Rachel Padilla v. Louis DeJoy

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘Oo’

Case No. 2:20-CV-11398-CAS (AFMx) Date January 2, 2024

Title RACHEL PADILLA V. LOUIS DEJOY

Present: The Honorable CHRISTINA A. SNYDER

Catherine Jeang Not Present N/A

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants:

Not Present Not Present

Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) - DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY

ADJUDICATION (Dkt. 32, filed on SEPTEMBER 22, 2023)

I. INTRODUCTION

On December 17, 2020, plaintiff Rachel Padilla filed this action against defendant

Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service (“USPS”). Dkt. 1.

Plaintiff alleges three claims for relief against USPS: (1) disability discrimination under

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791, et seq.; (2) age discrimination under the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C §§ 621-634; and (3) retaliation,

reprisal, and vicarious liability under Title VI, 42 USC § 2000e-3. Id. On June 4, 2021,

defendant filed an answer to plaintiff's complaint. Dkt. 9.

Plaintiff's claims arise out of her employment at USPS. Throughout her

employment, plaintiff has suffered physical ailments, which at various times have

affected her ability to perform her work responsibilities. She has brought multiple claims

against USPS. In the present case, plaintiff has brought claims for disability and age

discrimination and retaliation based on two specific sets of events. The first was the

issuance of a Letter of Warning (“LOW”) in June 2019, and the second was a series of

events occurring between September 2019, and February 2020. The timeline of events

following the issuance of the LOW appears to be as follows. On August 5, 2019,

plaintiff sustained a back injury. She was deemed temporary total disabled until her

doctor updated her work restrictions on September 18, 2019. Dkt. 32-3, Carrillo Decl.,

Ex. 3-13. On September 30, 2019, and October 4, 2019, plaintiff accepted an Offer of

Modified Assignment (“OMA”) at the San Marino Post Office. Id. at Exs. 4-14, 6-17.

On November 6, 2019, plaintiff's doctor revised her work restrictions, “such that she

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘Oo’

Case No. 2:20-CV-11398-CAS (AFMx) Date January 2, 2024

Title RACHEL PADILLA V. LOUIS DEJOY

could perform her previously assigned mail route.” Id. at Ex. 7-19; SDF § 37. On

November 13, 2019, plaintiff accepted an OMA to return to the Arcadia Post Office.

Dkt. 32-3, Carrillo Decl., Ex. 8-20. On December 3, 2019, Supervisor Linares asked

another employee, who already had plaintiff's phone number, to tell plaintiff to return to

the Post Office because information on her scanner system was set up improperly. Dkt.

32-4, Linares Decl. at 1; SDF §§ 39-42. On December 12, 2019, Linares’ vehicle

blocked plaintiff's vehicle in the parking lot, but Linares immediately moved his vehicle

when plaintiff told him that his car was blocking hers. SDF §{ 43-47. On January 16,

2020, plaintiff, and another employee, were required to participate in on-the-job refresher

trainings, but plaintiff's training was moved to a different location upon her request. SDF

9 48-54. On January 31, 2020, a USPS employee whom plaintiff alleged did not have a

handicap placard was parked in the only handicapped parking spot in the back of the

building, but Postmaster Carrillo informed plaintiff that the employee did in fact have a

valid placard, and there were other handicapped parking spots available. SDF 55-58.

In January 2020, plaintiff returned to her original Sierra Madre mail route upon her

request. Dkt. 51 at 4. Around February 6, 2020, plaintiff gave Carrillo a letter that

indicated that she was experiencing knee and heel pain. Dkt. 32-3, Carrillo Decl., Ex. 13-

27. Plaintiff worked full shifts until around February 12, 2020. Id. at 6. Thereafter,

plaintiff worked partial days until around February 22, 2020, when she “did not return to

work and was placed on sick leave.” Id. On March 26, 2020, Carrillo mailed plaintiff a

District Reasonable Accommodation Committee (“DRAC’”) form, but plaintiff never

responded or requested a reasonable accommodation. Id.: see also id. at Ex. 14-28. On

April 9, 2020, plaintiff filed a Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for

Compensation CA-2 form. Dkt. 32-3, Carrillo Decl., Ex. 15-35. On May 5, 2020,

plaintiff returned to work. Dkt. 51 at 5.

In this action, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment or, in the

alternative, summary adjudication on September 22, 2023. Dkt. 32. Defendant attached

a statement of uncontroverted facts and conclusions of law in support of his motion and

over 300 pages of declarations and exhibits. Id. On October 2, 2023, plaintiff filed an

opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, a statement of genuine issues of

material fact in dispute, and a declaration. Dkt. 36. On October 6, 2023, defendant filed

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘Oo’

Case No. 2:20-CV-11398-CAS (AFMx) Date January 2, 2024

Title RACHEL PADILLA V. LOUIS DEJOY

a reply in support of his motion. Dkt. 37. Defendant attached his evidentiary objections

to plaintiff's declaration and his response to the statement of genuine disputes. Id.'

On October 23, 2023, the Court held a hearing on defendant’s motion for summary

judgment and ordered supplemental briefing from the parties. Dkt. 40. On October 30,

2023, plaintiff filed a supplemental opposition to defendant’s motion for summary

judgment and a statement of genuine issues of material fact in dispute. Dkts. 41, 42,

(“SDF”). On November 6, 2023, defendant filed a supplemental reply memorandum in

support of his motion. Dkt. 43.

On November 13, 2023, the Court held a hearing on defendant’s motion for

summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. The Court directed

plaintiff to submit evidence supporting her claim that the work assignments she received

after November 2019, did not comply with her work restrictions.?, Dkt. 50. The Court

permitted defendant to file objections or responses to plaintiff's submission. Id.

On November 15, 2023, plaintiff filed a new declaration as directed at the

November 13 hearing. Dkt. 51. On November 20, 2023, defendant filed a response and

objections to plaintiff's third declaration in opposition to his motion and a supplemental

declaration. Dkt. 52.

The Court has given plaintiff three occasions to set forth the evidence which she

believes supports her claims. In her initial opposition, plaintiff indicated that she

disputed some of defendant’s uncontroverted facts, without offering any evidence

supporting the basis for her disagreement. Dkt. 36. On October 23, 2023, the Court

asked plaintiff to provide the evidence supporting her opposition, dkt. 40, and she

thereafter submitted two declarations, along with exhibits and portions of plaintiff's

deposition transcripts. Dkt. 42. However, the declarations were not executed under

penalty of perjury. Id. The Court permitted plaintiff to submit additional evidence by

November 15, 2023. Dkt. 50. While this supplemental information has filled in some

gaps, plaintiff has offered inconsistent assertions regarding certain of the key events on

which her claims are based.

? According to defendant, “[p]laintiff’s alleged November 2019 failure to accommodate

claim should not even be considered as this claim was never raised until [plaintiff filed

her second/supplemental opposition.” Dkt. 52 at 1.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘Oo’

Case No. 2:20-CV-11398-CAS (AFMx) Date January 2, 2024

Title RACHEL PADILLA V. LOUIS DEJOY

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary

adjudication, along with the parties’ papers and supplemental briefs, are presently before

the Court. Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments and submissions, the

Court finds and concludes as follows.

Il. BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise noted, the Court references only facts that are uncontroverted and

to which evidentiary objections, if any, have been overruled.

A. Plaintiff’s Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) Complaints

In 2011, plaintiff initiated her first EEO contact (Agency No. 4F-913-0078-11), but

she did not file a formal EEO complaint. SDF § 1. In 2013, plaintiff initiated her second

EEO contact (Agency No. 4F-913-0061-13), and summary judgment was granted in

favor of USPS. Id. § 2. On April 19, 2018, plaintiff initiated her third EEO contact

(Agency No. 4F-913-0084-18), and USPS settled the informal complaint on June 28,

2018. Id. §] 3-4. On October 9, 2018, plaintiff initiated her fourth EEO complaint

(Agency No. 4F-913-0005-19), and on January 24, 2019, she filed a formal EEO

complaint, which resulted in a Final Agency Decision in favor of USPS on January 21,

2020. Id. 5.

B. Plaintiff’s EEO Complaints That Are the Subject of This Litigation

As set forth above, plaintiffs claims in this case are based on her fifth and sixth

EEO complaints. On July 28, 2019, plaintiff initiated her fifth EEO complaint (Agency

No. 4F-913-0111-19), and her formal complaint filed on November 1, 2019, alleged:

“Because of my disability I was not able to walk fast enough for Melody Barayjas|’ |

standards due to a comparision [sic] to a young man, But [sic] I am able to complete my

entire route in a safe & professional manner. This is a retaliation due to ongoing EEO’s.”

Id. § 6. On December 2, 2019, the USPS National Equal Employment Opportunity

Investigative Services Office (“NEEOISO”) accepted the following issue for

investigation: “You alleged discrimination based on Sex (female), Age (DOB: [redacted |

1970); Disability (To Be Specified) and Retaliation (Prior EEO Activity) when: On June

26, 2019, you were issued a Letter of Warning (LOW).” Id. 4 7.

According to plaintiff, on June 18, 2019, Customer Services Supervisor Melody

Barajas observed plaintiff during a procedure known as a 3999, “which is a formal

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 2:20-CV-11398-CAS (AFMx) Date January 2, 2024

Title RACHEL PADILLA V. LOUIS DEJOY

observation procedure in which a supervisor observes a City Carrier complete his/her

mail route to evaluate the City Carrier’s efficiency.” Id. ] 9. Barajas observed plaintiff s

walking at a pace of 112 and 118 steps per minute, and plaintiff completed her entire

route without assistance by 5:30 PM. Id. 10-11. Defendant alleges that on June 19,

2019, Barajas conducted safety checks and calculated plaintiff's pace to be 80 steps per

minute, but when Barajas approached plaintiff to see if she was okay, Barajas observed

plaintiff increase her pace to her pace the day before. Id. J 12-13. Plaintiff completed

her delivery (25 Lima to 560 Montecito in Sierra Madre, California) in one hour on June

18 and in one hour and forty-five minutes on June 19. Id. 10, 14.

Barajas held a fact-finding investigation on June 20, 2019, to determine the pacing

variance between June 18 and June 19 and issued plaintiff a LOW on June 26, 2019, for

poor performance and for failing to follow instructions, citing “multiple violations of

USPS’ Handbook.” Id. 15-16. Plaintiff asserts that the issuance of the LOW was

improper for two reasons. Id. | 12. First, she asserts that Barajas had told her that the

observation of her pace on June 18 was not a “true formal observation.” Id. Second,

plaintiff alleges that because she was not carrying mail on June 18, her observed pace

was faster than on June 19 when she was actually carrying mail and walking uphill. Id.

Further, plaintiff disagrees that Barajas was unaware of any medical disability afflicting

plaintiff when she issued the LOW given plaintiffs “prior work-related injuries and EEO

activities.”> Id. § 17. On July 2, 2019, plaintiff filed a grievance protesting the LOW

through her union, the National Association of Letter Carriers, and a settlement

agreement to rescind and expunge the LOW was reached on July 8, 2019. Id. {J 18-19.

“Plaintiff testified that other than the fact that it bothered her having the LOW on her

record from June 26, 2019 to July 8, 2019, the LOW and the expungement of the LOW

had no effect on [p]laintiff's employment with USPS.” Id. § 20.

3 At the hearing on October 23, 2023, the Court directed plaintiff to cite admissible

evidence in her supplemental opposition. However, plaintiff has failed to provide

evidentiary support for several of her assertions, SDF □ 13, 17, 46, 61, and further,

neither of the declarations filed in opposition to defendant’s motion were executed under

penalty of perjury. Dkt. 42. On November 15, 2023, plaintiff filed a declaration that was

executed under penalty of perjury, but several of plaintiffs assertions remain conclusory.

Dkt. 51.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 2:20-CV-11398-CAS (AFMx) Date January 2, 2024

Title RACHEL PADILLA V. LOUIS DEJOY

The following events relate to plaintiffs sixth EEO complaint (Agency No. 4F-

913-0043-20). On August 5, 2019, plaintiff sustained an on-the-job back injury, was

placed on medical leave, and did not return from medical leave until late September

2019. Id. §] 26-27. From August 7, 2019, to September 10, 2019, plaintiff's Duty Status

Reports (“DSRs’”’) placed her on “TTD” or temporary total disability. Id. 726. On

September 18, 2019, plaintiff provided a DSR, which included updated medical work

restrictions, such as “no driving company vehicle,” to Postmaster Yvonne Carrillo. Id. {

28. Carrillo determined that there was no work she could provide plaintiff “as limited

duty within her medical work restrictions” and that plaintiff “could not perform her

previously assigned mail route.” Id. 29. On October 2, 2019, plaintiff's DSR and

medical restrictions were again updated, e.g., plaintiff could drive a vehicle four hours

intermittently per day. Id, § 33. In response to each DSR, Carrillo worked with the

USPS’ Injury Compensation Department and determined there was available work within

plaintiff's medical work restrictions at the San Marino Post Office. Id. 31, 34.

However, plaintiff's first allegation in her formal complaint reflects her belief that there

was work at the Arcadia Post Office within her restrictions and that she was given work

“detailed as custodian duties at the San Marino Post Office.” Id. 4 31, 34. According to

plaintiff, she accepted the OMA (Limited Duty) at the San Marino Post Office on

September 30, 2019, even though the work was purportedly outside of her medical

restrictions. Id. 32. On October 4, 2019, two days after her medical restrictions were

updated, plaintiff accepted a new OMA at the San Marino Post Office with the effective

start date of October 5. Id. 33, 35. Plaintiff testified that “she ‘was really happy there

and it was within [her] work restrictions,’ and that she never actually performed any

custodial duties and instead was given an ‘office manager position’” there. Id. § 36.

Plaintiff alleges that Supervisor Tony Cozul at San Marino realized she was given work

outside of her restrictions and instead gave her work within her restrictions. Id. On

November 13, 2019, plaintiff accepted an OMA as a City Carrier at the Arcadia Post

Office after her doctor revised her medical work restrictions, “such that she could

perform her previously assigned mail route.” Id. § 37.

Plaintiff's second allegation in her sixth formal complaint is that Supervisor

Marvin Linares gave plaintiffs personal cell phone number to another USPS employee to

enable him to relay an order to plaintiff. Id. ] 39-42. However, according to the

employee who was directed to contact plaintiff, he already had her cell phone number.

Id. 41-42. Plaintiff does not dispute this fact. Id. 9 41-42. Plaintiff's third allegation

is that Linares’ vehicle blocked plaintiff's vehicle in the supervisors’ parking lot. Id. □□

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘Oo’

Case No. 2:20-CV-11398-CAS (AFMx) Date January 2, 2024

Title RACHEL PADILLA V. LOUIS DEJOY

42-44. While plaintiff agrees that she did not have permission to park in the supervisors’

lot and that Linares moved his car immediately when she told him she could not exit

because of his car, she believes Linares “purposefully blocked her in.” Id. 4] 45-47.

Regarding plaintiff's fourth allegation that she participated in “refresher training

regarding how best to use the mail hamper to prevent injuries” after she returned to the

Arcadia Post Office, plaintiff alleges she had to bend over in the middle of the workroom

and was “made fun of by other employees due to her years of service with the Agency

and due to the nature of the training [she] was made to participate in.” Id. J 48-52.

According to defendant, which plaintiff does not dispute, Job Instructor Javier Fernandes

agreed to move the training to the outside dock area as plaintiff requested. Id. 4 53.

Further, as explained above, Fernandes provided “an identical training to another USPS

employee.” Id, 454. Plaintiff's fifth allegation is that she could not park in the

handicapped parking spot in the back parking lot. Id. §[ 55-58. In response to plaintiffs

note to Carrillo, stating that Carrillo had told her she could not park in that handicapped

spot, Carrillo informed her “that the back parking lot’s handicap|ped] spot was not

reserved for any USPS employee.” Id. §[ 57-58. Finally, with respect to her sixth

allegation about reasonable accommodations, plaintiff agrees she received a DRAC form

and filed a Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation CA-2 form. Id.

{| 62, 64. However, she alleges she did not request a reasonable accommodation because

there was no space to do so on the Notice form and she did not know she could do so on

the DRAC form, despite the form asking, “What specific accommodation(s) are you

requesting, if known?” Id. 59-65; see also dkt. 32-3, Carrillo Decl., Ex. 14-31.

On February 5, 2020, plaintiff initiated her sixth EEO complaint (Agency No. 4F-

913-0043-20), and her formal complaint made on May 14, 2020, alleged:

(1) on October 7, 2019, [p|laintiff was sent to San Marino because there was

“No” work at the Arcadia Post Office: (2) on December 3, 2019, Supervisor

Customer Services Marvin Linares gave [p]laintiff’s personal phone number

to another employee: (3) on December 12, 2019, Linares blocked

[p|laintiff’s car; (4) on January 16, 2020, Barajas “ordered” [p]laintiff to

take a training session in the middle of the work area; and (5) on January 31,

* Plaintiff agrees that she was sent to San Marino on September 30, 2019, rather than on

October 7, 2019. Dkt. 42, Exh. 27.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 2:20-CV-11398-CAS (AFMx) Date January 2, 2024

Title RACHEL PADILLA V. LOUIS DEJOY

2020, Arcadia Postmaster Yvonne Carrillo did not allow [p|laintiff to park in

a handicap[ped] spot, and instead “reserved it for a clerk.”

SDE §[§ 21-22. Thereafter, plaintiff made a sixth allegation that “[o]n February 13,

2020, through May 4, 2020, [she was] denied reasonable accommodation when [she was]

sent home and told that there was no work available within [her] restrictions.” Id. 4 23.

According to plaintiff, “while management argues there was no work within her

restrictions, she could have done any of the following which were always within her

restrictions: case her route, do Express, answer phone calls, take care of customer

complaints, front window, pull vacation hold mail or a package, or assist the lobby.” Id.

Plaintiff ultimately returned to work on May 5, 2020. Dkt. 51 at 5. On June 5, 2020,

NEEOISO accepted plaintiffs six allegations for investigation. SDF § 23.

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant 1s entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying relevant portions of the

record that demonstrate the absence of a fact or facts necessary for one or more essential

elements of each claim upon which the moving party seeks judgment. See Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

If the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set out

specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986): see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e). The

nonmoving party must not simply rely on the pleadings and must do more than make

“conclusory allegations [in] an affidavit.” Lujan v. Nat’] Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871,

888 (1990): see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Summary judgment must be granted for

the moving party if the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish

the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; see also Abromson v. Am.

Pac. Corp., 114 F.3d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1997).

In light of the evidence presented by the nonmoving party, along with any

undisputed facts, the Court must decide whether the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d

626, 631 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1987). When deciding a motion for summary judgment, “the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 2:20-CV-11398-CAS (AFMx) Date January 2, 2024

Title RACHEL PADILLA V. LOUIS DEJOY

inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most

favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted); Valley Nat’] Bank of Ariz. v. A.E.

Rouse & Co., 121 F.3d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1997). Summary judgment for the moving

party is proper when a rational trier of fact would not be able to find for the nonmoving

party on the claims at issue. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Disability Discrimination Claim

The Court acknowledges that the burden-shifting standard set forth in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), applies to plaintiffs disability

discrimination claim. Dkt. 32 at 9; dkt. 36 at 9-10. Plaintiff must demonstrate that she

(1) has a disability within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which is

governed by the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (2) “is a qualified individual

able to perform the essential functions of the job with reasonable accommodation”; and

(3) “suffered an adverse employment action because of [her] disability.” Allen v. Pac.

Bell, 348 F.3d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); see also Gladle v. United

States Dep’t of Veterans Affs., No. 2:15-CV-00057-CAS-JCX, 2020 WL 4904448, at *8

(C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2020) (“Disability discrimination claims brought under the

Rehabilitation Act are governed by Americans with Disabilities Act [] standards.”). If

plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disability discrimination, the burden shifts to

defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his allegedly

discriminatory conduct. Vasquez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir.

2003). If defendant provides such a reason, the burden shifts back to plaintiff to show

that defendant’s proffered reasons were not his actual reasons, but a pretext for

discrimination. Id.

1. Whether plaintiff is a person with a disability

Defendant argues that plaintiff has not established she has a disability because her

on-the-job injuries are transitory, meaning they had a duration of “six months or less”

pursuant to 42 U_S.C. § 12102(3)(B). Dkt. 32 at 10. According to defendant, plaintiff

sustained a back injury on August 5, 2019, was on temporary total disability until

September 10, 2019, and returned from medical leave in late September. Dkt. 43 at 1.

Defendant asserts that plaintiff's September 18 DSR was updated three weeks later on

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘Oo’

Case No. 2:20-CV-11398-CAS (AFMx) Date January 2, 2024

Title RACHEL PADILLA V. LOUIS DEJOY

October 2 to allow for more mobility and that the doctor revised her work restrictions

about five weeks later on November 6, which allowed her to perform her previously

assigned mail route. Id. He contends that plaintiff provided Postmaster Carnllo with a

note that in January 2020 she “could no longer tolerate” right knee pain, which had

started in November/December 2019, but she worked full shifts until about February 12,

2020, was placed on sick leave on February 22, and filed a Notice of Occupational

Disease and Claim for Compensation CA-2 form on April 9. Dkt. 32 at 10. According to

defendant, plaintiff's “myriad injuries to different parts of her body demonstrates that any

injuries she sustained were transitory.” Dkt. 43 at 2.

Plaintiff argues that she suffers from on-the-job-related injuries to both knees, her

back, her right heel, along with carpal tunnel syndrome on both hands and trigger finger

on her right thumb, and that her left knee impairment from 2012 did not end when she

hurt her back in 2019.° Dkt. 36 at 10-12. According to plaintiff, her “subsequent injuries

in combination with the existing impairment is a result of on-the-job injuries she endured

due to the [d]efendant’s failure to consistently accommodate her medical restrictions.”

Dkt. 41 at 11. Plaintiff contends that a reasonable jury could find she has a disability

because of the substantial limitation from the injuries on her ability to kneel, bend, walk

for a long period of time, reach above her shoulder, and otherwise participate in everyday

activities. Dkt. 36 at 12.

For purposes of this motion, the Court assumes that plaintiff has raised an issue of

fact as to whether she has a cognizable disability.

2. Whether plaintiff “is a qualified individual able to perform the

essential functions of the job with reasonable accommodation”

It appears plaintiff concedes she could not perform the essential functions of a City

Carrier, but she argues that defendant failed to reasonably accommodate her. Dkt. 36 at

13-14. Defendant cites Zivkovic v. S. California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th

Cir. 2002), to assert that an “employer must engage in an interactive process with the

> While plaintiff filed a U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Workers’ Compensation

Programs (“OWCP’”) form from July 2019, that indicates plaintiff suffered a meniscus

tear in her left knee in 2012, defendant contends there is no evidence USPS was aware of

plaintiff's complaints to OWCP, and the DSRs at issue in this action do not include any

mention of the meniscus tear injury. Dkt. 37 at 2; dkt. 43 at 2.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 2:20-CV-11398-CAS (AFMx) Date January 2, 2024

Title RACHEL PADILLA V. LOUIS DEJOY

employee to determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation.” Dkt. 32 at 12. First,

defendant contends that USPS engaged in an interactive process in September and

October 2019 by finding plaintiff a reasonable accommodation at the San Marino Post

Office. Id. While it appears that plaintiff was initially assigned custodian duties at the

San Marino Post Office, plaintiff conceded in her deposition that she never actually

performed them and was instead provided work within her restrictions. Dkt. 43 at 4-5:

see also dkt. 32-6, Blakey Decl., Exs. 1-5, 1-6.

Second, defendant argues that a reasonable accommodation would not have been

effective in February 2020, because plaintiff did not report to work after February 22.

2020. Dkt. 32 at 12. Specifically, defendant states “[o|n or around February 22, 2020,

[p]laintiff did not return to work and was placed on sick leave. At no point did [p]laintiff

complete a PS Form 3971 Request for or Notification of Absence indicating what type of

leave she sought.” SDF § 61. While plaintiff states that she disagrees with this

contention, she cites no evidence to support the basis for her disagreement. Id.

According to defendant, Carrillo nonetheless encouraged plaintiff to request a reasonable

accommodation while she was on leave. Dkt. 32 at 13. In this regard, defendant asserts

that Carrillo mailed plaintiff a DRAC form in March 2020, but plaintiff failed to respond.

Id. While plaintiff claims that she did not know she could request a reasonable

accommodation through the DRAC form, defendant demonstrates that the form, which is

entitled “Reasonable Accommodation Request,” includes instructions and asks, “What

specific accommodation(s) are you requesting, if known?” Dkt. 43 at 5. As such,

defendant contends that plaintiff in fact did not seek to “engage in the interactive process

because she did not want to return to work.” Id.

Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he reasonableness of accommodation 1s ordinarily a

question of fact” and that the interactive process is a “continuing obligation.” Dkt. 36 at

14; see also U.S. EE.O.C,, 620 F.3d at 1110-11. She argues that although defendant

provided her with modified job offers, “[t]here are material factual issues that preclude a

determination that [d]efendant had participated in the interactive process in good faith”

because her supervisors failed to consider her medical restrictions or provide her with

other duties within her restrictions. Dkt. 41 at 14. In her supplemental opposition,

plaintiff repeats her assertion that Carrillo gave her a job offer with duties outside the

scope of her restrictions even though Carrillo knew plaintiff could do carrier work within

her medical restrictions, such as mounted routes, customer complaints, express, and

taking mail to other carriers. Id. at 12. However, plaintiff does not provide context for

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 2:20-CV-11398-CAS (AFMx) Date January 2, 2024

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this assertion or offer additional evidence to support these claims. Plaintiff also argues

that defendant’s “attempts to accommodate” her were “ineffective” because she reinjured

herself in February 2020. Dkt. 36 at 15. While plaintiff initially alleges that she was

injured because Carrillo and Linares “failed to follow her medical restrictions on the

workroom floor,” she later concedes that she “sustained an on-the-job injury while

carrying her route.”° Id. at 15, 19. Further, plaintiff asserts that she “was forced to leave

early” multiple times in February after the injury because Carrillo informed her that there

was no available work within her restrictions and insisted that she take “sick time”

instead of providing her a modified job offer. Id. at 19: dkt. 41 at 13. Finally, plaintiff

asserts that during the mandatory training Barajas ordered, she was not allowed to “put

empty tubs in the bottom of...to create false bottom and minimize bending at waist,”

which her medical restrictions said she could do. Dkt. 41 at 12.

Defendant argues that plaintiff ignores the undisputed fact that many of her work

restrictions, other than the restriction relating to the mail hampers, prevented her from

performing City Carrier duties. Dkt. 43 at 3. While plaintiff lists other possible

accommodations, defendant contends that she does not provide evidence that these

positions were available and, further, employers have “ultimate discretion to choose

between effective accommodations.” Id. at 3-4; U.S. E.E.0.C. v. UPS Supply Chain

Sols., 620 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Defendant argues that

plaintiff does not provide evidence of “mounted” or “express” routes being available, but

regardless, plaintiff's “September 18, 2019, medical restrictions expressly stated: ‘no

driving company vehicle’ and the October 2, 2019, restrictions allowed only four hours

of driving “intermittently per day,’” such that plaintiff would not have been able to take

these routes. Dkt. 37 at 4; dkt. 43 at 4. Regarding plaintiff's alleged reinjury in

February, defendant argues that, based on the timing, “any injury was not in any violation

of [her] work restrictions.” Dkt. 43 at 5. Moreover, defendant argues that plaintiff does

not provide evidence to controvert the evidence that she did not return a completed Form

3971 Request for or Notification of Absence after she left in February 2020. Id. at 6.

Finally, while plaintiff alleges that she was not provided a job within her restrictions for

° Plaintiff also appears to ignore the fact that she gave Carrillo a note on or around

February 6, 2020, stating that she began to experience knee pain in November/December

2019 that increased significantly in January 2020, and that she “continued to work till

[she] could no longer tolerate it.” Dkt. 32-3, Carrillo Decl., Ex. 13-27.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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Case No. 2:20-CV-11398-CAS (AFMx) Date January 2, 2024

Title RACHEL PADILLA V. LOUIS DEJOY

two-and-one-half months, defendant asserts that plaintiff never engaged in the interactive

process. Id.

Although plaintiff asserts that at various times she was not provided with work

assignments consistent with her restrictions, those assignments appear to have been

adjusted either before or after plaintiff complained. Even if there were other assignments

available at the Arcadia Post Office within plaintiff's work restrictions, it appears to the

Court that defendant engaged in an interactive process and provided plaintiff with

reasonable accommodations. See U.S. E.E.O.C., 620 F.3d at 1110-11 (“An employer is

not obligated to provide an employee the accommodation he requests or prefers, the

employer need only provide some reasonable accommodation.” (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)). Thus, defendant fulfilled his obligation. With regard to

plaintiff's failure to request an accommodation in the DRAC form, it appears that that

form apprised her that she should state whatever accommodations she was requesting.

Given that plaintiff failed to respond, there is no evidence that there was a failure to

accommodate her after February 22, 2020, when she did not return to work. ”

3. Whether plaintiff “suffered an adverse employment action because of

[her] disability”

Defendant argues that plaintiff cannot establish that either the LOW issued by

Barajas, who did not know plaintiff had a medical disability, or the temporary assignment

to the San Marino Post Office, to accommodate her medical restrictions, occurred “but-

for” her disability. Dkt. 32 at 13-14 (citation omitted). He contends that plaintiff does

not provide evidence she had any medical restrictions at the time Barajas issued the LOW

due to the observed variation in plaintiffs delivery times on June 18 and 19. Id. at 13-14.

While plaintiff asserts that the “basis for the [LOW] was clearly inaccurate” because she

was not delivering mail, defendant responds that “to claim that Barajas observed

[p|laintiff during a 3999 when she was not delivering mail defies the very purpose of the

3999.” and further, plaintiff made 519 deliveries on June 18. Dkt. 43 at 7-8.

7 Although plaintiff suggests that she was capable of doing some work during the time

she was on sick leave, the fact remains that she never asked for an accommodation on the

DRAC form or otherwise until her meeting on May 1, 2020, after which she was given

two job offers within her restrictions. Dkt. 32-2, Haley Decl., Ex. 5-178; dkt. 51 at 5.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 2:20-CV-11398-CAS (AFMx) Date January 2, 2024

Title RACHEL PADILLA V. LOUIS DEJOY

In her supplemental opposition, plaintiff asserts for the first time that other carriers

were allowed to use vehicles to deliver mail, but plaintiff was required to use a pushcart,

and that when she finally received a vehicle, it was defective.2 Dkt. 41 at 12. Further,

plaintiff argues that a jury could reasonably find that defendant would not have issued the

LOW, which was rescinded when plaintiff's union contested the charge as improper

“because there was no set pace on the street for City Carriers,” but-for plaintiffs

disability. Dkt. 36 at 16-17. In her opposition, plaintiff argues that “motive may be

imputed to [| defendant” because Linares mentored but did not inform Barajas about

plaintiff's medical restrictions during the investigative interview before Barajas issued

the LOW. Id. at 16. However, defendant argues that plaintiff does not present “any

evidence that Carrillo or Linares harbored any purported bias towards her; that Carrillo or

Linares ever told Barajas that [p]laintiff had brought disability discrimination claims

where they were named as responsible management officials; |] that they knew of or

shared any of [p|laintiff’s medical restrictions to Barajas” or further, “that they were

involved in the decision to issue the LOW.” Dkt. 37 at 7: dkt. 43 at 7.

Further, plaintiff asserts that she accepted a modified carrier position at Arcadia in

November 2019, when Carrillo requested that she do so “because a young man had been

carrying her previous route,” but her supervisors assigned her more burdensome tasks

and responsibilities that were inconsistent with her restrictions. Dkt. 41 at 13. Plaintiff

alleges that Linares blocked her car; that Carrillo did not allow her to park in a particular

Plaintiff initiated her fourth EEO complaint (Agency No. 4F-913-0005-19) on October

9, 2018, and filed the formal complaint on January 24, 2019. SDF 45. As part of her

complaint, she alleged “since July 11, 2018, [p]laintiff was forced to deliver her route

using a pushcart.” Id. On January 21, 2020, the Final Agency Decision stated that “the

evidence does not support a finding that the complainant was subjected to discrimination

as alleged.” Dkt. 32-2, Haley Decl., Ex. 3-159. Plaintiff contends that her using a

pushcart constitutes an adverse employment action and supports her argument regarding

pretext. Dkt. 41. Several of the exhibits attached to plaintiff's opposition relate to her

use of the pushcart. Dkt. 42. However, according to defendant, the EEO claims at issue

do not concern the use of a pushcart. Dkt. 43 at 7 n.2. He argues that this claim is both

unexhausted and untimely. Id. It appears to the Court that plaintiff's use of a pushcart

cannot be an adverse employment action because it occurred a year before the events

relevant to the claims before the Court. Moreover, plaintiffs discrimination claim, which

was in part based on the pushcart, was adjudicated against her and in favor of USPS.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 2:20-CV-11398-CAS (AFMx) Date January 2, 2024

Title RACHEL PADILLA V. LOUIS DEJOY

handicapped spot, claimed there was no available work within her restrictions and sent

her home, and refused to provide her with a modified job offer; and that Barajas required

her to participate in a training in the middle of the workroom, such that she “was being

ostracized and singled out by her supervisors.” Id.

It appears to the Court that Barajas did not issue the LOW because of plaintiffs

disability, about which Barajas did not know. Further, the Court does not find that the

other alleged events rise to the level of adverse employment actions. Although plaintiff

apparently wanted to use the handicapped spot in the back of the building, it appears that

there were other handicapped parking spaces available to her. Further, Linares

immediately moved his vehicle when he was told that he was blocking plaintiff's vehicle.

With regard to whether plaintiff was required to accept a modified job/carrier position at

the Arcadia Post Office in November 2019, plaintiff has failed to set forth specific and

admissible evidence as to how her work assignments were outside of her restrictions.!°

See dkt. 51. Further, plaintiff concedes that she returned to her original Sierra Madre

route in January 2020. Id. 14-15. Thus, it does not appear that plaintiff “suffered an

adverse employment action because of [her] disability.”

4. Whether defendant’s actions were pretextual

Finally, defendant argues that plaintiff cannot demonstrate pretext because she

cannot prove USPS’ reasons were false and based on discrimination, and further,

defendant’s actions relating to plaintiff's other complaints were not adverse. Dkt. 32 at

15-16. According to defendant, the LOW was issued due to plaintiffs significant pace

differential, and USPS attempted to engage in the interactive process both when it

° Defendant asserts that the grievances regarding parking and training do not relate to her

alleged disability. Dkt. 32 at 14. Further, defendant contends that these events are

neither discriminatory nor adverse employment actions, and that plaintiff inaccurately

characterizes them. Dkt. 43 at 8. In her deposition, plaintiff explained that she believes

the training related to disability discrimination because she “can’t completely bend over

or bend [her] knees properly in front of a gurney and reach in.” Dkt. 42, Exh. C at 20-21.

10 Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss these “new allegations” because

|laintiff waited over 4.5 years from the time she filed her EEO complaint and 3 years

from the time she filed her Complaint before claiming that [d]efendant allegedly failed to

accommodate her in November 2019.” Dkt. 52.

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 2:20-CV-11398-CAS (AFMx) Date January 2, 2024

Title RACHEL PADILLA V. LOUIS DEJOY

provided her a reasonable accommodation at San Marino and after plaintiff stopped

reporting to work in February 2020. Id. at 15.

According to plaintiff, it was improper for defendant to issue the LOW. Dkt. 41 at

19. Plaintiff further alleges that Carrillo did not allow her “to work overtime because she

expected the route to be completed in an eight-hour workday without accommodation”

and made statements about a younger male employee who was faster at plaintiff's

previous route. Id. at 19-20. Finally, she argues that defendant did not reasonably

accommodate her and that his reasons were thus pretextual because the modified job

offers were often outside of her work restrictions. Id. at 19-20. For example, she was

initially provided a custodian job at the San Marino Post Office that did not meet her

medical restrictions, and she accepted a modified carrier position and sustained another

on-the-job injury when she returned to Arcadia Post Office. Id. at 20: dkt. 36 at 18-19.

Defendant rebuts plaintiff's contentions that the accommodation at the San Marino

Post Office was “ineffective” because plaintiff performed work within her restrictions

and further worked in a “office manager position” rather than as a custodian. Dkt. 37 at

8. Further, defendant argues that Barajas observed plaintiff deliver mail during a 3999

observation and issued the LOW because of the discrepancy in plaintiff's delivery time,

not because of plaintiff's “purported disability,” about which Barajas did not know. Id. at

7-9. Moreover, he asserts that Barajas rescinded the LOW when she learned that step

count could not form the basis for poor performance. Id. at 9. Finally, defendant argues

that plaintiff does not provide evidence to support her claim that the modified job offers

were outside her work restrictions. Id.

5. Conclusion

Because plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of disputed fact that defendant

failed to reasonably accommodate her disability, the Court grants summary judgment to

defendant on plaintiff's disability discrimination claim.

B. Plaintiff?’s Age Discrimination Claim

Claims of age discrimination are similarly analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green standard. See Sheppard v. David Evans & Assoc., 694 F.3d 1045, 1049

(9th Cir. 2012). Specifically, plaintiff must prove that she (1) was at least forty years old:

(2) was performing her job satisfactorily; (3) suffered an adverse employment action; and

(4) was “either replaced by [a] substantially younger [employee] with equal or inferior

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 2:20-CV-11398-CAS (AFMx) Date January 2, 2024

Title RACHEL PADILLA V. LOUIS DEJOY

qualifications or discharged under circumstances otherwise giving rise to an inference of

age discrimination.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Sweeney v. Chang, No. 2:16-CV-

07240-CAS-RAOX, 2018 WL 3473962, at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2018).

Plaintiff alleges that Barajas issued the LOW because plaintiff did not perform her

job as quickly as a twenty-five-year-old man. Dkt. 32 at 16. However, defendant

reasserts that Barajas issued the LOW because of plaintiffs job performance, and USPS

did not replace her with a younger employee. Id. Moreover, defendant contends that a

“stray comment” comparing plaintiff to a twenty-five-year-old man would be insufficient

to prove age discrimination. Id. at 16-17; see also Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113

F.3d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 1996): Nesbit v. Pepsico, Inc., 994 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1993).

In opposition, plaintiff asserts that she 1s over forty years old, has been performing

her job satisfactorily since about 1992, and was not issued disciplinary action until the

LOW “when she was compared to a younger man that could complete the route at a faster

pace.” Dkt. 36 at 20. According to plaintiff, when she returned to the Arcadia Post

Office, Carrillo requested that she “take a modified job because during her absence a man

aged 18-25 had been carrying [plaintiff's] previous route (2403) and he was much faster

than [her].” Id. at 21. Plaintiff alleges that Carmllo also told her that Carrillo would

similarly be unable “to walk that route as fast as a young man in his early twenties.” Id.

As such, plaintiff contends that defendant’s reasons were pretextual, which is further

evidenced by Carrillo’s refusal to allow plaintiff to work overtime when the route could

be completed without accommodations in the eight-hour workday. Id. In her

supplemental opposition, plaintiff asserts that Carrillo “effectively pushed [her] into a

modified city carrier position.” Dkt. 41 at 15. Further, plaintiff contends that when a

plaintiff “presents direct evidence of a discriminatory motive” that is “directly tied to the

adverse employment decision,” the court does not employ the McDonnell Douglas

burden shifting framework. Id.; see also France v. Johnson, 795 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th

Cir. 2015) (“Direct evidence, in the context of an ADEA claim, is defined as evidence of

conduct or statements by persons involved in the decision-making process that may be

viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude ... sufficient to permit

the fact finder to infer that that attitude was more likely than not a motivating factor in

the employer’s decision.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

In reply, defendant contends that plaintiff's only evidence of the alleged age

discrimination is “her own uncorroborated testimony.” Dkt. 37 at 9. Further, defendant

argues that plaintiff cannot establish her prima facie case because she returned to work at

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 2:20-CV-11398-CAS (AFMx) Date January 2, 2024

Title RACHEL PADILLA V. LOUIS DEJOY

the Arcadia Post Office and “was not ‘either replaced by [a] younger [employee] with

equal or inferior qualifications or discharged under circumstances otherwise giving rise to

an inference of age discrimination.’” Id. (citing Sheppard, 694 F.3d at 1049).

As an initial matter, while the issuance of the LOW may have constituted an

adverse employment action, plaintiff conceded in her deposition that the LOW did not

have an effect on her employment.'! Dkt. 32-6, Blakey Decl., Ex. 1-8. Thus, plaintiff

cannot establish a prima facie case of age discrimination based on the LOW. Moreover,

at the hearing on October 23, 2023, the Court directed plaintiff to present evidence that

she has in support of any claim that she was replaced by a younger employee. According

to plaintiff, plaintiff and Carrillo had an agreement about plaintiff's work assignments at

the Arcadia Post Office between November 2019, and January 2020. Plaintiff asserts in

both her deposition and her declaration that Carrillo gave plaintiffs route to a younger

man who could complete the route faster than plaintiff, but also gave plaintiff eight hours

of work within her restrictions.!* Dkt. 42, Sebial Decl., Exh. B at 66; dkt. 51 §§ 10-11.

However, plaintiff asserts that because Linares started giving her work that was not

within her restrictions, in violation of plaintiff's agreement with Carrillo, she ultimately

requested to return to her original Sierra Madre route. Dkt. 42, Sebial Decl., Exh. B at

66-68. Although plaintiff may not have been assigned to her original route between

November 2019, and January 2020, it appears that plaintiff and Carrillo had agreed that

plaintiff would have other work assignments during this time. Significantly, plaintiff

returned to her previously assigned mail route in January 2020. See dkt. 51 at 4. Thus,

while Carrillo may have made comments suggesting that plaintiff's age impacted her

ability to perform her job, plaintiff was not discharged from USPS and was provided with

other work assignments. Further, plaintiff has failed to present evidence that she was

replaced by a younger employee on her previously assigned mail route.!? As such,

So other than the fact that it bothered you having the warning letter out there for 11

or 12 days, did it have any other effect on your employment? A. No.” Dkt. 32-6, Blakey

Decl., Ex. 1-8.

! Plaintiff testified in her deposition that Carrillo stated, “[i]f you like, there’s a young

guy on your route right now, and he’s doing eight hours. I will give you another job offer

so you'll get your forty.” Dkt. 52, Exh. 2 at 65. Plaintiff agreed to this offer. Id. at 66.

13 During her deposition, plaintiff could not provide names for or identify the “younger

men” that she referenced. Dkt. 32-6, Blakey Decl., Exs. 2-16, 2-17. She further asserted

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 2:20-CV-11398-CAS (AFMx) Date January 2, 2024

Title RACHEL PADILLA V. LOUIS DEJOY

plaintiff has not presented evidence of any adverse employment action and thus has not

established age discrimination through either direct or circumstantial evidence. See

France, 795 F.3d at 1173 (“[S]tray remarks not directly tied to the decisionmaking

process are not direct evidence capable of defeating summary judgment.” (citation

omitted)). Accordingly, the Court grants defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to

plaintiff's age discrimination claim.

C. Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claim

The McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green standard similarly applies to retaliation

claims under Title VII. Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir.

1996) (“In a retaliation case, the burden shifting scheme is much the same as that in an

age discrimination case’’) (citing Lam v. University of Hawau, 40 F.3d 1551, 1559 & n.

11 (9th Cir.1994)). To establish a claim for retaliation, plaintiff must establish that (1)

she engaged in a protected activity pursuant to Title VII; (2) defendant subjected her “to

an adverse employment action”; and (3) a causal link exists between the events in (1) and

(2). See Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 646 (9th Cir. 2003).

Defendant first reiterates that there was no adverse employment action for most of

plaintiff's complaints. Dkt. 32 at 17. Second, defendant argues that plaintiff cannot

establish causation, either temporal or actual, because the passage of time between her

filing formal complaints and the alleged adverse employment actions “is insufficient to

infer causation.” Id. Finally, defendant argues that plaintiff, as with her disability and

age discrimination claims, cannot demonstrate pretext, such that her retaliation claim

similarly fails as a matter of law. Id.

In opposition, plaintiff asserts that filing EEO complaints and requesting an

accommodation are protected activities. Dkt. 36 at 22; see also Ray v. Henderson, 217

F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000): Coons v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879,

887 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff argues that defendant subjected her to adverse employment

actions by issuing her a LOW, requesting that she take a modified job, and refusing to

reimburse her mileage from her time at the San Marino Post Office. Dkt. 36 at 22-23;

dkt. 41 at 16. Moreover, plaintiff alleges that, between approximately December 2019,

and February 2020, Linares assigned her “more burdensome responsibilities,” shared her

that she never “chat|ted]” with the “younger, faster male carriers that had worked □□□□□

route before [her].” Id., Ex. 2-18.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 2:20-CV-11398-CAS (AFMx) Date January 2, 2024

Title RACHEL PADILLA V. LOUIS DEJOY

cell phone number with another employee, and blocked her car; Barajas instructed her to

do a training “in the middle of the work area,” despite knowing that she could not bend

over in the manner instructed because of her medical restrictions: and Carrillo informed

her that she could not park in the only available handicapped spot in the back of the

building and sent her home without providing a job offer because “there was no work

available within her restrictions.” ‘4 Dkt. 36 at 23-24: dkt. 41 at 17.

Plaintiff further contends there was a causal link because Linares and Carrillo

knew plaintiff had made EEO complaints, as they had been named as Responsible

Management Officials in one of them, and “their knowledge could be imputed to

Barajas.” Dkt. 36 at 25. In her opposition, plaintiff asserts that “Linares sat in and

mentored Supervisor Melody Barajas during the investigative interview leading up to the

[LOW].”)> Id. at 16. However, in her supplemental opposition, she asserts that Linares

and Carrillo merely trained Barajas. Dkt. 41 at 18. Plaintiff explains that Carrillo would

give instructions to supervisors and that she saw Barajas seek guidance from Carrillo

about “interacting with” plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Linares and Barajas issued the

LOW while her EEO, Agency Case No. 4F-913-0005-19, was pending, such that “there

was a proximity in time of less than 2 months.” Dkt. 36 at 25 (emphasis omitted). As

such, plaintiff argues that a reasonable jury could find that defendant, aware of plaintiffs

EEO complaint, subjected plaintiff to adverse employment actions while two of her

EEOs were pending. Id.

In reply, defendant argues that the mere fact the LOW was issued close in time to

some events that form the basis of plaintiff's January 24, 2019 formal complaint cannot

establish the required causal link for her retaliation claim. Dkt. 37 at 10. According to

defendant, plaintiff lacks factual and legal support for her theory that Linares and Carrillo

“imputed ‘their knowledge’ to Barajas,” the new supervisor, who alone issued the LOW.

4 Plaintiff attached photographs as exhibits in support of her opposition. Dkt. 42, Exh.

21. Regarding the handicapped parking spot, plaintiff alleges that the photographs show

that “that other non-supervisors had parked in that area and these other employees were

never told they couldn’t park there.” Id. at 8.

'S Plaintiff speculates that Linares mentored Barajas during the investigative interview in

plaintiff's declaration, which was not executed under penalty of perjury. Dkt. 36, Padilla

Decl., § 15. Linares, in his declaration filed under penalty of perjury, denies “hav[ing]

any involvement in the issuance of the LOW.” Dkt. 32-4, Linares Decl., § 3.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 2:20-CV-11398-CAS (AFMx) Date January 2, 2024

Title RACHEL PADILLA V. LOUIS DEJOY

Id. Defendant argues that Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2007), is not

applicable here where plaintiff has not provided “substantive evidence of bias.” Dkt. 43

at 11. Finally, defendant argues that “[e|mployers are not prevented from management

actions merely because an employee has brought an EEO complaint.” Id. at 10-11.

It is undisputed that plaintiff has engaged in protected activity by filing several

EEO complaints, satisfying the first element of her prima facie case of retaliation. For

the second element, plaintiff characterizes the following events as adverse employment

actions: (1) the investigative interview and issuance of the LOW on June 26, 2019; (2)

her modified job at the Arcadia Post Office after November 13, 2019; (3) Carrillo’s

refusal to remmburse plaintiff's mileage for the period of time she worked at the San

Marino Post Office; (4) Linares’ harassing plaintiff by assigning her more burdensome

responsibilities; (5) Linares’ giving plaintiff's cell phone number to another employee to

give plaintiff a direct order on December 3, 2019; (6) Linares’ blocking plaintiff's car in

a parking spot on December 12, 2019; (7) Barajas’ instructing plaintiff to take a training

in the middle of the workroom on January 16, 2020; (8) Carrillo’s statement that plaintiff

could not park in the only handicapped spot available in the back of the building on

January 31, 2020; and (9) Carrillo’s sending plaintiff home, “claiming that there was no

work available within [her] restrictions.” See dkts. 36, 41. To prove the final element of

her prima facie case, plaintiff must show that a causal link exists between her filing EEO

complaints and these adverse employment actions.

The Ninth Circuit takes an “expansive view” on what actions constitute adverse

employment actions. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1241-43 (9th Cir. 2000)

(holding “that an action is cognizable as an adverse employment action if it is reasonably

likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity’). As such, the Court finds

that the issuance of the LOW would constitute an adverse employment action. However,

plaintiff has failed to demonstrate causation with respect to the issuance of the LOW.

According to her own deposition testimony, plaintiff does not have any personal

knowledge that Barajas, or even Linares, knew of plaintiff's prior EEO complaints when

Barajas issued the LOW. See dkt. 42, Sebial Decl., Exh. B at 136. In her declaration,

Barajas asserts that she did not know plaintiff had any medical disability when she issued

the LOW for plaintiff's failure to follow instructions and for poor performance. See dkt.

32-5, Barajas Decl. at 2. Further, there is no evidence that Carrillo or Linares had

expressed an opinion about plaintiff to Barajas. In fact, Linares asserts in his declaration

that, “[o]ther than delivering the LOW, [he] did not have any involvement in the issuance

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘Oo’

Case No. 2:20-CV-11398-CAS (AFMx) Date January 2, 2024

Title RACHEL PADILLA V. LOUIS DEJOY

of the LOW.” See dkt. 32-4, Linares Decl. at 1. Thus, the Court finds that plaintiff has

failed to offer admissible evidence to controvert defendant’s showing that there was no

causal link made with regard to the LOW.

The other eight alleged events may be viewed collectively for purposes of

plaintiff's retaliation claim. See Flores v. City of Westminster, 873 F.3d 739, 749 (9th

Cir. 2017) (“[A]lleged acts of retaliation may be considered collectively to determine

whether, taken together, they constitute an adverse employment action under [California

Fair Employment and Housing Act].”). Defendant argues that the passage of time

between plaintiff's filing her most recent EEO complaint not at issue in this action and

her EEO complaint regarding the LOW 1s “insufficient to infer causation.” Dkt. 32 at 17.

Both parties appear to focus on the EEO complaint that plaintiff filed prior to the

issuance of the LOW for purposes of their causation analysis. However, it appears to the

Court that the relevant time period is that between when plaintiff initiated her fifth EEO

complaint regarding the LOW on July 28, 2019, which she formally filed on November

1, 2019, and the subsequent events that occurred between November 2019, through May

2020. This passage of time does not appear to be insufficient to infer causation. See

Flores, 873 F.3d at 750 (“W]e have held that, “[d]epending on the circumstances, three

to eight months is easily within a time range that can support an inference of retaliation.’”

(quoting Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 977 (9th Cir. 2003))): see also

Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, the Court finds that

plaintiff has sufficiently established a prima facie case of retaliation.

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the burden then shifts to defendant to

articulate nonretaliatory reasons for these employment actions. Defendant asserts that

USPS engaged in the interactive process to accommodate plaintiff's work restrictions,

and that as of November 13, 2019, plaintiff could perform her previously assigned mail

route. Regarding Linares’ giving plaintiff's phone number to another employee,

defendant asserts, and plaintiff does not dispute, that the employee already had plaintiffs

personal cell phone number. Dkt. 32-3, Carrillo Decl. at 4, Ex. 10-23; dkt. 32-4, Linares

Decl. at 1. Regarding his blocking plaintiff's vehicle, Linares explains that he did not

know it was plaintiffs vehicle that had occupied his spot in the supervisors’ parking lot

and that he immediately moved his vehicle to allow plaintiff to exit when she told him.

Dkt. 32-4, Linares Decl. at 2, Ex. 1-3. As for the refresher training, Barajas asserts that

plaintiff had told her that plaintiffs “back injury could have been caused by lifting

parcels from the mail hamper,” and plaintiff was instructed to participate in training

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘Oo’

Case No. 2:20-CV-11398-CAS (AFMx) Date January 2, 2024

Title RACHEL PADILLA V. LOUIS DEJOY

“regarding how best to use the mail hamper to prevent injuries.” Dkt. 32-5, Barajas Decl.

at 2. Barajas explains that the training was supposed to occur on the workroom floor

because that is where the mail hampers are located, but that the Job Instructor moved the

training to the back dock area at plaintiff's request. Id. at 3. Moreover, she asserts that

the Job Instructor gave an identical refresher training on the same day to another

employee. Id., Exh. 6. Regarding the handicapped parking spot, Carrillo told plaintiff

that the five handicapped spots were not reserved for any employee and that the

employee who was parked in the handicapped spot in the back of the building had a valid

placard. Dkt. 32-3, Carrillo Decl. at 5, Exs. 11-24, 12-25, 12-26. Finally, regarding

Carrillo’s sending plaintiff home, defendant argues that plaintiff did not return to work

after February 22, 2020, and she never requested a reasonable accommodation. Id. at 6.

As defendant has submitted admissible evidence to show several nonretaliatory

explanations for these employment actions, which evidence is not controverted by

plaintiff, defendant has met his burden.

Finally, the burden shifts back to plaintiff to demonstrate that defendant’s reasons

are pretextual. In Brooks v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 1 F. Supp. 3d 1029 (C.D. Cal.

2014), the court explained that “[t]o defeat summary judgment with a showing of pretext,

a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant’s proffered reason is unworthy of

credence; or (2) retaliation was the more likely motivation.” Id. at 1038 (citing

Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2002)). A plaintiff

must present “specific” and “substantial” circumstantial evidence to demonstrate pretext.

France, 795 F.3d at 1175. While “a plaintiff's burden to raise a triable issue of pretext 1s

hardly an onerous one,” France, 795 F.3d at 1175 (quoting Earl v. Nielsen Media Rsch.,

Inc., 658 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2011)) (anternal quotation marks and citations

omitted), here, plaintiff has not met that burden. Plaintiff does not specifically address

defendant’s reasons for these employment actions or argue that they are pretextual for

purposes of her retaliation claim. She further failed to offer any admissible evidence to

show that these claimed adverse employment actions were pretextual. Accordingly, the

Court grants defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's retaliation claim.

D. _—~Pilaintiff’s Additional Allegations in Other EEO Complaints

Finally, defendant contends that because plaintiff's additional EEO complaints are

“unexhausted” because the NEEOISO did not accept and investigate them, the Court

should reject the unrelated complaints. Dkt. 32 at 19: see also Green v. Los Angeles

Cnty. Superintendent of Sch., 883 F.2d 1472, 1475-76 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Incidents of

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘Oo’

Case No. 2:20-CV-11398-CAS (AFMx) Date January 2, 2024

Title RACHEL PADILLA V. LOUIS DEJOY

discrimination not included in an EEOC charge may not be considered by a federal court

unless the new claims are ‘like or reasonably related to the allegations contained in the

EEOC charge.””) (citations omitted). In his supplemental reply, defendant argues that

plaintiff's “recitation” of the allegations in her fourth, sixth, seventh, and eighth EEO

complaints “demonstrate that they concern different events, different facts, and should

not be part of this lawsuit as [p]laintiff initially confirmed that they were not.” Dkt. 43 at

12. Moreover, defendant contends that plaintiff's fourth EEO complaint is untimely and

time-barred by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407 because plaintiff failed to file suit within 90 days of

the Final Agency Decision, which was issued on January 21, 2020. Id.

Plaintiff argues that her EEO complaints contain claims that are “like or reasonably

related” because they similarly involve claims of retaliation and discrimination based on

disability and age, and they identify Carrillo and Linares. Dkt. 36 at 26; dkt. 41 at 20. As

such, she contends that “[t]aken altogether, the EEO complaints demonstrate a pattern of

discriminatory and retaliatory conduct by the [d]efendant.” Dkt. 41 at 20.

At the hearing on November 13, 2023, plaintiff asserted that she will not pursue

her additional EEO allegations in this case. Accordingly, the Court grants defendant’s

motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs additional allegations.

V. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the Court GRANTS summary judgment as to all

of plaintiff's claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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