Opinion

Vanessa M. Cervantes v. FCA US LLC

Court
District Court, C.D. California
Filed
Jan 31, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 16.4%

“We hold that where an underlying statute authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees, either with mandatory or discretionary language, such fees may be included in the amount in controversy.”

How later courts described this case

  • “We hold that where an underlying statute authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees, either with mandatory or discretionary language, such fees may be included in the amount in controversy.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Case 8:22-cv-02117-DOC-JDE Document 17 Filed 01/31/23 Page 1 of 5 Page ID #:151

JS-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 8:22-cv-02117-DOC-JDE Date: January 31, 2023

Title: VANESSA M. CERVANTES ET AL V. FCA US LLC ET AL.

PRESENT:

THE HONORABLE DAVID O. CARTER, JUDGE

Karlen Dubon Not Present

Courtroom Clerk Court Reporter

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR

PLAINTIFF: DEFENDANT:

None Present None Present

PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER REMANDING CASE TO

STATE COURT SUA SPONTE

On January 30, 2023, the Court held a Scheduling Conference in this action,

during which the Court and counsel conferred regarding jurisdiction. Upon closer review

of the pleadings, the Court finds that the amount in controversy falls short of the statutory

threshold required under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

Accordingly, and for reasons set forth more fully below, the Court sua sponte

REMANDS this case to the Superior Court of California, County of Orange.

I. Background

This action concerns Plaintiffs Vanessa M. Cervantes and Blanca Cervantes’s

(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) 2017 warranty contract with Defendant FCA US LLC.

(“FCA”) regarding a 2017 Jeep cherokee vehicle (“Vehicle”). Complaint (“Compl.”)

(Dkt. 1-2) ¶ 10. Plaintiffs allege FCA and FCA’s representatives concealed the defective

nature of the Vehicle, failed to service or repair the Vehicle, and subsequently failed to

replace it. Compl. ¶¶ 21–27. The total sale price for the Vehicle was $24,681.55. Notice

of Removal (“Notice”) (Dkt. 1) ¶ 34.

Case 8:22-cv-02117-DOC-JDE Document 17 Filed 01/31/23 Page 2 of 5 Page ID #:152

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. SA CV 22-02117-DOC-JDE Date: January 31, 2023

Page 2

Plaintiffs filed the original action in state court on October 17, 2022. Compl.

Defendants filed a Notice of Removal on November 22, 2022. Notice. The Court held a

scheduling conference on January 30, 2023.

II. Legal Standard

“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Removal of a case

from state court to federal court is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which provides in

relevant part that “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of

the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed . . . to the district court of

the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is

pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441. This statute “is strictly construed against removal

jurisdiction,” and the party seeking removal “bears the burden of establishing federal

jurisdiction.” Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988)

(emphasis added) (citations omitted).

Federal diversity jurisdiction requires that the parties be citizens of different states

and that the amount in controversy exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). For diversity

jurisdiction purposes, a corporation is “deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign

state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its

principal place of business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). The presence of any single plaintiff

from the same state as any single defendant destroys “complete diversity” and strips the

federal courts of original jurisdiction over the matter. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah

Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005).

Generally, a removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence

that the amount in controversy satisfies the jurisdictional threshold. Guglielmino v.

McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2008). If the complaint affirmatively

alleges an amount in controversy greater than $75,000, the jurisdictional requirement is

“presumptively satisfied.” Id. A plaintiff who then tries to defeat removal must prove to a

“legal certainty” that a recovery of more than $75,000 is impossible. St. Paul Mercury

Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938); Crum v. Circus Enters., 231

F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). This framework applies equally to situations where the

complaint leaves the amount in controversy unclear or ambiguous. See Gaus v. Miles,

Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1992); Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d

398, 403-04 (9th Cir. 1996).

Case 8:22-cv-02117-DOC-JDE Document 17 Filed 01/31/23 Page 3 of 5 Page ID #:153

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. SA CV 22-02117-DOC-JDE Date: January 31, 2023

Page 3

A removing defendant “may not meet [its] burden by simply reciting some

‘magical incantation’ to the effect that ‘the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of

[$75,000],’ but instead, must set forth in the removal petition the underlying facts

supporting its assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds [$75,000].” Richmond v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 897 F. Supp. 447, 450 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,

980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1992)). If the plaintiff has not clearly or unambiguously

alleged $75,000 in its complaint or has affirmatively alleged an amount less than $75,000

in its complaint, the burden lies with the defendant to show by a preponderance of the

evidence that the jurisdictional minimum is satisfied. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v.

Estate of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 2010); Guglielmino,

506 F.3d at 699.

While the defendant must “set forth the underlying facts supporting its assertion

that the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory minimum,” the standard is not so

taxing so as to require the defendant to “research, state, and prove the plaintiff’s claims

for damages.” Coleman v. Estes Express Lines, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1148 (C.D.

Cal. 2010) (emphases added). In short, the defendant must show that it is “more likely

than not” that the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory minimum. Id. Summary

judgment-type evidence may be used to substantiate this showing. Matheson v.

Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090–91 (9th Cir. 2003); Singer v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997). For example, defendants

may make mathematical calculations using reasonable averages of hourly, monthly, and

annual incomes of comparable employees when assessing the amount in controversy in a

wrongful termination suit. Coleman, 730 F. Supp. 2d. at 1148–49.

Federal district courts have original jurisdiction in actions “arising under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. An action "arises

under" the federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 if: (1) federal law creates

the cause of action, or (2) the Plaintiff right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of

a substantial question of federal law. Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers

Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. l, 27-28 (1983). 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(l)(B) of the Magnuson-

Moss Warranty Act states in part that a consumer who is damaged by a warrantor's

failure to comply with a warranty “may bring suit for damages and other legal and

equitable relief in an appropriate district court of the United States, subject to paragraph

(3) of this subsection.” Paragraph (3) goes on to state that “[n]o claim shall be cognizable

in a suit brought under paragraph (l)(B) of this subsection ... if the amount in controversy

Case 8:22-cv-02117-DOC-JDE Document 17 Filed 01/31/23 Page 4 of 5 Page ID #:154

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. SA CV 22-02117-DOC-JDE Date: January 31, 2023

Page 4

is less than the sum or value of $50,000.00 (exclusive of interest and costs) computed on

the basis of all claims to be determined in this suit ...” 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B).

If the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, any action it takes is ultra vires and

void. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 534 (2005); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better

Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 101–02 (1998). The lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be

raised at any time by either the parties or the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). If subject

matter jurisdiction is found to be lacking, the court must dismiss the action, id., or

remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). A Court may raise the question of subject matter

jurisdiction sua sponte. See Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002).

III. Discussion

Defendant argues that the Court has original jurisdiction in this case for the claims

arising under 15 U.S.C. §2310, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Notice ¶ 18. The

Court disagrees.

“No claim shall be cognizable in a suit brought under [the Magnuson-Moss

Warrnty Act]... if the amount in controversy is less than the sum or value of $50,000.00.”

15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B). The Court finds that Defendant has not shown by a

preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000 for

federal question purposes under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. It is undisputed that

the total sale price of the Vehicle is $24,681.55. Notice ¶ 34. Defendant then argues that

the Court should include statutory civil penalties (here, $49,363.10) in its calculation of

the amount in controversy. Notice ¶ 35.

The Court will not include speculative civil penalties or attorneys’ fees to meet the

amount in controversy requirement. See Galt G/S v. JSS Scandinavia, 142 F.3d 1150,

1156 (9th Cir. 1998) (“We hold that where an underlying statute authorizes an award of

attorneys’ fees, either with mandatory or discretionary language, such fees may be

included in the amount in controversy.”) (emphasis added). The Court finds that

Defendant has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in

controversy exceeds $50,000.

Accordingly, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over this matter.

Case 8:22-cv-02117-DOC-JDE Document 17 Filed 01/31/23 Page 5 of 5 Page ID #:155

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. SA CV 22-02117-DOC-JDE Date: January 31, 2023

Page 5

IV. Disposition

For reasons set forth above, the Court hereby REMANDS this case to the Superior

Court of California, County of Orange.

The Clerk shall serve this minute order on the parties.

MINUTES FORM 11 Initials of Deputy Clerk: kdu

CIVIL-GEN

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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