The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 4:22-cv-0950-P
FLOAT ALASKA IP, LLC,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)
(“Motion”). ECF No. 13. For the reasons stated below, the Court
DENIES the Motion. However, in the interest of justice, the Court
TRANSFERS this case to the United States District Court for the
Central District of California.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This suit arises out of the Parties’ competing uses of the “Northern
Pacific” trademarks in their respective industries. Plaintiff BNSF
Railway Company (“BNSF”) is one of the largest railroads in North
America and covers an extensive portion of the western United States.
ECF No. 1 at 2–3. In providing its railway-transportation services,
BNSF and its predecessors have been associated with the Northern
Pacific marks as early as 1893. Id. at 4.1 Defendant Float Alaska IP,
LLC (“Float Alaska”) provides chartered airline-transportation services
in the Pacific Northwest. ECF No. 14 at 1–2.
In 2021, Float Alaska filed five trademark applications with the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) to facilitate its
1 In 1970, the Northern Pacific Railway merged with other major railways to form
the Burlington Northern Railroad. Id. Then, in 1995, Burlington Northern Railroad
merged with Santa Fe to create the Burlington and Santa Fe Railway. Id. In 2005, the
company assumed its current name—BNSF. Id.
providing airline-transportation services under the name “Northern
Pacific Airlines.” ECF No. 14 at 6–7. Around September 2021, the
USPTO denied Float Alaska’s attempt to register the marks on the
grounds that they may be confused with BNSF’s use of the Northern
Pacific marks in the railway-transportation industry. Id. at 7. Then, in
early 2022, Float Alaska challenged the USPTO’s denial of its use of the
Northern Pacific marks, to which the USPTO maintained its prior
decision. Id. at 7–8. In September 2022, Float Alaska petitioned to
cancel BNSF’s marks with the United States Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board, arguing that BNSF abandoned and no longer used its
Northern Pacific marks in providing its railway-transportation services.
Id. at 8.
Following Float Alaska’s attempt to cancel BNSF’s marks, BNSF
initiated this action, alleging, inter alia, trademark infringement
against Float Alaska. ECF No. 1 at 7–9. Float Alaska moves to dismiss
BNSF’s claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). ECF No.
13. BNSF has responded, ECF No. 16, and Float Alaska replied, ECF
No. 18. The Motion is, therefore, ripe for the Court’s consideration.
LEGAL STANDARD
“When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the party
seeking to invoke the power of the court bears the burden of proving that
jurisdiction exists.” Luv N’ Care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465,
469 (5th Cir. 2006). To fulfill this burden, the party seeking jurisdiction
must establish a prima facie case that personal jurisdiction is proper.
Jones v. Artists Rts. Enf’t Corp., 789 F. App’x 423, 425 (5th Cir. 2019). A
court may consider “the contents of the record before [it] at the time of
the motion, including ‘affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral
testimony, or any combination of the recognized methods of discovery’”
in making its determination as to whether it possesses the requisite
jurisdiction to hear a case. Quick Techs., Inc. v. Sage Grp. PLC, 313 F.3d
338, 343 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,
755 F.2d 1162, 1165 (5th Cir. 1985)).
ANALYSIS
Float Alaska moves to dismiss BNSF’s claims, contending that the
Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it as a nonresident defendant.
ECF No. 13. In the alternative, Float Alaska requests that the Court
transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Central
District of California. ECF No. 14 at 23–24.2 The Court discusses each
request below.
A. Personal Jurisdiction
BNSF contends that the Court possesses personal jurisdiction over
Float Alaska based on its “numerous and systemic contacts with Texas.”
ECF No. 1 at 2.3 In response, Float Alaska avers that BNSF’s
jurisdictional allegations are demonstrably false and insufficient to
establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over it. ECF No. 14
at 6.
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires satisfaction of a two-prong test for a
federal court to properly exercise personal jurisdiction: (1) the
nonresident must have minimum contacts with the forum state, and
(2) subjecting the nonresident to jurisdiction must be consistent with
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Ford Motor Co.
v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021) (citing Int’l
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945)). The minimum-
contacts prong is further subdivided into contacts that give rise to
specific jurisdiction and those that give rise to general jurisdiction.
2 BNSF also supports Float Alaska’s request in the alternative to transfer this
action to the Central District of California as opposed to dismissing its claims if the
Court determines that it does not possess jurisdiction over Float Alaska. See ECF No.
16 at 7–8. In fact, BNSF argues extensively that, given the stay of the trademark-
cancellation proceedings brought by Float Alaska until the resolution of this matter,
the interest of justice “would be particularly served by transfer.” Id. at 7 (emphasis in
original).
3 The Court notes that BNSF does not specifically allege that the Court possesses
either general or specific jurisdiction over Float Alaska. See ECF No. 1 at 2. Instead,
it generally states that “this Court has personal jurisdiction over [Float Alaska].” Id.
To be safe, the Court addresses both.
Freudensprung v. Offshore Tech. Servs., Inc., 379 F.3d 327, 343 (5th Cir.
2004).
Float Alaska contends that both grounds are lacking. The Court
agrees that it lacks general jurisdiction over Float Alaska and specific
jurisdiction is, at best, tenuous.
1. General Jurisdiction
First, BNSF argues that the Court possesses jurisdiction over Float
Alaska based on its numerous and systemic contacts with Texas,
including operating a website that is accessible in Texas, recruiting
pilots from the Dallas-Fort Worth metroplex, securing aircraft formerly
operated by American Airlines, seeking crowd funding in Texas,
planning scheduled flights to Texas, communicating with BNSF, and
preparing to enter into contracts to provide transportation services in
this district. ECF No. 1 at 2. The Court disagrees.
General jurisdiction exists when a defendant’s contacts are so
continuous and systemic to render them essentially at home in the
forum state. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
414 (1984). As the tone of the Supreme Court suggests, the threshold for
proving that general jurisdiction exists is higher “because the state has
no direct interest in the cause of action.” Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
818 F.2d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447–48 (1952)).
Here, Float Alaska is a limited liability company organized under the
laws of the state of Delaware with offices in Anchorage, Alaska, and
maintains its principal place of business in Pomona, California. ECF No.
13-1 at 9. It can hardly be said that such a business entity would be “at
home” in Texas unless it possesses significant business contacts with the
state. See Hall, 466 U.S. at 414.
Even resolving all conflicts in favor of BNSF’s jurisdictional
allegations regarding Float Alaska’s business relationship with Texas,
they depict an infrequent one. In Hall, the defendant helicopter-
transportation company was found to not be “at home” in Texas despite
its negotiating contracts in the state, purchasing helicopters,
equipment, and training services in substantial sums in the state, and
sending personnel to the state for training. Id. at 416. The contacts with
Texas by the helicopter company in Hall were much more extensive than
Float Alaska’s in this case, and the Supreme Court nonetheless held that
the company was not subject to the general jurisdiction of the court. The
Court here reaches the same result—BNSF fails to prove that Float
Alaska is subject to the Court’s general jurisdiction.
2. Specific Jurisdiction
Second, BNSF asserts that Float Alaska is subject to the specific
jurisdiction of the Court because Float Alaska directed its allegedly
infringing conduct towards Texas. In support of its assertion, BNSF
cites the same seven grounds mentioned above as evidence that Float
Alaska’s contacts with the state directly flow from BNSF’s claims
against it.
Because Float Alaska and BNSF both view the transfer of this action
as an adequate remedy, the Court chooses not to make a conclusive
determination as to whether it possesses specific jurisdiction over Float
Alaska. See ECF No. 14 at 23–24; see also ECF No. 16 at 7–8. But the
Court expresses that its ability to exercise jurisdiction over Float Alaska
is, at best, questionable.4 The Court therefore considers whether
transferring this action to the Central District of California is a more
appropriate means of ensuring the efficient administration of justice.
B. Section 1404(a) Transfer
Federal venue rules states that “a district court may transfer any
civil action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Decisions to transfer venue are
“committed to the sound discretion” of the Court. Jarvis Christian Coll.
v. Exxon Corp., 845 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1988). While a plaintiff’s
choice of forum should be respected, clear convenience in a transferee
venue can overcome the deference afforded to a plaintiff’s forum choice.
4 In addition, the Court DENIES BNSF’s request for jurisdictional discovery as it
has failed to make a preliminary showing that discovery would yield the facts
necessary to withstand dismissal. See Johnson v. TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc., 21
F.4th 314, 326 (5th Cir. 2021).
See In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 314–15 (5th Cir. 2008)
(en banc).
To determine whether a § 1404(a) transfer is appropriate, a court
must analyze four private and four public-interest factors—none of
which are given dispositive weight. Id. at 315. Based on the Parties’
requests in the alternative that this case be transferred to the Central
District of California, the Court assesses whether a transfer of venue to
that court would be more appropriate considering the convenience of the
Parties and the interest of justice.
1. Private-Interest Factors
The private-interest factors are: (1) the accessibility of sources of
proof; (2) the ability of the court to secure the attendance of witnesses;
(3) the cost of attendance for witnesses; and (4) all other factors that
make a trial expeditious and inexpensive. In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc.,
545 F.3d at 315. The Court addresses each in turn.
First, the Central District of California will have better access to
sources of proof as most discovery in this case will flow from
representatives of Float Alaska and documents produced regarding its
prospective business plans. Given that Float Alaska’s principal place of
business is in Pomona, California, see ECF No. 13-1 at 9, the sources of
proof available to the court will be easily accessible. Second, the court
will have the best access to witnesses due to the proximity of Float
Alaska. Third, the cost of travel for the witnesses will also be lower due
to its proximity. Fourth, the trial will be more expeditious because
witnesses and parties will be privy to that court’s local rules and
procedures, as Float Alaska is a local company with California counsel,
and BNSF is a nationwide company with extensive experience being a
litigant in that district.
Accordingly, the private-interest factors weigh in favor of transfer.
2. Public-Interest Factors
The public-interest factors are: (1) the administrative difficulties
flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized
interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the law
that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of problems regarding
conflict of laws or the application of foreign law. In re Volkswagen of
Am., Inc., 545 F.3d at 315. The Court again discusses each in turn.
First, the evidence shows that the median time to disposition of a
civil case is fifty-six months in the Northern District of Texas compared
to almost five months in the Central District of California. See CIVIL
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS, 2021–2022 Report, Table C-5 (2022), available at:
https://www.us-courts.gov/statistics/table/c-5/judicial-business/202-
2/09/30. 5 Given the busyness of the docket of this Court, this factor
weighs heavily in favor of transfer. Second, Texas and California both
have localized interests based on the Parties’ statuses as resident
businesses. This factor is, therefore, neutral. Third, while BNSF’s
current complaint contains a pendent claim of unfair competition under
Texas law, the gravamen of its complaint against Float Alaska is
objecting to Float Alaska’s allegedly infringing conduct relating to the
Northern Pacific marks. See ECF No. 1 at 7–13 (depicting that four out
of the five causes of action alleged against Float Alaska pertain to
federal trademark law). Both courts can equally apply federal
trademark law, which makes this factor neutral. Fourth, there do not
appear to be problems associated with a conflict of laws or the
application of foreign law. This final factor is neutral.
The public-interest factors weigh slightly in favor of transfer.
* * *
Cumulatively, the private and public-interest factors—along with
the statutory considerations under § 1404(a) of convenience of all those
involved and the interest of justice—weigh in favor of transferring this
case.
5 This fact is likely due to the number of district judge positions versus the total
number of civil cases in the respective districts. The Northern District of Texas has
eighteen district judge positions, including the chief judge, senior status judges, and
vacancies. In comparison, the Central District of California has thirty-eight district
judge positions, including the same. From 2021 to 2022, the Northern District of Texas
had 8,698 total civil cases reported and the Central District of California had 12,887.
See CIVIL JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, Table C-5.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court DENIES the Motion but TRANSFERS
this case to the United States District Court for the Central District of
California.¢®
SO ORDERED on this 22nd day of May 2023.
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
6 Because the Court is transferring this case, BNSF’s motion to strike the appendix
supporting Float Alaska’s reply brief (ECF No. 20) should be, and it is hereby, rendered
MOOT.