“That standard, however, applies only when the plaintiff’s products or services are 12]/ marketed to different categories of purchasers, such as to both professional purchasers and the consuming public.” (emphasis 14]/ added)
How later courts described this case
- “That standard, however, applies only when the plaintiff’s products or services are 12]/ marketed to different categories of purchasers, such as to both professional purchasers and the consuming public.” (emphasis 14]/ added)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case 2:20-cv-04305-DDP-SK Document 102 Filed 02/23/22 Page 1 of 15 Page ID #:4182
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 HEALTHVANA, INC., ) Case No. CV 20-04305 DDP (SKx)
)
12 Plaintiff, )
) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
13 v. ) FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
)
14 TELEBRANDS CORP., )
) [Dkt. 70]
15 Defendants. )
)
16
17 Presently before the court is a Motion for Summary Judgment
18 filed by Defendants Telebrands Corp.; Hempvana, LLC; Bulbhead.com,
19 LLC; and Healthbloom, LLC (collectively, “Telebrands”). Having
20 considered the submissions of the parties and heard oral argument,
21 the court grants the motion and adopts the following Order.
22 I. Background
23 Since 2014, Plaintiff Healthvana, Inc. (“Healthvana”) has
24 operated a “digital health platform” named Healthvana (“the
25 Healthvana app”). Healthvana holds a trademark in the name
26 “Healthvana” for use in connection with software and software as a
27 service. Prior to 2020, the Healthvana app focused on delivering
28 the results of HIV tests, and tests for other sexually transmitted
diseases, to patients. With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in
Case 2:20-cv-04305-DDP-SK Document 102 Filed 02/23/22 Page 2 of 15 Page ID #:4183
1 March 2020, however, Healthvana shifted the focus of its digital
2 platform to Covid test records, and later vaccination records. At
3 all times, Healthvana’s customers have not included end users of
4 software or the Healthvana app, but rather governmental entities,
5 healthcare firms, medical officers, laboratories, and employers.
6 Telebrands markets and sells “As Seen on TV” consumer
7 household products via websites, phone numbers, and big box
8 retailers such as Home Depot, Lowes, and Walgreens. Among
9 Telebrands’ products is a line of “Hempvana” products. Upon the
10 outset of the pandemic, Telebrands made an effort to market and
11 sell a hand sanitizer product. Because, however, retailers were
12 historically reluctant to carry products associated with hemp,
13 Telebrands opted to market a hand sanitizer under the name
14 “Healthvana.” Telebrands’ marketing efforts initially included a
15 “direct response” television commercial and a product website, and
16 later expanded to big box stores.
17 In late March 2020, Healthvana contacted Telebrands to express
18 concerns about Telebrands’ use of the name “Healthvana.”
19 Telebrands’ counsel indicated that Telebrands would rebrand the
20 hand sanitizer as “Handvana” and change all “Healthvana” hand
21 sanitizer marketing. Telebrands did not admit to any wrongdoing.
22 By April 17, Telebrands represented that all changes had been made.
23 Several hundred thousand bottles of hand sanitizer, however, had
24 already been produced with the older, “Healthvana” label. Those
25 bottles were filled and shipped to big box customers sometime after
26 April 17. Once those pre-printed bottles had run out, subsequent
27 shipments of hand sanitizer were delivered in the new “Handvana”
28 bottles.
2
Case 2:20-cv-04305-DDP-SK Document 102 Filed 02/23/22 Page 3 of 15 Page ID #:4184
1 On May 12, 2020, Healthvana filed the instant suit. The
2 Complaint alleges causes of action for trademark infringement,
3 unfair competition, and false advertising in violation of both
4 federal and state law, as well as a cause of action for violation
5 of the AntiCybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”).
6 Telebrands now moves for summary judgment on all claims.
7 II. Legal Standard
8 Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings,
9 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
10 together with the affidavits, if any, show “that there is no
11 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
12 to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party
13 seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the
14 court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions
15 of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the
16 absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v.
17 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). All reasonable inferences from
18 the evidence must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See
19 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242 (1986). If the
20 moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it is
21 entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate that “there is
22 an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.”
23 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
24 Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to
25 the nonmoving party opposing the motion, who must “set forth
26 specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
27 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Summary judgment is warranted if a
28 party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
3
Case |2:20-cv-04305-DDP-SK Document 102 Filed 02/23/22 Page4of15 Page ID #:4185
1]}/ existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
2 which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex,
3] 477 U.S. at 322. A genuine issue exists if “the evidence is such
4! that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
5] party,” and material facts are those “that might affect the outcome
6]}of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
7 There is no genuine issue of fact “[w]here the record taken as a
□ □□ whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
9]}/nonmoving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
10}} Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
11 It is not the court’s task “to scour the record in search of a
12]/ genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275,
13/1278 (9th Cir. 1996). Counsel have an obligation to lay out their
14] support clearly. Carmen v. San Francisco Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d
1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). The court “need not examine the entire
16} file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the
17}/ evidence is not set forth in the opposition papers with adequate
18] references so that it could conveniently be found.” Id.
IIIT. Discussion
20 A. Trademark claims
21 The “core element” of a trademark infringement claim is the
likelihood that the similarity of the marks will confuse consumers
23]}as to the source of goods or services. Freecycle Network, Inc. v.
241 Oey, 505 F.3d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 2007). Relevant factors include
25|]}/ the strength of the mark, proximity of the goods, similarity of the
26||/marks, evidence of actual confusion, marketing channels used, the
27\|| degree of care likely to be exercised by consumers, the defendant’s
28
Case |2:20-cv-04305-DDP-SK Document 102 Filed 02/23/22 Page5of15 Page ID #:4186
intent, and likelihood of expansion of product lines. AMF Inc. v.
2} Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 941, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979).
3 As an initial matter, Telebrands appears to suggest that a
4! Sleekcraft, or likelihood of confusion, analysis is not applicable
Sf} in the first instance unless the goods at issue are “related.” The
□□ Ninth Circuit has explained that the purpose of a Sleekcraft
7] analysis is to determine “whether consumers would likely be
8 || confused by related goods.” Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced
9} Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis
10] added); see also M2 Software, Inc. v. Madacy Ent., 421 F.3d 1073,
11} 1080 (9th Cir. 2005) (describing Sleekcraft analysis’ role in
12] determining “whether there is a likelihood of confusion between the
□□□ parties’ allegedly related goods”) (emphasis added). Thus, the
□□□ argument appears to go, where goods are not related, a Sleekcraft
15] analysis is neither necessary nor informative. This Court has,
16]}/more than twenty years ago, applied a “relatedness” test as a
threshold question in this sense.’ See Bally Total Fitness Holding
18] Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1163 (C.D. Cal. 1998). The
19] majority of courts, however, including several of the authorities
20]} cited by Telebrands, have since treated relatedness of goods not as
21])/ an independent, predicate factor, but rather as a part of the
22|| Sleekcraft analysis, specifically as part of the analysis related
23] to the “proximity” of the goods. See, e.g., Surfvivor Media, Inc.
24 v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 633 (9th Cir. 2005); Entrepreneur
25 || Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1147 (9th Cir. 2002); Matrix
26
27 ' This Court went on, however, to assume for the sake of
28 argument that the goods in question were related and conduct a full
Sleekcraft analysis.
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1 Motor Co. v. Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1083,
2 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2003). The court finds that this approach is
3 appropriate, and looks to relatedness as part of the overall
4 confusion analysis.
5 1. Strength of Plaintiff’s Mark
6 “The purpose of examining the strength of the plaintiff’s mark
7 is to determine the scope of trademark protection to which the mark
8 is entitled.” Surfvivor, 406 F.3d at 631. Here, the term
9 “Healthvana” is fanciful or perhaps suggestive, insofar as the term
10 evokes something that is somewhat health-related. In either case,
11 the mark merits some degree of protection. Id.
12 2. Proximity/Relatedness of the Goods
13 As explained above, relatedness of the goods in question is
14 but one of the factors relevant to likelihood of confusion.
15 Healthvana’s software product, however, bears little resemblance to
16 Telebrands’ hand sanitizer. Healthvana contends, correctly, that
17 goods need not directly compete with one another to qualify as
18 “related.” Products and services related to a general industry
19 may, in some cases, be related to each other, insofar as consumers
20 are likely to associate one party’s products with the other party.
21 See Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Ent. Corp., 174 F.3d
22 1036, 1056 (9th Cir. 1999). In Brookfield, for example, the
23 plaintiff marketed “MovieBuff” software containing entertainment
24 industry-related software. Id. at 1042. The defendant, a
25 nationwide video chain, then, in the relatively early days of
26 internet marketing, registered the web domain moviebuff.com. The
27 Ninth Circuit found the two goods related, in that “both companies
28 offer products and services relating to the entertainment industry
6
Case 2:20-cv-04305-DDP-SK Document 102 Filed 02/23/22 Page 7 of 15 Page ID #:4188
1 generally, and their principal lines of business both relate to
2 movies specifically.” Id. at 1056. The court came to the opposite
3 conclusion, however, in Entrepreneur Media. There, the owners of
4 Entrepreneur magazine brought trademark infringement claims against
5 a public relations firm called “EntrepreneurPR,” which also
6 published a quarterly “Entrepreneur Illustrated” press release.
7 Entrepreneur Media, 279 F.3d at 1138-39. The court concluded that
8 “the fact that both parties’ goods relate generally to
9 entrepreneurs . . . can carry relatively little weight in
10 determining the likelihood of confusion. This is so because any
11 individual or company using the word ‘entrepreneur’ . . . is likely
12 to do so because that product or service has something to do with
13 the world of entrepreneurs.” Id. at 1147.
14 Here, although the term “Healthvana” is less descriptive than
15 “entrepreneur,” any entity using any variation on the word “health”
16 is likely to do so because its product has something to do with
17 “health.” As in Entrepreneur Media, therefore, the fact that both
18 parties’ products relate to the same, very general industry is of
19 little moment. Furthermore, the universe of health-related
20 products and services is far broader than that related to, for
21 example, movies, as was pertinent in Brookfield. In apparent
22 recognition of this reality, Healthvana suggests that the relevant
23 universe is not health products generally, but rather Covid-related
24 products specifically.2 This argument is not persuasive. First,
25
2 Healthvana is not entirely consistent, however, focusing on
26 both parties’ specific Covid-related products while also
recognizing that “both companies offer products and services
27 relating to medical issues generally.” (Opp. at 14-15.) Indeed,
for most of its history under the name Healthvana, Plaintiff’s
28 (continued...)
7
Case |2:20-cv-04305-DDP-SK Document 102 Filed 02/23/22 Page8of15 Page ID #:4189
Healthvana’s effort to paint Telebrands’ product as “Covid hand
2|| sanitizer” (Opposition at 2:8) is not supported in the record.
3} Although the pandemic undoubtedly played a role in Telebrands’
41} decision to expand into the sanitizer market, the sanitizer
5} indisputably has applications beyond the world of Covid.
6 || Telebrands’ television advertisement does not use the word “Covid,”
7! and Healthvana does not point to any other evidence of Covid-
specific marketing in the record. Second, even if Telebrands had
9]} focused on the Covid-related market, the court is skeptical that
10}| Healthvana’s phone app software would necessarily be “related to”
every other product in the universe of arguably Covid-related
12}| products, including hand wipes, cleaning solutions, masks, gloves,
13]| face shields, prescription medicines, vaccines, pulse oximeters,
14]| UV-sanitizers, thermometers, and so on. For purposes of a
15} Sleekcraft analysis, therefore, Healthvana’s phone app is not
16] closely related to Telebrands’ moisturizing hand sanitizer.
17 3. Similarity of the Marks
18 “Obviously, the greater the similarity between the two marks
at issue, the greater the likelihood of confusion.” GoTo.com, Inc.
20} v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2000). The marks
21])/ at issue here are displayed below:
22
ee
|| QY Healthvana || Healthwana®
24
25
26
27 *(...continued)
28 “digital health platform” focused on the prevention and management
of HIV and sexually transmitted diseases.
Case |2:20-cv-04305-DDP-SK Document 102 Filed 02/23/22 Page9of15 Page ID #:4190
1] Clearly, the spelling of the two marks is identical, with the
exception of an umlaut in Telebrands’ mark. Marks should, however,
“be considered in their entirety and as they appear in the
4) marketplace.” Entrepreneur Media, 279 F.3d at 1144. The color,
5} font, and imagery incorporated within the two marks are distinct
6]/ and distinguishable. Nor do the two marks appear in the same
7! marketplace, as Healthvana’s product is a phone app and Telebrands’
□□□ product is a physical good. The similarity of the marks,
9]} therefore, weighs only slightly in favor of confusion.
10 4, Actual Confusion
11 Although evidence of actual confusion is not required to
demonstrate a likelihood of confusion, it “is strong evidence that
13] future confusion is likely.” Off. Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6
14] F.3d 1385, 1393 (9th Cir. 1993). As an initial matter, the court
15] does not agree with Healthvana’s assertion that it has presented
evidence of “hundreds of instances of actual confusion.” As this
Court has explained, “stand-alone enquiries and misdirected
18] communications” are not evidence of actual consumer confusion.
19]) Delta Forensic Eng’g, Inc. v. Delta V Biomechanics, Inc., 402 F.
20] Supp. 3d 902, 910 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (discussing mis-addressed
mailings); see also Credit One Corp. v. Credit One Fin., Inc., 661
22\F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1140-41 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (communications intended
□□□ for one party but directed to another do not constitute evidence of
24]) actual confusion). Such evidence, rather, especially in electronic
25] formats, may demonstrate only that consumers were “inattentive or
26|| careless, as opposed to being actually confused” about the source
27 a product. Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 295 F.3d 623,
636 (6th Cir. 2002). Nevertheless, Healthvana has presented
Case 2:20-cv-04305-DDP-SK Document 102 Filed 02/23/22 Page 10 of 15 Page ID #:4191
1 evidence that some consumers did believe that Healthvana was the
2 company selling Healthvana-brand hand sanitizer. This evidence of
3 actual confusion weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion.
4 5. Marketing Channels
5 There is no dispute that, unlike Telebrands, Healthvana does
6 not market its phone app through television advertising or big box
7 retail stores. Nevertheless, Healthvana contends that a likelihood
8 of confusion exists because all parties market their products on
9 the internet. Courts have, in the past, concluded that “the Web,
10 as a marketing channel, is particularly susceptible to a likelihood
11 of confusion.” GoTo.com, 202 F.3d at 1207. That line of
12 reasoning, however, has long since fallen by the wayside. Over a
13 decade ago, the Ninth Circuit recognized that “[t]oday, it would be
14 the rare commercial retailer that did not advertise online, and the
15 shared use of a ubiquitous marketing channel does not shed much
16 light on the likelihood of consumer confusion.” Network
17 Automation, 638 F.3d at 1151 (emphasis added). This factor,
18 therefore, weighs against a likelihood of consumer confusion.
19 6. Degree of Care Exercised by Consumers
20 Courts expect consumers to be “more discerning—and less easily
21 confused,” when purchasing expensive items. Brookfield, 174 F.3d
22 at 1036. Similarly, a sophisticated consumer exercising a high
23 degree of care is less likely to be confused by similar marks.
24 Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1152. Here, consumers of
25 Healthvana’s software product are sophisticated entities such as
26 governments and laboratories who, if Healthvana’s revenues are any
27 indication, pay non-negligible amounts for Healthvana’s services
28 and products. Telebrands’ consumers, on the other hand, are not
10
Case 2:20-cv-04305-DDP-SK Document 102 Filed 02/23/22 Page 11lof15 Page ID #:4192
□□ likely to be sophisticated or to exercise a high degree of care
2 when purchasing a relatively inexpensive bottle of hand sanitizer.
3} Although the Ninth Circuit has not spoken definitively as to what
4} standard applies in “mixed buyer class” situations such as this
one, the court has suggested that “the standard of care to be
6])/ exercised by the reasonably prudent purchaser will be equal to that
7H of the least sophisticated consumer.” GoTo.com, 202 F.3d at 1209
8H (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods.,
9H Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 293 (3d Cir.1991); but see Cohn v. Petsmart,
10} Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 843 n.9 (9th Cir. 2002) (“That standard,
however, applies only when the plaintiff’s products or services are
12]/ marketed to different categories of purchasers, such as to both
professional purchasers and the consuming public.” (emphasis
14]/ added)). Because Telebrands’ customers exercise a low degree of
care when purchasing inexpensive hand sanitizer, this factor weighs
16]} somewhat in favor of a likelihood of confusion.
17 7. Telebrands’ Intent
18 The intent factor is of “minimal importance.” GoTo.com, 202
19] F.3d at 1208. In any event, there is no evidence that Telebrands
20 ]/ intended to confuse or deceive either its own or Healthvana’s
21]} customers. Telebrands selected a brand name similar to its
22 || Hempvana branding yet evocative of health, and agreed to change
that branding almost immediately when requested to do so. Although
24|| Healthvana makes much of the fact that Telebrands shipped out
25|| “Healthvana” labeled bottles even after agreeing to change its
26]| branding, the evidence is undisputed that the bottles had already
been produced. A de-identification period spanning a matter of
28
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Case 2:20-cv-04305-DDP-SK Document 102 Filed 02/23/22 Page 12 of 15 Page ID #:4193
1 weeks hardly constitutes evidence of any bad intent on Telebrands’
2 part.
3 8. Expansion of Product Lines
4 There is no evidence that either party has any intention or
5 plan of expanding into the others’ product lines at any point in
6 the future. This factor therefore weighs against a likelihood of
7 confusion.
8 9. Balance of Sleekcraft factors
9 The balance of the Sleekcraft factors weighs against a
10 likelihood of confusion. The actual confusion factor weighs in
11 Healthvana’s favor, and the strength of the mark, similarity of the
12 marks, and degree of care factors weigh slightly in favor of
13 confusion. The other factors, however, are either neutral or weigh
14 against a likelihood of confusion. In particular, the relatedness
15 of the goods, or lack thereof, weighs heavily against a likelihood
16 of confusion. Telebrands is, therefore, entitled to summary
17 judgment on Plaintiff’s trademark claims.
18 B. False Advertising
19 Telebrands contends that Healthvana’s false advertising claims
20 fail because the parties are not competitors, and because
21 Healthvana has presented no evidence that Telebrands’ advertising
22 statements caused any quantifiable loss of money or property.
23 First, “there is no doubt that the Supreme Court expressly rejected
24 any requirement that a plaintiff show direct competition to prevail
25 on a [Lanham Act] false advertising claim.” Geiger v. Creative
26 Impact Inc., No. CV-18-01443-PHX-JAT, 2020 WL 4583625, at *2 (D.
27 Ariz. Aug. 10, 2020) (citing Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static
28 Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 136, 138–39 (2014)). Any
12
Case 2:20-cv-04305-DDP-SK Document 102 Filed 02/23/22 Page 13 of 15 Page ID #:4194
1 commercial injury, including harm to reputation, will suffice.
2 Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 132; ThermoLife Int’l LLC v. Aesthetic
3 Distribution, LLC, No. CV-19-02048-PHX-DJH, 2020 WL 12581996, at *4
4 (D. Ariz. Jan. 7, 2020). A plaintiff must, however, show injury
5 “as a result of the false statement”. Gaby’s Bags, LLC v. Mercari,
6 Inc., No. CR 20-00734 WHA, 2020 WL 1531341, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
7 31, 2020 (citing Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d
8 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 1997)). Where parties do not compete with
9 each other, “it may be more difficult to establish proximate
10 causation.” Obesity Rsch. Inst., LLC v. Fiber Rsch. Int’l, LLC,
11 310 F. Supp. 3d 1089, 1106 (S.D. Cal. 2018).
12 Healthvana argues that it has presented evidence that
13 consumers were very angry with Healthvana in the period following
14 certain Telebrands advertisements. Although that evidence
15 certainly indicates reputational harm to Healthvana, the link
16 between consumer anger and the allegedly false statements is less
17 clear. Healthvana’s First Amended Complaint alleges that
18 Telebrands falsely stated that its version of Healthvana was a
19 “trusted brand since 2015,” had “over 100 million satisfied
20 customers,” that Telebrands’ sanitizer contained an ingredient used
21 in hospitals, and that Telebrands had maintained a website since
22 2019, when in reality the website went live in 2020. Although the
23 Declaration of Ramin Bastani refers to “hundreds of complaints,”
24 and Healthvana attaches an exhibit of over 600 pages of
25 correspondence, Healthvana identifies no particular instance of a
26 complaint related to any of Telebrands’ alleged false statements.
27
28
13
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1 Absent such evidence, Healthvana’s Lanham Act claim cannot
2 succeed.3
3 C. Cybersquatting
4 Healthvana alleges that Telebrands violated the Anti-
5 Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), by
6 registering the domain www.healthvanafoam.com with actual knowledge
7 of Healthvana’s registration of the Healthvana mark and without any
8 fair use of Healthvana’s mark on the website. ACPA “establishes
9 civil liability for ‘cyberpiracy’ where a plaintiff proves that (1)
10 the defendant registered, trafficked in, or used a domain name; (2)
11 the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a protected
12 mark owned by the plaintiff; and (3) the defendant acted with bad
13 faith intent to profit from that mark.” DSPT Int’l, Inc. v. Nahum,
14 624 F.3d 1213, 1218–19 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
15 omitted). Telebrands argues that Healthvana cannot show bad faith.
16 “Bad faith intent . . . shall not be found in any case in
17 which the court determines that the person believed and had
18 reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a
19 fair use or otherwise lawful.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii). In
20 any event, “[t]he most important grounds for finding bad faith are
21 the unique circumstances of the case.” Interstellar Starship
22 Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 946 (9th Cir. 2002)
23 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Healthvana’s
24 argument with respect to bad intent is not clear to the court.
25 Healthvana appears to rely on the fact that Telebrands’ website was
26 still operational on April 4, four days after Telebrands
27
3 Healthvana’s false advertising claim under California
28
Business & Professions Code § 17500 fails for the same reason.
14
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1 voluntarily agreed to change its Healthvana branding. As discussed
2 above, a de-identification period of less than one week hardly
3 demonstrates bad faith or intent. Furthermore, given the court’s
4 trademark analysis, above, Telebrands’ belief that its use of the
5 domain name was lawful was a reasonable one. Healthvana’s ACPA
6 claim, therefore, fails.
7 IV. Conclusion
8 For the reasons stated above, Telebrands’ Motion for Summary
9 Judgment is GRANTED.
10
11
12 IT IS SO ORDERED.
13
14
15 Dated:
February 24, 2022
DEAN D. PREGERSON
16 United States District Judge
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