“[T]he party 15 opposing arbitration must demonstrate that the contract 16 as a whole or a specific clause in the contract is both 17 procedurally and substantively unconscionable.”
How later courts described this case
- “[T]he party 15 opposing arbitration must demonstrate that the contract 16 as a whole or a specific clause in the contract is both 17 procedurally and substantively unconscionable.”
- “The fact that [a declarant] did 2 not complete [a form] himself, and his failure to 3 identify either the specific person who completed [the 4 form] or when that person completed it, do not keep [the 5 form] from being a business record.”
- “[D]ue 16 regard must be given to the federal policy favoring 17 arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the 18 arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of 19 arbitration.”
- holding that an 15 employee impliedly accepted reduced compensation by 16 continuing to work after receiving a letter from the 17 employer regarding the compensation change
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1 JS-6 'O'
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
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CV 21-08060-RSWL-MAR x
12 GUILLERMO BILL GONZALEZ,
ORDER re:
13 Plaintiff,
Defendant’s Motion to
14 v. Compel Arbitration [17]
15
ANHEUSER-BUSCH COMPANIES,
16 et al.,
17 Defendant.
18
Plaintiff Guillermo Bill Gonzalez (“Plaintiff”)
19
brings this Action against Defendant Anheuser-Busch
20
Commercial Strategy, LLC (“Defendant”) alleging: 1)
21
disability discrimination; 2) age discrimination; 3)
22
failure to accommodate a disability; 4) failure to
23
engage in the interactive process; 5) retaliation; 6)
24
wrongful termination; 7) constructive discharge; 8)
25
violation of the California Family Rights Act; and 9)
26
failure to pay all wages due and owed at the time of
27
termination. Currently before the Court is Defendant’s
28
1 Motion to Compel Arbitration (“Motion”) [17].
2 Having reviewed all papers submitted pertaining to
3 the Motion, the Court NOW FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS:
4 the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion.
5 I. BACKGROUND
6 A. Factual Background
7 1. Plaintiff’s Complaint
8 Plaintiff is an individual who resides in the State
9 of California, County of Ventura. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF
10 No. 1-2. Defendant is a large brewing company that
11 operates in the United States. Id. ¶ 12.
12 On July 11, 1978, Defendant hired Plaintiff to work
13 at one of Defendant’s breweries. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff
14 worked for Defendant for thirty-five years, eventually
15 becoming a business manager at the brewery. Id. ¶ 14.
16 In 2014, Plaintiff suffered multiple work-related
17 injuries. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff stopped working and
18 started to receive disability benefits. Id. Time
19 passed, and Plaintiff recovered to a degree in which he
20 could perform sedentary work. Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff’s
21 supervisor refused to accommodate Plaintiff and
22 requested that Plaintiff work in a position which
23 required a “great deal of walking.” Id. Due to the
24 supervisor’s demands, Plaintiff quit working for
25 Defendant. Id. In 2019, as a condition of a worker’s
26 compensation settlement, Plaintiff agreed to never
27 return to work for Defendant. Id. ¶¶ 17-18.
28 ///
1 B. Procedural Background
2 On April 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed his Complaint
3 [1-2] in the Superior Court of the State of California,
4 County of Los Angeles. On October 8, 2021, Defendant
5 filed its Notice of Removal [1].
6 On December 6, 2022, Defendant filed the instant
7 Motion to Compel Arbitration [17]. On January 17, 2023,
8 Plaintiff opposed [21]. On January 24, 2023, Defendant
9 replied [22].
10 II. DISCUSSION
11 A. Legal Standard
12 “[T]he Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) makes
13 agreements to arbitrate ‘valid, irrevocable, and
14 enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
15 in equity for the revocation of any contract.’” AT&T
16 Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336 (2011)
17 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
18 Provided that a court is “satisfied that the making
19 of the agreement for arbitration or that failure to
20 comply therewith is not an issue,” the court is required
21 to direct the parties to proceed to arbitration. See 9
22 U.S.C. § 4; Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S.
23 63, 68 (2010). When Congress enacted FAA section 2, it
24 intended to declare a “national policy favoring
25 arbitration.” Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,
26 10 (1984). “[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of
27 arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
28 arbitration.” Ferguson v. Corinthian Colls., Inc.,
1 733 F.3d 928, 938 (9th Cir. 2013).
2 “Generally, a court’s role under the FAA is limited
3 to determining ‘two gateway issues: (1) whether there is
4 an agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and
5 (2) whether the agreement covers the dispute.’” Manuwal
6 v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 484 F. Supp. 3d 862, 865
7 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (quoting Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d
8 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2015)).
9 B. Discussion
10 In deciding a motion to compel arbitration under
11 the FAA, a court’s inquiry is limited “to determining
12 (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and,
13 if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the
14 dispute at issue.” Revitch v. DIRECTV, LLC, 977 F.3d
15 713, 716 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Chiron Corp. v. Ortho
16 Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir.
17 2000)). “If the response is affirmative on both counts,
18 then the [FAA] requires the court to enforce the
19 arbitration agreement in accordance with its terms.”
20 Id.
21 “Under California law, ‘the party opposing
22 arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense,
23 such as unconscionability.’” Poublon v. C.H. Robinson
24 Co., 846 F.3d 1251, 1260 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting
25 Pinnacle Museum Tower Ass’n v. Pinnacle Mkt. Dev. (US),
26 LLC, 55 Cal. 4th 223, 236 (2012)).
27 Here, Plaintiff argues that he is not bound by
28 Defendant’s DRP because Plaintiff never agreed to it.
1 Opp’n at 4:15-17. Furthermore, Plaintiff contends that
2 even if he did accept the terms of Defendant’s DRP, the
3 arbitration agreement is unconscionable and should not
4 be enforced. See id. at 9:15-27.
5 1. Evidentiary Objections
6 Plaintiff objects to excerpts of the Marjorie Yocum
7 Declaration. See Pl.’s Evid. Objs., ECF No. 21-3.
8 Defendant objects to excerpts of the Guillermo Bill
9 Gonzalez and Marc Appell Declarations. See Def.’s Evid.
10 Objs., ECF Nos. 23, 24.
11 “On a motion to compel arbitration, the court
12 applies a standard similar to the summary judgment
13 standard applied under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
14 Civil Procedure.” E.g., Alvarez v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
15 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146757, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 20,
16 2011). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[a]
17 party may object that the material cited to support or
18 dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would
19 be admissible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).
20 Consequently, the focus of an objection on a motion to
21 compel arbitration is not “the admissibility of the
22 evidence’s form” but on the “admissibility of its
23 contents.” See Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036
24 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court has considered the
25 admissibility of the evidence and has not considered
26 facts that are irrelevant or that could not be in a form
27 that would be admissible at trial. See Norse v. City of
28 Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 973 (9th Cir. 2010).
1 a. Plaintiff’s Objections
2 Here, Plaintiff’s objects to the Marjorie Yocum
3 Declaration on the grounds that: (1) Ms. Yocum lacks
4 personal knowledge; (2) her testimony is inadmissible
5 hearsay; (3) she is not a qualified witness under
6 Federal Rule of Evidence (“Rule”) 803(6); and (4) her
7 offered documentary evidence lacks foundation. See
8 generally Pl.’s Evid. Objs.
9 Ms. Yocum administers Defendant’s DRP as a
10 “Benefits Manager,” and is familiar with its history and
11 how it currently applies. Decl. of Marjorie Yocum ¶¶ 2-
12 6. Therefore, her statements are within the scope of
13 her job responsibilities and are based on personal
14 knowledge. See Abrahim v. Esis, Inc., No. C-07-04014
15 JCS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8909, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
16 25, 2008) (holding that an employee had personal
17 knowledge of how a company administered its arbitration
18 policy given the employee’s title and job
19 responsibilities).
20 Accordingly, to the extent that Ms. Yocum’s
21 testimony may constitute hearsay, it falls under the
22 Rule 803(6) exception. Considering the Supplemental
23 Declaration of Marjorie Yocum, the requirements of the
24 business record exception are met.1 See generally
25 1 District courts may in their discretion consider a
supplemental declaration or a supplemental piece of testimony
26
attached to a reply brief “to the extent that it replies to
27 arguments raised in the Opposition and does not raise new issues
or introduce new information.” Sweet v. Pfizer, 232 F.R.D. 360,
28 364 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
1 Suppl. Decl. of Marjorie Yocum, ECF No. 22-1; see Fed.
2 R. Evid. 803(6). As to Plaintiff’s specific objection
3 that Ms. Yocum is not a qualified witness, Ms. Yocum is
4 a qualified witness under Rule 803(6) because “[t]he
5 phrase ‘other qualified witness’ is broadly interpreted
6 to require only that the witness understand the record-
7 keeping system.” United States v. Ray, 930 F.2d 1368,
8 1370 (9th Cir. 1990). Ms. Yocum has testified that she
9 understands Defendant’s record keeping as it relates to
10 the DRP. See generally Suppl. Decl. of Marjorie Yocum.
11 Plaintiff lastly objects to Ms. Yocum’s documentary
12 evidence as lacking foundation. “Rule 803(6)’s
13 foundation requirement ‘may be satisfied by the
14 testimony of anyone who is familiar with the manner in
15 which the document was prepared, even if [s]he lacks
16 firsthand knowledge . . . and even if [s]he did not
17 [herself] either prepare the record or even observe its
18 preparation.’” Lomeli v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. 19-
19 CV-01141-LHK, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166151, at *16 (N.D.
20 Cal. Sep. 26, 2019) (quoting Miller v. Fairchild Indus.,
21 Inc., 885 F.2d 498, 514 (9th Cir. 1989)).
22 Here, as a qualified witness, Ms. Yocum understands
23 how the DRP is administered, and further understands the
24 DRP’s mailing process. See generally Suppl. Decl. of
25 Marjorie Yocum. Simply because Ms. Yocum did not work
26 for Defendant in 2004 or mail the DRP herself to
27 Plaintiff, does not mean that Rule 803(6) is not
28 satisfied. See United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123,
1 127 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The fact that [a declarant] did
2 not complete [a form] himself, and his failure to
3 identify either the specific person who completed [the
4 form] or when that person completed it, do not keep [the
5 form] from being a business record.”). While Plaintiff
6 has not demonstrated that Ms. Yocum’s testimony lacks
7 trustworthiness, Ms. Yocum has testified that credible
8 business records exist that assert that the DRP was
9 mailed to Plaintiff’s address in 2004. See generally
10 Suppl. Decl. of Marjorie Yocum; see generally Pl.’s
11 Evid. Objs.
12 Therefore, after reviewing Plaintiff’s objections
13 to the Marjorie Yocum Declaration, Plaintiff’s
14 objections are OVERULLED.
15 b. Defendant’s Objections
16 Given that the Court does not rely on the excerpts
17 to which Defendant objects to in the Guillermo Bill
18 Gonzalez and Marc Appell Declarations, the Court DENIES
19 as moot Defendant’s objections to those
20 Declarations. See Muhammad v. Reese L. Grp., APC, No.
21 16cv2513-MMA (BGS), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91792, at *5
22 (S.D. Cal. June 14, 2017) (denying evidentiary
23 objections as moot in which the court “did not rely on
24 the . . . declarations and exhibits in ruling on the . .
25 . motion.”).
26 2. A Valid Arbitration Agreement Exists
27 General California principles of contract law
28 determine whether parties have entered into a binding
1 agreement to arbitrate. See Chan v. Drexel Burnham
2 Lambert, Inc., 178 Cal. App. 3d 632, 640 (1986). A
3 party’s acceptance of an agreement to arbitrate may be
4 express or implied. See Gorlach v. Sports Club Co., 209
5 Cal. App. 4th 1497, 1507 (2012).
6 In California, an at-will employee accepts changed
7 employment terms if the employee continues working after
8 the employer gives notice of the changed terms. See
9 Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 23 Cal. 4th 1, 11 (2000)
10 (“California law permits employers to implement policies
11 that may become unilateral implied-in-fact contracts
12 when employees accept them by continuing their
13 employment.”); see also DiGiacinto v. Ameriko-Omserv
14 Corp., 59 Cal. App. 4th 629, 632 (1997) (holding that an
15 employee impliedly accepted reduced compensation by
16 continuing to work after receiving a letter from the
17 employer regarding the compensation change).
18 Here, Defendant argues the DRP is a binding
19 agreement between the Parties to arbitrate because
20 Plaintiff accepted the DRP’s terms by continuing to be
21 employed by Defendant and the DRP is not substantively
22 and procedurally unconscionable. See generally Mot.
23 a. Plaintiff Agreed to Arbitrate His
24 Employment Disputes with Defendant
25 “Under both [California] and federal law, a
26 properly mailed letter is presumed to have been
27 received.” Pollok v. Vanguard Grp., Inc., 774 F. App’x
28 407, 408 (9th Cir. 2019). “When there is evidence of
1 mailing, it can only be rebutted by actual evidence of
2 non-receipt.” Chavez v. Bank of Am., No. C 10-653 JCS,
3 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116630, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7,
4 2011) (holding that a plaintiff’s specific factual
5 denial of receipt was insufficient to rebut the
6 presumption of mailing).
7 Plaintiff began working for Defendant in 1978.
8 Compl. ¶ 13. Defendant started its DRP in 1994. See
9 Decl. of Marjorie Yocum ¶ 4. Defendant updated its DRP
10 in 2004. Id. ¶ 5.
11 In 2004, Defendant sent a packet in the mail
12 explaining the DRP updates to Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 6. The
13 DRP packet explained what arbitration is and explained
14 that Plaintiff was making a new binding agreement by
15 continuing to be employed by Defendant. See Decl. of
16 Marjorie Yocum, Ex. 1 at 2. The DRP packet explained to
17 Plaintiff that by continuing to be employed by
18 Defendant, Plaintiff agreed to submit all his “covered
19 claims” to arbitration. Id. at 1.
20 In 2004, Defendant noted and recorded that it sent
21 a DRP packet through the mail to Plaintiff’s home
22 address. See Decl. of Marjorie Yocum ¶ 7. In 2019,
23 Plaintiff stopped working for Defendant. Compl. ¶¶ 17-
24 18.
25 In his declaration attached to the Opposition,
26 Plaintiff asserts that he has “never received, saw, or
27 heard of the [DRP] letter . . . attached to Ms. Yocum’s
28 declaration prior to this [M]otion being filed.” Decl.
1 of Guillermo Bill Gonzalez ¶ 6, ECF No. 22-1. Plaintiff
2 further asserts that no one discussed Defendant’s DRP
3 with him and he never agreed to arbitrate his employment
4 disputes. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. This alone is insufficient to
5 show that Plaintiff did not receive the DRP packet. See
6 Castro v. Macy's, Inc., No. C 16-5991 CRB, 2017 U.S.
7 Dist. LEXIS 9925, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2017)
8 (holding that an employee’s “mere denial of receipt” of
9 an arbitration agreement was insufficient to show that
10 the agreement was not received in the mail).
11 Given that Plaintiff continued to be employed by
12 Defendant after receiving the 2004 updated DRP packet,
13 Plaintiff has accepted the DRP terms, and he has agreed
14 to arbitrate his employment disputes with Defendant.
15 See Cal. Labor & Workforce Dev. Agency v. Compucom Sys.,
16 No. 2:21-cv-02327-KJM-KJN, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133411,
17 at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 26, 2022) (“An employee consents
18 even if he does not sign the arbitration agreement or
19 otherwise affirmatively consent to the change.”).
20 b. The DRP Is Not Unconscionable
21 Plaintiff argues that the arbitration agreement
22 encompassed in Defendant’s DRP is unconscionable. Opp’n
23 at 9:15-15:17. “Under California law both procedural
24 and substantive unconscionability must ‘be present in
25 order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse
26 to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of
27 unconscionability.’” Acevedo v. Russell Cellular, No.
28 1:20-cv-01440-, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49300, at *23
1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2021) (quoting Peng v. First
2 Republic Bank, 219 Cal. App. 4th 1462, 1469 (2013)).
3 i. Procedural Unconscionability
4 Plaintiff argues that the DRP is procedurally
5 unconscionable because it was given to Plaintiff on a
6 “take-it-or-leave-it” basis or it constituted an
7 adhesion contract in which Plaintiff had little ability
8 to bargain. Opp’n at 10:15-11:9. When assessing
9 procedurally unconscionability, “[t]he court focuses on
10 whether the contract was one of adhesion.” Soltani v.
11 W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir.
12 2001). “A contract of adhesion is defined as a
13 standardized contract, imposed upon the subscribing
14 party without an opportunity to negotiate the terms.”
15 Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1281 (9th
16 Cir. 2006). Here, Defendant does not argue that the DRP
17 is an adhesion contract. See Mot. at 19:9 (“[T]he DRP
18 Policy Manual represents an adhesion contract[.]”).
19 Therefore, there is at least some degree of procedural
20 unconscionability in the DRP. See Molina v.
21 Scandinavian Designs, Inc., No. 13-cv-04256 NC, 2014
22 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55863, at *23 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2014)
23 (“[B]ecause the [a]rbitration [a]greement is an adhesion
24 contract offered to a person with little bargaining
25 power on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the [c]ourt finds
26 that the [a]rbitration [a]greement contains a minimal
27 degree of procedural unconscionability.”); see also
28 Davis v. Kozak, 53 Cal. App. 5th 897, 907 (2020)
1 (“[A]dhesion establishes only a “low” degree of
2 procedural unconscionability.”)
3 ii. Substantive Unconscionability
4 “The substantive element of the unconscionability
5 analysis focuses on overly harsh or one-sided results.”
6 Baxter v. Genworth N. Am. Corp., 16 Cal. App. 5th 713,
7 724 (2017). When assessing substantive
8 unconscionability, courts look to see whether the terms
9 “are unreasonably favorable to the [more powerful]
10 party.” Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 57 Cal. 4th
11 1109, 1145 (2013).
12 Plaintiff argues that the DRP is substantively
13 unconscionable because the DRP requires Plaintiff to
14 first present his disputes to “Local Management Review,”
15 which will give Defendant a “sneak peak of his entire
16 case.” Opp’n at 11:24-12:9. However, the DRP similarly
17 requires Defendant to disclose information to Plaintiff
18 prior to arbitration. See Decl. of Marjorie Yocum, Ex.
19 1 at 3-5. Given the bilateral nature of the DRP’s
20 internal review mechanism, it is not one sided or
21 substantively unconscionable. See Harper v. Charter
22 Commc’ns., LLC, No. 2:19-cv-01749 WBS DMC, 2019 U.S.
23 Dist. LEXIS 218440, at *13-14 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2019)
24 (holding that since the requirements of an internal
25 review term in an arbitration agreement applied equally
26 to both the company and the employee, it was not one
27 sided).
28 Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that the DRP is
1 unconscionable because Plaintiff must proceed to
2 mediation and pay $50. Opp’n at 12:10-15. However,
3 Plaintiff will pay less proceeding through the DRP than
4 if Plaintiff paid an initial filing fee to litigate his
5 claims. See Colvin v. NASDAQ OMX Grp., Inc., No. 15-cv-
6 02078-EMC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149932, at *26 (N.D.
7 Cal. Nov. 4, 2015) (finding “no substantive
8 unconscionability because there is no evidence that the
9 [arbitration program] will require [the] [p]laintiff to
10 pay more than the initial filing fee.”).
11 Plaintiff also argues that the DRP is substantively
12 unconscionable because it limits Plaintiff’s ability to
13 conduct discovery. Opp’n at 13:13-26. However,
14 “[l]imited discovery rights are the hallmark of
15 arbitration.” Coast Plaza Doctors Hosp. v. Blue Cross
16 of Cal., 83 Cal. App. 4th 677, 689 (2000). Furthermore,
17 the DRP provides that the arbitrator can expand
18 discovery if the requesting party provides a good
19 justification to expand it. See Decl. of Marjorie
20 Yocum, Ex. 1 at 13. Here, the DRP allows for two
21 individual depositions and ten interrogatories. See id.
22 These limitations do not make the DRP substantively
23 unconscionable. See Abeyrama v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank,
24 No. CV12-00445 DMG (MRWx), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87847,
25 at *12 (C.D. Cal. June 22, 2012) (“While the arbitration
26 agreement normally allows only two depositions, such
27 limitations are generally legal if either party can ask
28 the arbitrator to expand discovery for good cause.”);
1 see also Maxson v. Beazer Homes Holdings Corp., No. SA
2 CV 17-0583-DOC (AFMx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225839, at
3 *13-14 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2017) (holding that an
4 arbitration agreement which limited a party to ten
5 interrogatories was not substantively unconscionable
6 because the arbitrator was allowed to expand discovery
7 as appropriate).
8 Thus, Plaintiff has failed to establish that the
9 DRP is substantively unconscionable. Therefore, even
10 though the DRP may be somewhat procedurally
11 unconscionable, it is not substantively unconscionable,
12 and Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing
13 unconscionability. See Poublon v. C.H. Robinson Co.,
14 846 F.3d 1251, 1260 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he party
15 opposing arbitration must demonstrate that the contract
16 as a whole or a specific clause in the contract is both
17 procedurally and substantively unconscionable.”).
18 3. The DRP Encompasses the Disputes at Issue
19 Plaintiff does not dispute that the DRP applies to
20 his employment related claims in this Action. See
21 generally Opp’n.
22 Here, the DRP specifies that covered claims
23 include: “(1) involuntary terminations . . . when those
24 terminations are alleged to be discriminatory; (2)
25 [e]mployment discrimination and harassment claims based
26 on . . . disability; (3) retaliation claims; (4)
27 [c]laims relating to workplace accommodation due to
28 disabilities; [and] (5) [c]laims of violation of public
1 policy.” Decl. of Marjorie Yocum, Ex. 1 at 5.
2 Plaintiff asserts nine claims in his Complaint: (1)
3 disability discrimination; (2) age discrimination; (3)
4 failure to accommodate a disability; (4) failure to
5 engage in the interactive process; (5) retaliation; (6)
6 wrongful termination; (7) constructive discharge; (8)
7 violation of the California Family Rights Act; and (9)
8 failure to pay all wages due and owed at the time of
9 termination. See generally Compl. In general,
10 Plaintiff’s claims are work-related disability,
11 retaliation, and wrongful termination claims that
12 clearly fall within the DRP’s specified covered claims.
13 Thus, the Court finds that the DRP encompasses all the
14 claims at issue in this Action. See Mastrobuono v.
15 Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995) (“[D]ue
16 regard must be given to the federal policy favoring
17 arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the
18 arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of
19 arbitration.”). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s
20 Motion to Compel Arbitration.
21 4. Dismiss or Stay the Action
22 Having determined that the Parties’ disputes are
23 arbitrable, the Court next addresses whether to stay or
24 dismiss this Action pending completion of the
25 arbitration proceedings. Under the FAA, if the court is
26 satisfied that a dispute is referable to arbitration, it
27 “shall on application of one of the parties stay the
28 trial of the action until such arbitration has been had
1 in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”
2 9 U.S.C. § 3. The Ninth Circuit has held that,
3 “notwithstanding the language of § 3, a district court
4 may either stay the action or dismiss it outright when,
5 as here, the court determines that all of the claims
6 raised in the action are subject to arbitration.”
7 Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc., 755 F.3d 1072,
8 1074 (9th Cir. 2014). All of Plaintiff’s claims are
9 subject to arbitration. Plaintiff did not argue for a
10 stay in the event the Court compelled arbitration of all
11 claims. See generally Opp’n. Defendant argued the
12 Court should either dismiss or stay the Action pending
13 arbitration. See Mot. at 22:17-28. Here, given that
14 all the claims in this Action are subject to
15 arbitration, the Court in its discretion DISMISSES the
16 Action without prejudice.
17 ///
18 ///
19 ///
20 ///
21 ///
22 ///
23 ///
24 ///
25 ///
26 ///
27 ///
28 ///
1 III. CONCLUSION
2 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS
3 Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and ORDERS the
4 Parties to arbitrate their disputes in accordance with
5 the terms of the DRP. This Action is DISMISSED without
6 prejudice. The Clerk of the Court shall close this
7 Action.
8
9 IT IS SO ORDERED.
10
11 DATED: April 18, 2023 /s/Ronald S.W. Lew
HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW
12
Senior U.S. District Judge
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