“Nor does 15 an agent ordinarily have a cause of action based upon some third person’s violation of its principal’s 16 rights. Without some breach of a duty owed to him, it has no power to sue on the principal’s 17 claim.”
How later courts described this case
- “Nor does 15 an agent ordinarily have a cause of action based upon some third person’s violation of its principal’s 16 rights. Without some breach of a duty owed to him, it has no power to sue on the principal’s 17 claim.”
- “That the actions of the parties 5 should be used as a reliable means of interpreting an ambiguous contract is, of course, well settled in 6 our law.”
- “[W]here . . . 23 damages reflect a ‘loss of profits on collateral business arrangements,’ they are [consequential damages].”
- “The plain language of the contract 17 should be considered first . . . .” (quoting Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2009))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case 2:20-cv-05155-MEMF-E Document 95 Filed 07/12/22 Page 1 of 20 Page ID #:1132
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
Case No.: 2:20-cv-05155-MEMF(Ex)
11 CHERINE MEDAWAR, et al.,
12 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE
13 v. ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 66] AND GRANTING
14 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE [ECF
15 OTIS ELEVATOR COMPANY, et al., NO. 67]
Defendants.
16
17
18
19
20 Before the Court is Defendant Otis Elevator Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment or,
21 in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment. ECF No. 66. The Court held oral argument on this
22 matter on June 30, 2022. For the reasons stated herein, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART the
23 Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment.
24
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26
27 / / /
28 / / /
1
Case 2:20-cv-05155-MEMF-E Document 95 Filed 07/12/22 Page 2 of 20 Page ID #:1133
1 BACKGROUND
2 I. Factual Background
3 In November 2018, Defendant Otis Elevator Company (“Otis Elevator”) entered into a
4 written agreement with JCM Builders, Inc. (“JCM”) to furnish and install an elevator at a property
5 owned by Cherine and Jill Medawar (collectively, “the Medawars”). Otis Elevator SUF ¶ 1.
6 Although the elevator was conveyed to the Medawars in October 2019 and installed in January 2020,
7 the dispute concerns whether Otis Elevator delayed its performance under the agreement and failed
8 to furnish a fully functional Subject Elevator that passed a final State inspection and earned a
9 certificate of occupancy within a reasonable time, thereby breaching the agreement.
10 II. Procedural History
11 On May 8, 2020, the Medawars filed a complaint against Otis Elevator in the Superior Court
12 of Los Angeles County. ECF No. 1-2. On June 10, 2020, this case was removed to federal court.
13 ECF No. 1. On June 26, 2020, the Medawars filed a First Amended Complaint. ECF No. 17. On
14 March 2, 2021, the Medawars filed a Second Amended Complaint, alleging four causes of action:
15 (1) breach of contract; (2) intentional breach of contract; (3) fraud; and (4) negligence. See generally
16 SAC. On August 13, 2021, the Court granted Otis Elevator’s Motion to Dismiss the Medawars’
17 negligence, fraud, and intentional breach claims. ECF No. 52. On April 29, 2022, Otis Elevator filed
18 the instant Motion for Summary Judgment and Request for Judicial Notice. ECF Nos. 66 (“Motion”
19 or “Mot.” or “MSJ”), 67 (“RJN”). Otis Elevator seeks a full order granting summary judgment on
20 the grounds that no genuine dispute exists as to any material fact with respect to the Medawars’
21 causes of action herein, entitling Otis Elevator to judgment as a matter of law. Mot. at 1. Otis
22 Elevator also moves, in the alternative, for partial summary judgment as to the Medawars’ prayer for
23 consequential, indirect, and special damages. Id. at 2. The Motion for Summary Judgment was fully
24 briefed on June 9, 2022. ECF Nos. 71 (“Opp’n”), 78 (“Reply”). A hearing on the Motion was held
25 on June 30, 2022.1
26
27 1 The Medawars contend that the Motion was not timely noticed for hearing. Under the Court’s Civil Trial
Order, the last day to hear motions, including motions for summary judgment, was June 9, 2022. ECF No. 70.
28
2
Case 2:20-cv-05155-MEMF-E Document 95 Filed 07/12/22 Page 3 of 20 Page ID #:1134
1 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
2 I. Applicable Law
3 A court may take judicial notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute where the facts
4 “(1) [are] generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and
5 readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” FED. R. EVID.
6 201(b). Under this standard, courts may take judicial notice of “undisputed matters of public record,”
7 but generally may not take judicial notice of “disputed facts stated in public records.” Lee v. City of
8 Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cnty. of
9 Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125–26 (9th Cir. 2002).
10 II. Otis Elevator’s Request for Judicial Notice
11 Otis Elevator submits—and asks the Court to take judicial notice of—one (1) exhibit in
12 support of its Motion for Summary Judgment:
13
1. Contractor’s License Detail for License #1043732, Contractors State License Bd. (last
14
visited Apr. 5, 2022),
15
https://www.cslb.ca.gov/onlineservices/checklicenseII/checklicense.aspx.
16
17 Although a district court generally may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in
18 ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court may take judicial notice of matters in the public record. Id. at
19 689–90. The Ninth Circuit has recognized public records, including the records of state agencies, as
20 proper subjects of judicial notice. See, e.g., Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc.,
21 375 F.3d 861, 866 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a court “may take judicial notice of the records
22 of state agencies and other undisputed matters of public record”).
23
24
25
On April 6, 2022, per the Court’s Civil Standing Order, Otis Elevator contacted the Court to confirm whether
26 the Court was able to hear the Motion on June 2, 2022. Given the Court’s calendar, the Court informed Otis
Elevator that June 30, 2022, was the earliest available date—as a result, the earliest available date was beyond
27 the deadline set by the Court’s Civil Trial Order. Given the circumstances, the Court will exercise its
discretion to accept the filing. However, the parties are advised to ensure that all proposed dates comply with
28 the Civil Trial Order in the future. To the extent that an extension is required, the parties must submit a formal
request or stipulation to amend the Civil Trial Order on which the Court will rule before setting new dates.
3
Case 2:20-cv-05155-MEMF-E Document 95 Filed 07/12/22 Page 4 of 20 Page ID #:1135
1 Here, the exhibit submitted by Otis Elevator—the contractor’s license for JCM builders—
2 falls into the category of public records that courts have deemed proper for judicial notice. The Court
3 therefore GRANTS Otis Elevator’s unopposed Request to take judicial notice of Exhibit 1.
4
5 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
6 I. Applicable Law
7 A. Motion for Summary Judgment
8 Summary judgment should be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
9 as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.
10 56(a). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists &
11 Opticians v. Harris, 682 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
12 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
13 return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248.
14 Under Rule 56(a), a court also has authority to grant partial summary judgment, or
15 “judgment on less than the entire case.” 10B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
16 Practice and Procedure § 2737 (4th ed. 2022) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). Under Rule 56(g), a
17 court that “does not grant all the relief requested by the motion . . . may enter an order stating any
18 material fact . . . that is not genuinely in dispute and treating the fact as established in the case.” FED.
19 R. CIV. P. 56(g).
20 A court must view the facts and draw inferences in the manner most favorable to the non-
21 moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1992); Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil
22 Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1992). The moving party bears the initial burden of
23 demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial, but it need not disprove the
24 other party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the non-moving party
25 bears the burden of proving a claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden by pointing
26 out that the non-moving party has failed to present any genuine issue of material fact as to an
27 essential element of its case. See Musick v. Burke, 913 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir. 1990).
28
4
Case 2:20-cv-05155-MEMF-E Document 95 Filed 07/12/22 Page 5 of 20 Page ID #:1136
1 If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to set out
2 specific material facts showing a genuine issue for trial. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248–49. A
3 party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact simply by making assertions in its legal papers.
4 S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense v. Walter Kidde & Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1235, 1238
5 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, there must be specific, admissible evidence identifying the basis for the
6 dispute. See id. “If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address
7 another party’s assertion of fact . . . the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed.” FED. R. CIV. P.
8 56(e)(2). The Court need not “comb the record” looking for other evidence; it is only required to
9 consider evidence set forth in the moving and opposing papers and the portions of the record cited
10 therein. Id. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001). The
11 Supreme Court has held that “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be insufficient;
12 there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for [the opposing party].” Liberty
13 Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.
14 B. Breach of Contract
15 Under California law, the elements of a breach of contract claim are: (1) the existence of a
16 contract; (2) the plaintiff’s performance or excuse for non-performance; (3) the defendant’s breach;
17 and (4) damages to the plaintiff caused by the breach. Hamilton v. Greenwich Investors XXVI, LLC,
18 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 174, 183 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Reichert v. General Ins. Co., 442 P.2d 377, 381
19 (Cal. 1968)). Moreover, “[s]omeone who is not a party to the contract has no standing to enforce the
20 contract.” Hatchwell v. Blue Shield of Cal., 244 Cal. Rptr. 249, 253 (Ct. App. 1988).
21 II. Discussion
22 A. Findings of Fact2
23 The Court finds that the following material facts are established for trial under FED. R. CIV.
24 P. 56(a) and FED. R. CIV. P. 56(g).
25
26
27 2 The facts set forth below are taken from the parties’ prepared Statements of Undisputed and Additional
Facts. ECF Nos. 66-1 (“Otis Elevator SUF”); 72, at 1 (“Medawar SUF Opp’n”); 72, at 25 (“Medawar SAF”).
28 To the extent that any statements of fact are omitted, the Court concludes they are not material to the
disposition of this Motion.
5
Case 2:20-cv-05155-MEMF-E Document 95 Filed 07/12/22 Page 6 of 20 Page ID #:1137
1 On November 12, 2018, Defendant Otis Elevator entered into a written agreement listing
2 JCM as the “Customer.” Otis Elevator SUF ¶ 1; ECF No. 66-3 (“Bruhl Decl.”), Ex. 1, at 1. The
3 Contract was in the sum of $71,500 to furnish and install one Otis 3510 HydroFit Front Opening
4 Holess Hydraulic Elevator at 25024 Narbonne Ave., Lomita, California 90717. Otis Elevator SUF ¶
5 1. JCM is a General Building Contractor licensed by the State of California.3 Id. ¶ 2. The Plaintiffs
6 in this case are Cherine and Jill Medawar, who hold title (in their individual capacities) to the
7 Subject Property where the Subject Elevator would be installed. Medawar SAF ¶ 100. Together, they
8 also wholly own, and are the sole shareholders, officers, and directors of JCM. Id. The Contract was
9 signed by Medawar as the “Authorized Representative” of the “Customer,” who identified in
10 handwriting that he was “CFO” (i.e., Chief Financial Officer) of JCM. Id. ¶ 105. Immediately below
11 this, Medawar also signed as the “Principal, Owner or Authorized Representative of Principal or
12 Owner,” without mentioning JCM. Id.
13 Prior to the commencement of the instant litigation, JCM paid the invoices issued by Otis
14 Elevator in connection with Otis Elevator’s work under the Contract. Otis Elevator SUF ¶ 3. In
15 December 2018, Otis sent its first invoice for $32,175, along with lien release documentation.
16 Medawar SAF ¶ 107. These were addressed only to Medawar and did not mention JCM. Id.
17 Medawar signed the JCM check used to promptly pay the invoice. Id. In September 2019, Otis sent
18 its next invoice under the contract for $22,522.50, along with lien release documentation. Id. ¶ 108.
19 These were also addressed only to Medawar and did not mention JCM. Id. The $22,522.50 was
20 promptly paid by JCM check signed by Medawar. Id. Subsequently, on April 20, 2020, Otis Elevator
21 issued an additional charge of $2,300 in connection with certain work performed by Otis Elevator
22 under the Contract on overtime basis, discussed in detail below. Otis Elevator SUF ¶ 4. The
23 additional charge raised the total Contract price to $73,800. Id. ¶ 5.
24 The Contract provides in relevant part: “It is agreed that we do not intend to create a right in
25 any third party by entering into this contract.” Id. ¶ 6. The Contract further provides that certain
26
27
3 In its Request for Judicial Notice, Otis Elevator submitted a copy of JCM’s contractor’s license, obtained
28 from the California Department of Consumer Affairs – Contractors State License Board’s website. See RJN,
Ex. 1.
6
Case 2:20-cv-05155-MEMF-E Document 95 Filed 07/12/22 Page 7 of 20 Page ID #:1138
1 mandatory construction and electrical work must be performed by others before Otis Elevator can
2 install, adjust, and schedule the final California State Inspection of the Subject Elevator pursuant to
3 the relevant Elevator Code. Id. ¶ 7. The term “adjustment” refers to Otis Elevator’s post-installation
4 examination of the Subject Elevator designed to ensure that the Subject Elevator is ready for the
5 final State Inspection. Id. ¶ 8.
6 Specifically, the Contract states that entities and/or individuals other than Otis Elevator must:
7 1) provide electrical power “of permanent characteristic” necessary to perform adjustment of the
8 Subject Elevator; 2) provide Code-compliant elevator hoistway and pit, including but not limited to
9 waterproof pit and pit ladder; 3) provide Code-compliant properly lighted and ventilated fireproof
10 elevator machine room; 4) furnish and install circuit breakers, among others, “necessary to meet
11 requirements of the governing code or authority”; 5) supply a light switch in the elevator machine
12 room; and 6) provide telephone service with a dedicated line, run in conduit, to the elevator control
13 panel in the elevator machine room. Id. ¶ 9. Many of the previously referenced Contract terms also
14 appear in the documents entitled “Confirmation of Power for Elevator Systems” (“Confirmation of
15 Power”) and “Contractor’s Pre-Inspection Checklist,” (“Pre-Inspection Checklist”), which Medawar
16 received from Otis Elevator on March 5, 2019. Id. ¶ 11. Without this work completed, the Subject
17 Elevator would not pass the final State Inspection, and it would be unavailable for any passenger use
18 whatsoever. Id. ¶ 13.
19 The Contract does not specify the manufacturing, delivery, or installation completion
20 deadline for the Subject Elevator. Id. ¶ 15. Even though the project lasted well beyond June 30,
21 2019, Otis Elevator never charged Plaintiffs and/or JCM for additional labor or materials costs
22 associated with the lengthy duration of the project. Id. ¶ 18.4 Nor does Contract contain a “Time Is
23 of
24
25
4 Otis Elevator’s SUF proposed the following fact: “Even though the project lasted well beyond June 30,
26 2019, through no fault of Otis Elevator, Otis Elevator never charged Plaintiffs and/or JCM for additional labor
or materials costs.” Otis Elevator SUF ¶ 18. Although the Medawars contend that this fact is disputed, the
27 Court finds that the Medawars failed to establish that this constitutes a genuine dispute, as they merely argue
that “Otis failed to perform within a reasonable time,” without citing to evidence showing that Otis Elevator
28
7
Case 2:20-cv-05155-MEMF-E Document 95 Filed 07/12/22 Page 8 of 20 Page ID #:1139
1 the Essence” clause. Id. ¶ 19. The Contract provides in relevant part:
2
LOSS, DAMAGES OR DELAY
3
Under no circumstances shall either of us be liable for any loss, damage or delay due to any
4 cause beyond your or our reasonable control . . . . Under no circumstances shall either of us
be liable for special, indirect or consequential damages of any kind including, but not limited
5 to, loss of profits, loss of good will, loss of business opportunity, additional financing costs
or loss of use of any equipment or property, whether in contract, tort, warranty, or otherwise,
6
notwithstanding any indemnity provisions to the contrary.
7
Id. ¶ 20.
8
On March 5, 2019, Otis Elevator provided Medawar with the Final Approval Package, which
9
contained various specifications for the Subject Elevator Plaintiffs were required to approve before
10
Otis Elevator could commence manufacturing the elevator equipment. Id. ¶ 21. On May 29, 2019,
11
Otis Elevator promptly ordered the elevator materials for manufacturing. Id. ¶ 23. The elevator
12
equipment arrived at the Subject Property in October 2019. Id. ¶ 24. However, Otis Elevator was
13
prevented from commencing the installation of the Subject Elevator at that time because certain
14
preinstallation work related to the Subject Elevator’s pit, hoistway, and machine room had not yet
15
been completed by others. Id. ¶ 25. If a customer is not ready and the installation date is missed, Otis
16
Elevator would generally schedule manpower on first-come, first-served basis. Id. ¶ 27. On January
17
8, 2020, Otis Elevator installed the Subject Elevator at the Subject Property. Id. ¶ 29. However, it did
18
not adjust the Subject Elevator on that date due to the lack of permanent power. Id. ¶ 30.5 On that
19
same date, Otis Elevator provided Medawar with a document entitled “Job Site Field Memo
20
Survey,” (“Survey”) which details “items of work by others” that “should be completed so as not to
21
delay our [Otis Elevator’s] installation schedule or state inspection.” Id. ¶ 31. The Survey states:
22
23
24 charged them for additional labor or materials costs associated with the duration of the project. See Medawar
SUF Opp’n ¶ 18. However, the Court finds the phrase “through no fault of Otis Elevator” to be argumentative
25 and subject to dispute; as a result, the phrase has been omitted from the Court’s findings of fact.
5 Otis Elevator’s SUF proposed the following fact: “However, it could not adjust the Subject Elevator on that
26 date due to the continued lack of permanent electrical power.” Otis Elevator SUF ¶ 30. The Medawars dispute
this fact, arguing that Otis could in fact have adjusted the Subject Elevator using a temporary generator.
27 Medawar SUF Opp’n ¶¶ 9, 30. The Medawars further note that Kim Boyle, an Otis Elevator employee,
admitted during her deposition that “Otis had often used temporary generators before and that was an option
28 in this case.” Id. ¶ 9. For clarity’s sake, the Court adjusts the proposed language and finds that Otis Elevator
“did not adjust the Subject Elevator on that date due to the continued lack of permanent electrical power.”
8
Case 2:20-cv-05155-MEMF-E Document 95 Filed 07/12/22 Page 9 of 20 Page ID #:1140
1 “PLEASE CALL WHEN ALL ITEMS ARE COMPLETED SO AS NOT TO DELAY OUR
2 INSTALLTION SCHEDULE.” Id. ¶ 33. On January 8, 2020, Otis Elevator provided another
3 checklist of items that the Medawars were required to complete to obtain final inspection approval.
4 Medawar SAF ¶ 109. The checklist was addressed to Medawar and did not mention JCM. Id.
5 On February 7, 2020, Medawar notified Otis Elevator that he was in the process of securing
6 permanent electrical power and requested that Otis Elevator schedule an adjustment of the Subject
7 Elevator and a state inspection.6 Id. ¶ 35; Golodnitska Decl., Ex. 3, at 1; see also Medawar SUF
8 Opp’n ¶ 35. The Contract requires additional charge for any overtime work, such as work performed
9 on weekends.7 Otis Elevator SUF ¶ 36. On February 14, 2020, Medawar signed a change order
10 prepared by Otis, agreeing to pay overtime in order to speed up the scheduling of final inspection for
11 the elevator. Medawar SAF ¶ 115. The change order was addressed to Medawar, without mentioning
12 JCM, and was signed by Medawar as the “Owner.” Id.
13 On Saturday, February 22, 2020, Otis Elevator adjuster Eric Wilber performed the
14 adjustment of the Subject Elevator. Otis Elevator SUF ¶ 39. During the February 22, 2020 visit,
15 Wilber noted that a properly functioning telephone line in the Subject Elevator’s machine room
16 remained outstanding. Id. ¶ 40. As such, Otis Elevator did not schedule the final State Inspection at
17 that time. Id. ¶ 41.8
18
19 6 Otis Elevator’s SUF proposed the following fact: “On February 7, 2020, Mr. Medawar notified Otis Elevator
that he was in the process of securing permanent electrical power and that, therefore the Subject Elevator was
20
now ready for adjustment.” Otis Elevator SUF ¶ 35. The Medawars object to this fact, arguing that Otis
Elevator General Manager Carrie Bruhl, whose declaration is cited in support of this fact, lacks foundation
21
and personal knowledge to testify to this information. Medawar SUF Opp’n ¶ 35. The Court overrules this
22 objection. As General Manager at Otis Elevator, Bruhl would reasonably be aware of the company’s
communications with clients, even with respect to communications not sent directly to her. Moreover,
23 Medawar’s email, which was submitted as evidence, shows that no genuine dispute exists here. See ECF No.
66-2 (“Golodnitska Decl.”), Ex. 3, at 1.
24 7 The Medawars dispute this fact, arguing that the Contract does not require that a Customer pay overtime,
but that the Customer may agree to pay overtime. The Court finds that this is not a genuinely disputed fact. In
25 fact, it appears that the Medawars are merely repeating Otis Elevator’s statement of uncontroverted fact—that
under the Contract, a customer who chooses to request overtime work, such as work performed on weekends,
26 is required to pay an additional charge.
8 Otis Elevator’s SUF proposed the following fact: “As such, Otis Elevator was unable to schedule the final
27 State Inspection at that time.” Otis Elevator SUF ¶ 41. The Medawars dispute this fact, arguing that Otis
technically “could have scheduled the State Inspection in anticipation of the completion and testing of the
28
9
Case 2:20-cv-05155-MEMF-E Document 95 Filed 07/12/22 Page 10 of 20 Page ID #:1141
1 On April 20, 2020, Otis Elevator issued a charge of $2,070, the amount of the $2,300
2 overtime charge completed in February 2020, less ten percent retainage. Otis Elevator SUF ¶ 38;
3 Medawar SAF ¶ 118. The invoice was addressed solely to Medawar without mention of JCM but
4 was not paid until Otis completed the work. Id. On May 1, 2020, Otis Elevator signed a lien release
5 documentation for the payment of the $2,070. Id. ¶ 119. The lien release documentation identified
6 Medawar as the “customer” without mentioning JCM. Id. On May 1, 2020, Otis Elevator prepared a
7 statement again addressed to Medawar without mentioning JCM. Id. ¶ 120.
8 On January 14, 2021, Wilber again examined the Subject Elevator in order to determine
9 whether the conditions at the Subject Property were acceptable for the final State Inspection. Id. ¶
10 42. He confirmed that all work on behalf of Otis Elevator in connection with the Subject Elevator
11 was indeed complete. Id. ¶ 43. Although there was still no functioning telephone line to the Subject
12 Elevator’s machine room when Wilber arrived, Plaintiffs were eventually able to work with their
13 service provider that afternoon to establish a working signal into the machine room, and thus the
14 elevator, during Wilber’s second visit to the Subject Property. Id. ¶ 44.
15 During this same visit, Wilber also determined that the Subject Elevator’s machine room
16 lacked sufficient ventilation, which could potentially impact the Subject Elevator passing the final
17 State Inspection. Id. ¶ 45. Accordingly, Wilber suggested that Plaintiffs install a louver in the
18 Subject Elevator’s machine room’s door to improve ventilation and consequently, increase the
19 likelihood of the Subject Elevator passing the final State Inspection. Id. ¶ 46.
20 The Medawars having cured the critical issue in connection with the telephone line, and
21 consistent with the express terms and conditions under the Contract, Otis Elevator requested a date
22
23
24
25
26 telephone line, without waiting for that completion and testing.” Medawar SUF Opp’n ¶ 41. Here, the
Medawars appear to object to semantics—specifically, to the use of the word “could.” Although it is true that
27 Otis technically could have scheduled a state inspection at any time, the primary issue was that the Subject
Elevator likely would not have passed the final State Inspection without a properly functioning telephone line.
28 However, for clarity’s sake, the Court adjusts the proposed language and finds that “Otis Elevator did not
schedule the final State Inspection at that time.”
10
Case 2:20-cv-05155-MEMF-E Document 95 Filed 07/12/22 Page 11 of 20 Page ID #:1142
1 from the State of California for the final State Inspection.9 Otis Elevator SUF ¶ 47. The final State
2 Inspection occurred on January 29, 2021. Id. The Subject Elevator passed the final State Inspection
3 and was conveyed to Plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 48. The Contract provides that all Contract-related charges,
4 inclusive of change orders, must be billed up to 90% of the total Contract price and paid before title
5 to the Subject Elevator can transfer to the elevator owner. Id. ¶ 49. The Contract provides that
6 monthly progress payments shall be made to Otis Elevator thirty-five (35) days after each billing
7 date. Id. ¶ 50. The April 20, 2020 charge of $2,300 for Eric Wilber’s overtime adjustment work
8 performed on February 22, 2020, was not paid until February 1, 2021. Id. ¶ 51.
9
A. Whether the Medawars Have Standing to Bring a Breach of Contract Claim
10 Depends on the Existence of an Agency Relationship, Which Is a Question of
Fact Not to Be Decided on a Motion for Summary Judgment Under The
11 Circumstances Presented In This Case.
12
Otis Elevator contends that the Medawars lack the standing necessary to allege a breach of
13
contract claim against it because no contract exists between Otis Elevator and the Medawars. Mot. at
14
10–11. In particular, Otis Elevator notes that it only entered into the Contract with JCM to furnish
15
and install the Subject Elevator at the Subject Property. Id. In response, the Medawars argue that
16
they have the necessary standing to allege a breach of contract claim because the parties understood
17
and intended that JCM act as an agent on behalf of the Medawars, that the Medawars were a
18
disclosed principal on whose behalf JCM acted, and that even if the Medawars lacked standing
19
against Otis Elevator, JCM could and should be substituted in as a plaintiff. Opp’n at 14–15.10
20
21
22
23
9 The Medawars again contend that this fact is disputed because “Otis could have scheduled the State
24 Inspection in anticipation of the completion and testing of the telephone line, without waiting for that
completion and testing.” Medawar SUF Opp’n ¶ 47. The Court finds no genuine dispute here. Unlike the
25 previous facts offered by Otis Elevator, see Otis Elevator SUF ¶ 41, this fact does not suggest that Otis
Elevator was unable to schedule an earlier inspection. Rather, this fact merely establishes that Otis Elevator
26 only scheduled the final State Inspection after the Medawars fixed the issue concerning the telephone line.
10 The Medawars note that Otis Elevator stated in the parties’ Joint Case Management report that it believed
27 that JCM should be substituted in as a plaintiff instead of the Medawars and that Otis Elevator would stipulate
to the substitution. Opp’n at 12, 15 (citing ECF No. 64). As a result, the Medawars contend that the complaint
28 should not be dismissed for lack of standing. However, the parties never actually stipulated to the substitution.
Therefore, the Medawars’ argument is unavailing.
11
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1 A plaintiff seeking to demonstrate standing bears the burden of proof to establish standing
2 “with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of litigation.” Washington
3 Envt. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504
4 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (noting that in responding to a motion for summary judgment, “the plaintiff
5 can no longer rest on . . . mere allegations, but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific
6 facts, which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true”)).
7 As an initial matter, only the real party in interest has standing to sue under the substantive
8 law. Gantman v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 284 Cal. Rptr. 188, 191 (Ct. App. 1991). Under California
9 law, someone who is not a party to a contract has no standing to enforce the contract. Id. These rules
10 extend to third parties who are agents of a party to a contract. Cohen v. TNP 2008 Participating
11 Notes Program, LLC, 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d 340, 356 (Ct. App. 2019). “[A]n agent for a party to a
12 contract not made with or in the name of the agent is not a real party in interest with standing to sue
13 on the contract.” Id. (quoting Powers v. Ashton, 119 Cal. Rptr. 729, 733 (Ct. App. 1975)); see also
14 Epic Commc’ns, Inc. v. Richwave Tech., Inc., 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572, 589 (Ct. App. 2009) (“Nor does
15 an agent ordinarily have a cause of action based upon some third person’s violation of its principal’s
16 rights. Without some breach of a duty owed to him, it has no power to sue on the principal’s
17 claim.”).
18 “Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests
19 assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to
20 the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.” Restatement
21 (Third) of Agency § 1.01. “[O]stensible authority arises as a result of conduct of the principal which
22 cause[s] the third party reasonably to believe that the agent possesses the authority to act on the
23 principal’s behalf.” Tomerlin v. Canadian Indem. Co., 394 P.2d 571, 574 (Cal. 1964). “An agent’s
24 authority may be implied from the circumstances of a particular case and may be proved by
25 circumstantial evidence.” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rest., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 479–80
26 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Kelley v. R.F. Jones Co., 77 Cal. Rptr. 170, 174 (Ct. App. 1969)). “However,
27 unless only one conclusion may be drawn, existence of an agency and the extent of an agent’s
28 authority is a question of fact and should not be decided on summary judgment.” Id. at 480.
12
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1 In order to determine whether the Medawars have standing, the Court must identify—
2 between the Medawars and JCM—who was the agent of whom. In order to make this determination,
3 the Court may consider not only the contract between the parties itself, but also the conduct of the
4 parties. Crestview Cemetery Ass’n, 356 P.2d 171, 752 (Cal. 1960) (“That the actions of the parties
5 should be used as a reliable means of interpreting an ambiguous contract is, of course, well settled in
6 our law.”). Upon review of the course of dealing between the Medawars, JCM, and Otis Elevator,
7 however, the Court ultimately finds that genuinely disputed facts exist as to this inquiry.
8 The Contract itself was a written agreement between Otis Elevator and JCM. Otis Elevator
9 SUF ¶ 1. On the other hand, Medawar signed this initial contract as the “Authorized Representative”
10 of the “Customer,” indicating that he was the Chief Financial Officer of JCM. Medawar SAF ¶ 105.
11 Otis Elevator also referred to JCM as the “Customer” in various documents, including the
12 Confirmation of Power, Bruhl Decl., Ex. 3, and Critical Construction Information, id., Ex. 5 at 4.
13 However, Otis Elevator sent the Medawars charge orders and invoices addressed to Medawar or
14 identifying him as the client, without mentioning JCM. Id. ¶¶ 107, 115–16. Moreover, the initial
15 Contract identified JCM as the “Customer” and Medawar as an “Authorized Representative” of
16 JCM. Id. ¶¶ 107, 115–16.
17 On balance after considering the parties’ conduct in their entire course of dealing, the Court
18 finds that there are genuine factual disputes as to the nature of the relationship between the
19 Medawars and JCM. More precisely put, although the historical facts of what occurred between the
20 parties are not in dispute, the facts themselves lead the Court to two different, but reasonable,
21 inferences—on the one hand, that the Medawars acted as agents of JCM, and on the other, that JCM
22 acted as an agent of the Medawars. “[S]ummary judgment should not be granted where contradictory
23 inferences may be drawn from such facts, even if undisputed.” Braxton-Secret v. A.H. Robins Co.,
24 769 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. Perry, 431 F.2d 1020, 1022 (9th Cir.
25 1970)).
26 As a result, because more than one reasonable inference may be drawn from the facts in this
27 case, the Court finds this issue appropriate for resolution by the jury. See C.A.R. Transp., 213 F.3d at
28 480 (“[U]nless only one conclusion may be drawn, existence of an agency and the extent of an
13
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1 agent’s authority is a question of fact and should not be decided on summary judgment.”). The Court
2 therefore DENIES the Motion to Summary Judgment as to the issue of standing.
3 / / /
4 / / /
5
B. Whether Otis Elevator Breached Its Contractual Obligations Is a Genuinely
6 Disputed Fact.
7
Otis Elevator further contends that Otis Elevator did not breach any of its contractual
8
obligations because: (1) there is no evidence that Otis Elevator failed to complete installation,
9
adjustment, or a timely scheduling of the final state inspection of the subject elevator; (2) Otis
10
Elevator’s request for payment of overtime work was reasonable and justified; (3) there is no
11
evidence that Otis Elevator failed to complete manufacture and delivery of the subject elevator to the
12
subject property within a reasonable time in 2019; and (4) JCM breached the contract by failing to
13
timely pay the $2,300 overtime charge for the February 2020 adjustment work. Mot. at 12–16. The
14
Medawars note that any discussion of Otis Elevator’s actions in 2019 is irrelevant, as “[t]he problem
15
in this case is not what happened in 2019. It is the failure of Otis [Elevator] to schedule and complete
16
the final State Inspection within a reasonable period of time after January of 2020 when Otis
17
provided its January 8, 2020 checklist.” Medawar SUF Opp’n ¶¶ 22–26, 28–29. Therefore, the Court
18
need not consider Otis Elevator’s argument that there is no evidence that it failed to complete
19
manufacture and delivery of the Subject Elevator to the Subject Property within a reasonable time in
20
2019. Mot. at 15–16.
21
i. Whether Otis Elevator Completed Installation, Adjustment, or a Scheduling of
22 the Final State Inspection of the Subject Elevator Within a Reasonable Time
Is a Genuinely Disputed Fact.
23
24 Otis Elevator contends that it fully performed its obligations under the Contract by furnishing
25 and installing the Subject Elevator at the Subject Property despite being hindered by the Medawars’
26 continued failure to comply with their contractual obligations by: (1) failing to install permanent
27 electrical power necessary to perform adjustment of the Subject Elevator until February 2020; and
28 (2) failing to furnish a properly functioning telephone line in the Subject Elevator’s machine room
14
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1 until January 14, 2021. Mot. at 12–14. Otis Elevator further notes that, once these issues had been
2 resolved, it subsequently requested a date for the final State Inspection and thereafter informed the
3 Medawars that the Subject Elevator passed the inspection. Mot. at 14. The Medawars allege that
4 there exists a dispute as to whether Otis Elevator completed the installation, adjustment, and timely
5 scheduling of the final State Inspection of the Subject Elevator within a reasonable time. Opp’n at
6 16. They concede that the Contract contained no performance deadline but assert that it included
7 parameters suggesting a reasonable time by which performance should be completed. Id. “If no time
8 is specified for the performance of an act required to be performed, a reasonable time is allowed.”
9 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1657. Moreover, “[t]he question of what constitute[s] a reasonable time” within
10 which to perform obligations under a contract is “one of fact.” Lyon v. Goss, 123 P.2d 11, 19 (Cal.
11 1942).
12 Here, there exists a dispute as to whether Otis Elevator breached the Contract by failing to
13 perform its obligations within a reasonable time. Otis Elevator concedes that the Contract does not
14 specify the manufacturing, delivery, or installation completion deadline for the Subject Elevator.
15 Otis Elevator SUF ¶ 15. As a result, under the California Civil Code, Otis Elevator’s obligations
16 were to be performed within a reasonable time. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1657. Because what constitutes a
17 reasonable time is a question of fact that is genuinely in dispute, the Court finds that this inquiry is
18 inappropriate for resolution on a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court therefore DENIES the
19 Motion for Summary Judgment as to breach of contract.11
20
C. The Contract’s “Loss, Damages or Delay” Provision Bars Relief for
21 Consequential, Special, and Indirect Damages.
22
23
24
25 11 Because the Court finds that a genuine dispute exists as to whether Otis Elevator fully complied with its
obligations under the Contract within a reasonable time, and therefore that granting summary judgment is
26 inappropriate as to the issue of breach of contract, the Court need not consider Otis Elevator’s other
allegations on this Motion for Summary Judgment, such as that Otis Elevator’s request for payment of
27 overtime work was reasonable and justified and that JCM breached the Contract by failing to timely pay the
$2,300 overtime charge for the February 2020 adjustment work. Mot. at 14–18. Moreover, Otis Elevator only
28 asks that the Court, if not inclined to grant full summary judgment, alternatively grant partial summary
judgment as to the Medawars’ prayer for consequential, indirect, and special damages. Id. at 2, 16–18.
15
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1 Finally, Otis Elevator contends that any relief sought for consequential, special, and indirect
2 damages are expressly barred by the Contract. Mot. at 16–18. The Contract provides in relevant part:
3
LOSS, DAMAGES OR DELAY
4
Under no circumstances shall either of us be liable for any loss, damage or delay due to
5 any cause beyond your or our reasonable control . . . . Under no circumstances shall
either of us be liable for special, indirect or consequential damages of any kind
6 including, but not limited to, loss of profits, loss of good will, loss of business
opportunity, additional financing costs or loss of use of any equipment or property,
7
whether in contract, tort, warranty, or otherwise, notwithstanding any indemnity provisions
to the contrary.
8
9 Bruhl Decl., Ex. 1 at 4 (emphasis added); Otis Elevator SUF ¶ 20 (emphasis added). The Medawars
10 contend that Otis Elevator’s reliance on this clause is misplaced because: (1) the clause in question
11 seeks to limit damages only for delays “beyond [Otis Elevator’s] reasonable control”; (2) the clause
12 does not apply to general contract damages, which include the damages for lost profits sought by
13 Otis Elevator; (3) the clause is an unconscionable attempt to avoid all liability; and (4) even if
14 conscionable, the clause is inappropriate under the current circumstances. Opp’n at 16–21.
15 As an initial matter, contract interpretation begins with the plain language of the contract,
16 Simonoff v. Expedia, Inc., 643 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The plain language of the contract
17 should be considered first . . . .” (quoting Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2009))),
18 and here the Contract contains no language limiting special, indirect, or consequential damages only
19 to delays beyond Otis Elevator’s reasonable control.
20 Although the Contract specifically lists “loss of profits” among the damages neither party
21 shall be liable for, Bruhl Decl., Ex. 1 at 4, the Medawars contend that they may still recover for lost
22 rental profits under the contract because these claimed lost profits are general contract damages and
23 therefore not covered by the second sentence of the “loss, damages or delay” clause quoted above,
24 which only prohibits “special, indirect, or consequential damages.” Under California law, “[l]ost
25 profits, if recoverable, are more commonly special rather than general damages.” Lewis Jorge
26 Constr. Mgmt., Inc. v. Pomona Unified Sch. Dist., 102 P.3d 257, 266 (Cal. 2004) (citations omitted).
27 General damages are generally characterized as “those that flow directly and necessarily from a
28 breach of contract, or that are a natural result of a breach.” Id. at 261. As the California Supreme
16
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1 Court has held, “[g]eneral damages for breach of a contract ‘are based on the value of the
2 performance itself, not on the value of some consequence the performance may produce.’” Id. at 263
3 (quoting 3 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies, § 12.4(1) (1993)).12 This concept, also contained in the
4 rule of Hadley, see Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), is codified in the California
5 Civil Code:
6
For the breach of an obligation arising from contract, the measure of damages, except
7 where otherwise expressly provided by this Code, is the amount which will compensate
the party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, or which, in the
8 ordinary course of things, would be likely to result therefrom.
9
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3300 (emphasis added). As the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 351 puts it:
10
(1) Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have reason
11 to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was made.
(2) Loss may be foreseeable as a probable result of a breach because it follows from
12
the breach
13 (a) in the ordinary course of events, or
(b) as a result of special circumstances, beyond the ordinary course of events,
14 that the party in breach had reason to know.
(3) A court may limit damages for foreseeable loss by excluding recovery for loss of
15 profits, by allowing recovery only for loss incurred in reliance, or otherwise if it
concludes that in the circumstances justice so requires in order to avoid
16
disproportionate compensation.
17 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 351 (1981).13
18
That is, either the losses flow from the breach in the ordinary course of events—in which
19
they are general damages—or they are the result of special circumstances—in which they are special
20
21
22
12 See also Biotronik A.G. v. Conor Medsystems Ireland, Ltd., 11 N.E.3d 676, 680 (N.Y. 2014) (“[W]here . . .
23 damages reflect a ‘loss of profits on collateral business arrangements,’ they are [consequential damages].”);
11 Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts § 56.6 (rev. ed. 2022) (“These two terms [“general” and “special”
24 damages] may be convenient as shorthand words to differentiate between those cases in which there are no
unusual circumstances and the sequence of breach and injury, as cause and effect, would be believed to be
25 known to the ordinary person, and other cases in which there are unusual circumstances and there must be
evidence that the defendant had reason to know them and to foresee the injury that has occurred.”).
26 13 Although the Restatement Second of Contracts (Restatement) is not binding authority, “considering the
circumstances under which it has been drafted, and its purposes, in the absence of a contrary statute or
27
decision in this state, it is entitled to great consideration as an argumentative authority.” Lake Alamanor
Assocs. L.P. v. Huffman-Broadway Grp., Inc., 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71, 76 n.3 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Canifled
28
v. Security-First Nat’l Bank, 87 P.2d 830, 844–45 (Cal. 1939)).
17
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1 damages. This concept is helpfully described by a sister district court also in reliance on the
2 Restatement:
3
The common law distinction between special and general damages is instructive to
4 interpreting the Limitation of Liability provision in the Contract. In breach of contract
cases, the distinction between consequential or special damages and general or direct
5 damages is defined by the level of foreseeability the parties had at the time the contract
was made of the possible harm resulting from breach. General or direct damages are
6 foreseeable damages because they occur in the ordinary course of events. In contrast,
special or consequential damages are those that occur as a result of special
7
circumstances, beyond the ordinary course of events, which the party in breach will be
8 aware of at the time of contract formation only if notified of such circumstances.
9
Assurance Co. of Am. v. Premium Constr. Grp., Inc., 2012 WL 1292420, at *2 (W.D. Wa. Apr. 16,
10
2012) (citations omitted).
11
Where California courts have permitted lost profits as general damages, it is because in those
12
instances, “[t]he likelihood of lost profits from related or derivative transactions is so obvious . . .
13
that the breaching party must be deemed to have contemplated them at the inception of the contract.”
14
Lewis Jorge, 102 P.3d at 264.
15
Here, although the Medawars contend that the parties contemplated that lost rental profits
16
would result from a breach of contract, Opp’n at 18–20, the Medawars have failed to establish that
17
lost rental profits would ordinarily result from any breach of an elevator construction contract as a
18
matter of law. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3300 (“For the breach of an obligation arising from contract, the
19
measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this Code, is the amount which
20
will compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, or which, in
21
the ordinary course of things, would be likely to result therefrom.” (emphasis added)). It does not
22
appear to be the case that lost rental profits would result from a delay in construction of an elevator
23
“in the ordinary course of things.” Id.; see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 351(2)(a)
24
(1981) (“Loss may be foreseeable as a probable result of a breach because it follows from the
25
breach . . . in the ordinary course of events.”).
26
They have also failed to point to any authority stating as much. It is therefore of no moment
27
that, as claimed by the Medawars, it was allegedly “obvious” to these parties that this building was
28
18
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1 to be used for rentals.14 Opp’n at 13, 20. Any special circumstances specific to these parties—such
2 as the allegedly contemplated rental use of the property—would only operate to justify special
3 damages, had the parties not explicitly disclaimed them in the Contract. The fact that it may have
4 been obvious to these parties that the Medawars wanted to rent out the property does not make these
5 lost rental profits general damages. Having reviewed the analogous cases and the authority cited
6 above, this Court finds that such lost rental profits do not constitute damages that would flow “in the
7 ordinary course of things.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 3300. As a matter of law, therefore, the lost profits the
8 Medawars claim are indeed special damages, and, as such, are explicitly excluded under the plain
9 language of the Contract.
10 The Medawars further contend that the clause is an unconscionable attempt to avoid all
11 liability. However, there is no evidence that the clause, based on its plain language, shields Otis
12 Elevator from all liability. Indeed, as the Medawars identified in their Opposition, the clause does
13 not apply to general contract damages. Opp’n at 18–20. If the Medawars are the real party in interest
14 and have suffered general contract damages as a result of a breach of the contract, Otis Elevator will
15 be liable.
16 Lastly, the Medawars contend that limitation of liability clauses, such as the clause
17 contemplated here, are only appropriate in limited circumstances “where one party is offering a
18 service for free to the public or where the beneficiary of the clause is involved in a high-risk, low-
19 compensation service.” Opp’n at 21 (quoting Lewis v. YouTube, LLC, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d 219, 224
20 (Ct. App. 2015)). In support of this contention, the Medawars cite Lewis, which found that a
21 limitation of liability clause in the Terms of Service for a free video posting and streaming website
22 was valid. Lewis, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 224–25. However, the Medawars’ reading of Lewis is
23 inaccurate. Although Lewis found that limitation of liability clauses were appropriate in such
24
25 14 In fact, the SAC contains no allegations suggesting that the Medawars communicated to Otis Elevator
JCM’s intent to rent out units in the building where the elevator was to be constructed at the time the parties
26 entered into the Contract. See generally SAC. Although the SAC alleges that Medawar informed an Otis
Elevator employee that the Medawars “were losing $3,000 per day due to Otis’s failure to complete the job,”
27
SAC ¶ 19, this communication took place on February 12, 2020—years after the parties initially entered into
the Contract—and therefore well after the time period that might make this communication justify lost profits
28
even as special damages.
19
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1 circumstances, California has not limited such clauses only to these circumstances. In fact, in Food
2 Safety Net Services v. Eco Safe Systems USA, Inc., cited by the Lewis court, the California Court of
3 Appeal concluded that a limitation of liability clause “effectively limit[ed]” the defendant’s liability,
4 even though the defendant was not offering a free public service or involved in a high-risk, low-
5 compensation service. Food Safety Net, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 634, 641–45 (Ct. App. 2012). As a result,
6 the Court finds that the “loss, damages or delay” clause limits the Medawars’ recovery and bars any
7 relief sought for consequential, special, and indirect damages. The Court therefore GRANTS the
8 Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Medawars’ prayer for consequential, indirect, and special
9 damages.
10 III. Conclusion
11 In light of the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:
12 1. The Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED;
13 2. The Court’s Findings of Fact are ESTABLISHED for trial; and
14 3. The Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Motion for Partial Summary
15 Judgment, is GRANTED IN PART.
16
17 IT IS SO ORDERED.
18
19 Dated: July 12, 2022 ___________________________________
20 MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG
21 United States District Judge
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