Wilson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CARRIE S. WILSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:19-cv-645-RAH-KFP

) [WO]

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., )

)

Defendant. )

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This is an employment discrimination and retaliation case. Carrie Wilson

(“Wilson”) is a former retail banking branch manager for Wells Fargo Bank (“Wells

Fargo”) in Ozark, Alabama who was fired from her job at Wells Fargo for allegedly

falsifying documents in violation of company policy. In connection with her firing, Wilson

claims that Wells Fargo discriminated and retaliated against her based on her race.

Wilson brings suit against Wells Fargo under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”) and Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of

1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”). Wells Fargo has filed a motion for summary

judgment (Doc. 29) (“the motion”), Wilson a response (Doc. 32), and Wells Fargo a short

reply, (Doc. 33), and therefore the motion is ripe for resolution. For good cause shown and

for the reasons that follow, Wells Fargo’s motion is due to be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Wilson was hired at Wells Fargo in 2012 and was promoted to branch manager on

November 13, 2016. (Doc. 29-2, p. 2.) As branch manager, she reported directly to James

Redd, regional banking district manager for Wells Fargo. (Id.) Wilson, like other

employees, was expected to follow all applicable accounting standards, legal requirements,

and the company’s system of internal controls. (Id., p. 3.)

The employment decision at issue in this case concerned Wells Fargo’s use of

Deposit Technical Exception (“DTE”) worksheets. Sometimes, customer accounts are

opened without all documents required by governing banking regulations, such as marriage

licenses, death certificates, and customer signatures. (Id.) When that happens, branch

employees create a DTE worksheet, which allows the branch to document employee efforts

to obtain the missing customer documentation. (Id.) During company audits, branches are

assessed in categories including compliance with company standards, and a loss in points

is assessed when DTE worksheets are not in compliance with standards. (Id.)

Sometime in early April 2018, both Ashley Knight (black female) and Mary

Parkinson (white female), personal bankers who reported to Wilson at the Ozark branch,

contacted Wells Fargo’s corporate employee relations department and lodged

whistleblower complaints about Wilson. (Doc. 29-3, p. 2.) They each reported that during

a surprise company audit of the Ozark branch on March 23, 2018, Wilson intentionally

entered false information (including false dates and follow up activities) on multiple DTE

worksheets, all with the purpose of concealing from the auditors various noncompliance

issues with the DTE worksheets. (Id.)

These allegations were referred to the company’s internal investigations department

which immediately began an investigation. (Doc. 29-3, p. 3.) After reviewing company

records and conducting witness interviews, the investigators authored a report on May 15,

2018, that “confirmed falsification of bank records in this case” and recommended

Wilson’s termination. (Id.)

That same day, Redd and Tamra Addison, a human resources manager, were

informed via email of the investigation’s results and the recommendation that Wilson be

terminated. (Doc. 29-2, p. 4; Doc. 29-3, p. 6.) Though Redd personally liked Wilson, he

ultimately agreed with the decision to fire Wilson. (Doc. 29-2, p. 4.)

Redd and another manager met with Wilson on May 23, 2018, and notified her that

she was fired. (Doc. 29-2, p. 5.) Michelle Rymes, a black female, replaced Wilson as the

Ozark branch manager. (Id., p. 6.)

Wilson contested her termination through Wells Fargo’s discharge review process.

(Doc. 29-4, p. 274.) Wilson did not make any claim of racial discrimination in her initial

termination review request, (id., pp. 274-275), nor did she in connection with her

unemployment claim. But on August 13, 2018, in an email to employee relations

consultant Melissa Pritchard, (id., pp. 513-517), Wilson first raised the issue in reference

to a conversation with Redd on May 8, 2018, about a hiring decision regarding two tellers.

(See Doc. 29-4, pp. 279-280, 513.)

As to that conversation, in her deposition, Wilson testified that, though she did not

remember verbatim what was said between her and Redd, Redd asked Wilson whether she

took diversity into consideration when hiring the two new tellers at the Ozark branch. (Doc.

29-4, pp. 251, 513.) Wilson responded that it depended on how one defined diversity,

explaining that she took the candidates’ qualifications into account, and noted that both

candidates she chose for the positions happened to be male. (Id.) Redd in turn responded

“that’s not what I am talking about,” and Wilson asked him whether he was “asking did I

hire [sic] a Caucasian?” (Id., p. 513.) Redd replied that he was asking about race. (Id., pp.

252, 513.) Wilson then asked Redd whether he asked any white branch managers that ran

predominately white branches to consider diversity in their workplace (Id.) Redd was

“shocked” that Wilson asked that question, but replied “of course I do.” (Id., p. 252.)

Wilson also recalled telling Redd that the racial composition of the candidate pool

included, to the best of her memory, five black applicants and one white applicant; she

remembers explaining that she did not hire the white applicant because of apparent

emotional issues. (Id. p. 253.)

For his part, Redd testified that during the May 2018 conversation with Wilson

about hiring, he asked her “if she took diversity into account when making her hiring

decisions, as required by the Company’s diversity policy.” (Doc. 29-2, p. 5.) Redd “did

not criticize” her hiring decisions, and Wilson never complained to him about this

conversation. (Id.) Redd characterized their conversation as “an extremely brief, routine

business conversation,” and Redd averred that he has had “these same types of diversity

conversations with other bank branch managers” in his district, “including with a

Caucasian branch manager in the Andalusia, Alabama branch where a majority of

employees . . . are Caucasian.” (Id.)

Ultimately, despite Wilson’s concern, Pritchard sent a letter to Wilson on August

30, 2018, upholding Wells Fargo’s termination decision. (Doc. 29-4, p. 481.) Wilson

requested a second level review, which on December 14, 2018, upheld the termination

decision as well. (Id., pp. 482-483.)

Wilson filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) on November 1, 2018. In her charge to the EEOC, Wilson stated

that on May 8, 2018, Redd “inquired about the selection of a Black candidate” for a position

in her branch, and that she “questioned if he made a similar inquiry to the White staff,”

whereby she was discharged “15 days later.” (Doc. 1-1, p. 2.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). “Rule 56 [] mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time

for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)

(alteration in original). The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of

a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party,

who is required to “go beyond the pleadings” to establish that there is a “genuine issue for

trial.” Id. at 324 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

On summary judgment motions, the court must construe the evidence and all

reasonable inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Any factual disputes will be resolved in the non-moving party’s

favor when sufficient competent evidence supports the non-moving party’s version of the

disputed facts. See Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2002) (a

court is not required to resolve disputes in the non-moving party’s favor when that party’s

version of events is supported by insufficient evidence). However, “mere conclusions and

unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment

motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Bald

Mountain Park, Ltd. v. Oliver, 863 F.2d 1560, 1563 (11th Cir. 1989)).

A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The non-movant “must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, the non-movant must present “affirmative

evidence” of material factual conflicts to defeat a properly supported motion for summary

judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. If the non-movant's response consists of nothing

more than conclusory allegations, the court must enter summary judgment for the movant.

See Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1565, n. 6 (11th Cir. 1997); Harris v. Ostrout, 65

F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 1995).

III. ANALYSIS

Wilson makes race discrimination and retaliation claims against Wells Fargo, both

related to her termination. The Court will examine Wilson’s Title VII and § 1981

substantive discrimination and retaliation claims in tandem, as they have the same general

requirements of proof and use the same analytical framework. See CBOCS W., Inc. v.

Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008); Chapter 7 Trustee v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d

1249, 1256-57 (11th Cir. 2012).

First however, the Court would be remiss if it did not note that the party opposing

summary judgment “must spell out his arguments squarely and distinctly, or else forever

hold his peace,” as the Court “may ignore arguments not adequately developed by [the]

nonmovant.” Ratcliff v. Heavy Machines, Inc., Case No. CIV.A. 06-0861-WS-M, 2007 WL

1791646, at *3 (S.D. Ala. June 20, 2007) (citing Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe,

Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 260 (1st Cir. 1999) (the party opposing summary judgment “must spell

out his arguments squarely and distinctly, or else forever hold his peace.”)). “(T)he onus is

upon the parties to formulate arguments.” Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587,

599 (11th Cir. 1995).

Wilson’s brief in response to Wells Fargo’s summary judgment motion barely

makes an attempt to “spell out” her arguments, but, in an abundance of caution, the Court

will still give her claims due consideration. C.f. Resol. Tr. Corp., 43 F.3d at 599 (“grounds

alleged in the complaint but not relied upon in summary judgment are deemed

abandoned.”).

A. Wilson’s Race Discrimination Claim

To demonstrate a case of race discrimination based on circumstantial evidence

under the McDonnell Douglas framework,1 Wilson must first establish a prima facie case

of race discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

After establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production is placed

upon Wells Fargo to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment

action. See Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). Wilson may

then seek to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for her

termination “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more

likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered

explanation is unworthy of credence.” Id. at 256; Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d

1519, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997).

In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Wilson “has to show four

things: (1) that she was a member of a protected class, (2) that she was qualified for the

job, (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) that she was replaced by

someone outside the protected class.” Hinson v. Clinch Cty., Georgia Bd. of Educ., 231

F.3d 821, 828 (11th Cir. 2000).

Another way to meet the fourth analytical prong is for Wilson to demonstrate that

she was treated less favorably than someone outside her protected class, i.e., by offering a

“comparator.” See Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1091 (11th Cir. 2004).

To be a valid comparator, an employee must be similarly situated “in all material respects,”

but need not be “nearly identical” to the plaintiff. Lewis v. Union City, GA, 918 F.3d 1213,

1 Wilson did not present, nor does she argue, direct evidence of race discrimination.

1218-19 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc). A valid comparison turns “not on formal labels, but

rather on substantive likenesses.” Id. at 1228. “If a plaintiff fails to show the existence of a

similarly situated employee, summary judgment is appropriate where no other evidence of

discrimination is present.” Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997),

abrogated on other grounds by Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1224-25.

Here, Wells Fargo does not dispute that Wilson meets the first two prongs of the

prima facie framework, i.e., that Wilson is a member of a protected class and that she was

qualified for her job. And of course, job termination is the quintessential adverse

employment action. Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008) (adverse

employment actions include “ultimate employment decisions ... such as termination, failure

to hire, or demotion”). So, the only dispute about the prima facie case of Wilson’s race

discrimination claim is whether she was either replaced by a person outside of her protected

class or otherwise treated worse than her proffered comparators.

Wilson does not offer any legitimate evidence that she was replaced by a person of

a different protected class. In her summary judgment response, she identifies her

replacement, Michelle Rhymes, and describes her as “German.” (See Doc. 32, p. 8.) But

Wilson does not actually argue that Rymes is not a member of her own protected class, i.e.,

black. In her deposition, Wilson was a little more forthcoming about Rhymes when she

admitted “I guess [Rymes] identifies herself as African-American.” (See Doc. 29-4, pp.

287-289.) Regardless, Wilson cannot meet her prima facie burden under this consideration

because Wilson has failed to show that she was replaced by someone outside her protected

class. Instead, from all that appears from the record, including Wilson’s own testimony,

Wilson was replaced by someone in her same protected class.

Then, to meet her prima facie burden on the fourth prong, Wilson must show that

she was treated less favorably than a comparator. Wilson fails on this end, too. In her

Complaint, Wilson vaguely references several unidentified employees who “have engaged

in similar or worse falsification of documents and have not been terminated” and who were

subjected to better terms and conditions of employment, (see Doc. 1, p. 3), but she does

not specify how they were similarly situated to her or who they even were.2 And in her

summary judgment response, she altogether abandons any effort to substantively prove

these allegations with any evidence. Wilson cannot create a genuine issue of material fact

based on her complaint allegations alone, and even those vaguely referenced employees do

not come remotely close to meeting her burden of showing similarly situated “in all

material respects.” See Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia, 918 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th

Cir. 2019); Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of Div. of Universities of Fla. Dep't of Educ. ex rel.

Univ. of S. Fla., 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Wood v. Berryhill, Case

No. 4:18-CV-558-RDP, 2019 WL 3413785, at *6, n. 3 (N.D. Ala. July 29, 2019) (“Because

2 In the part of her brief discussing retaliation, Wilson vaguely references an accusation of

document falsification about a subordinate, Parkinson, that she made to Redd. (Doc. 32, p. 10,

citing Doc. 29-4, p. 141.) Wilson makes little other attempt to explain how Parkinson is a proper

comparator. See Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1227-1228; see also Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385

F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[A] legal claim or argument that has not been briefed before

the court is deemed abandoned and its merits will not be addressed.”). The attempt she does make

is insufficient to meet her prima facie burden.

Plaintiff’s briefs do not present adequate argument on this issue, the court is under no

obligation to consider it.”).

Accordingly, Wilson has failed to meet her burden of proof for race discrimination

under McDonnell Douglas as it concerns her termination, and therefore Wells Fargo’s

motion for summary judgment as to Count I of the Complaint is due to be granted.

B. Retaliation

In Count II, Wilson advances a claim for retaliation in the context of her termination.

Wilson can demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that (1) she engaged

in protected conduct; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a

causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action.

Crawford, 529 F.3d at 970. Once she meets this burden, Wells Fargo must articulate a

legitimate non-retaliatory reason for its employment action, which Wilson can rebut with

evidence of pretext. See Brown v. Alabama Dep't of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1181-82 (11th

Cir. 2010). In its summary judgment motion, Wells Fargo challenges Wilson’s ability to

meet the first and third prongs.

As to the first prong, informal complaints made to an employee’s superiors and the

use of an employer’s internal grievance procedures can qualify as protected conduct. See

Rollins v. State of Fla. Dep't of Law Enforcement, 868 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1989). “A

complaint about an employment practice constitutes protected opposition only if the

individual explicitly or implicitly communicates a belief that the practice constitutes

unlawful employment discrimination.” Carson v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth.

(MARTA), 572 F. App'x 964, 969 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) §§

8–II–B(2) (2006)); see also Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008)

(the EEOC manual reflects “a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts

and litigants my properly resort for guidance”).

Here, Wells Fargo asserts that Wilson cannot show that she engaged in protected

conduct prior to her termination. To the extent Wilson relies upon her complaints of

discrimination that occurred after her termination, those communications clearly cannot

serve as the basis for actionable protected conduct. See Hawk v. Atlanta Peach Movers,

469 F. App'x 783, 786 (11th Cir. 2012); McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1376 (11th

Cir. 2008) (to establish causation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer was aware

of the protected conduct). The only other communication or action to which Wilson refers,

concerns a May 2018 conversation with Redd about Wells Fargo’s diversity practices and

Wilson’s hiring of two new tellers. During that conversation, Redd asked Wilson whether

she had taken diversity into account when she hired two new tellers for that office, to which

Wilson responded and asked Redd whether he asked that question of white branch

managers.

At best, even in the light most favorable to Wilson, the Court cannot conclude that

there was any protected activity during this communication. To be considered protected

activity, “the employee must still, at the very least, communicate her belief that

discrimination is occurring to the employer, and cannot rely on the employer to infer that

discrimination has occurred.” Demers v. Adams Homes, Inc., 321 F. App’x 847, 852 (11th

Cir. 2009) (internal quotes omitted); see Murphy v. City of Aventura, 383 F. App'x 915,

918 (11th Cir. 2010); Jeronimus v. Polk County Opportunity Council, Inc., 145 F. App’x

319, 326 (11th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff’s complaint “of being ‘singled out,’ being subjected to

‘a campaign of harassment,’ and working in a ‘hostile environment’” was not protected

conduct where plaintiff “never suggested that this treatment was in any way related to . . .

race or sex”); Hill v. IGA Food Depot, Case No. 204CV00966WKWVPMWO, 2006 WL

3147672, at *5 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 2, 2006) (“If he was opposing something,” Plaintiff did

not demonstrate supervisor had reason to know he was complaining about an illegal

employment practice, where, while Plaintiff did ask why the store had fewer African-

American cashiers than was proportionate to its customer base, and thus might have alerted

the supervisor that Plaintiff was asking a question about race, that inquiry “is a far cry from

alleging that an employee or the company is intentionally refusing to hire African-

Americans.”); Dowell v. Prime Healthcare Corp., Case No. CIV. A. 00-D-686-E, 2001

WL 611198, at *11 (M.D. Ala. May 4, 2001), aff'd sub nom. Dowell v. Prime Healthcare,

277 F.3d 1380 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The employee must complain of discrimination, not about

unfairness and the like.”); Webb v. R & B Holding Co., 992 F. Supp. 1382, 1389 (S.D. Fla.

1998) (“It is not enough for the employee merely to complain about a certain policy or

certain behavior of co-workers and rely on the employer to infer that discrimination has

occurred.”).

Wilson’s question to Redd about whether Redd discussed diversity with white

branch managers could in theory be construed as a statement to him that she was concerned

about the propriety of his remarks. Still, her statement “lacked sufficient detail to constitute

statutorily protected expression,” as it “does not appear that [Wilson] suggested to [Redd]

in any way that she was complaining of [race] discrimination,” and “(t)hus, her statement

does not constitute protected opposition sufficient to trigger Title VII's anti-retaliation

provisions.” Snellgrove v. Teledyne Abbeville, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1238, n.19 (M.D.

Ala. 1999) (citing Webb, 992 F.Supp. 1382; EEOC v. Shoney's, Inc., 536 F.Supp. 875, 877

(N.D. Ala. 1982) (“His very generalized complaints were that he was not being treated

fairly in that other managers could date waitresses who worked at the restaurant. There is

nothing in his own testimony of what he said that would put Shoney's on notice that he was

protesting an illegal employment practice.”); Galdieri–Ambrosini v. National Realty &

Development Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 292 (2nd Cir. 1998) (“[Plaintiff's] complaints to Simon

and Chiaro did not state that [she] viewed Simon's actions as based on her gender, and there

was nothing in her protests that could reasonably have led National Realty to understand

that that was the nature of her objections.”); Jurado v. Eleven–Fifty Corporation, 813 F.2d

1406, 1411 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding expression not protected because “Jurado has not

shown that he ever opposed the format change as discriminatory before he was fired. He

merely opposed the change for personal reasons.”)).

Still, even assuming that somehow Wilson’s conversation with Redd could be

construed as a complaint to Redd, Wilson must still show that her complaint was based on

a “good faith reasonable belief” that her employer was engaged in unlawful discrimination.

See Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1351 (11th Cir. 1999). Wilson must

show that she subjectively believed that unlawful discrimination against her was occurring

and that her belief was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record present. See

Howard v. Walgreen Co., 605 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2010). “The objective

reasonableness of an employee's belief that her employer has engaged in an unlawful

employment practice must be measured against existing substantive law.” Clover, 176 F.3d

at 1351.

Wilson offers nothing on that account. To be sure, an employer’s “intent may be

difficult to discern,” Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 813 (11th

Cir. 2010), but “it is not objectively reasonable to presume that, simply because an

employee has been subjected to seemingly inexplicable negative treatment, the true reason

for the treatment must be unlawful discrimination. In other words, it is not objectively

reasonable to infer race or gender discrimination merely from the lack of a clear reason for

an employer’s mistreatment of its employee,” Herron-Williams v. Alabama State Univ.,

805 F. App'x 622, 632 (11th Cir. 2020). Though Wilson offers that she was perhaps

uncomfortable or offended with Redd’s question, she did not actually state to him that she

thought his question was discriminatory, and she did not otherwise complain to him or

anyone else at Wells Fargo about this May 2018 conversation.

Finally, even assuming that Redd and Wilson’s conversation constituted protected

activity,3 Wilson makes little other argument as to the causal connection between that

conversation and Wells Fargo’s termination decision which was made upon whistleblower

3 In her reply brief, Wilson also makes vague reference to “complaints” made in the summer of

2018. (Doc. 32, p. 9.) She offers no other detail or explanation about those dates apart from the

fact that they were the two dates on which she made requests to corporate to review her

termination. As previously discussed, in the June 2018 request, Wilson did not mention

discrimination, and in the August 2018 email, while Wilson did mention alleged discriminatory

conduct, the email was sent to Wells Fargo three months after she was fired, which, as a matter of

logic, could not have caused the decision to terminate her employment. See Hawk v. Atlanta Peach

Movers, 469 F. App'x 783, 786 (11th Cir. 2012); McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1376 (11th

Cir. 2008) (to establish causation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer was aware of the

protected conduct).

complaints made by others, an investigation conducted by others, and an employment

recommendation made by others. Wilson hinted at a theory of temporal causation in her

EEOC charge of discrimination, (see Doc. 1-1, p. 2), but she does not provide any

explanation whatsoever about how this conversation caused her termination. “(I)n order to

survive summary judgment and be entitled to a jury trial, there must be a genuine dispute

as to whether the protected activity was a but-for cause of the adverse employment action.”

Herron-Williams, 805 F. App'x at 633 (citing Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570

U.S. 338, 362 (2013)). With nothing on that score in her brief, Wilson cannot meet the final

prong of her prima facie burden. See Resol. Tr. Corp., 43 F.3d at 599 (“grounds alleged in

the complaint but not relied upon in summary judgment are deemed abandoned.”); ibid

(“There is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that could

be made based upon the materials before it ....”); see also Higgins, 194 F.3d at 260 (a “party

who aspires to oppose a ... motion must spell out his arguments squarely and distinctly, or

else forever hold his peace,” as the district court may ignore arguments not adequately

developed by the nonmovant).

Therefore, because Wilson cannot meet her prima facie burden on her claim of

retaliation, Wells Fargo’s motion for summary judgment as to Count II is also due to be

granted.

C. Reason for Termination – Pretext

Wilson’s discrimination and retaliation claims also fail for an additional reason. As

previously explained, Wells Fargo’s stated reason for termination is Wilson’s falsification

of documents in violation of company policy, and as the Eleventh Circuit has held, breach

of the employer’s internal policies may constitute a legitimate reason. See Schoenfeld v.

Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999).

Thus, the burden shifts back to Wilson to offer that this reason was pretext. Burdine,

450 U.S. at 256. Wilson offers barely anything in response, and further, even admitted to

investigators that she filled out her DTE worksheets in violation of company policy. (Doc.

29-3, p. 6.) Wilson offers that the DTE worksheet process is flawed and that she did not

intentionally falsify documents. However, to demonstrate pretext, Wilson must

demonstrate “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or

contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable

factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610

F.3d 1253, 1265 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “A plaintiff is not allowed to recast an

employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons or substitute [her] business judgment for

that of the employer,” as she does in her quibbles with the DTE process, so “provided that

the proffered reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer, an employee must

meet that reason head on and rebut it, and [she] cannot succeed by simply quarreling with

the wisdom of that reason.” Id. at 1265–66 (citing Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012,

1030 (11th Cir. 2000)).

Wilson’s statement that she did not intentionally falsify the documents is not

dispositive and certainly not dispositive in her favor. “The relevant inquiry is therefore

whether the employer in good faith believed that the employee had engaged in the conduct

that led the employer to discipline the employee.” Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Georgia,

Inc., 967 F.3d 1121, 1148 (11th Cir. 2020). “The inquiry . . . is limited to whether [the

employer] believed that [the employee] was guilty of [misconduct], and if so, whether this

belief was the reason behind [the employee’s] discharge.” Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,

939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 980 n.

2 (11th Cir.1989), cert. den., 495 U.S. 935 (1990) (That the employee did not in fact engage

in misconduct reported to the employer is irrelevant to the question whether the employer

believed the employee had done wrong.)). Federal courts “do not sit as a super-personnel

department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions.” Elrod, 939 F.2d at 1470. An

“employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on

erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory

reason.” Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir.

1984).

Simply put, Wilson’s proffered evidence “is too weak to raise a genuine fact issue.”

Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1268 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,

148 (2000) (the employer is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the plaintiff creates

“only a weak issue of fact” as to whether employer’s proffered reason was untrue and there

was “abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had

occurred”). Thus, both her discrimination and retaliation claims fail.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Wells Fargo’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 29)

on Counts I and II of the Complaint is due to be and is hereby GRANTED. This matter in

its entirety is hereby dismissed. A separate judgment will issue.

DONE, on this the 23rd day of April, 2021.

/s/ R. Austin Huffaker, Jr.

R. AUSTIN HUFFAKER, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE