Ross v. Sejin America, Inc. (LEAD) (MAG+)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

JESSICA ROSS, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:18-cv-537-ALB-JTA

)

SEJIN AMERICA, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

JESSICA ROSS and LAEBBOINE )

RUSSELL, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:18-cv-734-ALB-JTA

)

SEJIN AMERICA, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Sejin America, Inc.’s

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint (Doc. 42) and Plaintiffs’

Motion for Leave to Add Party-Defendant. (Doc. 46). Upon consideration,

Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART,

and Plaintiffs’ motion to add a party-defendant is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This employment discrimination action has been pending for more than a

year, yet it is still at the pleadings stage and discovery has not even begun. That is

because Plaintiffs have repeatedly failed to plead a sufficient complaint under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8 and 12. These repeated failures have not been due to a lack of

opportunities or instruction given by the Court. Indeed, the Court has generously

given Plaintiffs chance after chance to fix their complaint. But now for the fourth

time, Plaintiffs have failed to plead a sufficient complaint, except as to one claim.

Plaintiffs Jessica Ross, LaEbboine Russell, Naquita Bledsoe, and Latoya

Pearson, who are African-American females, were employed by Defendant Sejin

America, Inc. as Administrative Assistants.1 On May 25, 2018, Plaintiffs filed their

initial Complaint, asserting—or attempting to assert—various employment

discrimination claims against Defendant. Defendant moved to dismiss the

Complaint for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 10). Though the Court denied

Defendant’s motion without prejudice, the Court dismissed without prejudice

Plaintiffs’ “shotgun complaint” because it was “virtually impossible to know . . .

which allegations of fact [were] intended to support which claim(s) for relief.” (Doc.

25). In addition, the Court granted Plaintiffs leave to refile an amended complaint

1 It is unclear from the complaint whether any of the plaintiffs are still employed by

Defendant.

“that complie[d] with the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.” (Doc. 25). After Plaintiffs’ first and second amended complaints were

stricken due to pleading deficiencies (Docs. 26 and 28), Plaintiffs filed their Third

Amended Complaint on March 14, 2019. (Doc. 30). Defendant moved to partially

dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint and moved for a more definite statement. (Doc. 31).

On August 15, 2018, Plaintiffs Ross and Russell filed a separate Complaint

against Defendant, asserting additional employment discrimination claims and

related state law claims. (Doc. 1, Ross v. Sejin America, Inc., Case No. 3:18-cv-734).

Defendant also moved to dismiss this complaint for failure to state a claim. (Docs. 9

and 14, Case No. 3:18-cv-734).

On July 15, 2019, the Court consolidated the two cases and ordered Plaintiffs

to file an Amended Complaint for the consolidated cases, cautioning Plaintiffs that

this would be their “last opportunity to state claims that comply with Rule 8 and

Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (Doc. 39). On August 5, 2019,

Plaintiffs filed their Fourth Amended Complaint. (Doc. 40).

In Count I, Plaintiffs claim that they were discriminated against by Defendant

based on their race and national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). Specifically,

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant treated them differently than its Asian/Korean

employees by (1) awarding Plaintiffs more points for the same violations under its

attendance policy, which caused Plaintiffs to be more frequently disciplined, (2)

calculating Plaintiffs’ actual hours worked in a way that resulted in lesser wages,

and (3) awarding Plaintiffs leave eligibility after a longer period of employment.

(Doc. 40, ¶¶ 21-29).

In Count II, Ross asserts an additional discrimination claim under Title VII,

claiming that she was discriminated against based on her race and national origin

because she was required to perform her supervisor’s duties without additional pay

and her Asian/Korean co-workers were not. (Doc. 40, ¶¶ 30-41). In Count III,

Pearson claims that she was subjected to a racially hostile work environment in

violation of Title VII because she was required to serve tea to Korean executives on

“at least one occasion.” (Doc. 40, ¶¶ 42-54). In Count IV, Russell claims she was

retaliated against and ultimately terminated by Defendant in violation of Title VII

because she filed an EEOC Charge. In Count V, Ross claims that she was subjected

to sexual harassment by supervisor Sean Rhee in retaliation for filing an EEOC

Charge. And finally, in Count VI, Ross alleges a state law outrage claim against

Rhee (and possibly Sejin America, Inc.), claiming that she suffered extreme

emotional distress from his sexual harassment.

Defendant again moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint for failure to state a

claim under Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 42). Plaintiffs filed their response in opposition to

Defendant’s motion (Doc. 47) and, for the first time, move to add Sean Rhee as a

party-defendant in this case. (Doc. 46).

STANDARD

For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Court assumes the factual allegations

are true and construes them in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. Hishon v. King

& Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir.

1993). To survive a motion to dismiss based on a challenge to the sufficiency of the

pleadings, Plaintiffs need not plead their claims with “detailed factual allegations.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rather, Plaintiffs need only plead

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, that would allow the court “to draw the

reasonable inference that [D]efendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss Complaint

Defendant argues that Counts IV and V of the Complaint should be dismissed

with prejudice because they are untimely. Defendant further argues that Counts I, II,

III, and VI should be dismissed with prejudice because (1) Plaintiffs’ Fourth

Amended Complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading, (2) Plaintiffs failed to

plausibly state a claim for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), and/or (3) Plaintiffs failed

to exhaust their administrative remedies. Plaintiffs argue that the Fourth Amended

Complaint satisfies Rule 8(a) because it provides enough factual specificity to give

Defendant adequate notice of their claims and that Plaintiffs exhausted their

administrative remedies because the allegations contained in the Complaint are “like

or related to” the allegations in their EEOC Charges.

A. Timeliness of Counts IV and V

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), a plaintiff is required to file a civil action

under Title VII within 90 days of receipt of her Notice of Right to Sue letter from

the EEOC. Gant v. Jefferson Energy Co-op, 348 F. App’x 433, 434 (11th Cir. 2009).

Plaintiffs Ross and Russell concede that their retaliation and sexual harassment

claims under Title VII (Counts IV and V) were filed more than 90 days after receipt

of their Notice of Right to Sue letters and that they cannot present any facts to

support equitable tolling of the 90-day deadline to file suit. (Doc. 47 at 5); see

Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) (“One who fails to

act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse the lack of diligence.”);

Gant, 348 F. App’x at 434 (“[T]raditional equitable principles require a claimant to

justify [her] untimely filing by a showing of extraordinary circumstances.”). For

these reasons, Counts IV and V of the Complaint are due to be dismissed with

prejudice. See Green v. Union Foundry Co., 281 F.3d 1229, 1233-34 (11th Cir.

2002) (recognizing that plaintiff has the burden of showing that he met the 90-day

filing requirement once defendant contests the issue).

B. Sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ Complaint under Rules 8 and 12

Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Each allegation must be

“simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Rule 10(b) further provides

that a plaintiff must state her claims in numbered paragraphs, and “i[f] doing so

would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or

occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate count.”

When a complaint violates Rule 8(a)(2) or 10(b), it is “often disparagingly

referred to as [a] shotgun pleading[].” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Office,

792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). “Shotgun pleadings” have been uniformly

rejected by the Eleventh Circuit because they “fail to one degree or another, and in

one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against

them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323. The most common

type of shotgun pleading is “a complaint containing multiple counts where each

count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count

to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire

complaint.” Id. at 1321. Another common type of shotgun pleading is one that does

not “separat[e] into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief.” Id. at

1323. Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint is a shotgun pleading for both of those

reasons and is due to be dismissed with prejudice, except as to Count I.

The Complaint alleges six counts against Defendant. Count I is brought by all

four Plaintiffs collectively, and the other counts are asserted by Plaintiffs

individually. At least one count (Count V) appears to assert multiple claims within

the same count, and another count (Count VI) appears to assert a claim against

multiple defendants within the same count, though the Court cannot be certain.

Needless to say, clarity in a Complaint of this nature is critical. Yet, despite

Plaintiffs’ many opportunities to provide that clarity to both Defendant and the

Court, Plaintiffs have again failed to do so.

Further, as Defendant points out, Counts II, III, IV, and VI of the Complaint

“adopt[] and reallege[] all of the above and foregoing paragraphs as if set forth

herein.”2 This means, for example, that Ross’s outrage claim (Count VI)

incorporates and relies on the allegations of the entire complaint, including the

factual allegations and legal conclusions related to other plaintiffs’ individual and

unrelated claims, such as Pearson’s hostile work environment claim in Count III.

This very practice—where a complaint “contains several counts, each one

incorporating by reference the allegations of its predecessors, leading to a situation

2 Defendant also points out that Count I of Plaintiffs’ Complaint “adopt[s] and

reallege[s] each and every allegation contained in this complaint as if set out anew

herein.” (Doc. 40, ¶ 21). But the Court construes this paragraph to adopt and reallege

the paragraphs before it, i.e. paragraphs 1-20, which set out the facts related to the

conduct forming the basis of their race and national origin claims in Count I. Thus,

Count I, unlike the other counts, does not contain irrelevant factual allegations and

legal conclusions contained in other counts.

where most of the counts (i.e., all but the first) contain irrelevant factual allegations

and legal conclusions”—has been expressly condemned by the Eleventh Circuit.

Strategic Income Fund, LLC v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d 1293, 1295-

96 (11th Cir. 2002). Indeed, this Court previously admonished Plaintiffs that they

“should not simply incorporate all factual allegations by reference into every count”

and instructed them that they “must indicate with clarity which specific factual

allegations are material to each specific count.” (Doc. 25 at 8).

But even if Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint did not constitute an

impermissible shotgun pleading, Counts II, III, and VI are still due to be dismissed

because Plaintiffs have not pleaded sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for

relief.

First, in Count II, Ross claims that she was discriminated against in violation

of Title VII because she was “required to provide instructional training” to her

Asian/Korean supervisor and was “required to perform her supervisors’ job duties,

without any additional pay,” though “Korean employees of Asian descent [were] not

required to perform their supervisor’s job duties without additional pay.” (Doc. 40,

¶ 33, 36). Ross’s general, conclusory allegations referencing “Korean employees of

Asian descent” as her comparators do not plausibly allege a claim for intentional

race and/or national origin discrimination. See, e.g., Henley v. Turner Broadcasting

Sys., Inc., 267 F. Supp. 3d 1341, 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2017) (granting motion to dismiss

race discrimination claim where plaintiff’s “only reference to a comparator [was]

her general allegation that ‘other Caucasian executive assistants[] in the same

department’ worked fewer hours”). For example, Ross fails to identify any specific

comparator and does not allege that these other “Korean employees of Asian

descent” had a similar job position, worked in the same department or performed

similar work, or even worked for the same supervisor—in fact, her allegations

suggest that they worked for other supervisors. Because Ross fails to allege the

existence of a valid comparator or allege other facts giving rise to an inference of

discrimination, Count II is due to be dismissed.

Next, in Count III, Pearson asserts a racially hostile work environment claim

against Defendant. To plead a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must

allege (1) that she belongs to a protected class, (2) that she has been subjected to

unwelcomed harassment, (3) that the harassment was based on a protected

characteristic of the employee, (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of her employment, and (5) that the

employer is liable for the harassment. Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1300

(11th Cir. 2010); Foster v. Auburn Univ. Montgomery, No. 2:11-cv-6140965, 2011

WL 6140965, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 8, 2011).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to plead that the alleged harassment was

severe or pervasive. The Court agrees. To support her hostile work environment

claim, Pearson asserts the following:

45. On at least one occasion Plaintiff Pearson, an African-American

woman was required to serve tea to Asian company executives from

South Korea, which was outside the scope of her regular job duties.

Plaintiff avers and believes, based upon the demeanor and conduct of

those executives at the time she served them, that the purpose of this

unusual assignment was to degrade and humiliate her, and place her in

a position of symbolic subservience to Asian males. Plaintiff Pearson

avers that the action of Defendant Sejin created a hostile, demeaning

and unpleasant work environment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e).

Plaintiff Pearson was required to prepare the tea and to serve it in a

specific manner. When Plaintiff protested, she was informed by Male

Korean supervisor(s) that her serving tea was part of the Korean’s

“culture.” No Asian male female [sic] employees were required to serve

tea.

(Doc. 40, ¶ 45).

Striking the many conclusory allegations asserted by Pearson, Pearson bases

her hostile work environment claim on one incident3 where she had to serve tea to

Asian company executives.4 Even if this allegation were true, one isolated incident

of harassment of this nature is not enough to plausibly state a hostile work

environment claim under Title VII. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.

3 Pearson states that she had to serve tea to Asian company executives on “at least

one occasion” but fails to allege any facts that this incident occurred more than once.

4 Of course, because Pearson “adopts and realleges all of the above and foregoing

paragraphs” in the Complaint, it is impossible to determine whether she alleges that

other facts support her hostile work environment claim. This is particularly true

given that Pearson adopts and realleges the facts and legal conclusions asserted by a

different plaintiff in support of a different claim.

775, 788 (1998) (recognizing that “offhand comments [and] isolated incidents[,]

unless extremely serious[,]” are not discriminatory changes to the terms and

conditions of employment); Arafat v. School Bd. of Broward Cnty., 549 F. App’x

872, 874 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of hostile work environment claim

based on isolated incident of harassment and finding that “[a]t a minimum,

[plaintiff’s] complaint fail[ed] to satisfy” the severe or pervasive element); Stubbs v.

Compass Bank, No. 2:18-cv-661, 2018 WL 5084860, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 18, 2018)

(recognizing that allegations of isolated incidents of harassment justify dismissal of

hostile work environment claim). For these reasons, Count III is due to be

dismissed.5

Finally, in Count VI of the Complaint, Ross asserts an outrage claim against

Sean Rhee. But as discussed below, Rhee is not a proper party to this action, and

thus this claim is due to be dismissed. It is unclear from the Complaint whether Ross

also intended to assert an outrage claim against Defendant. But to the extent she did,

she fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Ross’s only allegations

against Defendant are conclusory allegations. For instance, Ross claims that

5 Alternatively, Pearson’s hostile work environment claim is due to be dismissed

because, as Defendant points out, Pearson did not raise these issues or even mention

harassment or a hostile work environment in her EOOC Charge. Thus, Pearson failed

to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to this claim. See Doc. 10-1;

Burkes v. Hubbell Steel Corp., No. 2:06-cv-1959, 2007 WL 9717341, at *4 (N.D.

Ala. Jan. 18, 2007) (dismissing hostile work environment claim where allegations

were unrelated to discrimination claim alleged in EEOC Charge).

Defendant “adopted, confirmed, and/or ratified all of the actions and omissions of

it’s [sic] agents, servants and employee as it’s [sic] own” and that Defendant “has

ratified the said acts of Defendant Sean Rhee.” (Doc. 40, ¶ 90 and 94). Ross does

not allege how Defendant ratified Rhee’s alleged actions or even that Defendant was

aware of such actions. For these reasons, Count VI of the Complaint is due to be

dismissed with prejudice.

Given Plaintiffs’ repeated failures to satisfy the pleading requirements under

Rule 8, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claims in the Fourth Amended Complaint,

except Count I, are due to be dismissed with prejudice.

C. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Defendant also argues that certain allegations in Count I should be dismissed

with prejudice because Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.

Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ discrimination claims in Count I

related to Defendant’s application of leave policies and calculation of employees’

timecards are due to be dismissed because the claims were “not included in their

EEOC Charges, nor [are they] like or related to the allegations contained in the

Charges.” (Doc. 42 at 19). Defendant’s argument is unavailing.

A plaintiff is required to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing a

judicial complaint asserting discrimination or retaliation claims under Title VII.

Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001). First, a plaintiff

must timely file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the last act of discrimination.

Id. And second, a plaintiff must file a civil action within 90 days of receipt of her

Notice of Right to Sue letter. Gant v. Jefferson Energy Co-op, 348 F. App’x 433,

434 (11th Cir. 2009); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). If a plaintiff files a civil action, the

plaintiff’s judicial complaint is “limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation

[that] can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.”

Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004). Thus,

to determine whether a plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies,

the proper inquiry is “whether the plaintiff’s judicial complaint was like or related

to, or grew out of, the administrative allegations.” Basel v. Sec’y of Defense, 507 F.

App’x 873, 875-76 (11th Cir. 2013).

In determining whether a plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative

remedies, courts should construe the EEOC Charge broadly because courts are

“extremely reluctant to allow procedural technicalities to bar claims brought under

[Title VII].” Penaloza v. Target Corp., 549 F. App’x 844, 848 (11th Cir. 2013).

Though “allegations of new acts of discrimination are inappropriate,” claims that

“amplify, clarify, or more clearly focus” the allegations in the EEOC Charges are

permitted. Penaloza, 549 F. App’x at 848.

Here, Plaintiffs complain in their EEOC Charges that “Korean and Asian

American employees were given benefits that were not offered to the Black and

American employees.” See Doc. 10-1. An investigation into the benefits not received

by Plaintiffs and the reasons why they were not received is plainly expected to “grow

out” of this allegation. And the leave-related allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint only

“amplify, clarify, or more clearly focus” these allegations in Plaintiffs’ EEOC

Charges. For instance, Plaintiffs allege in the complaint that Asian/Korean

employees were awarded vacation and leave time sooner than Plaintiffs and other

non-Asian employees, i.e., a benefit received by Korean/Asian employees that was

not received by Plaintiffs. For this reason, the Court finds that Plaintiffs exhausted

their administrative remedies with respect to these allegations.

Plaintiffs also allege in their EEOC Charges that “Black and American

employees . . . are paid lessor [sic] wages” than Korean and Asian American

employees. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs explain in more detail the basis for this

allegation: that the number of hours worked on their timecards was rounded in a

different manner than the timecards of the Asian/Korean employees, resulting in

Plaintiffs receiving lesser wages. Because these allegations reasonably relate to, or

“grow out of,” Plaintiffs’ allegations in their EEOC Charges, the Court finds that

Plaintiffs exhausted their administrative remedies.

D. Failure to Promote Claim

Finally, Plaintiffs claim in their response that they have sufficiently stated a

failure to promote claim against Defendant. But Plaintiffs’ complaint is devoid of

any factual allegations supporting a failure to promote claim. Though Plaintiffs

attempt to circumvent this fatal flaw by arguing that “only through the normal

discovery process can Plaintiffs appropriately develop detailed facts to support their

failure to promote claim,” even at the pleadings stage, a plaintiff must allege

sufficient factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010).

Here, Plaintiffs have not alleged even the most basic factual information—

who, what, and when—to support a failure to promote claim. In fact, Plaintiffs only

mention promotions twice in the entire complaint: Plaintiffs allege that “the

accumulation of employee points is one of the factors used by Defendant Sejin

America, Inc. in the awarding of promotions” (Doc. 40, ¶ 15), and Plaintiffs allege

that Defendant has a “long-standing policy, practice, custom and usage of limiting

the employment and promotional opportunities” of African-American employees.

(Doc. 40, ¶ 25). These two passing references are not enough to survive a motion to

dismiss. For these reasons, to the extent Plaintiffs assert failure to promote claims

against Defendant, those claims are due to be dismissed with prejudice.

II. Motion to Amend Complaint to Add Sean Rhee as Party-Defendant

Under Rule 15(a), leave to amend the pleadings should be granted freely when

justice so requires. “In deciding whether to grant leave to amend[,] [a] district court

must take into account several [considerations,] such as ‘undue delay, bad faith or

dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by

amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of

allowance of the amendment, [and the] futility of the amendment.’” Bamm, Inc. v.

GAF Corp., 651 F.2d 389, 391 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit B) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371

U.S. 178, 182 (1962)); see Brown-Marx Assocs. Ltd. v. Emigrant Savings Bank, 703

F.2d 1361, 1371 (11th Cir.1983). “[A] motion to amend may be denied on numerous

grounds such as undue delay, undue prejudice to the defendants, and futility of the

amendment.” Brewer–Giorgio v. Producers Video, Inc., 216 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th

Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S.

154 (2010).

Here, Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the Complaint to add Sean Rhee as a party-

defendant should be denied for at least two independent reasons. First, the Court

finds that Plaintiffs’ amendment—filed more than one year after this action was

originally filed—is the result of undue delay and dilatory motive on the part of

Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have had ample opportunity to amend the complaint to add Rhee

as a party to this action—four, to be exact—but Plaintiffs have offered no

explanation for their delay in waiting until now to do so.

Second, the Court finds that any such amendment would be futile. A proposed

amendment is futile “when the complaint would still be properly dismissed.”

Coventry First, LLC v. McCarty, 605 F.3d 865, 870 (11th Cir. 2010). As discussed

above, the Fourth Amended Complaint constitutes an impermissible shotgun

pleading and is due to be dismissed with prejudice. Thus, allowing Plaintiffs to

amend the complaint a fifth time would be futile. For these reasons, Plaintiffs’

motion to amend is due to be denied.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint (Doc.

42) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

2. Count I brought by all Plaintiffs against Defendant Sejin America, Inc. states

a claim upon which relief can be granted.

3. Count II brought by Plaintiff Ross against Defendant Sejin America, Inc. is

DISMISSED with prejudice because it fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted and because the Fourth Amended Complaint, except as

to Count I, is an impermissible shotgun pleading.

4. Count III brought by Plaintiff Pearson against Defendant Sejin America, Inc.

is DISMISSED with prejudice because (1) it fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted, (2) Pearson failed to exhaust her administrative

remedies, and (3) the Fourth Amended Complaint, except as to Count I, is an

impermissible shotgun pleading.

5. Count IV brought by Plaintiff Russell against Defendant Sejin America, Inc.

is DISMISSED with prejudice because it is untimely and because the Fourth

Amended Complaint, except as to Count I, is an impermissible shotgun

pleading.

6. Count V brought by Plaintiff Ross against Defendant Sejin America, Inc. is

DISMISSED with prejudice because it is untimely and because the Fourth

Amended Complaint, except as to Count I, is an impermissible shotgun

pleading.

7. Count VI brought by Plaintiff Ross against Sean Rhee and Defendant Sejin

America, Inc. is DISMISSED with prejudice because (1) Rhee is not a party

to this action, (2) Ross fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

as to Sejin America, Inc., and (3) the Fourth Amended Complaint, except as

to Count I, is an impermissible shotgun pleading.

8. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Add Party-Defendant (Doc. 46) is DENIED.

9. This action will proceed on the basis of the allegations in Count I of the Fourth

Amended Complaint.

DONE and ORDERED this 2nd day of March 2020.

/s/ Andrew L. Brasher

ANDREW L. BRASHER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE