because plaintiff was proceeding pro se, “the district court was 13 required to ‘afford [him] the benefit of any doubt’ in ascertaining what claims he 14 ‘raised in his complaint’”
How later courts described this case
- because plaintiff was proceeding pro se, “the district court was 13 required to ‘afford [him] the benefit of any doubt’ in ascertaining what claims he 14 ‘raised in his complaint’”
- “pro se litigants are not excused 19 from following court rules”
- Rule 8 requires at a minimum that 12 a pleading allow each defendant to discern what he or she is being sued for
- “Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or 9 sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, 10 frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of 11 carrying out policy.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case 5:22-cv-01544-DSF-AFM Document 13 Filed 11/28/22 Page 1 of 17 Page ID #:60
1
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3
4
5
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7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 JAMIE PETER SWART, Case No. 5:22-cv-01544-DSF (AFM)
12 Plaintiff,
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST
13
v. AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH
14 LEAVE TO AMEND
LYLE FOREHAND, et al.,
15
Defendants.
16
17
18 On September 1, 2022, plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action
19 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff is presently being held at the
20 John Benoit Detention Center in Indio, California (“Detention Center”). Plaintiff
21 also filed a Request to Proceed Without Prepayment of Filing Fees, which
22 subsequently was granted. (ECF Nos. 2, 4, 6.) In the caption of the Complaint,
23 plaintiff named as defendants “Dr. Lyle Forehand” and “Riverside Sheriff’s Office.”
24 (ECF No. 1 at 1.) In the body of the pleading, plaintiff named as defendants “Lyle
25 Forehand, Staff Psychiatrist for Riverside County,” and an “RSO employee” in the
26 position of “intake release.” Both of these defendants were named in their official as
27 well as individual capacities. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff listed three incident dates of
28 September 9, 2021, March 11, 2022, and April 15, 2022. (Id.) Plaintiff appeared to
Case 5:22-cv-01544-DSF-AFM Document 13 Filed 11/28/22 Page 2 of 17 Page ID #:61
1 raise only one claim, and he alleged that he had “been released on 4 separate
2 ocassions [sic] without [his] mental health meds.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff sought
3 monetary damages and “to be given the medication prescribed to [him] in property
4 [sic] on release.” (Id. at 5.)
5 In accordance with the mandate of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
6 (“PLRA”), the Court screened the Complaint prior to ordering service to determine
7 whether the action is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may
8 be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
9 relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A, 1915(e)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). Following
10 careful review of the Complaint, the Court found that plaintiff’s pleading failed to
11 comply with Rule 8 because it did not include a short and plain statement of each
12 claim sufficient to give any defendant fair notice of what plaintiff’s claims are and
13 the grounds upon which they rest. (ECF No. 7; “Court’s First Order.”) Further, the
14 factual allegations appeared insufficient to state a federal civil rights claim on which
15 relief may be granted against any defendant. Accordingly, the Complaint was
16 dismissed with leave to amend to correct the deficiencies as discussed in the Court’s
17 First Order. See, e.g., Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A
18 district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless it
19 is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by
20 amendment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff was ordered, if he wished
21 to pursue this action, to file a First Amended Complaint remedying the deficiencies
22 discussed in the Court’s First Order. (ECF No. 7.)
23 On October 17, 2022, plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 10;
24 “FAC”), the caption of which named the only defendant as “Dr. Lyle Forehand
25 riverside Sheriff [sic] Office.” (Id. at 1 (capitalization in original).) In the body of
26 the pleading, plaintiff also lists one defendant, Dr. Lyle Forehand, now identified as
27 “Staff psychiatrist for riverside county.” (Id. at 3 (capitalization in original).)
28 Plaintiff’s FAC lists March 11, 2022, as the only incident date. (Id.) Within the body
2
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1 of the FAC, plaintiff raises one claim for cruel and unusual punishment arising from
2 the failure of Dr. Forehand to “order post-release medication.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff
3 seeks an “injunction to provide supply of medication in release property [sic].”
4 Plaintiff does not appear to seek damages. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff signed and dated the
5 FAC on October 14, 2022. (Id.) Attached to the pleading (but not referenced therein)
6 are three pages that begin with a page with a caption indicating that it is the “First
7 Amended Complaint” in this case. In the caption, plaintiff appears to name as
8 defendants “Dr. Lyle Forehand, et al.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff signed and dated the
9 second page of the attachments on October 9, 2022, and he appears to also seek
10 monetary damages on this signature page. (Id. at 8.) Further, it is not clear whether
11 plaintiff is purporting to raise a separate claim in his attachments because he
12 references two dates in those page – March 11, 2022, and April 15, 2022. (Id. at 7.)
13 The attachments do not clearly allege any specific claim against any defendant.
14 Pursuant to the PLRA the Court has screened FAC (including the attachments)
15 before ordering service to determine whether the action is frivolous or malicious;
16 fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against
17 a defendant who is immune from such relief. The Court’s screening of the pleading
18 is governed by the following standards. A complaint may be dismissed as a matter
19 of law for failure to state a claim for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal
20 theory; or (2) insufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. See, e.g.,
21 Kwan v. SanMedica Int’l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Rosati, 791
22 F.3d at 1039 (when determining whether a complaint should be dismissed for failure
23 to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court applies the same standard as
24 applied in a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). In determining
25 whether the pleading states a claim on which relief may be granted, its allegations of
26 fact must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. See,
27 e.g., Soltysik v. Padilla, 910 F.3d 438, 444 (9th Cir. 2018). However, the “tenet that
28 a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
3
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1 inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
2 Rather, a court first “discount[s] conclusory statements, which are not entitled to the
3 presumption of truth, before determining whether a claim is plausible.” Salameh v.
4 Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Chavez v. United
5 States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012). Nor is the Court “bound to accept as
6 true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation or an unadorned, the-
7 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1243
8 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
9 Because plaintiff is appearing pro se, the Court must construe the allegations
10 of the pleading liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. See Hebbe
11 v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152,
12 1158 (9th Cir. 2008) (because plaintiff was proceeding pro se, “the district court was
13 required to ‘afford [him] the benefit of any doubt’ in ascertaining what claims he
14 ‘raised in his complaint’”) (alteration in original). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
15 has held that “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to
16 relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
17 elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to
18 raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the
19 allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atlantic Corp.
20 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted, alteration in
21 original); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (To avoid dismissal for failure to state a
22 claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
23 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ . . . A claim has facial plausibility when
24 the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
25 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” (internal citation
26 omitted)).
27 ///
28 ///
4
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1 In addition, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (“Rule 8”) states:
2 A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a
short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
3
jurisdiction . . .; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim
4 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a
demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in
5
the alternative or different types of relief.
6
(Emphasis added). Rule 8(d)(1) provides: “Each allegation must be simple, concise,
7
and direct. No technical form is required.” Although the Court must construe a
8
pro se plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, a plaintiff nonetheless must allege a minimum
9
factual and legal basis for each claim that is sufficient to give each defendant fair
10
notice of what plaintiff’s claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. See, e.g.,
11
Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995); McKeever v. Block,
12
932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991) (a complaint must give defendants fair notice of
13
the claims against them). If a plaintiff fails to clearly and concisely set forth factual
14
allegations sufficient to provide defendants with notice of which defendant is being
15
sued on which theory and what relief is being sought against them, the pleading fails
16
to comply with Rule 8. See, e.g., McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir.
17
1996); Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981). A
18
claim has “substantive plausibility” if a plaintiff alleges “simply, concisely, and
19
directly [the] events” that entitle him to damages. Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574
20
U.S. 10, 12 (2014). Failure to comply with Rule 8 constitutes an independent basis
21
for dismissal of a pleading that applies even if the claims are not found to be “wholly
22
without merit.” See McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179.
23
Following careful review of the FAC, the Court finds that plaintiff’s pleading
24
once again does not comply with Rule 8 because it fails to include a short and plain
25
statement of each claim that is sufficient to give any defendant fair notice of what
26
plaintiff’s claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. Further, the factual
27
allegations appear insufficient to state a federal civil rights claim on which relief may
28
5
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1 be granted against any defendant. Accordingly, the FAC is dismissed with leave to
2 amend to correct the deficiencies as discussed in this Order, the Court’s Second
3 Order. See, e.g., Rosati, 791 F.3d at 1039.
4 If plaintiff desires to pursue this action, he is ORDERED to file a Second
5 Amended Complaint no later than thirty (30) days after the date of the Court’s
6 Second Order, remedying the deficiencies discussed herein. Plaintiff is
7 admonished that, if he fails to timely file a Second Amended Complaint or fails to
8 remedy the deficiencies of his pleading, the Court will recommend that this action be
9 dismissed without further leave to amend.1
10 A. RULE 8
11 Plaintiff’s pleading violates Rule 8 in that it fails to allege a minimum factual
12 and legal basis for any claim that is sufficient to give defendants fair notice of what
13 claims are raised against each defendant and which factual allegations in the pleading
14 give rise to any claim.
15 Initially, irrespective of his pro se status, plaintiff must comply with the
16 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of the United States District
17 Court for the Central District of California (“L.R.”). See, e.g., Briones v. Riviera
18 Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1997) (“pro se litigants are not excused
19 from following court rules”); L.R. 1-3; L.R. 83-2.2.3 (“Any person appearing pro se
20 is required to comply with these Local Rules and with” the Federal Rules.). Plaintiff
21 should file only one title page for an amended pleading. Further, pursuant to Fed. R.
22
1 Plaintiff is advised that this Court’s determination herein that the allegations in the First Amended
23
Complaint are insufficient to state a particular claim should not be seen as dispositive of that claim.
24 Accordingly, although this Court believes that you have failed to plead sufficient factual matter in
your pleading, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, you are not
25 required to omit any claim or defendant in order to pursue this action. However, if you decide to
pursue a claim in a Second Amended Complaint that this Court has found to be insufficient, then
26 this Court, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636, ultimately may submit to the assigned
district judge a recommendation that such claim be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a
27
claim, subject to your right at that time to file Objections with the district judge as provided in the
28 Local Rules Governing Duties of Magistrate Judges.
6
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1 Civ. P. 10(a), the caption of the pleading must include all defendants listed elsewhere
2 in the pleading. See also Local Rule 11-3.8(d). Plaintiff’s FAC additionally violates,
3 inter alia, L.R. 11-3.3 and L.R. 11-5.2, which require that all pages of a pleading be
4 numbered consecutively.
5 In this action, plaintiff may be raising only one claim, although it is unclear
6 whether the allegations that appear to be set forth in the attachment to the FAC are
7 intended to be part of that claim, or if plaintiff is purporting to raise a separate, but
8 unspecified claim, in his attached “First Amended Complaint.” (See ECF No. 10 at
9 7-8.) Further, in the body of the pleading, plaintiff lists only one incident date,
10 March 11, 2022. (Id. at 3.) In the attachment, however, plaintiff lists two incident
11 dates, March 11, 2022, and April 15, 2022. (Id. at 7.) Further, in the body of his
12 pleading, plaintiff only seeks injunctive relief (id. at 6), but in the attached pages
13 plaintiff appears to also seek monetary damages from unspecified defendants.
14 Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff’s pleading violates Rule 8 because it fails
15 to set forth “a short and plain statement” of each claim showing that plaintiff is
16 entitled to relief from any defendant, and it fails to specify the relief sought.
17 In the pages attached to his FAC, plaintiff alleges that he was “released without
18 medication.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff alleges both that Dr. Forehand “failed to order”
19 post-release medication, and that the “Riverside Countys [sic] policy on Federal
20 Releases is the cause behind not receiving medication.” (Id. at 7-8.) It appears that
21 plaintiff is alleging either that a “County Sheriff’s Office policy” or a “Federal”
22 policy prevented doctors at the Detention Center from “prescibing [sic] medication
23 due to the sudden release from custody.” (Id. at 5.) Accordingly, it is entirely unclear
24 to the Court if plaintiff is purporting to allege that the sole defendant named in this
25 action acted in accordance with a policy set either by the Riverside County Sheriff’s
26 Office or by an unspecified “federal” official or agency when plaintiff was released
27 from custody without an unspecified prescribed medication. Additionally, in the
28 attachments to the FAC, plaintiff alleges that Dr. Forehand “failed to order the 30-
7
Case 5:22-cv-01544-DSF-AFM Document 13 Filed 11/28/22 Page 8 of 17 Page ID #:67
1 day supply of post-release psych [sic] medication,” which appears to indicate that
2 Dr. Forehand failed to follow some policy or required procedure. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff
3 also alleges that he had had “multiple interactions” with a “prescibing Dr [sic]” (id.)
4 while in custody, but plaintiff sets forth no facts regarding any such interaction, the
5 dates on which these interactions allegedly took place, or showing that Dr. Forehand
6 was the doctor providing treatment to plaintiff.
7 To state a federal civil rights claim against a specific defendant, a pleading
8 must set forth facts alleging that such defendant, acting under color of state law,
9 deprived plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the United States Constitution or a
10 federal statute. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “A person deprives
11 another ‘of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an
12 affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act
13 which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff
14 complains].’” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Johnson
15 v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)) (emphasis and alteration in original).
16 Here, plaintiff’s only specific factual allegations against Dr. Forehand are that he
17 “failed to order post-release medication due to federal release Riverside County
18 Sheriff’s Office policy on releasing inmates” (ECF No. 10 at 5), and that
19 Dr. Forehand “failed to order the 30 day supply of post-release psych medication”
20 (id. at 7). Although plaintiff alleges that Dr. Forehand was a “prescribing Dr. [sic]
21 who [plaintiff] had multiple interactions with,” plaintiff supports these conclusory
22 allegations with no specific facts. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that a government has
23 an “affirmative duty to provide reasonable medical care” and that he “made
24 reasonable requests for treatment” (id.), but plaintiff does not allege that
25 Dr. Forehand failed to provide reasonable medical care at any time or failed to
26 respond to a specific request that plaintiff made for medical treatment. The Court
27 discounts plaintiff’s “conclusory statements” that are unsupported by specific factual
28 allegations while “determining whether a claim is plausible.” Salameh, 726 F.3d at
8
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1 1129. Similarly, the Court does not accept as true plaintiff’s unadorned, the-
2 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].” Keates, 883 F.3d at 1243.
3 Plaintiff’s FAC does not set forth specific factual allegations sufficient to raise
4 a plausible inference that the actions taken, or the failure to take action, by
5 Dr. Forehand caused plaintiff to be released without necessary medication. In
6 addition, the FAC does not include simple and concise factual allegations showing
7 that any specific official at the Detention Center failed to provide constitutionally
8 adequate medical care to plaintiff at any particular time. Plaintiff’s FAC altogether
9 fails to allege that any specific official at the Detention Center took a specific
10 affirmative act, participated in another’s affirmative act, or failed to perform an act
11 that he or she was legally required to do that caused plaintiff to suffer a particular
12 constitutional deprivation at a specific time. Finally, it is unclear to the Court what
13 official at the Detention Center plaintiff is purporting to allege any claim against.
14 The Court finds that plaintiff’s pleading once again violates Rule 8 because it fails to
15 give Dr. Forehand fair notice of the factual or legal basis for any claim that plaintiff
16 is purporting to raise against the defendant.
17 Moreover, it is not clear to the Court what plaintiff’s status was at the time of
18 any alleged incident. Plaintiff’s FAC alleges that the violations occurred while
19 plaintiff was being held at the Detention Center (ECF No. 10 at 2) and that he was
20 “released” “from a parole violation” (id. at 8), but in one of the attachments to his
21 FAC, plaintiff states that he “put [himself] in the county’s care for mental health” (id.
22 at 9). Further, in the factual allegations formerly set forth in plaintiff’s now-
23 dismissed Complaint, plaintiff alleged that he “was a state prisoner on parole
24 violation [sic] on all dates.” (ECF No. 1 at 6.) Accordingly, it appears that plaintiff
25 may have been a prisoner for purposes of the PLRA at the relevant tine(s). See, e.g.,
26 Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000); Flores v. Cnty. of Fresno, 2020
27 U.S. Dist. Lexis 133750, at *9, n.3, 2020 WL 4339825 (E.D. Cal. July 28, 2020)
28 (noting that individuals incarcerated in a county jail for a parole violation must raise
9
Case 5:22-cv-01544-DSF-AFM Document 13 Filed 11/28/22 Page 10 of 17 Page ID #:69
1 claims alleging inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment); Jensen v.
2 Cnty. of Los Angeles, 2017 U.S. Dist. Lexis 232123, at *18, 2017 WL 10574058, at
3 *7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2017) (“Claims by those who have been incarcerated for parole
4 violations arise under the Eighth Amendment.”). If plaintiff was a prisoner at the
5 time that the alleged incident or incidents occurred, it does not appear that plaintiff’s
6 facts give rise to any claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
7 Amendment.
8 Plaintiff names Dr. Forehand as the sole defendant. In his pleading, plaintiff
9 alleges that this defendant was a “staff psychiatrist” for Riverside County. (ECF No.
10 10 at 3, 8.) To the extent that plaintiff is intending to hold Dr. Forehand liable as a
11 supervisor for Riverside County, supervisory personnel are not liable under § 1983
12 on a theory of respondeat superior. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Government
13 officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates
14 under a theory of respondeat superior”); Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d
15 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-
16 08 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff’s FAC does not allege any facts showing that
17 Dr. Forehand set “in motion a series of acts by others,” or “knowingly refus[ed] to
18 terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or reasonably should
19 have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Starr, 652 F.3d at
20 1207-08.
21 Further, it appears to the Court that plaintiff may be alleging that unspecified
22 employees failed to follow Detention Center regulations or policies when plaintiff
23 was released without necessary medication. To the extent that plaintiff is purporting
24 to raise a federal civil rights claim against any defendant for violating state law or
25 Detention Center policies, allegations that a defendant failed to comply with internal
26 agency regulations or state law cannot give rise to a federal civil rights claim. See,
27 e.g., Galen v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 662 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Section 1983
28 requires [a plaintiff] to demonstrate a violation of federal law, not state law.”); see
10
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1 also Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2009).
2 Following review of the FAC, it is unclear to the Court what or how many
3 federal civil rights claims plaintiff intends to allege in this action. As currently pled,
4 the factual allegations in plaintiff’s pleading fail to allege that a named defendant
5 took an affirmative act, participated in another’s affirmative act, or failed to take an
6 action that he or she was legally required to do that caused plaintiff to suffer a specific
7 constitutional deprivation when plaintiff was released from the Detention Center at a
8 particular time. To state a claim against an individual defendant, plaintiff must allege
9 sufficient factual allegations against that defendant to nudge each claim plaintiff
10 wishes to raise “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” See Twombly, 550
11 U.S. at 570; see also McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1177 (Rule 8 requires at a minimum that
12 a pleading allow each defendant to discern what he or she is being sued for).
13 Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff once again has failed to meet his
14 pleading burden of alleging that a named defendant deprived him of a right
15 guaranteed under the United States Constitution or a federal statute. The Court is
16 mindful that, because plaintiff is appearing pro se, the Court must construe the
17 allegations of the pleading liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.
18 That said, the Supreme Court has made clear that the Court has “no obligation to act
19 as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004).
20 In addition, the Supreme Court has held that, while a plaintiff need not plead the
21 exact legal basis for a claim, plaintiff must allege “simply, concisely, and directly
22 events” that are sufficient to inform each defendant of the factual grounds for each
23 claim. Johnson, 574 U.S. at 12. In the FAC, plaintiff fails to do so. As currently
24 pled, it is not clear what action at what time by what official at the Detention Center
25 caused plaintiff to suffer an identified constitutional deprivation. Plaintiff’s FAC
26 fails to set forth any factual allegations supporting a plausible claim against a named
27 defendant. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Therefore, plaintiff’s pleading
28 violates Rule 8 because it fails to set forth a minimal factual and legal basis for any
11
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1 claim sufficient to give any defendant fair notice of what plaintiff’s claims are and
2 the grounds upon which they rest.
3 If plaintiff wishes to state a federal civil rights claim against a particular
4 official or employee of the Detention Center, plaintiff should set forth in a Second
5 Amended Complaint a separate, short, and plain statement of the actions that each
6 such defendant is alleged to have taken, or failed to have taken, at a particular time
7 that caused a specific violation of a right guaranteed under the federal Constitution.
8 See, e.g., Johnson, 574 U.S. at 12.
9 B. EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS
10 To the extent that plaintiff wishes to allege a claim or claims for
11 constitutionally inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner
12 must show that a specific defendant was deliberately indifferent to his serious
13 medical needs. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); Estelle v. Gamble,
14 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). “This includes both an objective standard -- that the
15 deprivation was serious enough to constitute cruel and unusual punishment -- and a
16 subjective standard -- deliberate indifference.” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060,
17 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
18 First, to meet the objective element of a deliberate indifference claim, a
19 prisoner “must demonstrate the existence of a serious medical need.” Colwell, 763
20 F.3d at 1066. “A medical need is serious if failure to treat it will result in significant
21 injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d
22 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). In his FAC,
23 plaintiff only alleges that he suffers from “mental health problems,” and that he
24 “need[s] [his] medication” (ECF No. 10 at 5, 7), but he does not allege any supporting
25 facts raising a plausible inference that he was suffering from a serious medical need
26 at the relevant time or times. Accordingly, plaintiff’s FAC fails to allege sufficient
27 facts to allow the Court to draw a reasonable inference that plaintiff was suffering
28 from a serious medical need at any relevant time.
12
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1 Second, to meet the subjective element of a deliberate indifference claim, “a
2 prisoner must demonstrate that the prison official acted with deliberate indifference.”
3 See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks
4 omitted). Deliberate indifference may be manifest by the intentional denial, delay,
5 or interference with a prisoner’s medical care. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. The
6 prison official, however, “must not only ‘be aware of facts from which the inference
7 could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must
8 also draw the inference.’” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan,
9 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)); see also Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1066 (a “prison official is
10 deliberately indifferent . . . only if the official knows of and disregards an excessive
11 risk to inmate health and safety” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, an
12 inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care, negligence, a mere delay in
13 medical care (without more), or a difference of opinion over proper medical
14 treatment, are all insufficient to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. See
15 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-07; Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1059-60; Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d
16 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d
17 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional
18 violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
19 Here, it appears that plaintiff is purporting alleging a claim or claims pursuant
20 to the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause for
21 constitutionally inadequate medical care. (ECF No. 10 at 5, 7.) Plaintiff’s FAC,
22 however, fails to set forth any factual allegations showing that any named defendant
23 was aware that he suffered from a particular serious mental health need when he was
24 released without necessary medication. Further, plaintiff’s few factual allegations
25 are insufficient to raise a plausible inference that any named defendant was aware of
26 sufficient facts from which an inference could be drawn that plaintiff was exposed to
27 a substantial risk of serious harm arising from the lack of unspecified medication at
28 the time of his release, that any named defendant drew such an inference, or that any
13
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1 named defendant acted deliberately to disregard plaintiff’s need for medical
2 treatment for a serious mental health issue at any relevant time.
3 A pleading that merely alleges “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual
4 enhancement” is insufficient to state a claim against any defendant or to comply with
5 Rule 8. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alteration in original, internal quotation marks
6 omitted).
7 C. CLAIMS PURSUANT TO MONELL
8 Plaintiff names Dr. Forehand, who appears to be employed by the County of
9 Riverside, in his official as well as individual capacity. (See ECF No. 10 at 3.) As
10 the Court has previously admonished plaintiff, the Supreme Court has held that an
11 “official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against
12 the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Such a suit “is not a
13 suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity.” Id. at
14 166 (emphasis omitted). Accordingly, any claim that plaintiff is purporting to raise
15 against any employee of the County of Riverside in his or her official capacity is the
16 same as a claim against the County of Riverside.
17 In Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), the
18 Supreme Court held that “a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an
19 injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a
20 government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose
21 edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the
22 government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; see
23 also Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“under § 1983, local governments
24 are responsible only for their own illegal acts” (emphasis in original, internal
25 quotation marks omitted)). To state a claim arising from the execution of a local
26 entity’s policy or custom, a plaintiff must set forth factual allegations to show that
27 the execution of a specific policy, regulation, custom or the like was the “actionable
28 cause” of any alleged constitutional violation. See, e.g., Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc.,
14
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1 698 F.3d 1128, 1146 (9th Cir. 2012) (“a plaintiff must also show that the policy at
2 issue was the ‘actionable cause’ of the constitutional violation, which requires
3 showing both but-for and proximate causation”). Additionally, a Monell claim may
4 not be premised on an isolated or sporadic incident. See, e.g., Gant v. Cnty. of
5 Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 618 (9th Cir. 2014) (a plaintiff does not establish liability
6 under Monell without showing that “a single incident of unconstitutional actively”
7 was more than an “isolated or sporadic” incident); Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918
8 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or
9 sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration,
10 frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of
11 carrying out policy.”).
12 To the extent plaintiff is purporting to raise any claims against the County of
13 Riverside, plaintiff’s factual allegations appear to arise from one or possibly two
14 incidents when he appears to have been released from detention without necessary
15 “post-release medication.” (ECF No. 10 at 5, 7.) It is unclear whether plaintiff is
16 alleging that these isolated incidents were caused by the execution of a specific
17 policy, regulation, or custom of the County of Riverside. Regardless, two similar
18 incidents of plaintiff’s release (by unspecified employees who are not named)
19 without a required medication are entirely insufficient to raise a reasonable inference
20 that specific unconstitutional actions by employees of the County of Riverside were
21 of sufficiently long duration or occurred frequently enough to be considered a
22 “traditional method of carrying out policy” by the County of Riverside. See, e.g.,
23 Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918.
24 Accordingly, it appears that plaintiff is alleging the type of random or isolated
25 incidents that simply cannot give rise to liability against the County of Riverside
26 pursuant to Monell. Therefore, plaintiff’s factual allegations in the FAC are
27 insufficient to raise a plausible inference that the County of Riverside is liable for
28 any alleged constitutional violation. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
15
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1
2 ************
3 If plaintiff still desires to pursue this action, then he is ORDERED to file
4 a Second Amended Complaint no later than thirty (30) days after the date of
5 this Order, remedying the pleading deficiencies discussed above. The Second
6 Amended Complaint should bear the docket number assigned in this case; have only
7 one title page with one caption, be labeled “Second Amended Complaint”; and be
8 complete in and of itself without reference to the original Complaint, the First
9 Amended Complaint, or any other pleading or document.
10 Plaintiff is admonished that, irrespective of his pro se status, if plaintiff wishes
11 to proceed with this action, then he must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil
12 Procedure and the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Central
13 District of California. See, e.g., L.R. 1-3; L.R. 83-2.2.3.
14 The clerk is directed to send plaintiff a blank Central District civil rights
15 complaint form, which plaintiff is encouraged to utilize. Plaintiff is admonished that
16 he must sign and date the civil rights complaint form, and he must use the space
17 provided in the form to set forth all of the claims that he wishes to assert in a Second
18 Amended Complaint. Further, if plaintiff feels that any document is integral to any
19 of his claims, then he should attach such document as an exhibit at the end of the
20 Second Amended Complaint and clearly allege the relevance of each attached
21 document to the applicable claim raised in the Second Amended Complaint.
22 In addition, if plaintiff no longer wishes to pursue this action, then he may
23 request a voluntary dismissal of the action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
24 Procedure 41(a). The clerk also is directed to attach a Notice of Dismissal form for
25 plaintiff’s convenience.
26 Plaintiff is further admonished that, if he fails to timely file a Second
27 Amended Complaint, or if he fails to remedy the deficiencies of this pleading as
28 discussed herein, then the Court will recommend that the action be dismissed
16
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1 | on the grounds set forth above and for failure to diligently prosecute.
2 IT IS SO ORDERED.
4 || DATED: 11/28/2022 (Wy Ye é °
5 ——
° ~ ALEXANDER F. MacKINNON
7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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