Murriel L. Hays v. Kilolo Kijakazi

Case 5:21-cv-01997-RAO Document 27 Filed 12/28/22 Page 1 of 12 Page ID #:1102

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 MURRIEL L. H., Case No. EDCV 21-01997-RAO

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

ORDER

14 KILOLO KIJAKAZI,

Acting Commissioner of Social

15 Security,

Defendant.

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17 I. INTRODUCTION

18 Plaintiff Murriel L. H.1 (“Plaintiff”) challenges the Commissioner’s denial of

19 her disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act.

20 For the reasons stated below, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

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II. SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

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On April 14, 2020, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB alleging a disability

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onset date of February 27, 2018. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 197.) The

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Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s application by initial determination on August 8,

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26 1 Plaintiff’s name is partially redacted in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil

27 Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court

Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United

28 States.

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1 2020, and upon reconsideration on October 28, 2020. (AR 67-83, 85-100.)

2 Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on

3 October 31, 2020. (AR 112-13.) A hearing was held on April 14, 2021. (AR 33-

4 66.) The ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s application on April 27, 2021.

5 (AR 12-32.) The ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision when

6 the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (AR 1-6.) Plaintiff filed

7 this action on September 23, 2021. (Dkt. No. 1.)

8 To determine whether Plaintiff was disabled under the Social Security Act,

9 the ALJ followed the familiar five-step sequential evaluation process. Lester v.

10 Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). At step one, the ALJ found that

11 Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 27, 2018.

12 (AR 17.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the severe impairments of

13 “cervicalgia and cervical myofascial pain; bilateral shoulder myofascial pain;

14 migraine headaches; depressive disorder; and anxiety disorder.” (AR 17-18.) At

15 step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination

16 of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of a listed impairment in

17 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525,

18 and 404.1526). (AR 18-20.)

19 Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual

20 functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R.

21 § 404.1567(c), except Plaintiff

22 [C]an occasionally lift and carry 50 pounds and frequently lift and

carry 25 pounds; can stand and walk six hours in an eight-hour day;

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can sit six hours in an eight-hour day; can occasionally climb ladders,

24 ropes, or scaffolds; can frequently climb ramps and stairs, balance,

stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; can be exposed to at most moderate

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noise intensity levels, as that term is defined in the Selected

26 Characteristics of Occupations (i.e., a business office where

typewriters are used, department store, grocery store, light traffic, or a

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fast-food restaurant at off hours); cannot be exposed to bright lights or

28 bright sunlight; can follow simple instructions and complete simple

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tasks for two-hour increments with normal breaks; cannot have

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customer-service interaction with the public; and can have frequent

2 interaction with coworkers and supervisors, but cannot perform

tandem tasks or work as part of a team.

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4 (AR 20-21.) At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any

5 past relevant work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1565. (AR 26.) At step five,

6 considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found

7 that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that

8 Plaintiff can perform. (AR 26.) Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has

9 not been under a disability since February 27, 2018. (AR 28.)

10 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

11 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner’s

12 decision to deny benefits. A court must affirm an ALJ’s findings of fact if they are

13 supported by substantial evidence, and if the proper legal standards were applied.

14 Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 2001). “Substantial evidence .

15 . . is ‘more than a mere scintilla[,]’ . . . [which] means—and means only—‘such

16 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

17 conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, 203 L. Ed.2d

18 504 (2019) (citations omitted); Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir.

19 2017). An ALJ can satisfy the substantial evidence requirement “by setting out a

20 detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence,

21 stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Reddick v. Chater, 157

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F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).

23 “[T]he Commissioner’s decision cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a

24 specific quantum of supporting evidence. Rather, a court must consider the record

25 as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from

26 the Secretary’s conclusion.” Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir.

27 2001) (citations and internal quotations omitted). “‘Where evidence is susceptible

28 to more than one rational interpretation,’ the ALJ’s decision should be upheld.”

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1 Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Burch v.

2 Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,

3 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (“If the evidence can support either affirming or

4 reversing the ALJ’s conclusion, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the

5 ALJ.”). The Court may review only “the reasons provided by the ALJ in the

6 disability determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did

7 not rely.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Connett v.

8 Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003)).

9 IV. DISCUSSION

10 Plaintiff raises two issues for review: (1) whether the ALJ properly assessed

11 her mental health impairments at step three; and (2) whether the ALJ properly

12 evaluated the medical opinions related to her mental health impairments. (Joint

13 Stipulation (“JS”) at 4, 18.)

14 A. The ALJ’s Determination at Step Three Is Supported By

15 Substantial Evidence

16 1. Applicable Legal Standards

17 At step three, the ALJ considers the medical severity of a claimant’s

18 impairments to determine whether the impairments meet or equal the criteria of any

19 of the impairments listed in the Listings of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

20 Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“Listings”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 404.1525;

21 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999). The Listings describe the

22 impairments considered to be severe enough to prevent an individual from doing

23 any gainful activity, regardless of age, education, or work experience. 20 C.F.R.

24 § 404.1525(a). Each impairment is described in terms of the “objective medical

25 and other findings needed to satisfy the criteria of that listing.” 20 C.F.R.

26 § 404.1525(c)(3). “If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments,

27 the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled.” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S.

28 137, 141 (1987); cf. Kennedy v. Colvin, 738 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 2013)

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1 (“Listed impairments are purposefully set at a high level of severity because the

2 listings were designed to operate as a presumption of disability that makes further

3 inquiry unnecessary.” (citation and internal quotations omitted)).

4 A “special technique” is used to evaluate the severity of mental impairments.

5 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(a). First, the ALJ determines whether a claimant has a

6 medically determinable mental impairment(s), then the ALJ rates the degree of

7 functional limitation in four broad areas based on a five-point scale. 20 C.F.R.

8 §§ 404.1520a(b)-(c). The four broad areas are: “[u]nderstand, remember, or apply

9 information; interact with others; concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and adapt

10 or manage oneself.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3); see also Listings 12.00E. The

11 rating scale is: “[n]one, mild, moderate, marked, and extreme.” 20 C.F.R.

12 § 404.1520a(c)(4); see also Listings 12.00F.

13 Listings 12.04 (depressive, bipolar and related disorders) and 12.06 (anxiety

14 and obsessive-compulsive disorders) each contain three paragraphs, designated A,

15 B, and C. Paragraph A includes the medical criteria that must be present in the

16 medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 12.00 (Mental

17 Disorders)(A)(2)(a). Paragraph B lists the functional criteria used to evaluate the

18 degree to which mental impairment(s) affect the four areas of mental functioning

19 and the ability to function independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a

20 sustained basis. 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 12.00 (Mental

21 Disorders)(A)(2)(b). To satisfy the paragraph B criteria, a mental impairment must

22 result in one “extreme” limitation, or “marked” limitation in two of the four areas of

23 mental functioning. Id. Paragraph C describes the criteria used to evaluate serious

24 and persistent mental disorders. 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 12.00

25 (Mental Disorders)(A)(2)(c). To satisfy the paragraph C criteria, there must be a

26 medically documented history of the existence of the disorder over a period of at

27 least two years and evidence that satisfies the criteria in both C1 and C2 (set forth

28 in Listing 12.00G). Id. To meet these listings, a claimant must demonstrate that

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1 her mental disorder satisfies the requirements of both paragraphs A and B, or the

2 requirements of both paragraphs A and C. 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1,

3 12.00 (Mental Disorders)(A)(2).

4 2. Discussion

5 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly determined that her severe

6 impairments do not meet or equal Listings 12.04 or 12.06.2 (JS at 7.) In particular,

7 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly consider Dr. Peterson’s medical

8 report. (JS at 7-11.) The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s finding that

9 Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet the marked or extreme limitations that are

10 required under the Listings is supported by substantial evidence. (JS at 11-14.)

11 The Court agrees with the Commissioner.

12 In determining that the severity of Plaintiff’s mental impairments does not

13 meet or medically equal the criteria for Listings 12.04 and 12.06, the ALJ

14 considered Plaintiff’s Representative’s Brief. (AR 19, 277-78.) The ALJ also

15 considered evidence from Dr. Fera (AR 471,864), evidence from Dr. Peterson (AR

16 709), state agency reports (AR 74, 91), various mental status exams (AR 336, 340,

17 461), a third-party functional report (AR 260), and Plaintiff’s own self-reported

18 symptoms (AR 231, 233-34, 236-37). (AR 19-20.)

19 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not satisfied either the paragraph B

20 requirements or the paragraph C requirements for both listings.3 (AR 19-2.) In

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2 Plaintiff also argues that the Court must remand for further proceedings requiring

22 the ALJ to reevaluate Plaintiff’s disability at step three under the correct version of

23 the Listings. (JS at 11.) However, Plaintiff does not present any actual argument

concerning use of the incorrect Listing requirements, identify any errors, or include

24 any citations to the record. Thus, no such argument has been properly presented.

25 See Carmickle v. Comm’r. Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 n.2 (9th Cir.

2008) (declining to address challenge to ALJ’s finding when claimant failed to

26 argue the issue with any specificity”); see also Nazarian v. Berryhill, No. CV 17-

27 1114 JC, 2018 WL 2938581, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2018) (collecting cases).

3 The ALJ did not address whether Plaintiff satisfied the paragraph A requirements.

28 In the Joint Stipulation, Plaintiff provides citations to the record that support a

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1 evaluating the paragraph B criteria for both listings, the ALJ found Plaintiff has a

2 moderate limitation in understanding, remembering, or applying information; a

3 moderate limitation in interacting with others; a moderate limitation with regard to

4 concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and a mild limitation in adapting or

5 managing herself. (AR 19-20.) The ALJ concluded that because Plaintiff’s

6 impairments do not cause at least two marked limitations or one extreme limitation,

7 the paragraph B criteria are not met. (AR 20.) In considering whether the

8 paragraph C criteria for both listings are satisfied, the ALJ found that there is

9 insufficient evidence to meet or equal the requirements. (AR 20.)

10 Plaintiff’s argument that Dr. Peterson assessed Plaintiff with 17 marked or

11 extreme limitations is unavailing. The sections in Dr. Peterson’s report that

12 Plaintiff relies on contain Plaintiff’s self-reported symptoms. (AR 711-14.) Dr.

13 Peterson specifically begins each impairment section with “[t]he applicant says” or

14 “[t]he applicant rates.” (Id.) By contrast, Dr. Peterson assessed Plaintiff with a

15 GAF score of 62, and restricted Plaintiff to “not [having] direct contact with the

16 coworker whose allegations prompted an investigation into the [Plaintiff’s]

17 workplace behavior.” (AR 724-25.) Based on its review of the record, the Court

18 determines that Dr. Peterson did not rate Plaintiff’s mental impairments as

19 “extreme, marked, moderate, mild, or none” but rather described Plaintiff’s self-

20 reported symptoms.

21 Plaintiff’s self-reported symptoms on their own cannot support a finding that

22 Plaintiff’s mental impairments meet or equal a Listing. The Listings specify the

23 objective medical evidence needed to satisfy the criteria. 20 C.F.R.

24 § 404.1525(c)(3); cf. Kennedy, 738 F.3d at 1176 (“[F]or a claimant to qualify for

25 benefits by showing that his unlisted impairment, or combination of impairments, is

26 finding that Plaintiff meets the paragraph A requirements for Listings 12.04 and

27 12.06, but the Commissioner does not address these requirements. (JS at 10.) The

Court need not reach the issue whether Plaintiff satisfied the requirements of

28 paragraph A for the reasons discussed below.

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1 ‘equivalent’ to a listed impairment, he must present medical findings equal in

2 severity to all the criteria for the one most similar listed impairment.” (citation

3 omitted). Plaintiff does not identify any objective medical evidence or medical

4 opinions that support a finding that Plaintiff met or equaled Listings 12.04 or 12.06.

5 The Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination at

6 step three that Plaintiff’s impairments, or combination of impairments, do not meet

7 or medically equal the severity of one of the Listings.

8 B. The ALJ Properly Evaluated the Medical Opinions

9 1. Applicable Legal Standards

10 For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, the former hierarchy of medical

11 opinions based on the extent of a doctor’s relationship with a claimant no longer

12 applies. Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2022). “An ALJ reviews

13 every medical opinion for ‘supportability’ and ‘consistency’.” Reynolds v.

14 Kijakazi, 2022 WL 4095381, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 7, 2022) (citing Woods, 32 F.4th

15 at 791-92); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). Supportability means the extent to which a

16 medical source supports the medical opinion by explaining the relevant objective

17 medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1); see Woods, 32 F.4th at 791-92.

18 Consistency means the extent to which a medical opinion is consistent with the

19 evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim. 20

20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(2); see Woods, 32 F.4th at 792. The ALJ will also consider

21 other factors: relationship with the claimant; specialization; and other factors that

22 tend to support or contradict the medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), (c).

23 2. Discussion

24 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not follow the new regulations when

25 analyzing the medical opinions in the record. (JS at 17.) The Commissioner

26 contends that Plaintiff fails to identify any harmful legal error in the ALJ’s

27 evaluation of the medical opinion evidence. (JS at 19.) The Court agrees with the

28 Commissioner.

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1 The ALJ considered the opinions of Dr. Peterson and Dr. Fera, along with

2 opinions of the state psychological consultants. (AR 25.)

3 The ALJ found the opinion of Dr. Fera unpersuasive. (AR 25.) The ALJ

4 noted Dr. Fera’s opinion that Plaintiff had a marked limitation in her ability to carry

5 out complex instruction, marked limitations in interacting appropriately with

6 supervisors, marked limitations in the ability to interact appropriately with co-

7 workers, and extreme limitations in the ability to respond appropriately to usual

8 work situations and changes in a routine setting. (AR 25, 889-90.) However, the

9 ALJ determined these limitations were overstated—inconsistent or unsupportable—

10 given Plaintiff’s general mental status examinations and self-reported daily

11 activities. (AR 25.)

12 The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s March 2018 mental status examinations that

13 showed cooperative behavior, normal speech, normal cognition, intact alertness,

14 intact and normal memory, fair insight, fair and normal judgment, intact

15 concentration, coherent thought form, euthymic, depressed, and anxious mood, and

16 appropriate affect. (AR 22-23, 336, 339-40.) In June 2018, Plaintiff’s mental

17 status examination reflected cooperative behavior, coherent thought form, euthymic

18 mood, and an appropriate affect. (AR 23, 322-23.) Dr. Fera’s examination from

19 July 2018 reported that Plaintiff drove herself to the appointment, had social

20 appropriateness, was serious with saddened facial appearance, was highly guarded,

21 had good receptive and expressive language, had no behavioral impairment, had

22 fair eye contact, was angry at times, had intact memory, and had no problems with

23 judgment or insight. (AR 23, 461.) In August 2018, Plaintiff showed attentive and

24 cooperative behavior, normal speech, no psychomotor abnormalities, anxious mood

25 and affect, linear and logical thought process, and limited insight and judgment.

26 (AR 23, 716.) Dr. Peterson also reported Plaintiff was able to immediately register

27 three out of three items, three out of three items after five minutes, and was able to

28 perform serial sevens. (Id.) In February 2020, Dr. Fera reported Plaintiff had

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1 social withdrawal, paranoia, low autonomy, psychomotor agitation, attention

2 diversion due to chronic pain, poor focus associated with clinical depression and

3 anxiety, and low motivation. (AR 23, 865.) The ALJ also noted Dr. Fera’s

4 observation that Plaintiff had poor sleep with fatigue that negatively affected her

5 overall energy, short-term memory, and concentration to task. (Id.) In May 2020,

6 Dr. Fera reported similar observations. (AR 23, 472.)

7 Regarding Plaintiff’s daily activities, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s

8 testimony that she cared for a one-year-old baby eight hours per day, five days a

9 week. (AR 24, 48-49.) The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s testimony that she

10 prepares food for her children and toddler, plays with the toddler, does three loads

11 of laundry a week, shops with her children, and exercises twice a week for an hour

12 and a half. (AR 24, 49-50, 338.) The ALJ found that these activities require some

13 degree of mental functioning and are inconsistent with Plaintiff’s alleged

14 limitations. (AR 24.) The ALJ appropriately found that Dr. Fera’s opinion that

15 Plaintiff experienced marked and extreme limitations was inconsistent with the

16 substantial evidence showing Plaintiff’s generally normal mental status

17 examinations and daily activities. See Woods, 32 F.4th at 792 (holding that an ALJ

18 can reject a doctor’s opinion as unsupported or inconsistent if the ALJ provides an

19 explanation supported by substantial evidence); Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489,

20 495-96 (9th Cir. 2022) (finding no error in discounting physician’s opinion because

21 the ALJ identified specific and legitimate inconsistencies supported by substantial

22 evidence). The Court finds the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Fera’s opinion is supported

23 by substantial evidence and consistent with the new regulations required for

24 weighing medical opinion evidence.

25 Next, the ALJ found the opinion of Dr. Peterson only somewhat persuasive.

26 (AR 25.) Dr. Peterson opined that Plaintiff displays symptoms consistent with a

27 major depressive disorder diagnosis. (AR 721.) Dr. Peterson observed that

28 Plaintiff’s symptoms included depression, anhedonia, fatigue, insomnia, appetite

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1 changes, feelings of worthlessness, problems with memory, difficulty

2 concentrating, and difficulty thinking clearly. (Id.) Dr. Peterson did not diagnose a

3 separate anxiety disorder because Plaintiff’s symptoms of anxiety “occur

4 exclusively with depression.” (Id.) Dr. Peterson also assessed Plaintiff with a

5 Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 62, meaning Plaintiff has

6 “[s]ome mild symptoms . . . [or] some difficultly in social, occupational, or school

7 functions . . . but generally [functions] pretty well, [and] has some meaningful

8 interpersonal relationships.” (AR 722-23.) Ultimately, Dr. Peterson diagnosed

9 Plaintiff as temporarily disabled on a psychiatric basis and restricted Plaintiff to

10 “not [having] direct contact with the coworker whose allegations prompted an

11 investigation into the [Plaintiff’s] workplace behavior.” (AR 724-25.)

12 An ALJ must articulate how persuasive the medical opinions are and

13 consider the supportability and consistency factors. Woods, 32 F.4th at 791-92

14 (citations omitted). Here, the ALJ assessed a more restrictive RFC than the one Dr.

15 Peterson opined Plaintiff should have. (AR 25.) The ALJ reached this

16 determination based on Plaintiff’s history of depression and anxiety and based on

17 consideration of her subjective complaints. (Id.); see Johnson v. Kijakazi, No. 21-

18 35755, 2022 WL 3998572, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 2022) (affirming the ALJ’s

19 finding that physician’s marked mental limitation opinion was not supported by, or

20 consistent with, other record evidence). The Court finds the ALJ properly

21 evaluated Dr. Peterson’s opinion.

22 Lastly, the ALJ found the state psychological consultants’ opinions to be

23 persuasive because the opinions are “consistent with the record as a whole,

24 including the [Plaintiff’s] history of depression and anxiety with generally normal

25 mental status examination[s] and the [Plaintiff’s] self-reported activities of daily

26 living.” (AR 25.) Considering the standard established in Woods, the ALJ properly

27 considered the state agency consultants’ opinions and articulated how the opinions

28 are consistent with the evidence of Plaintiff’s mental status examinations and daily

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1 activities. See Woods, 32 F.4th at 791-92.

2 Plaintiff contends the opposite—that Dr. Peterson’s and Dr. Fera’s opinions

3 are consistent with the record as a whole and the state agency consultants’ opinions

4 are inconsistent—but only broadly cites to the record in support (see AR 860-91,

5 706-42). (JS at 18.) Plaintiff also contends the Dr. Fera and Dr. Peterson both

6 found marked limitations in similar areas of functioning. (JS at 18.) Although

7 Plaintiff identifies Dr. Fera’s report regarding Plaintiff’s limitations (see AR 881-

8 91), Plaintiff does not identify where Dr. Peterson reported the same limitation.

9 Lastly, Plaintiff’s contention that Dr. Fera and Dr. Peterson have better insight into

10 Plaintiff’s disability because they examined and treated Plaintiff is without merit.

11 (JS at 19.) As already noted, the new regulations did away with the former

12 hierarchy of medical opinions. Woods, 32 F.4th at 787. While the ALJ may

13 consider relationship factors, the most important factors are supportability and

14 consistency. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (a), (c). The Court concludes that the ALJ

15 properly evaluated the medical opinions related to Plaintiff’s mental health

16 impairments, and the ALJ’s evaluation is supported by substantial evidence.

17 V. CONCLUSION

18 IT IS ORDERED that Judgment shall be entered AFFIRMING the decision

19 of the Commissioner denying benefits.

20 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court serve copies of this

21 Order and the Judgment on counsel for both parties.

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23 DATED: December 28, 2022 /s/

ROZELLA A. OLIVER

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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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NOTICE

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THIS DECISION IS NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION IN WESTLAW,

28 LEXIS/NEXIS, OR ANY OTHER LEGAL DATABASE.

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