determination of the scope of “California’s sentence 25 enhancement provisions is a question of state sentencing law” outside 26 the purview of federal habeas relief
How later courts described this case
- determination of the scope of “California’s sentence 25 enhancement provisions is a question of state sentencing law” outside 26 the purview of federal habeas relief
- “To the extent petitioner may 28 be challenging the state courts’ denial of his petition for 7 1 resentencing under [P.C. §] 1170.95, his claims pertain solely to the 2 state court’s interpretation and application of state sentencing law 3 and therefore are not cognizable.”
- “Merely adding the phrase ‘due 27 process’ to state law claims does not transform those claims into 28 federal claims; rather, they remain state law claims ‘dressed up’ as 8 1 federal due process claims.”
- “[M]erely placing . . . a [due process] 24 label on an alleged state law sentencing violation is insufficient to 25 state a cognizable federal constitutional claim.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 RICKY SANDERS, ) NO. CV 23-6428 ODW (AS)
)
12 Petitioner, )
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13 v. ) ORDER OF DISMISSAL
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14 TRACY JOHNSON, Warden, )
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15 Respondent. )
)
16
17 I.
18 INTRODUCTION
19
20 On May 30, 2023, Ricky Sanders (“Petitioner”), a California
21 prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
22 by a Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in United
23 States District Court for the Central District of California case no.
24 23-4203-ODW(AS) (“Sanders I”). (Sanders I Docket (“Dkt.”) No. 1). The
25 Sanders I Petition alleged that: (1) the trial court erred in denying
26 Petitioner resentencing pursuant to California Penal Code (“P.C.”) §§
27
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1 1170.95/1172.61 by considering an uncharged robbery; (2) the trial court
2 erred in the illegal use of a felony murder instruction when there was
3 no underlying charge or conviction; (3) the trial court erred in
4 failing to consider “the juvenile brain at the time of the crime”; and
5 (4) the trial court erred in using Latoya Doss’s testimony, which was
6 stricken in the denial of resentencing pursuant to P.C. §§
7 1170.95/1172.6. (Sanders I Petition at 5-6). On June 30, 2023,
8 Judgment was entered dismissing Sanders I because Petitioner “failed to
9 present any cognizable claim for federal relief.” (Sanders I, Dkt. No.
10 5).
11
12 On July 28, 2023, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas
13 Corpus by a Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the
14 present action (“Petition”). (Dkt. No. 1). Although labeled a “First
15 Amended Petition” and accompanied by a “Request to Amend the Complaint
16 and File [a] First Amended Complaint” (“Request to Amend”),2 the
17 Petition was filed as a new action.3 (Petition at 1, 32). The Petition
18
19 1 “Section 1170.95 was renumbered as section 1172.6, effective
June 30, 2022.” Brown v. Atchley, 76 F.4th 862, 864 n.1 (9th Cir.
20
2023). The pending Petition and Sanders I both refer to sections
21 “1170.95/1172.6,” and the Court will do the same.
22 2 The Request to Amend stated that “Petitioner added the
Constitution to each of the grounds submitted.” (Petition at 32 (as
23 paginated on the Court’s electronic docket; some capitalization
omitted)).
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3 Judgment was entered in Sanders I before the pending Petition
was filed, and “once judgment has been entered in a case, a motion to
26 amend the complaint can only be entertained if the judgment is first
reopened under a motion brought under Rule 59 or 60.” Lindauer v.
27 Rogers, 91 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1996); Henry v. Adventist Health
Castle Med. Ctr., 970 F.3d 1126, 1133 n.5 (9th Cir. 2020), cert.
28
denied, 142 S. Ct. 67 (2021). Since Petitioner did not seek to reopen
2
1 alleges that: (1) the trial court erred in denying Petitioner
2 resentencing pursuant to P.C. §§ 1170.95/1172.6 by considering an
3 uncharged robbery in violation of due process of law; (2) the trial
4 court erred in the illegal use of a felony murder instruction when
5 there was no underlying charge or conviction in violation of due
6 process of law; (3) the trial court erred in failing to consider “the
7 juvenile brain at the time of [the] crime” in violation of due process
8 of law; and (4) the trial court erred and deprived Petitioner of due
9 process of law in using Latoya Doss’s testimony, which was stricken in
10 the denial of resentencing pursuant to P.C. §§ 1170.95/1172.6.
11 (Petition at 5-6).
12
13 II.
14 BACKGROUND
15
16 The Sanders I Court set forth the background relevant to these
17 proceedings:
18
19 On November 16, 2001, a Los Angeles Superior Court jury
20 convicted Petitioner of one count of first degree murder in
21 violation of [P.C. §] 187(a). On January 16, 2002, Petitioner
22 was sentenced to an aggregate term of forty-five years to life
23 in state prison. Thereafter, the California Court of Appeal
24 affirmed the judgment, and the California Supreme Court denied
25 review.
26
27 Sanders I, the Court could not consider any request to file an amended
petition in Sanders I. Henry, 970 F.3d at 1133 n.5; Lindauer, 91 F.3d
28
at 1357.
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1 On June 21, 2004, Petitioner sought relief from the state
2 conviction by filing a federal habeas corpus petition in this
3 Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (case number CV 04-4456-DT
4 (CW)). On August 7, 2006, the Court denied the petition on the
5 merits. Several years later, on November 13, 2015, Petitioner
6 filed another habeas petition in this Court challenging the
7 same conviction pursuant to § 2254 (case number CV 15-8866-ODW
8 (CW)). On December 1, 2015, the Court dismissed the petition
9 without prejudice because it was barred as an unauthorized
10 second or successive petition.
11
12 On September 30, 2018, the California Governor signed
13 Senate Bill 1437. “The legislation, which became effective on
14 January 1, 2019, addresses certain aspects of California law
15 regarding felony murder and the natural and probable
16 consequences doctrine by amending [P.C. §§] 188 and 189, as
17 well as by adding [P.C. §] 1170.95, which provides a procedure
18 by which those convicted of murder can seek retroactive relief
19 if the changes in law would affect their previously sustained
20 convictions.” People v. Martinez, 31 Cal. App. 5th 719, 722,
21 as modified on denial of reh’g (Feb. 13, 2019), review denied
22 (May 1, 2019). In particular, Senate Bill 1437 “was enacted to
23 amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
24 consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that
25 murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
26 actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not
27 a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
28
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1 reckless indifference to human life.” Id. at 723 (citation
2 omitted).
3
4 On January 7, 2019, Petitioner filed a petition in Los
5 Angeles County Superior Court (case number TA059122) for
6 resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95/1172.6. Because
7 Petitioner had been tried under a felony murder theory of
8 liability and was therefore prima facie eligible for relief
9 under section 1170.95/1172.6, the trial court held an
10 evidentiary hearing on the petition. Upon considering the
11 trial record and other evidence, on March 18, 2022, the court
12 denied relief on the ground that the evidence established that
13 Petitioner was a major participant in the underlying robbery
14 who had acted with reckless indifference to human life.
15 Petitioner appealed, and the California Court of Appeal
16 affirmed in a reasoned decision on November 30, 2022 (case
17 number B319876). The California Supreme Court then denied a
18 petition for review on February 22, 2023 (case number S278222).
19
20 Petitioner also sought habeas relief in state court
21 regarding the denial of his section 1170.95/1172.6 petition for
22 resentencing. Petitioner’s habeas petition in the trial court
23 was denied on February 22, 2023. He then filed a petition in
24 the California Court of Appeal on April 24, 2023, which was
25 denied on May 5, 2023 (case number B328128).
26
27 (Sanders I, Dkt. No. 5 at 2-4 & n.2 (noting that the facts and
28 procedural history set forth above “are derived from the instant
5
1 Petition, as well as the California state appellate court dockets
2 available online at https://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/, and the
3 petitions and court records in the Central District of California in
4 the following cases of which this Court takes judicial notice [pursuant
5 to Fed. R. Evid. 201]: Sanders v. Giurbino, Case No. CV 04-4456-DT (CW)
6 (C.D. Cal.), and Sanders v. Price, Case No. CV 15-8866-ODW (CW) (C.D.
7 Cal.))); see also Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, Ala., 394 U.S.
8 147, 157 (1969) (federal court may properly take judicial notice of its
9 own files and records); Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer, 753 F.3d 890, 894
10 (9th Cir. 2014) (“It is well established that we may take judicial
11 notice of judicial proceedings in other courts.”).
12
13 III.
14 DISCUSSION
15
16 “Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States
17 District Court provides that district courts ‘must dismiss’ a petition
18 ‘[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits
19 that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.’”
20 Clayton v. Biter, 868 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Rule 4 of
21 the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
22 Courts). “Thus, Rule 4 explicitly allows a district court to dismiss
23 summarily the petition on the merits when no [cognizable] claim for
24 relief is stated.” Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir.
25 1983); O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990); see also
26 Clayton, 868 F.3d at 845 (“District courts adjudicating habeas
27 petitions under § 2254 are instructed to summarily dismiss claims that
28 are clearly not cognizable.”). “A petition may not be cognizable, for
6
1 example, where the petitioner fails to allege a federal claim.”
2 Clayton, 868 F.3d at 845. Here, for the reasons set forth in Sanders
3 I and discussed further below, the Petition does not state a cognizable
4 claim for relief and must be dismissed.
5
6 In particular, a federal court, in conducting habeas review, is
7 limited to deciding whether a state court decision violates the
8 Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §
9 2254(a); Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (per curiam);
10 Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Federal habeas corpus
11 relief “does not lie for errors of state law.” Lewis v. Jeffers, 497
12 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); see also Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010)
13 (per curiam) (“[I]t is only noncompliance with federal law that renders
14 a State’s criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the
15 federal courts.” (emphasis in original)).
16
17 The Court dismissed Sanders I as not cognizable because it
18 “involve[d] only the application of state sentencing law and [did] not
19 give rise to a federal question cognizable on federal habeas review.”
20 (Sanders I, Dkt. No. 5 at 5-6 (citing Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616,
21 622–23 (9th Cir. 2002) (state prisoner’s challenge to trial court’s
22 exercise of discretion under state sentencing law fails to state
23 federal habeas claim) and Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1118–19
24 (9th Cir. 1989) (determination of the scope of “California’s sentence
25 enhancement provisions is a question of state sentencing law” outside
26 the purview of federal habeas relief))); see also Cole v. Sullivan, 480
27 F. Supp. 3d 1089, 1097 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (“To the extent petitioner may
28 be challenging the state courts’ denial of his petition for
7
1 resentencing under [P.C. §] 1170.95, his claims pertain solely to the
2 state court’s interpretation and application of state sentencing law
3 and therefore are not cognizable.”); Shallowhorn v. Guzman, 2023 WL
4 5004495, *4 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (“Federal courts have routinely held that
5 challenges to denials of section 1170.95 resentencing petitions
6 ‘pertain solely to the state court’s interpretation and application of
7 state sentencing law and therefore are not cognizable’ on federal
8 habeas review.” (citations omitted)); Springfield v. Lozano, 2023 WL
9 3409502, *4 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (“Courts in this district have repeatedly
10 held that whether a petitioner is entitled to resentencing under the
11 amendments effected by Senate Bill 1437 is solely an issue of state law
12 and does not give rise to a claim cognizable on federal habeas.”),
13 report and recommendation accepted by, 2023 WL 4316774 (C.D. Cal.
14 2023).
15
16 Petitioner has now re-pled each claim dismissed in Sanders I as a
17 purported due process violation. (Compare Sanders I Petition at 5-6
18 with Petition at 5-6). But Petitioner “may not . . . transform a
19 state-law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of
20 due process.” Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996);
21 Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1083 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006); Cole, 480
22 F. Supp. 3d at 1097; see also Moore v. Chrones, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1005,
23 1040 n.27 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“[M]erely placing . . . a [due process]
24 label on an alleged state law sentencing violation is insufficient to
25 state a cognizable federal constitutional claim.”); Lacy v. Lewis, 123
26 F. Supp. 2d 533, 551 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (“Merely adding the phrase ‘due
27 process’ to state law claims does not transform those claims into
28 federal claims; rather, they remain state law claims ‘dressed up’ as
8
1 federal due process claims.”). Moreover, in Sanders I, the Court
2 explained to Petitioner that even if he raised his claims as due
3 process claims, they would still fail since his claims, “liberally
4 construed, give no indication that the state court’s ruling on his
5 section 1170.95/1172.6 petition for resentencing amounted to a denial
6 of federal due process.” (Sanders I, Dkt. No. 5 at 6-8). This remains
7 the case. Nothing has changed with the addition of the term “due
8 process” to Petitioner’s previously dismissed claims.
9
10 Finally, Sanders I stated that “to the extent that [Petitioner’s]
11 claims challenge [his] 2001 conviction at trial rather than the state
12 court’s later ruling on his petition for resentencing, they are also
13 barred as unauthorized successive claims because this Court previously
14 denied on the merits a previous habeas petition challenging the same
15 state criminal judgment, and Petitioner apparently has not obtained the
16 Ninth Circuit’s permission to assert these new claims.” (Sanders I,
17 Dkt. No. 5 at 7-8 (citations omitted)). Since Petitioner has not
18 demonstrated that circumstances have changed in this regard, this
19 observation from Sanders I remains true, and Petitioner has still
20 “failed to present any cognizable claim for federal relief.” (Id. at
21 8); Cole, 480 F. Supp. 3d at 1097-98.
22 \\
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1 Iv.
2 ORDER
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4 ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED that the Petition be dismissed.
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6 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
7 Ne .
8 || DATED: October 5, 2023 Jp eae
OTIS D. RIGHT, II
10 UNITED STATES STRICT JUDGE
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Presented by:
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13 _—/sf
ALKA SAGAR
14 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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