment in favor of Cunningham on all federal

claims, the court elects not to exercise pendent jurisdiction as to Murdock’s state law

claims against Cunningham. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. Accordingly, those claims

will be DISMISSED without prejudice.

b. Colonel Robinson and Major Palmer

i. Count I

As he did with all other defendants, Murdock names Robinson and Palmer in

Count I of the First Amended Complaint. Therein, Murdock claims that Robinson

and Palmer’s actions and inactions resulted in his prolonged detention in the

Montgomery County Detention Facility without due process,17 namely an initial

appearance or appointment of counsel. (Doc. 32 at 7-8 .)

Unlike a hearing to determine probable cause, the Alabama Rules of Criminal

Procedure mandate an initial appearance before a neutral magistrate whether an

arrest is made with or without a warrant. See Ala. R. Crim. P. 4.3. Importantly, “[t]he

information imparted to a detainee at [an initial] appearance serves to enforce or give

meaning to important individual rights,” including notice to the accused of the

charges against him, the constitutional right to counsel, and the privilege against

self-incrimination. Alexander, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1231-32. Consequently, “an

extensive detention without a first appearance substantially impinges upon and

threatens” those constitutional rights. Id. at 1232.

17 In Count I, Murdock asserts that his 48-day detention violated both his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

But as the court has already determined, Murdock’s claims are properly analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment.

A. Liability under § 1983

There is no dispute among the parties that Murdock was detained for 48 days

without any hearing whatsoever. However, Robinson and Palmer’s failure to meet

the 72-hour deadline required by Rule 4.3(b) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal

Procedure does not, without more, infringe upon Murdock’s constitutional rights.

Barnes, 2017 WL 1508239 at *2. Instead, to have a valid constitutional claim,

Murdock must present facts demonstrating Robinson and Palmer’s deliberate

indifference to his Fourteenth Amendment rights. “Conduct by a government actor

. . . will rise to the level of a substantive due process violation only if the act can be

characterized as arbitrary or conscience-shocking in a constitutional sense.” Davis

v. Carter, 555 F.3d 979, 982 (11th Cir. 2009).

“[L]iability for deliberate indifference to inmate welfare rests upon the luxury

enjoyed by prison officials of having time to make unhurried judgments, upon the

chance for repeated reflection, largely uncomplicated by the pulls of competing

obligations.” County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 853.

B. Qualified Immunity

Robinson and Palmer raise the defense of qualified immunity. (Doc. 50 at

29.) Qualified immunity protects government officials from suit unless they violate

“clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A defendant

“asserting that he is entitled to the protection of qualified immunity must initially

establish that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the

allegedly wrongful acts occurred. Once the defendant has made this showing, the

burden shifts to the plaintiff” to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.

Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1199 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal citations

omitted).

To determine whether allegedly wrongful actions are in an individual’s

“discretionary authority,” courts assess whether the acts in question “are of a type

that fell within the employee’s job responsibilities. The inquiry is two-fold: courts

ask whether the government employee was (1) performing a legitimate job-related

function; that is, pursuing a job-related goal, and (2) performing this function

through means that were within his power to utilize.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v.

Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004).

In applying each prong of this test, the court should “look to the general nature

of the defendant’s action, temporarily putting aside the fact that it may have been

committed for an unconstitutional purpose, in an unconstitutional manner, to an

unconstitutional extent, or under constitutionally inappropriate circumstances.” Id.

at 1266. Allegedly unlawful intent is irrelevant. Plotkin v. United States, 465 F.

App’x 828, 831–32 (11th Cir. 2012) (“In determining whether a defendant

performed a discretionary function, our inquiry is not whether the act complained of

was done for an improper purpose . . . .”). Instead “a court must ask whether the act

complained of, if done for a proper purpose, would be within, or reasonably related

to, the outer perimeter of an official’s discretionary duties.” Mikko v. City of Atlanta,

Ga., 857 F.3d 1136, 1144 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted).

Once a defendant has proven that she was acting within her discretionary

authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must make two showings. The

plaintiff must “establish that the defendant violated a constitutional right” and that

the right violated was “clearly established” by law.18 Griffin Indus., Inc., 496 F.3d

at 1199 (internal citations omitted). In considering whether a right is “clearly

established,” relevant law “consists of holdings of the Supreme Court, the Eleventh

Circuit, or the highest court of the relevant state.” Sebastian v. Ortiz, 918 F.3d 1301,

1307 (11th Cir. 2019). Guided by this analysis, the court now considers Robinson

and Palmer’s claims of qualified immunity.

1. Discretionary Authority

Arguing that Robinson and Palmer ignored the warrant’s command that

Murdock be brought before the circuit court, Murdock submits that these defendants

were not acting within their discretionary authority. The inquiry here, however, is

18 Courts may consider these prongs in either order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (“The judges of

the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which

of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the

particular case at hand.”).

not whether Robinson and Palmer had the discretionary authority to detain Murdock

without an immediate court appearance, but rather, whether holding and releasing

detainees is reasonably related to the duties of a detention facility director. “Holding

and releasing prisoners is within the scope of the discretionary authority of jail

administrators and jailers.” Williams v. Williams, Case No. 1:10-cv-34-WHA-SRW,

2010 WL 779290, at * 3 (M.D. Ala. May 21, 2010).

The court concludes that during Murdock’s detention, Robinson and Palmer

were acting within their discretionary authority as facility directors. This shifts the

burden to Murdock to demonstrate that qualified immunity is not appropriate. To do

so, Murdock must show that Robinson and Palmer violated a constitutional right and

that the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Youmans,

626 F.3d at 562.

2. Constitutional Violation

To establish a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violation,

Murdock must show that Robinson and Palmer acted with deliberate indifference to

his constitutional rights. Cannon v. Macon County, 1 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir.

1993). Human error does not equal deliberate indifference. Instead, Murdock must

demonstrate that Robinson and Palmer had “(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of

serious harm; [and] (2) disregard[ed] . . . that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than

mere negligence.” Cagle v. Sutherland, 334 F.3d 980, 987 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original).

At this point in the court’s analysis, a particular dispute of fact between the

parties becomes material. Murdock maintains that during his 48-day detention, he

submitted both an inmate request form addressed to Colonel Robinson and a

grievance form19 notifying detention facility staff of his prolonged detention without

a court appearance, yet he never received a response to either form. (Doc. 49-1 at

27-28; Doc. 49-2 at 34.)

Robinson and Palmer claim that they have no record that Murdock submitted

any forms during his detention.20 In fact, despite working inside the Montgomery

County Detention Facility and being charged with the custody and care of all inmates

and detainees therein, despite walking through the facility at least three times each

week to speak with inmates (Doc. 49-8 at 14; Doc. 49-9 at 4), and despite Murdock’s

19 While Murdock has not provided evidence, other than his own testimony, to prove he submitted these two forms or

to prove the substance of his complaints, based on his testimony, he would be unable to do so. Robinson testified that

when a detainee submits a grievance, a copy is made and kept within the detention facility’s files. (Doc. 49-8 at 16.)

Although facility policy requires the grievance clerk to send a written receipt to the detainee indicating the date and

time the clerk received the complaint (Doc. 49-6 at 51), a copy of the form is not required to be returned to the detainee.

Murdock testified during his deposition that he submitted two complaint forms, neither of which received a

confirmation or response, written or otherwise. He also filed an affidavit confirming this averment. (Doc. 53-1 at 2.)

Murdock’s testimony and affidavit are sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he submitted

either form. See Stein, 881 F.3d at 857 (holding that a plaintiff’s purely self-serving and uncorroborated statements

“based on personal knowledge or observation” set forth in a verified complaint or affidavit may create an issue of

material fact which precludes summary judgment).

20 In their summary judgment reply brief, Robinson and Palmer accept as true Murdock’s claim that his written

requests were ignored but say they have produced “unrefuted evidence” that they had no subjective knowledge of a

substantial risk of harm to Murdock. (Doc. 57 at 13.) The “evidence,” however, is actually just attorney argument set

forth in their own summary judgment brief. (Doc. 50 at 34-35.)

presence in the facility for 48 days, these defendants insist “they did not know

Murdock; they did not know he was incarcerated in the facility; they never had any

communications with him; and that they were never made aware of his requests for

a court hearing.” (Doc. 50 at 31.)

Notwithstanding these averments, at the summary judgment stage, this court

must construe this dispute of fact in favor of Murdock as the non-movant. The

“facts” at the summary judgment stage are not necessarily what a jury at trial would,

or will, determine to be the facts. See Perez v. Suszczynski, 809 F.3d 1213, 1217

(11th Cir. 2016). Instead, the facts at this procedural stage are what a reasonable

jury could find from the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the party

opposing summary judgment. Scott v. United States, 825 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir.

2016); Swint v. City of Wadley, Ala., 51 F.3d 988, 992 (11th Cir. 1995) (emphasis

added). These fact-defining rules are especially important here because whether a

jury credits Murdock’s account of the facts could be outcome-determinative in this

case.

Counsel for Robinson and Palmer acknowledged at oral argument that any

form submitted by a detainee stating he had not received a hearing within 72 hours

of his arrest “would have gone to the attention of the director or at least the assistant

director” of the facility. (Doc. 86 at 36.) Counsel’s acknowledgment is confirmed

by Montgomery County Detention Facility Policy No. E-401 which provides that

“an emergency grievance21 . . . should be forwarded . . . immediately to an official

at a level capable of immediately correcting the situation” and that “[e]mergency

grievances should receive an expedited response at every level.” (Doc. 49-6 at 55.)

In addition, Robinson stated during her deposition testimony that one of her

duties as director of the detention facility is to “deal with grievances,” either by

responding to written forms or “walk[ing] the jail [and] talk[ing] to the inmates.”

(Doc. 49-8 at 14.) As assistant director of the facility, Palmer, too, was responsible

for handling grievances and “walk[ing] the floor at least three times a week” to

address inmate issues. (Doc. 49-9 at 4.) Robinson further testified that if a detainee

submitted a form complaining that he had not received a court appearance, “that’s

just a matter of simply picking up the phone and calling over to the clerk’s office.”

(Id.)

A reasonable jury could credit Murdock’s testimony that on two separate

occasions he followed detention facility procedure to submit complaint forms to

facility staff, including an inmate request form addressed directly to Robinson.22 If

21 The detention facility’s Policy and Procedure Directive identifies an emergency grievance as one which presents a

“substantial risk of serious harm or another factor requiring expedited consideration.” (Doc. 49-6 at 55.)

22 A jury could instead find Robinson and Palmer’s account of the facts more credible. There is testimonial evidence

in the record to support both accounts. Either way, weighing evidence and determining the credibility of the parties

is not the court’s role at this procedural stage. Smith v. LePage, 834 F.3d 1285, 1296 (11th Cir. 2016) (Issues of

material fact are properly resolved “only by a finder of fact because [the issues] may reasonably be resolved in favor

of either party.”). Instead, “[w]hen considering a motion for summary judgment, including one asserting qualified

immunity, ‘courts must construe the facts and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party

and when conflicts arise between the facts evidenced by the parties, [the court must] credit the nonmoving party’s

version.’” Feliciano, 707 F.3d at 1252 (quoting Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006)).

Murdock’s forms indicated that he had not yet received a court appearance, those

forms would have gone to the attention of either Robinson as the facility director or

to Palmer as the assistant director, putting these defendants on notice that Murdock

had been detained for weeks without a hearing.23

A jury could then reasonably find that the directors’ knowledge of Murdock’s

detention without a court appearance, combined with their failure to make a simple

phone call on his behalf, was more than mere negligence. Instead, a reasonable jury

could find that these defendants knew their inaction could lead to Murdock’s

continued detention without due process and yet they disregarded any such risk. If

a jury finds Murdock’s contentions credible, it could reasonably find that Robinson

and Palmer’s conscious disregard of an ongoing, weeks-long constitutional violation

demonstrates deliberate indifference at a level that shocks the conscience.

The court acknowledges that the deliberate indifference standard is “a difficult

burden for a plaintiff to meet.” Popham v. City of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561, 1563

(11th Cir. 1990). Nonetheless, Murdock has presented facts sufficient for a

reasonable fact-finder to determine that he has overcome this burden. See

Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 580 (holding plaintiff’s continued protests regarding his

detention without a court appearance provided an inference that detention officers

knew of a serious risk and their failure to pass on those complaints to their

23 The County defendants do not assert the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust in this case. (Doc. 86 at 46.)

supervisors evinced serious possibility of deliberate indifference, precluding

summary judgment); see also Hayes, 388 F.3d at 674-75 (holding jail administrator

was not entitled to qualified immunity where administrator consciously disregarded

detainee’s grievance regarding his failure to receive a first appearance required by

state law). Because a jury could so reasonably find, summary judgment cannot be

granted on the theory that there is no Fourteenth Amendment violation here.

The first prong of qualified immunity having been satisfied, the court now

turns to the issue of whether Murdock’s constitutional right to be free from

prolonged detention without due process was clearly established.

3. Clearly Established

Robinson and Palmer are entitled to qualified immunity unless their disregard

of Murdock’s complaints were not only violative of Murdock’s constitutional rights,

as a jury could reasonably find, but also that those rights were clearly established by

law. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (“If the law at the time did not

clearly establish that the officer’s conduct would violate the Constitution, the officer

should not be subject to liability.”).

The customary way of demonstrating that a plaintiff’s constitutional rights

were clearly established is by identifying a case, in existence at the time of the

purported violation, in which the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit found a

violation based on materially similar facts. Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208

F.3d 919, 926 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[U]nless a controlling and materially similar case

declares the official’s conduct unconstitutional, a defendant is usually entitled to

qualified immunity.”). A materially similar decision in a pre-existing case would

“make it obvious to all reasonable government actors, in the defendant's place, that

what he is doing violates federal law.” Id. A close factual fit between the pre-

existing case and the case at issue is typically essential because general propositions

from prior decisions will not do. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

That said, given the discrete factual circumstances that exist within each case,

a pre-existing decision with material similarity is not always necessary to clearly

establish the applicable law. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002); Cannon,

1 F.3d at 1564-65 (holding pretrial detainee had a clearly established right to be free

from false imprisonment without due process even where no prior precedent had

held that the jail official’s specific conduct gave rise to §1983 liability); Cantu v.

City of Dothan, Ala., 974 F.3d 1217, 1232-35 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding police officer

was not entitled to qualified immunity where her use of force was so excessive that

a reasonable officer should have known it was unconstitutional).

As the Supreme Court recognized in its Hope decision, requiring plaintiffs to

find a “materially similar” pre-existing case places a “rigid gloss on the qualified

immunity standard” that is inconsistent with the Court’s earlier precedent. Id. at 739.

The “obvious clarity exception,” as it is called, means that “officials can still be on

notice that their conduct violates established law . . . even in novel factual

circumstances.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. The inquiry remains the same: at the time

she engaged in the conduct giving rise to the claim, did the defendant have fair

warning that her conduct was unconstitutional? See id.

District courts in Alabama have found that prolonged detentions without an

initial appearance can violate a detainee’s substantive due process rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment. Alexander, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1229; Barnes, 2017 WL

1508239 at *2; Jackson v. Hamm, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1241 (M.D. Ala. 1999).

While neither the Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit has specifically decided

whether the failure to provide a timely court appearance to a pretrial detainee is a

violation of a clearly established constitutional right, these courts have considered

whether continued or prolonged detentions of pretrial detainees are constitutional.

In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the case establishing the Fourth

Amendment right to a prompt judicial determination of probable cause following a

warrantless arrest, the Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he consequences of

prolonged detention may be more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest.

Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his source of income,

and impair his family relationships.” Id. at 114. While this language in Gerstein

helps to establish the depth of constitutional concern for prolonged detention, the

decision admittedly applies only to arrests without a warrant.

Four years later, in Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979), the Court held

that the plaintiff, who was arrested and detained for three days despite his protests

of mistaken identity, failed to demonstrate a constitutional violation because his

relatively short detention pursuant to a valid warrant did not amount to a deprivation

of liberty without due process. The Court went on, though, to note that after the

lapse of a certain amount of time, continued detention in the face of repeated protests

will deprive the accused of liberty without due process. The Court acknowledged:

Obviously, one in [a pretrial detainee’s] position could not be

detained indefinitely in the face of repeated protests of innocence even

though the warrant under which he was arrested and detained met the

standards of the Fourth Amendment . . . . We may even assume,

arguendo, that depending on what procedures the State affords

defendants following arrest and prior to actual trial, mere detention

pursuant to a valid warrant but in the face of repeated protests of

innocence will after the lapse of a certain amount of time deprive the

accused of “liberty . . . without due process of law.”

Baker, 443 U.S. at 144-45.

Courts in other Circuits have relied on the pronouncements in Baker to hold

that prolonged detentions without an initial appearance violate due process rights

afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Jauch, 874 F.3d at 427 (holding 96-day

detention without initial appearance violated procedural due process); Hayes, 388

F.3d at 673 (holding 38-day detention without initial appearance violated substantive

due process); Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 573 (holding 57-day detention without initial

appearance violated substantive due process); Oviatt, 954 F.2d at 1477 (holding that

114-day detention without initial appearance violated procedural due process).

Although neither the Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit have defined a

specific time period after which a detention becomes “prolonged,” to be clearly

established, “the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable

official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). In other words, a constitutional right is clearly

established when “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).

Here, it would have been sufficiently clear to a reasonable jailer that holding

a pretrial detainee for 48 days without a court appearance would violate a

constitutional right.

As noted supra, each aspect of an initial court appearance achieves a

constitutional purpose. An initial appearance marks the formal beginning of the

criminal prosecution during which a judge ensures the defendant is the person named

in the complaint, informs the defendant of the charges against him, and determines

conditions of release. Ala. R. Crim. P. 4.4. In addition, the judge informs the

defendant of his right to counsel and, if the defendant is indigent, of his right to

appointed counsel. Id. The elements of a first appearance enforce important

individual rights that are either expressly granted in the Constitution or are

prescribed by Supreme Court precedent.

Recognizing the importance of these constitutional safeguards, the

commentary to Rule 4.4 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure confirms that

the constitutional components of a first appearance apply to Alabama's criminal

process. “Rule 4.4(a) insures procedural compliance with Miranda v. Arizona . . .

and Escobedo v. Illinois . . . as well as provides for the prompt determination of the

conditions for release.” Ala. R. Crim. P. 4.4 committee comment (internal citations

omitted). A prolonged detention without a hearing, therefore, threatens and

impinges upon a detainee’s constitutional rights. Alexander, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1229.

During her deposition, Robinson confirmed that detention facility staff,

including facility directors, are trained to follow specific procedures in conformity

with the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, including procedures to guarantee

that detainees are scheduled for timely court hearings. (Doc. 49-8 at 17.) Rule 4.3

requires that a pretrial detainee appear before a judge within three days of arrest.

Ala. R. Crim. P. 4.3. If a reasonable officer knows that without a court appearance,

detentions of even four days violate Rule 4.3, then it certainly would be obvious to

that officer that a 48-day detention is violative. As the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals has held, the very purpose of Rule 4.3 is “to ensure that defendants are not

forgotten and left in jail without . . . due process.” Dutell v. State, 596 So. 2d 624,

625 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).

Moreover, construing the facts in Murdock’s favor, Murdock repeatedly

protested his failure to receive a prompt court appearance, at least twice in writing.

The court considers this a key factor because the Supreme Court conspicuously

noted the importance of protestations in its Baker decision. 443 U.S. at 144-45. As

the Court suggested in Baker, the Constitution does not permit a jailer to hold a

detainee indefinitely without procedural protections, particularly in the face of

repeated protests. Although the Constitution does not mandate the specific pretrial

procedures required by the state of Alabama, it certainly does not tolerate the

absence of any procedure whatsoever. Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 575.

Having testified about their training on the Alabama Rules of Criminal

Procedure, which enforce protections afforded by the Constitution and recognized

by the United States Supreme Court, Robinson and Palmer could not reasonably

believe that holding Murdock in the facility for 48 days without a court appearance,

in spite of his repeated protests, was constitutional. Murdock’s constitutional right

to be free from prolonged detention without an appearance before a judge is obvious

and therefore, clearly established. Robinson and Palmer are not entitled to qualified

immunity. Summary judgment is due to be DENIED as to Murdock’s claims against

Robinson and Palmer in Count I.

ii. Count II

In Count II, Murdock contends that Robinson and Palmer’s failure to

adequately train and supervise detention facility employees on the appropriate

procedures to ensure all detainees are afforded their constitutional rights led to his

prolonged detention. (Doc. 32 at 11-12.) Murdock asserts that the detention facility

officers ignored his repeated verbal requests for assistance and failed to provide the

appropriate documents to voice his grievances, thereby causing his

unconstitutionally prolonged detention.

Robinson and Palmer dispute these allegations and argue that they trained

their officers appropriately. They assert that detention facility rovers were trained

to walk through the dormitory periodically, write down any inmate requests or

concerns, and respond accordingly. (Doc. 49-8 at 9-12.) Robinson testified during

her deposition that facility staff are trained to keep a supply of grievance forms on

hand and to request additional forms should they run out. (Id. at 12.) In addition,

these defendants argue that the individual officers who ignored Murdock’s requests

are the ones who should be held accountable in this action. And true enough,

Murdock has not named any detention facility officers as defendants in this lawsuit.

Instead, Murdock asserts that Robinson and Palmer are liable for failing to properly

train facility staff to ensure they followed procedure, especially when a pretrial

detainee alerts an officer that he has not received an appearance before a judge.

To the extent Murdock claims that Robinson and Palmer are responsible for

the actions of the detention facility officers through a theory of respondeat superior,

his claims are not cognizable under § 1983. See Braddy, 133 F.3d at 801. However,

as directors of the facility, Robinson and Palmer did act in supervisory roles, so

Murdock may establish liability if he demonstrates that these defendants “personally

participated in the violation” or that “there was a causal connection between the

actions of [the defendant(s)] and the violation.” Id. at 801-02. This causal

connection can be established where a history of widespread abuse puts a supervisor

on notice of the need for more training to correct an alleged deprivation. Id. at 802.

As the court previously noted in its analysis of Murdock’s claims against

Cunningham, there is no evidence here that Robinson and Palmer were aware of

regular instances of prolonged detentions or repeated incidents of officers denying

access to grievance forms such that the directors should have recognized an obvious

need for further training or supervision. Where the plaintiff bases a failure-to-train

claim on a single incident, and where the need for training is not “so obvious,” courts

have held that a plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege a widespread pattern of abuse.

See, e.g., Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1329 (11th

Cir. 2015); Diamond v. Owens, 131 F. Supp. 3d 1346, 1381 (M.D. Ga. 2015).

Murdock has not shown that the training detention facility officers receive is

constitutionally inadequate for their duties. If Murdock’s version of the facts is to

be believed, these officers certainly ignored their training on multiple occasions with

respect to Murdock’s repeated complaints and requests for assistance, but evidence

that detention facility personnel may have failed to follow procedure, even multiple

times, is insufficient to satisfy a claim that Robinson and Palmer knew of the failure

or were aware of any need for additional training. See West, 496 F.3d at 1330

(“Evidence that the Jail staff occasionally erred and failed to fulfill duties is

insufficient to satisfy the high standard for supervisory liability.”).

Based on the evidentiary record, the court cannot find that Robinson and

Palmer were deliberately indifferent to Murdock’s constitutional rights by failing to

properly train their staff. Summary judgment on Count II is due to be GRANTED

in favor of Robinson and Palmer.

iii. Count IV

In Count IV, Murdock charges Robinson and Palmer with failing to

implement appropriate policies and adopting unconstitutional policies. (Doc. 32 at

14.) The First Amended Complaint does little to clarify which policies these

defendants failed to implement or which policies they should have adopted. In

response to summary judgment, Murdock contends that “Robinson and Palmer did

not implement any policies or procedures that would ensure that the warrant was

properly followed once received at the Detention Center.” (Doc. 54 at 19.) At oral

argument, counsel for Murdock clarified, “the policies . . . are fine, but they were

not implemented.” (Doc. 86 at 45.) Murdock argues that Robinson and Palmer

knew, or should have known, that Murdock had not had a court appearance and

failed to remedy the violation. Id.

Robinson and Palmer respond by noting that facility policies were

implemented here. (Doc. 50 at 37-38 (emphasis added).) They state that each

weekday morning, detention facility staff gathered the arrest warrants and detention

orders and sent those documents, along with a list of newly arrested detainees, to the

circuit court clerk. The defendants note that Murdock’s paperwork was stamped as

received by the circuit court clerk on June 20, 2014, proving that a detention facility

policy that helps to ensure detainees receive timely court appearances was properly

implemented. (Doc. 49-5 at 41-43.)

The record reveals that at some point after the circuit court clerk stamped the

official notice of Murdock’s arrest and detention, the process of scheduling an initial

appearance broke down. This court is unable to discern where exactly that

breakdown occurred, whether in the circuit court clerk’s office or the circuit judge’s

office, because no evidence or testimony has been presented by any party as to what

the failure was or when or where it took place. But the evidentiary record does

demonstrate that, for reasons unknown at this time, Murdock was neither scheduled

for a court appearance nor escorted to the courthouse the morning after his arrest.

To further support their position, Robinson and Palmer argue that the Inmate

Handbook sets forth several methods for a pretrial detainee to directly request

assistance from the facility administration. Murdock counters that, although the

handbook provides that grievance forms should be used to lodge complaints, the

grievance forms were unavailable and his repeated requests for forms were ignored

by detention facility staff, in contravention of facility policy. (Doc. 53-1 at 2; Doc.

54-3 at 88-94, 100, 104, 267-68.) Murdock does not, however, point to any other

known instances of facility detainees failing to receive timely court appearances as

a result of lapses in policy implementation. Therefore, to the extent Murdock asserts

that Robinson and Palmer are liable for the failure of their subordinates to follow or

implement policy, his claims must fail.

However, to the extent Murdock alleges Robinson and Palmer personally

failed to implement facility policy, his claim survives. Murdock may establish

liability as to Count IV if he can demonstrate that Robinson and Palmer “personally

participated in the violation” or that “there was a causal connection between the

actions of [the defendant(s)] and the violation.” Braddy, 133 F.3d at 801.

At the summary judgment stage, this court must construe the facts in favor of

Murdock as the non-movant. Murdock insists that he submitted two separate forms

to Robinson and Palmer protesting his failure to be taken before a judge.24 If a jury

24 As noted supra, Murdock testified that his inmate request form was addressed to Robinson, whereas his grievance

form complaining of his continued detention would have been routed to either Robinson or Palmer as directors of the

facility.

credits this testimony, it could reasonably determine that Robinson and Palmer were

on notice of Murdock’s weeks-long detention without a court appearance—a

violation of facility policies intended to enforce the Alabama Rules of Criminal

Procedure and protect constitutional rights. If a jury believes that Robinson and

Palmer ignored these requests, as Murdock alleges, it could reasonably find that

these defendants personally failed to implement facility policy and ensure

Murdock’s timely appearance before a judge, thereby causing his continued

detention.25 A reasonable jury could find that the directors’ inaction shocks the

conscience and was therefore deliberately indifferent to Murdock’s substantive due

process rights; rights that this court has explained are obvious and clearly

established. Summary judgment as to Count IV is due to be DENIED.

F. State Law Claim against Robinson and Palmer

This leaves for resolution the state law claim in Count VII, alleging false

imprisonment. (Doc. 32 at 17-18.) Robinson and Palmer argue that, as to this claim,

they are entitled to state agent immunity under Alabama state law, specifically

Alabama’s Jailer Act. (Doc. 50 at 39.)

25 The court does note that, following Murdock’s release, the detention facility implemented new policies to ensure

detainees are scheduled for timely court appearances, including a partnership with the local public defender’s office.

(Doc. 49-7 at 5-6.) This demonstrates that the facility has made an effort to protect against future prolonged detentions,

but with regard to Murdock’s requests for assistance during his own detention, a reasonable jury could find that those

requests provided notice to the directors of an ongoing constitutional violation, yet fell on deaf ears.

Alabama's false imprisonment statute, § 6-5-170, provides: “False

imprisonment consists in the unlawful detention of the person of another for any

length of time whereby he is deprived of his personal liberty.” Ala. Code § 6-5-170.

In Alabama, state law claims for monetary damages against a sheriff are

barred by Art. I, § 14. Ex parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d 74 (Ala. 1996); McMillan v.

Johnson, 101 F.3d 1363, 1364-65 (11th Cir 1996). Deputy sheriffs are entitled to

the same immunity afforded sheriffs. Hereford v. Jefferson County, 586 So. 2d 209,

210 (Ala. 1991).

Following the passage of the Jailer Act in 2011, district courts in Alabama

have interpreted the Act to entitle jailers to the same immunity enjoyed by sheriffs

and deputies, provided the jailers are acting within the line and scope of their duties

and in compliance with the law. Young v. Myhrer, 243 F. Supp. 3d 1243, 1257-58

(N.D. Ala. 2017).

In Young v. Myhrer, a district judge found that the phrase “in compliance with

the law,” as used in the Act, provides jailers with immunity from suit for all state

law torts, as long as that the jailers were complying with criminal and civil statutes

as well as constitutional standards. Id. According to Young, “if a case has reached

the dispositive motions phase, only when sufficient evidence exists that a jailer has

violated a criminal statute, a civil statute, or a constitutional principle does he lose

the Jailer Act’s sovereign immunity protection and become subject to Alabama tort

laws.” Id. at 1258; see also Johnson v. Milliner, 65 F.Supp.3d 1295, 1305 (S.D. Ala.

2014) (denying immunity under the Jailer Act when a dispute of material fact existed

as to whether the defendant had violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights).

Here, in its analysis of Robinson and Palmer’s qualified immunity defense,

the court already has found that, at all times relevant to the First Amended

Complaint, Robinson and Palmer were acting within the scope of their duties as

directors of the detention facility. The court has also identified a material dispute of

fact regarding Robinson and Palmer’s deliberate indifference to Murdock’s

constitutional rights. As a result, consistent with the findings of other district courts,

these defendants have not shown that they were acting in compliance with

constitutional standards and are consequently not entitled to immunity under the

Jailer Act. If a jury finds that Robinson and Palmer violated Murdock’s

constitutional rights by ignoring his written complaints, that jury could reasonably

find that these defendants unlawfully detained Murdock, depriving him of personal

liberty, and thereby find in Murdock’s favor as to his false imprisonment claim. Ala.

Code § 6–5–170. Summary judgment is due to be DENIED as to Count VII.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED as follows:

1. The Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 46) filed by Defendants City of

Montgomery, Kevin Murphy, Jeremy Lewis, and Nickie Givan is

GRANTED as to the federal claims (Counts I, II, and III);

2. The Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendants City of Montgomery,

Kevin Murphy, and Jeremy Lewis and Nickie Givan (Counts VII, VIII, IX,

X and XII) are DISMISSED without prejudice;

3. The Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 48) filed by Defendants

Montgomery County, Derrick Cunningham, Wanda Robinson, and

Barbara Palmer is GRANTED as to the federal claims against Derrick

Cunningham (Counts I, II, and III);

4. The Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 48) is GRANTED and as to

Count II against Wanda Robinson and Barbara Palmer;

5. The Plaintiff’s claims against Montgomery County (Counts I, II, III, V,

and VI) are DISMISSED with prejudice;

6. The Plaintiff’s state law claims against Derrick Cunningham (Counts VII

and X) are DISMISSED without prejudice;

7. All claims for equitable relief are DISMISSED as moot;

8. The City of Montgomery, Kevin Murphy, Jeremey Lewis, Nickie Givan,

Montgomery County, and Derrick Cunningham are DISMISSED as

defendants; and

9. The Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 48) filed by Defendants Wanda

Robinson and Barbara Palmer is DENIED as to Counts I, IV, and VII.

These claims shall proceed.

DONE this the 17th day of September, 2021.

/s/ R. Austin Huffaker, Jr.

R. AUSTIN HUFFAKER, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE