Mulvaney v. Kane

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

TRISTA C. MULVANEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:13cv677-MHT

) (WO)

DENNIS MEEKS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, plaintiff

Trista C. Mulvaney brought this case contending the

defendants violated her rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment by their deliberate indifference to her

serious medical needs while she was in custody in the

Covington County, Alabama Jail.1 There are two groups

of defendants: those involved primarily in providing

medical care at the jail (collectively, the “medical

1. Mulvaney also cites the First, Fourth, Fifth,

and Ninth Amendments in her complaint, although it

appears that only the Fourteenth Amendment is relevant

to her claim, and she did not respond to the motion to

dismiss as to these claims. The court will dismiss her

claims to the extent they are based on these other

amendments.

defendants”); and those associated with the overall

supervision and custody of inmates in the Covington

County Jail (collectively, the “Sheriff’s Department

defendants”): Sheriff Dennis Meeks, Jail Administrator

Preston Hughes, and Corrections Officers Stacey

Bedsole, Linda Benson,2 Laura Hudson, and Linda

Pouncey.3 Subject-matter jurisdiction is proper under

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question) and 1343 (civil

rights).

The case is now before the court on the motion to

dismiss filed by the Sheriff’s Department defendants.

The motion to dismiss will be granted in part and

denied in part, for the reasons explained below.

2. The complaint notes that Linda Benson carries

the title of “Administrator Sgt. and Court Liaison

Corrections Officer.” Complaint (doc. no. 1) at 3. As

she is referred to as a corrections officer in the

remainder of the complaint, the court refers to her as

such in this opinion, rather than as a supervisor.

3. The court previously dismissed plaintiff’s

claims against Covington County, its county commission,

and certain individual commissioners. See Opinion and

Judgment (doc. nos. 58 & 59).

2

I. MOTION-TO-DISMISS STANDARD

In considering a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the

court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true,

Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), and

construes the complaint in the plaintiff’s favor, Duke

v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir. 1993). “The

issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer

evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes,

416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need

not contain “detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), but “only

enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the

3

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to

a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than

a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

II. BACKGROUND

Mulvaney was arrested in August of 2011 and charged

with possession of a controlled substance, unlawful

possession of drug paraphernalia, driving under the

influence of a controlled substance, and improper lane

change. She was released on bond.

Early the following month, Mulvaney was in court to

plead guilty to marijuana possession. A parole officer

observed her slurring her speech and entering a men’s

bathroom and suspected that she was under the influence

of an intoxicating substance in violation of the terms

of her release on bond. A couple days later, a judge

ordered her bond revoked and issued a warrant for her

4

arrest. On September 13, 2011, Mulvaney was taken into

custody on the bond-revocation warrant and incarcerated

in the Covington County Jail.

Upon arrival at the jail, Mulvaney was placed in a

cell with other inmates. Within hours, she began

“screaming, hallucinating, and acting in such a manner

that other detainees asked that Correction Officers

provide medical treatment” to her. Complaint (doc. no.

1) at 6-7. Her behavior was “erratic and strange,” and

included taking off all her clothes as well as

urinating and defecating on herself and in various

parts of her cell, but not the toilet. Id. at 7.

Other inmates observed her sitting naked on the sink in

the cell, saw urine running out of her cell, and heard

her screaming “throughout the day and night.” Id.

From September 13 until September 18, she refused to

eat or drink.

The jail nurses refused to see or treat Mulvaney

during her incarceration. Mulvaney contends that the

5

four correctional officers she named as defendants were

aware of her concerning behavior and failure to eat,

and did nothing to help her, with a couple minor

exceptions. At some point during her incarceration,

defendant correctional officer Bedsole expressed

concern for Mulvaney’s welfare by attempting to have

her eat a candy bar and a drink, but Mulvaney was

physically unable to eat any food. And, on September

18, as she continued to behave erratically, unnamed

correctional officers ordered two inmates to wash

Mulvaney, who at that time had dried urine and feces in

her hair and all over her body. The inmates placed her

back in bed after the shower.

At some point afterwards, Mulvaney fell from her

bed to the floor and cut her eye. Correctional Officer

Bedsole was observing Mulvaney on a monitor when this

happened and saw the fall. At some point thereafter,

Mulvaney was transported to a local hospital in a state

of unconsciousness.

6

Her eye was sutured at that hospital, but her

condition was so severe that she was transferred to

another hospital for further treatment. Testing there

revealed that she was suffering from paracentral disc

protrusions and a urinary-tract infection. Doctors

also determined that she had been experiencing a series

of seizures. She was admitted to the intensive-care

unit and remained unconscious for approximately three

days.

III. DISCUSSION

The Sheriff’s Department defendants move to dismiss

on multiple grounds, including the statute of

limitations, qualified immunity, lack of standing for

equitable relief, and other grounds. The court will

address each argument in turn.

A. Statute of Limitations

The Sheriff’s Department defendants argue that

7

Mulvaney’s claims should be dismissed because she filed

one day after the statute of limitations passed on her

claims. The medical defendants also moved to dismiss

on this ground, and the court previously denied that

motion, but with leave to re-raise the issue in an

appropriate motion. See Opinion and Order (doc. no.

62). Rather than repeat the analysis here, the court

will simply deny the Sheriff’s Department defendants’

argument for dismissal on statute-of-limitations

grounds for the reasons set forth in the earlier

opinion. As with the medical defendants, the Sheriff’s

Department defendants may immediately re-raise the

issue in an appropriate motion with evidentiary

support.

A. Eighth v. Fourteenth Amendment

The Sheriff’s Department defendants argue that

Mulvaney’s claims should be dismissed because she

improperly pleaded them under the Fourteenth Amendment

8

instead of the Eighth Amendment. While constitutional

claims of denial of medical care for pretrial detainees

are brought under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due

process clause, those for convicted prisoners are

brought under the Eighth Amendment’s protection against

cruel and unusual punishment. See City of Revere v.

Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983).

The Sheriff’s Department defendants contend that, based

on the complaint, Mulvaney was a convicted prisoner at

the time of her incarceration. Their argument is based

on a misreading of the complaint, and accordingly

dismissal on this basis will be denied.4

The defendants argue that, based on the complaint,

4. The same standard applies to a claim for denial

of medical care whether brought under the Eighth or the

Fourteenth Amendment. See Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774

F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir. 1985) (“This court holds

that in regard to providing pretrial detainees with

such basic necessities as food, living space, and

medical care the minimum standard allowed by the due

process clause is the same as that allowed by the

eighth amendment for convicted persons.”). Thus, even

if the complaint were improperly pleaded under the

Eighth Amendment, the court would allow amendment.

9

Mulvaney was serving a sentence at the time of her

incarceration, and accordingly she should have pleaded

her case under the Eighth Amendment, rather than the

Fourteenth Amendment, which applies only to pretrial

detainees. The defendants’ read of the complaint is

understandable, as the complaint is confusingly

drafted. However, their interpretation of the relevant

allegations is incorrect. The complaint establishes

that Mulvaney was a pretrial detainee during her

incarceration, and, accordingly, that the Fourteenth

Amendment governs her claim for denial of medical care.

The relevant facts in the complaint are the

following. Mulvaney was arrested in August 2011 and

charged with possession of a controlled substance,

unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, driving

under the influence of a controlled substance, and

improper lane change. In September 2011, she went to

court to plead guilty to a different offense, marijuana

possession. While in the courthouse for that plea, an

10

officer saw her acting erratically in the courthouse,

which was a breach of the conditions of her release on

bond. Two days later, a State District Court judge

issued an order revoking her bond. After being

informed that her bond was revoked, she was transported

to the Covington County Jail.

The Sheriff’s Department defendants seem to assume

that Mulvaney pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana

in the case stemming from the August arrest at the

September court date, was put back on bond for some

reason after her plea, and had her bond on the

marijuana conviction revoked due to her behavior at the

courthouse that day. But that is a strained reading of

the complaint. Because she was not charged with

marijuana possession in the August arrest, the

reasonable inference is that the marijuana plea was

taken in an entirely different case, and that her

appearance in court that day was mentioned in the

complaint only because it led to the revocation of her

11

bond in the case based on the August arrest, which in

turn led to her incarceration.5

Thus, Mulvaney’s case was brought properly under

the Fourteenth Amendment, and the motion to dismiss on

this ground will be denied.

B. Qualified Immunity

1. The Qualified Immunity Standard

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects

government officials ‘from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which

a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “For a

constitutional right to be clearly established, its

5. Indeed, review of Mulvaney’s publicly available

case records on Alacourt.com confirms this reading.

See State of Alabama v. Trista Mulvaney, DC-2011-1660

(Covington County District Court); State of Alabama v.

Trista Carol Mulvaney (DC-2011-1415) (Covington County

District Court).

12

contours ‘must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable

official would understand’” that the conduct violates

that right, thereby giving fair and clear warning to

government officials who may engage in such behavior.

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 753 (2002) (quoting

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).

“This is not to say that an official action is

protected by qualified immunity unless the very action

in question has previously been held unlawful ... ; but

it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the

unlawfulness must be apparent.” Id.

A defendant who invokes qualified immunity has the

initial burden of showing that he or she "was acting

within the scope of his or her discretionary authority

when the challenged action occurred.” Patel v. City

of Madison, Alabama, 959 F.3d 1330, 1338 (11th Cir.

2020) (citing Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109, 1120

13

(11th Cir. 2013)).6 Once the defendants establish that

they were acting within their discretionary authority,

"the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that

qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Lee v.

Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002).

To determine whether a plaintiff has met her

burden, a court must both “decide whether the facts

that a plaintiff has alleged ... make out a violation

of a constitutional right” and “whether the right at

issue was clearly established at the time of

defendant's alleged misconduct.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at

232 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

It is undisputed that the actions of the Sheriff’s

Department defendants occurred in the exercise of their

discretionary duties. Thus, the court must analyze

whether Mulvaney has met the burden of sufficiently

6. “The term ‘discretionary authority’ ‘include[s]

all actions of a governmental official that (1) were

undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties,

and (2) were within the scope of his authority.’”

Patel, 959 F.3d at 1338 (quoting Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d

1559, 1566 (11th Cir. 1994)).

14

pleading against each defendant a constitutional

violation that was clearly established at the time it

occurred.

2. Constitutional Violation

Mulvaney contends that the Sheriff’s Department

defendants violated her constitutional rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment by denying her necessary medical

care while she was in the jail. To plead a Fourteenth

Amendment claim for denial of medical care, a plaintiff

“must sufficiently allege ‘both an objectively serious

medical need and that a Defendant acted with deliberate

indifference to that need.’” Harper v. Lawrence Cty.,

Ala., 592 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir.

2008)).

A medical need is objectively serious if it “has

been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or

... is so obvious that even a lay person would easily

15

recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.”

Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Hill v. Dekalb Reg'l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d

1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994)). In addition, the medical

need must be “one that, if left unattended, ‘pos[es] a

substantial risk of serious harm.’” Id. (quoting

Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000)

(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).

The Sheriff’s Department defendants do not contest

the seriousness of Mulvaney’s medical need, and the

court finds that the complaint plausibly pleads that

her need was ‘serious.’ According to the complaint,

Mulvaney was screaming and hallucinating, defecating

and urinating on herself, and could not eat or drink

for at least five days. She screamed throughout the

day and night and sat naked in her cell. She had dried

urine and feces in her hair, body, urinary tract,

rectum, arms, and legs, and had to be cleaned by other

inmates. Assuming the pleadings are true, as the court

16

must at a motion to dismiss, her medical needs were “so

obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize

the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Farrow, 320

F.3d at 1243. Mulvaney had a serious medical need.

Mulvaney’s complaint must also plausibly plead that

the defendants acted with deliberate indifference. To

satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff must plead facts

showing a defendant’s “(1) subjective knowledge of a

risk of serious harm... [and] (2) disregard of that

risk ... (3) by conduct that is more than mere

negligence.”7 Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1176

(11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d

1344, 1351 (11th Cir. 2004)). Importantly, “imputed or

collective knowledge cannot serve as the basis for a

7. While it makes no difference to the outcome

here, the court notes that some panels of the Eleventh

Circuit have described the third prong as “more than

gross negligence,” rather than “more than mere

negligence.” See, e.g., Townsend v. Jefferson Cty., 601

F.3d 1152, 1158 (11th Cir. 2010). But see Melton v.

Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1223 n.2 (11th Cir. 2016)

(explaining that the “more than mere negligence”

standard appears to be the correct one).

17

claim of deliberate indifference. Each individual

Defendant must be judged separately and on the basis of

what that person knows.” Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d

1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal citations

omitted).

As the analysis is distinct for the correctional

officers and the supervisors, the court will analyze

each in turn.

a. The Correctional Officers

Mulvaney names four correctional officers in the

complaint, defendants Bedsole, Benson, Hudson, and

Pouncey. The motion to dismiss will be granted as to

Benson, Hudson, and Pouncey, but not as to Bedsole.

The allegations of the complaint, as currently

pleaded, are not sufficient to plead that defendants

Benson, Pouncey, and Hudson were deliberately

indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to

Mulvaney. Although a close call, the allegations in

18

the complaint that these defendants “knew” and “were

aware” of Mulvaney’s condition and the substantial risk

of serious harm she faced are unentitled to an

assumption of truth because they are a conclusory

tracking of one of the legal elements at issue, namely

the subjective awareness subpart of the deliberate

indifference prong. See generally Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

680-81 (finding that Iqbal’s allegation that officials

“‘knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously

agreed to subject [him]’ to harsh conditions of

confinement ‘as a matter of policy, solely on account

of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for

no legitimate penological interest,’” was a conclusory

allegation of discriminatory intent). While there are

other well-pleaded allegations in the complaint, they

are insufficient to show that any of these defendants

had the requisite knowledge of Mulvaney’s condition for

a finding of deliberate indifference. There is no

allegation that these defendants were on duty during

19

the relevant period or that they were tasked with

supervising Mulvaney or responding to her health needs.8

There is no allegation that these individual defendants

were in a position where they could see or hear

Mulvaney’s screaming, hallucinations, and other

concerning behavior, or that they personally received a

request for medical care for her or knew of such a

request received by others. The complaint states that

unnamed correctional officers had inmates clean

Mulvaney because she was covered with feces; however,

without any allegations suggesting that the defendant

correctional officers were on duty when this happened,

or otherwise knew of Mulvaney’s condition, this

allegation does not help. Thus, the claims against

Benson, Pouncey, and Hudson will be dismissed.

However, Mulvaney will be allowed to amend her

8. Indeed, as noted earlier, the complaint states

that defendant Benson served as “Administrator Sgt. and

Court Liaison Corrections Officer.” Complaint (doc.

no. 1) at 3. Her titles suggest she may not have been

directly involved in overseeing inmates.

20

complaint to add more specificity to the allegations

about these defendants.

As for correctional officer Bedsole, the

allegations are sufficient. On a motion to dismiss,

the court must “draw[] all reasonable inferences in the

plaintiff's favor.” See Keating v. City of Miami, 598

F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010). The complaint

specifically states that Bedsole, out of concern for

Mulvaney, attempted to have her eat a candy bar and a

drink at some point, and that Mulvaney was physically

unable to consume the food. It also states that

Bedsole was observing Mulvaney on a television monitor

and saw her fall off the bed. This, combined with the

allegation that “Covington County Correction Officers”

had observed Plaintiff Mulvaney’s erratic and strange

behavior on their Covington County Monitors,” Id. at

10, is enough to support the reasonable inferences that

Bedsole (1) monitored Mulvaney’s behavior, (2) was

aware of Mulvaney’s bizarre behavior and refusal to

21

eat, and (2) due to the obviousness of Mulvaney’s

medical needs, drew the inference that Mulvaney had a

serious medical need, but did nothing other than

unsuccessfully attempting one time to try to get her to

eat a candy bar and drink a soft drink. “[A]n official

acts with deliberate indifference when he knows that an

inmate is in serious need of medical care, but he fails

or refuses to obtain medical treatment for the inmate.”

Lancaster v. Monroe County, Ala., 116 F.3d 1419, 1425

(11th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted), overruled in part

on other grounds by LeFrere v. Quezada, 588 F.3d 1317

(11th Cir. 2009). The allegations are sufficient at

the motion-to-dismiss stage to plausibly plead that

Bedsole was deliberately indifferent.

Moreover, it was clearly established long before

the events at issue in the case that doing almost

nothing in the face of an inmate who is failing to eat

or drink for days, hallucinating, screaming, urinating

and defecating and covering herself with feces

22

constitutes deliberate indifference. There are three

ways to show that a right is clearly established:

“First, the plaintiff can point to a materially

similar case decided at the time of the

relevant conduct by the Supreme Court, the

Eleventh Circuit, or the relevant state supreme

court. ... The prior case law need not be

directly on point, but existing precedent must

have placed the statutory or constitutional

question beyond debate. Second, the plaintiff

can identify a broader, clearly established

principle that should govern the novel facts of

the situation. Third, the plaintiff can show

that the conduct at issue so obviously violated

the Constitution that prior case law is

unnecessary.”

Patel, 969 F.3d at 1186 (quoting J. W. ex rel. Williams

v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 904 F.3d 1248, 1259–60

(11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted)).

Broad, clearly established principles made clear

well before the events in this case that defendant

Bedsole’s alleged actions here were unlawful. “A core

principle of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in the area

of medical care is that prison officials with knowledge

of the need for care may not, by failing to provide

23

care, delaying care, or providing grossly inadequate

care, cause a prisoner to needlessly suffer the pain

resulting from his or her illness.” McElligott v.

Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 1999).

Mulvaney’s hallucinating, screaming, urinating and

defecating on herself, and refusal to eat or drink for

days on end were obviously serious medical needs, and

any reasonable correctional officer would have known

that the delay of at least five days in obtaining

medical evaluation and treatment for her was

unconstitutional.

The defendants argue that the complaint lacks

allegations showing that any of officers were in a

position to override the medical officials’ policies

and decisions. But the complaint does not allege that

the officers deferred to the medical staff’s judgment.

The complaint does not say anything about any

interaction between the officers and the medical staff,

and the court, at this stage, must view the complaint

24

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Furthermore, within the four corners of the complaint,

there is nothing to suggest that, had the officers done

more, they would have been overriding medical

officials’ judgment. The complaint alleges that the

medical providers refused to “see or treat” her, not

that they examined her and determined that she was not

in need of medical care. Complaint (doc. no. 1) at 8.

Therefore, Mulvaney did not need to allege facts

showing that the officers could have overridden the

medical officials’ judgment.

The court will therefore deny the motion to dismiss

as to defendant Bedsole, but will grant it as to the

other correctional officer defendants.

b. Claims Against Supervisors

With regard to the supervisory Sheriff’s Department

defendants, Sheriff Meeks and Jail Administrator

Hughes, the complaint alleges a policy of underfunding

25

and delaying the provision of medical care in the jail.

It also alleges that they failed to train and supervise

their subordinates adequately, leading to Mulvaney’s

injuries. There are no allegations that Meeks or

Hughes had any personal contact with Mulvaney.

“Supervisory liability lies where the defendant

personally participates in the unconstitutional conduct

or there is a causal connection between such conduct

and the defendant’s actions.” Harper, 592 F.3d at

1236. A plaintiff may establish a causal connection in

several ways, such as by showing “a history of

widespread abuse [that] puts the responsible supervisor

on notice of the need to correct the alleged

deprivation,” and the supervisor’s failure to do so.

Id. (quoting Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360-61

(11th Cir. 2003), abrogated in part on other grounds by

Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010)).

“Alternatively, the causal connection may be

established when a supervisor's custom or policy ...

26

result[s] in deliberate indifference to constitutional

rights or when facts support an inference that the

supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully

or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and

failed to stop them from doing so.’” Id.

The complaint’s factual allegations are not

sufficient to plead a plausible claim against the

supervisory defendants. Other than alleging generally

that Meeks and Hughes had responsibility for

supervising the jail and that they were involved in

retaining Southern Health Partners to provide medical

services, the complaint contains very few factual

allegations regarding these defendants. See Complaint

(doc. no. 1) at 10 (supervisory defendants “could ...

reasonably be aware” from common sense and prisoner

complaints that cost cutting would result in

constitutionally deficient medical care); id. at 13

(supervisory defendants “were aware of the

consequences” of using Southern Health Partners).

27

Those factual allegations that Mulvaney does make

against the supervisory defendants are insufficient to

state a plausible claim of deliberate indifference.

Compare Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th

Cir. 2013) (complaint was insufficient to state a

plausible claim against supervisory defendants) with

Harper, 592 F.3d at 1236-37 (complaint that alleged

specifics of similar incident that occurred one month

earlier and involved the same supervisory jail

personnel was sufficient). Therefore, Mulvaney’s

claims against the supervisory Sheriff’s Department

defendants, Meeks and Hughes, will be dismissed.

C. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

The Sheriff’s Department defendants argue that

Mulvaney’s claim for declaratory relief should be

dismissed because the complaint does not contain facts

sufficient to support standing to obtain such relief.

The court agrees.

28

In the complaint, Mulvaney requests, in addition to

damages and costs, a declaration that the Sheriff’s

Department defendants violated her rights. She also

requests that the court “instruct” the defendants to

provide proper medical care and that the court

establish a “panel of independent medical experts” to

evaluate medical care and compliance. Complaint (doc.

no. 1) at 15. The court views these latter requests as

seeking injunctive relief. The standing requirements

for both types of equitable relief are the same.

Relying upon City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.

95 (1983), the defendants argue that Mulvaney has not

alleged facts to support standing to seek such relief.

There is no indication in the complaint that Mulvaney

was in the Covington County Jail at the time the

complaint was filed and therefore would still be

subject to the defendants’ actions. Yet, in the

complaint, she states that she will continue to suffer

irreparable injury from defendants’ conduct without

29

equitable relief. However, she does not explain how or

why. This conclusory allegation is insufficient for

Lyons standing. See id. at 105 (requiring plaintiff to

show a “real and immediate threat” that he would be

both stopped for a future offense and subjected to a

choke-hold in order to establish standing for an

injunction against chokeholds). Furthermore, the

individual defendants have been sued only in their

individual capacities, and “injunctive relief may only

be recovered from public officials acting in their

official capacities.” Hill v. Shelander, 924 F.2d

1370, 1374 (7th Cir. 1991).

Therefore, the motion to dismiss will be granted to

the extent Mulvaney seeks equitable relief.

D. Motion for More Definite Statement

The Sheriff’s Department defendants move, in the

alternative, for a more definite statement. A court

may grant such a motion if the complaint is “so vague

30

or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a

response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). The motion will be

granted to the extent that, if Mulvaney decides to

replead her claim against the three correctional

officer defendants being dismissed, she shall provide

additional detail as to the basis of their knowledge of

her medical needs.

***

An appropriate judgment will be entered.

DONE, this the 13th day of January, 2021.

/s/ Myron H. Thompson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

31