“Section 10110.6 . . . bans the enforcement of discretionary clauses in California.”
How later courts described this case
- “Section 10110.6 . . . bans the enforcement of discretionary clauses in California.”
- “[T]he rule requires not, as its common name implies, the best evidence in every case but rather the production of an original document instead of a copy.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ADEL F. SAMAAN, M.D., No. 2:17-cv-01690-DSF-AGR
Plaintiff,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
v. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE
UNPAID CLAIMS
AETNA LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants.
I. INTRODUCTION
The parties agreed to trifurcate this matter. On January 14,
2019, the Court issued an Order re Standing, Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies, and Contractual Limitations. Dkt. 43.
In this second phase, the parties ask the Court to decide whether
Plaintiff is entitled to benefits for certain unpaid claims. The
Court deemed this matter appropriate for decision without oral
argument and took the matter under submission on August 1,
2019.
Having reviewed and considered the parties’ briefs and the
administrative record, the Court makes the following Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a medical doctor. Dkt. 53-1 (Samaan Dec.) ¶ 1.
This phase involves healthcare services Plaintiff provided to ten
different patients. Dkt. 53-3.1 The parties agree that each patient
was a beneficiary of the Bank of America Plan (Plan), as described
in the 2013 and 2016 Summary Plan Descriptions, and that
Defendants were the claims administrators of the Plan. Dkt. 25
(“FAC”) ¶ 5; Dkt. 53 at 2; Dkt. 60 at 5-6. Plaintiff seeks recovery
of unpaid benefits for 43 claim events2 involving the patients
pursuant to the Plan. See FAC ¶¶ 40-41; Dkt. 53-3. The parties
agree that the Plan is governed by the Employee Retirement and
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). FAC ¶¶ 40-41; Dkt. 60 at
10.
III. FINDINGS OF FACT
A. Terms of the Plan
1. The Plan “applies to current U.S.-based employees” of
Bank of America Corporation. AR 2306 (2013 Plan), 2582 (2016
Plan).
2. The Plan covers services for “medically necessary care,”
as described in relevant part below:
1 Plaintiff lists 11 different patient identifiers in his list of unpaid claims. Id.
However, Patient X and Patient AE are the same patient. See id.;
Supplemental Admin. Record at 162.
2 Plaintiff lists 45 claim events in his list of unpaid claims. Dkt. 53-3.
However, Plaintiff states in his Amended Complaint that he is no longer
seeking to recover benefits for services provided during one of the claim
events. FAC at 9 n.1. Plaintiff also lists the October 25, 2016 claim event for
Patient X/AE twice. Dkt. 53-3 at 2-3.
Unless otherwise noted the Plan[] cover[s]
certain services and supplies for medically
necessary care including:
- Specialty and outpatient care
- Inpatient Services
- Surgical benefits
Id. at 2372 (2013 Plan), 2628 (2016 Plan).
3. The Plan covers certain surgical services, as described
in relevant part below:
Surgical Benefits
Unless otherwise noted, the Plan[] cover[s]
the following surgical services:
- Surgical benefits cover surgery
performed to treat an illness or injury;
medical services by surgeons [Medical
Doctors (MD) or Doctors of Osteopathy
(DO)], assistant surgeons,
anesthesiologists, consultants (during
and after an operation and any required
second opinions); and medical services of
podiatrists.
. . .
- Surgical services include:
o A cutting procedure (except for
cutting procedures of the mouth
that are considered dental expenses
. . . .)
o Suturing
. . .
o Preoperative and postoperative care
Id. at 2374 (2013 Plan).3
4. The Plan does not cover services that Defendants deem
not medically necessary, as described in relevant part below:
Unless otherwise noted the Plan[] do[es] not
cover certain services, procedures and
equipment, including:
. . .
- Experimental, investigational and
unproven services and procedures;
ineffective surgical, medical
psychiatric or dental treatments or
procedures; research studies; or other
experimental, investigational or
unproven health care procedures or
pharmacological regimes, as
determined by [Defendants], unless
approved by [Defendants].
- Services that are not medically
necessary as determined by
[Defendants].
3 The 2016 Plan contains substantially similar language. Id. at 2633. The
Court does not find any relevant differences between the plans.
Id. at 2379-80 (2013 Plan).4
5. The Plan defines “medical necessity” as follows:
Medical necessity or medically necessary
refers to services or supplies provided by
hospital, physician, practitioner or other
provider that are determined by
[Defendants] to be:
- Consistent with broadly accepted medical
standards in the United States as
essential to the evaluation and treatment
of disease or injury and professionally
recognized as effective, appropriate and
essential based on recognized standards
of the health care specialty
- Not furnished primarily for the
convenience of the patient, the attending
physician or other provider
- Furnished at the most appropriate level
that can be provided safely and
effectively to the patient
- Likely to produce significant positive
outcome, and no more likely to produce
negative outcome than any alternative
service or supplies, as it relates to both
the disease or injury involved and your
overall health condition
4 Again, the 2016 Plan contains substantially language, and the Court finds
no relevant differences between the plans. Id. at 2642-43, 2645.
- Not more costly than an alternative
service or sequence of services at least as
likely to produce equivalent therapeutic
or diagnostic results as to the diagnosis
or treatment of that patient’s illness,
injury or disease
Id. at 2386 (2013 Plan) (internal footnote omitted), 2659 (2016
Plan).
6. Pursuant to the Plan, an out-of-network provider may
not recover more than the “reasonable and customary” fee for a
service, as described in relevant part below:
Reasonable and customary (R&C)
Reasonable and customary (R&C) fees are
those set each year by your medical plan as
the fees that most doctors in a geographic
area charge for particular services or
procedures. R&C is based on available data
resources of competitive fees in that
geographic area.
. . .
If your doctor is out-of-network and charges
more than the R&C fee, the Plan will not
pay for the amount in excess of the R&C
level. You are responsible for paying this
difference if you are not using an in-network
physician.
Id. at 2389 (2013 Plan).
Reasonable and customary – A
reasonable and customary fee is the amount
of money that [Defendant] determines is the
normal, or acceptable, range of payment for
specific health-related service or medical
procedure. Reasonable and customary fees
operate within given geographic areas and
the exact numbers of such fees depend on
the location of service.
. . .
If your doctor is out of network and charges
more than the allowed amount fee, the plan
won’t pay for any amount above the allowed
amount. You’re responsible for paying this
difference which is shown on the
explanation of benefits (E0B) you receive
from your medical plan.
Id. at 2620 (2016 Plan).
7. The Plan contains the following clause granting
Defendants discretion in making claims determinations:
The Bank of America Corporation Corporate
Benefits Committee, as plan administrator,
has delegated to . . . insurance companies or
other third-party claims administrators
discretionary authority to determine
eligibility for benefits and construe the
terms of the applicable component plan and
resolve all questions relating to claims for
benefits under the component plan.
Id. at 2493 (2013 Plan), 2797 (2016 Plan).
B. The Component Plans that Govern Plaintiff’s Claims
for Benefits Are Self-Funded
8. The Plan documents provided by the parties govern
multiple component plans. AR 2306 (2013 Plan), 2582 (2016
Plan).
9. Defendants are the claims administrators for some, but
not all, of the component plans. Id. at 2496-98 (2013 Plan), 2789-
92 (2016 Plan).
10. Among the component plans for which Defendants are
the claims administrators, some, but not all, provide healthcare
benefits. Id.5
11. Plaintiff seeks to recover benefits pursuant only to
component plans where both (1) Defendants are the claims
administrators, and (2) the plan provides healthcare benefits.
FAC ¶¶ 39-41. Each of the component plans that match this
description is “[n]ot insured.” AR 2496 (2013 Plan), 2789 (2016
Plan). The “company and employees share costs based on
actuarial determination,” and “the employee portion” is pretax.
Id.
12. In light of the foregoing, each of the component plans
at issue is self-funded.
5 The other component plans for which Defendants are the claims
administrators provide “dental benefits,” “vision benefits,” “life insurance,”
“accident insurance,” “disability income,” or “counseling and referral
services.” Id. at 2497-98 (2013 Plan), 2791-92 (2016 Plan). Plaintiff does not
seek to recover benefits for providing any of these services.
C. Plaintiff
13. Plaintiff Adel F. Samaan is a medical doctor practicing
in Los Angeles County, whose primary practice area is
gynecological surgery. Samaan Dec. ¶ 1.
14. Plaintiff is an out-of-network provider under the Plan.
FAC ¶ 11.
D. Dr. James Krominga
15. Dr. James Krominga submitted a declaration in
support of Defendants’ claims decisions. Dkt. 60-2 (“Krominga
Dec.”). Dr. Krominga graduated from medical school in 1977,
completed a family practice residency in 1980, and received board
certification in family medicine in 1980. Dr. Krominga’s board
certification is current. Id. ¶ 2.
16. Dr. Krominga has been Defendant Aetna Life
Insurance Company’s Senior Medical Director for the Southwest
Markets for the past eight years. Id. ¶ 1. As Senior Medical
Director, he is responsible for oversight of medical policy
implementation, and participates in the development,
implementation, and evaluation of clinical/medical programs. Id.
17. Dr. Krominga is a fellow of the American Academy of
Family Physicians, and also belongs to the Arizona Academy of
Family Physicians and the Arizona Medical Association. Id.
E. Assignments of Benefits
18. Plaintiff states that he “received a written assignment
of benefits in connection with” each of the unpaid claims at issue.
Samaan Dec. ¶ 3.
19. Plaintiff provided a copy of a written assignment for
seven of the ten patients at issue:
- Patient A, Supplemental Admin. Record (SAR) 506;
- Patient K, AR at 1495;
- Patient T, id. at 7965, 7966, 8004;
- Patient X/AE, id. at 1872;
- Patient Z, id. 1095, 1096; SAR 1771;
- Patient AA, AR 726, 727; and
- Patient DD, id. at 1101-03; SAR 222.
20. Plaintiff did not provide a copy of a written assignment
for the following three patients: Patient LL, Patient AK, Patient
AR.
6 Patient A’s written assignment is included in the Supplemental
Administrative Record and contains a SAMAANAETNA Bates Designation.
In reviewing Defendants’ claims determinations, the Court will not consider
documents containing a SAMAANAETNA designation for the reasons stated
in this order. See Conclusions of Law 24-28. But whether Plaintiff received
an assignment of benefits, and therefore has standing to pursue the claim of
a patient, is a preliminary issue distinct from the court’s review of
Defendants’ claims determinations. Therefore, the Court will consider
documents containing the SAMAANAETNA designation for purposes of
determining whether Plaintiff received an assignment of benefits.
F. Defendants’ Denials of Plaintiff’s Claims for Benefits7
1) Defendants’ Grounds for Denying Plaintiff’s Claims
Are Stated in Documents Entitled Explanation of
Benefits and ATV Service Offering Engagements
21. The administrative record contains documents entitled
Explanation of Benefits (EOB) for each of the claim events at
issue. The EOB states Defendants’ grounds for denying Plaintiff’s
claim. See generally AR.
22. The administrative record contains documents entitled
ATV Service Offering Engagements, which reference many of
Plaintiff’s claim events. The ATV Service Offering Engagements
provide further explanation for Defendants’ claims
determinations. See generally AR.
2) Defendants Denied Several of Plaintiff’s Claims on
the Grounds that the Services Were Not Performed
Based on the Information Defendants Received
23. For the following 27 claim events, Defendants denied
Plaintiff’s claims on the grounds that, “based on the information
received, the[] services were not provided”:
- Patient A (date of service (“DOS”): 1/3/2015), AR 501;
- Patient A (DOS: 1/19/2015), id. at 501, 547-48;
- Patient A (DOS: 2/10/2015), id. at 551;
- Patient A (DOS: 2/23/2015), id. at 554-55;
7 Because Plaintiff fails to show he has standing to recover benefits for
services provided to Patients LL, AK, and AR, see Conclusions of Law 3-7,
the Court does not address Defendants’ claims determinations involving
those patients.
- Patient A (DOS: 4/4/2015), id. at 570;
- Patient A (DOS: 7/3/2015), id. at 619-20;
- Patient A (DOS: 7/6/2015), id. at 643;
- Patient A (DOS: 7/16/2015), id. at 546;
- Patient A (DOS: 7/30/2015), id. at 676;
- Patient A (DOS: 9/16/2015), id. at 685;
- Patient T (DOS: 4/24/2015), id. at 7282;
- Patient T (DOS: 5/15/1015), id. at 7287;
- Patient T (DOS: 6/2/2015), id. at 72838;
- Patient T (DOS: 11/14/2015), id. at 8979;
- Patient X/AE (DOS: 3/26/2015), id. at 1961;
- Patient X/AE (DOS: 4/25/2015), id. at 1961, 1966;
- Patient X/AE (DOS: 6/26/2015), id. at 1966-67;
- Patient X/AE (DOS: 7/10/2015), id. at 2018;
- Patient X/AE (DOS: 7/27/2015), id. at 8980-81;
- Patient X/AE (DOS: 8/4/2015). id. at 2065;
- Patient X/AE (DOS: 8/18/2015), id. at 8356;
- Patient Z (DOS: 8/6/2015), id. at 1052;
8 Defendants only denied some of Plaintiff’s claims for services provided to
Patient T on June 2, 2015 on the grounds that the services were not
performed based on the information received. The remaining claim was
denied on the grounds that the service was not medically necessary. Id.; see
also Finding of Fact 53.
- Patient Z (DOS: 11/26/2015), id. at 1075;
- Patient AA (DOS: 10/2/2015), id. at 8635;
- Patient DD (DOS: 12/8/2015), id. at 1160;
- Patient DD (DOS: 12/19/2015), id.; and
- Patient DD (DOS: 2/13/2016), id. at 1246.9
a. For Some of the Claim Events, There Is No
Evidence that Plaintiff Provided Medical
Documentation to Defendants Supporting the
Claim During the Claims Administration Process
24. For ten of the 27 claim events referenced in paragraph
23, there is no evidence that Plaintiff submitted to Defendants
medical documents supporting the claim during the claims
administration process:
- Patient A (DOS: 1/3/2015);
- Patient A (DOS: 1/19/2015);
- Patient A (DOS: 2/10/2015);
- Patient A (DOS: 2/23/2015);
- Patient A (DOS: 7/30/2015);
- Patient A (DOS: 9/16/2015);
9 Plaintiff submitted three claims for services provided to Patient DD during
the February 13, 2016 claim event. Id. For two of these claims, Defendants
paid a portion of the claim, which the parties do not address. Id. Because
Plaintiff seeks to recover unpaid, but not underpaid, benefits during this
phase of the action, the Court will not consider the two claims which
Defendants paid in part in this Order. See Conclusion of Law 56.
- Patient T (DOS: 4/24/2015);
- Patient T (DOS: 5/15/1015);
- Patient T (DOS: 6/2/2015); and
- Patient X/AE (DOS: 8/18/2015).
25. For three of these ten claim events, Plaintiff does not
cite to any medical documentation supporting the claim:
- Patient A (DOS: 2/10/2015);
- Patient T (DOS: 4/24/2015); and
- Patient T (DOS: 6/2/2015).
26. For seven of these ten claim events, Plaintiff cites only
to medical documentation containing the Bates designation
SAMAANAETNA:
- Patient A (DOS: 1/3/2015), SAR 38;
- Patient A (DOS: 1/19/2015), SAR 39;
- Patient A (DOS: 2/23/2015), SAR 40;
- Patient A (DOS: 7/30/2015), SAR 46;
- Patient A (DOS: 9/16/2015), SAR 47;
- Patient T (DOS: 5/15/1015), SAR 87; and
- Patient X (DOS: 8/18/2015), SAR 150.
27. Plaintiff states in his briefing that the documents with
the SAMAANAETNA designation are “from the parties’ earlier
exchange of documents in this action.” Dkt. 53 at 3. Plaintiff did
not provide evidence showing that Defendants received these
documents during the claims administration process, before
Plaintiff filed this action.
b. For Some of Plaintiff’s Claims, Plaintiff Provided
Medical Documentation Purportedly Supporting
the Claim
28. For 17 of the 27 claim events referenced in paragraph
22, Plaintiff submitted to Defendants medical documentation
purportedly supporting the claims during the claims
administration process:
- Patient A (DOS: 4/4/2015), AR 577,
- Patient A (DOS: 7/3/2015), id. at 632;
- Patient A (DOS: 7/6/2015), id. at 648;
- Patient A (DOS: 7/16/2015), id. at 659;
- Patient T (DOS: 11/14/2015), id. at 7988;
- Patient X/AE (DOS: 3/26/2015), id. at 1955;
- Patient X/AE (DOS: 4/25/2015), id. 1965;
- Patient X/AE (DOS: 6/26/2015), id. at 2015;
- Patient X/AE (DOS: 7/10/2015), id. at 2031;
- Patient X/AE (DOS: 7/27/2015), id. at 2053;
- Patient X/AE (DOS: 8/4/2015), id. at 2066;
- Patient Z (DOS: 8/6/2015), id. at 8416-19;
- Patient Z (DOS: 11/26/2015), id. at 1079;
- Patient AA (DOS: 10/2/2015), id. at 728, 8665;
- Patient DD (DOS: 12/8/2015), id. at 1183;
- Patient DD (DOS: 12/19/2015), id. at 1203; and
- Patient DD (DOS: 2/13/2016), id. at 1249.
i. Plaintiff Submitted Several Claims for
Administering B6 and B12 Injections that
Defendants Denied
29. The Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) code for an
injection of Vitamin B6 is 84207. Krominga Dec. ¶ 4.
30. The CPT code for an injection of Vitamin B12 is 82607.
Id.
31. The CPT code for administering an injection is 96372.
Id.
32. Defendants denied Plaintiff’s claims for administering
B6 and B12 injections for the following ten claim events:
- Patient A (DOS: 4/4/2015), AR 570;
- Patient A (DOS: 7/6/2015), id. at 643;
- Patient A (DOS: 7/16/2015), id. at 546;
- Patient X/AE (DOS: 3/26/2015), id. at 1961;
- Patient X/AE (DOS: 6/26/2015), id. 1966-67;
- Patient X/AE (DOS: 7/10/2015), id. at 2018;
- Patient X/AE (DOS: 7/27/2015), id. at 8980-81;
- Patient X/AE (DOS: 8/4/2015), id. at 2065;
- Patient DD (DOS: 12/8/2015), id. at 1160; and
- Patient DD (DOS: 12/19/2015), id.
1. Defendants Denied Plaintiff’s Claims as to
Patient A for Failing to Include Specific
Information About the Injections
33. In an ATV Service Offering Engagement note dated
October 8, 2015, Defendants provided the following rationale for
denying some of Plaintiff’s claims as to Patient A on the grounds
that the services were not performed:
There are no separate injection records
submitted doc medication/dosage/specific
route or signature of professional who may
have administered medications or lab work
submitted to support services rendered.
AR 514. This note applied to Plaintiff’s claims for administering
B6 and B12 injections on the following dates, among others: DOS
4/4/2015, DOS 7/6/2015, and DOS 7/16/2015. Id.
34. The medical documentation purportedly supporting
Plaintiff’s claim for services provided to Patient A on April 4, 2015
and July 16, 2015 state that Vitamin B6 and B12 were given,
without further detail. Id. at 577, 659. The documentation does
not contain separate injection records, nor discuss specific dosage
or route of B6 or B12 injections. Id.
35. The medical documentation purportedly supporting
Plaintiff’s claim for services provided to Patient A on July 6, 2015
is not legible. Id. at 648. It is not evident that the documentation
mentions B6 or B12 injections. Id.
36. Dr. Krominga opines that the standard in the medical
industry is to record all injections in a specific section and, for
each injection, to include the name of the manufacturer, the
dosage, the lot number and expiration date, the route of
administration, and the name of the person administering the
injection. Krominga Dec. ¶ 9.
2. Defendants Denied Plaintiff’s Claims as to
Patient X/AE and Patient DD for Failing to
“Support” the Injections, Without Further
Explanation
37. In an ATV Service Offering Engagement note dated
October 9, 2015, Defendants provided the following rationale for
denying some of Plaintiff’s claims as to Patient X on the grounds
that the services were not performed:
Notes do not support injection/labs
performed.
AR 1946. This note applied to Plaintiff’s claim for administering
B6 and B12 injections on the following dates, among others: DOS:
03/26/2015, DOS: 06/26/2015, DOS: 07/10/2015, DOS: 07/27/2015,
and DOS: 8/4/2015. Id. at 1945. The note did not include further
grounds for denial. Id.
38. The medical documentation purportedly supporting
Plaintiff’s claims for services provided to Patient X on March 26,
2015 is not legible. Id. at 1955. It is not evident that the
documentation mentions B6 or B12 injections. Id.
39. The medical documentation purportedly supporting
Plaintiff’s claims for services provided to Patient X on June 26,
2015, July 10, 2015, July 27, 2015 and August 4, 2015 show that
B6 and B12 injections were given, but do not include further
detail. Id. at 2015, 2031, 2053, 2066.
40. In an ATV Service Offering Engagement note dated
June 16, 2016, Defendants provided the following rationale for
denying some of Plaintiff’s claims as to Patient DD on the grounds
that the services were not performed:
Notes do not support injection administered.
Id. at 1118. This note applied to Plaintiff’s claims for
administering B6 and B12 injections on the following dates: DOS:
12/08/2015 and DOS: 12/19/2015.
41. The medical documentation purportedly supporting
Plaintiff’s claims for services provided to Patient DD on December
8, 2015 and December 19, 2015 state that B-6 and B-12 injections
were given for weakness and fatigue, without further detail. Id. at
1183, 1203.
42. There is no evidence in the administrative record that
Defendants requested that Plaintiff provide specific dosage, route
of administration, or the signature of the administering doctor in
response to Plaintiff’s claims as to Patient X/AE and Patient DD.
ii. Defendants Denied Several of Plaintiff’s
Claims for Providing Comprehensive Office
Visits
43. The CPT Code for a comprehensive office visit is 99215.
Krominga Dec. ¶ 4.
44. Defendants denied Plaintiff’s claims for providing a
comprehensive office visit during the following 11 claim events:
- Patient A (DOS 4/4/2015), AR 570;
- Patient A (DOS: 7/3/2015), id. at 619-20;
- Patient A (DOS: 7/6/2015), id. at 643;
- Patient A (DOS: 7/16/2015), id. at 546
- Patient T (DOS 11/14/2015), id. at 8979;
- Patient X/AE (DOS 4/25/2015), id. at 1961, 1966;
- Patient X/AE (DOS 8/4/2015), id. at 2065;
- Patient Z (DOS 8/6/2015), id. at 105210;
- Patient Z (DOS 11/26/2015), id. at 1075.
- Patient AA (DOS 10/2/2015), id. at 8635.
- Patient DD (DOS 2/13/2016), id. at 1246.
45. In an ATV Service Offering Engagement note dated
October 8, 2015, Defendants provided the following rationale for
denying some of Plaintiff’s claims as to Patient A on the grounds
that the services were not performed:
Progress notes submitted have limited
information. Most do not contain subj c/o, no
detailed history, no exam, assessment or
treatment plan as well as notes do not contain a
signature with credentials to support seen by
billing provider.
Id. at 514. This note applied to Plaintiff’s claims for providing
comprehensive office visits on the following dates: DOS: 4/4/2015,
DOS: 7/3/2015, DOS: 7/6/2015, and DOS 7/6/2015. Id.
46. In an ATV Service Offering Engagement note dated
June 4, 2016, Defendants provided the following rationale for
denying Plaintiff’s claim for providing a comprehensive office visit
to Patient T on November 14, 2015:
Clinical documentation does not support the
required criteria of and office visit of
10 Plaintiff also made a claim for services provided to Patient Z on August 6,
2015 under a service code not identified by either party. Id.
history, physical and medical management
or that any medications/injections were
given with record or flow sheet.
Id. at 7977.
47. In an ATV Service Offering Engagement note dated
October 8, 2015, Defendants provided the following rationale for
denying some of Plaintiff’s claims as to Patient X/AE on the
grounds that the services were not performed:
Notes do not support a comprehensive
hx/exam/end mdm high complexity.
Limited info on notes. All notes do not
appear to be signed so it is unclear who
performed these services.
Id. at 1946. This note applied to Plaintiff’s claims for providing
comprehensive office visits on April 24, 2015 and August 4, 2015.
Id. at 1945.
48. In an ATV Service Offering Engagement note dated
June 4, 2016, Defendants provided the following rationale for
denying Plaintiff’s claim for providing a comprehensive office visit
to Patient Z on August 6, 2015:
Notes do not support comprehensive
history; A comprehensive examination;
Medical decision making of high complexity
performed
Id. at 1046.
49. In that same ATV Service Offering Engagement note,
Defendants provided the following rationale for denying Plaintiff’s
other claim for services provided to Patient Z on August 6, 2015:
Documentation does not support
venipuncture, age 3 years or older,
necessitating the skill of physician or other
qualified health care professional (separate
procedure) for diagnostic or therapeutic
purposes (not to be used for routine
venipuncture) performed . . . .
Id.
50. In an ATV Service Offering Engagement note dated
June 21, 2016, Defendants provided the following rationale for
denying Plaintiff’s claim for providing a comprehensive office visit
to Patient Z on November 26, 2015:
Notes do not support comprehensive
history; A comprehensive examination;
Medical decision making of high complexity
performed. Note does not appear to include
legible signature with credentials[.]
Id. at 1090.
51. In an ATV Service Offering Engagement note dated
October 30, 2015, Defendants provided the following rationale for
denying Plaintiff’s claim for providing a comprehensive office visit
to Patient AA on October 2, 2015:
Notes do not support s [sic] comprehensive
history; A comprehensive examination;
Medical decision making of high complexity
performed. Note does not appear to include
legible signature with credentials[.]
Id. at 737.
52. In an ATV Service Offering Engagement note dated
June 16, 2016, Defendants provided the following rationale for
denying Plaintiff’s claim for providing a comprehensive office visit
to Patient DD on February 13, 2016:
Notes do not supports [sic] comprehensive
history; A comprehensive examination;
Medical decision making of high complexity
performed. Note does not appear to include
legible signature with credentials[.]
Id. at 1118.
3) Defendants Denied Some of Plaintiff’s Claims on
the Grounds of Lack of Medical Necessity
53. For six of the claim events at issue, Defendants’ stated
ground for denial was that the service was not “accepted under
recognized professional standards as appropriate and effective for
the diagnosis, care or treatment of the disease or injury involved,”
or was “experimental or still under clinical investigation”:
- Patient K (DOS: 12/29/2014), AR 1488;
- Patient T (DOS: 03/30/2015), id. at 7282-83;
- Patient T (DOS: 6/2/2015), id. at 7283;
- Patient AA (DOS: 8/9/2016), id. at 699;
- Patient AA (DOS: 8/22/2016), id. at 699; and
- Patient AA (DOS: 9/12/2016), id. at 719.11
11 Defendants only denied some of Plaintiff’s claim for services provided to
Patient AA on September 12, 2016 on the grounds that the services were not
medically necessary. Defendants denied the remaining claims on the
a. Defendants’ Denial of Plaintiff’s Claim for
Services Provided to Patient K
54. Plaintiff submitted to Defendants an operating report
in support of his claim for services provided to Patient K on
December 29, 2014. AR 1490-92.
55. Plaintiff made the following preoperative diagnoses of
Patient K in the operating report:
1. Inflamed left Bartholin’s cyst
2. Dyspareunia
3. Severe menometrorrhagia with large
blood clots
Id. at 1490.
56. Plaintiff’s “Indication for Surgery” provided, in
relevant part:
The patient has been complaining of
dyspareunia and pain in the left side of her
labia for almost 2 months which lately
became much worse and at the same time
she has been complaining of severe vaginal
bleeding on-and-off with large blood clots.
Therefore the decision was made to perform
marsupialization of left Bartholin’s cyst
along with an operative hysteroscopy and
fractional dilatation and curettage.
grounds that the charges were not “reasonable and appropriate … because
the global care includes visits for post-operative services.” Id.; see also
Finding of Fact 67.
Id.
57. Plaintiff described the operation as follows:
1. Marsupialization of inflamed left
Bartholin cyst
2. Operative hysteroscopy
3. Uterine polypectomy x 2
4. Fractional dilatation and curettage
Plaintiff also provided a more detailed description of the procedure
in the operating report. Id. at 1490-91.
58. In an ATV Service Offering Engagement note dated
March 11, 2015, Defendants explained their decision to deny
Plaintiff’s claim as follows:
We reviewed information about your
condition and circumstances. Based on the
information we have, coverage for the
surgery is denied. There is limited
documentation to support medical necessity
of the surgical procedures.. [sic] The
provider did not document a history or
exam. There was no documentation of prior
conservative treatment tried and failed.
Id. at 1504.
59. The operating report did not indicate whether Plaintiff
performed a History and Physical (H&P), nor whether the patient
had attempted treatment prior to surgery for any of the
preoperative diagnoses. Id. at 1490-92.
60. During the claims administration process, Plaintiff did
not submit any other evidence to Defendants demonstrating
whether he performed an H&P or whether Patient K had
attempted other treatment.
61. Dr. Krominga opines in his declaration that:
Prior to performing surgery, unless it is an
emergency or there is no other option under
the circumstances, it is standard in the
industry to take a detailed history and
attempt conservative treatment before
performing surgery. All of this should be
carefully documented in the patient’s chart.
Krominga Dec. ¶ 11.
62. Dr. Krominga further opines that:
On the day of the elective surgery, it is
standard in the industry to perform a brief
history and physical exam before the
surgery is performed to make sure the
patient has had no recent change in health
status that would preclude the surgery,
such as an acute illness or acute blood loss .
. . .
Id. ¶ 12.
63. In response to Dr. Krominga’s opinion, Plaintiff opines
that conservative treatment “in the face of worsening pain and
severe vaginal bleeding” for Patient K would have been
inappropriate, and that an “[i]nfected big Bartholin cyst should be
removed surgically.” Dkt. 62-2 ¶ 6.
b. Plaintiff Does Not Offer Evidence to Show that
the Services Provided to Patient T and Patient
AA Were Medically Necessary
64. For two of the claim events referenced in paragraph 53,
there is no evidence that Plaintiff submitted medical documents to
Defendants supporting the claim during the claims administration
process:
- Patient T (DOS: 03/30/2015); and
- Patient T (DOS: 6/2/2015).
65. For three of the claim events referenced in paragraph
52, Plaintiff submitted to Defendants medical documentation
purportedly supporting the claims:
- Patient AA (DOS: 8/9/2016), AR 701;
- Patient AA (DOS: 8/22/2016), id. at 717; and
- Patient AA (DOS: 9/12/2016), id. at 722.
66. Plaintiff states in his declaration that all “medical
services actions undertaken by me with respect to the unpaid
claim events” at issue “were medically necessary, in my
professional explanation.” Plaintiff does not provide further
detail. Samaan Dec. ¶ 6.
4) Defendants Denied One of Plaintiff’s Claims
Because Plaintiff’s Services Were Included as Part
of a Global Care Surgery Event
67. For some of Plaintiff’s claims for services provided to
Patient AA on September 12, 2016, Defendants’ stated ground for
denial was that the Plan “provides coverage for charges that are
reasonable and appropriate. The charge for this service does not
meet this requirement . . . because the global care includes visits
for post - operative services.” Id. at 719.
68. Plaintiff submitted claims for providing surgical
services to Patient AA on August 6, 2016, in addition to the claims
he submitted for services provided on September 12, 2016. Id. at
704-12.
69. Plaintiff opines that “in his experience,” it is not
“reasonable and customary for surgeons in Southern California to
perform follow-up visits free of charge.” Samaan Dec. ¶ 8.
5) Defendants Issued Payments for Some of the
Claims Plaintiff Lists as “Unpaid”
70. Plaintiff submitted three claims, requesting a total of
$1,005.00, for services provided to Patient X/AE on February 18,
2017. AR 8444. Defendants paid all or a portion of each of these
claims. Id. Defendants’ payment totaled $415.00. Id.
71. Plaintiff submitted a claim for $875.00 for services
provided to Patient X/AE on June 21, 2017. Id. at 6852.
Defendants issued a payment of $820.00 for this claim. Id.
6) Defendants Denied the Remainder of Plaintiff’s
Claims on Other Grounds
72. For the following four claim events, Defendants’ stated
ground for denial was “[t]he information previously requested for
this charge was never received”:
- Patient A (DOS: 6/13/2015), AR 589;
- Patient X/AE (DOS: 8/23/2016), id. at 2122;
- Patient X/AE (DOS: 9/6/2016), id. at 2131; and
- Patient X/AE (DOS: 10/25/2016), id. at 2131-32.
73. Plaintiff opines that, in his experience, health insurers
do not “follow a practice of requesting medical records of every
patient office visit . . . .” Samaan Dec. ¶ 7.
74. For some of Plaintiff’s claims for services provided to
Patient X/AE on December 28, 2016, Defendants’ stated ground
for denial was that the Plan “provides benefits for covered
expenses at the prevailing charge level made for the service in the
geographical area where it is provided.” AR 6692-93.
75. For the remainder of Plaintiff’s claims for services
provided to Patient X/AE on December 28, 2016, Defendants’
stated grounds for denial was that the service was not billed at
“the E & M [evaluation and management] level usually associated
with the billed diagnosis code.” Id.
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Legal Standards
1. Under ERISA, “a civil action may be brought . . . by a
participant or beneficiary . . . to recover benefits due to him under
the terms of his plan . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1).
2. A claimant bears the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to benefits
under an ERISA plan “where the claimant has better—or at least
equal—access to the evidence needed to prove entitlement.”
Estate of Barton v. ADT Sec. Servs. Pension Plan, 820 F.3d 1060,
1065-66 (9th Cir. 2016).
B. Assignments
3. Generally, only a participant or beneficiary may bring
an action to recover benefits under an ERISA Plan. 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(1). However, “ERISA does not forbid assignment by a
beneficiary of his right to reimbursement under a health care plan
to the health care provider.” Misic v. Bldg. Serv. Employees
Health and Welfare Trust, 789 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1986).
4. Plaintiff’s access to the evidence needed to show that
his patients assigned him their right to Plan benefits is clearly
better than Defendants’ access. Therefore, Plaintiff has the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his
patients assigned him their rights to benefits.
5. Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of showing that
Patients LL, AK, and AR assigned their rights to benefits to him.
Plaintiff’s statement in his declaration that he “received a written
assignment of benefits in connection with” each of the claims at
issue, Samaan Dec. ¶ 3, absent additional evidence, is insufficient
evidence for Plaintiff to meet this burden.
6. Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of proving that he has
standing to bring claims under the Plan for services provided to
Patients LL, AK, and AR.
7. Plaintiff meets his burden of showing that Patients A,
K, T, X/AE, Z, AA, and DD assigned to him their rights to benefits
under the Plan and that he has standing to bring claims under the
Plan for services provided to these patients.
C. Denials of Benefits
8. Under ERISA, a claims administrator “must provide a
plan participant with adequate notice of the reasons for denial . . .
.” Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 974 (9th
Cir. 2006).
9. A plan administrator must provide the following
information when making any “adverse benefit determination”:
(i) The specific reason or reasons for the
adverse determination;
. . .
(iii) A description of any additional material
or information necessary for the claimant to
perfect the claim and an explanation of why
such material or information is necessary . .
. .
29 C.F.R. § 2560.503–1(g)(1).
10. A plan administer violates ERISA “[w]hen [the]
administrator tacks on a new reason for denying benefits in a final
decision, thereby precluding the plan participant from responding
to that rationale for denial at the administrative level.” Abatie,
458 F.3d at 974.
1) The Court Reviews Defendants’ Claims
Determinations Under an Abuse of Discretion
Standard
a. The Terms of the Plan Call for Abuse of
Discretion Review
11. Because the Plan contains a discretionary clause, the
terms of the Plan call for abuse of discretion review of Defendants’
claims determinations. Williby v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 867 F.3d
1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 2017).
12. When reviewing a claims administrator’s decision
under an abuse of discretion standard, the “administrator’s
decision ‘will not be disturbed if reasonable.’” Stephan v. Unum
Life Ins. Co. of America, 697 F.3d 917, 929 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506 (2010)).
13. “This reasonableness standard requires deference to
the administrator’s benefits decision unless it is ‘(1) illogical, (2)
implausible, or (3) without support in inferences that may be
drawn from the facts in the record.’” Id. (quoting Salomaa v.
Honda Long Term Disability Plan, 642 F.3d 666, 676 (9th Cir.
2011)).
14. “This standard of review applies to the plan
administrator’s factual determinations as well as to her ultimate
decision.” Estate of Barton, 820 F.3d at 1070.
b. ERISA Preempts California Insurance Code
Section 10110.6 as Applied to the Plan
Plaintiff argues that the Court must review Defendants’
claims determinations de novo because California Insurance Code
section 10110.6(a) renders the discretionary clause in the Plan
void and unenforceable.
15. California Insurance Code section 10110.6(a) generally
prohibits the enforcement of discretionary clauses contained in
insurance policies:
If a policy . . . that provides or funds life
insurance or disability insurance coverage
for any California resident contains a
provision that reserves discretionary
authority to the insurer, or an agent of the
insurer, to determine eligibility for benefits
or coverage, to interpret the terms of the
policy . . . or to provide standards of
interpretation or review that are
inconsistent with the laws of this state, that
provision is void and unenforceable.
See also Williby, 867 F.3d at 1134 (“Section 10110.6 . . . bans the
enforcement of discretionary clauses in California.”)
16. ERISA, however, contains three interrelated provisions
that preempt state laws under certain conditions: the “pre-
emption clause,” the “saving clause,” and the “deemer clause.”
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57–58, 111 S. Ct. 403, 112 L.
Ed. 2d 356 (1990).
17. The pre-emption clause provides that ERISA “shall
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may . . . relate to
any employee benefit plan” governed by ERISA. 29 U.S.C. §
1144(a).
18. The saving clause exempts from the scope of the pre-
emption clause “any law of any State which regulates insurance,
banking, or securities,” except as provided in the deemer clause.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
19. “[T]he deemer clause qualifies the scope of the saving
clause . . . .” Williby, 867 F.3d at 1135. “Under the deemer clause,
an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA shall not be ‘deemed’
an insurance company, an insurer, or engaged in the business of
insurance for purposes of state laws ‘purporting to regulate’
insurance companies or insurance contracts.” FMC Corp., 498 U.S.
at 58.
20. As the Supreme Court explained in FMC Corp, the
deemer clause applies to ERISA plans that are self-funded. The
deemer clause exempts such plans from the saving clause, thereby
relieving the plans from state insurance regulations:
We read the deemer clause to exempt self-
funded ERISA plans from state laws that
“regulate insurance” within the meaning of
the saving clause. . . . State laws that
directly regulate insurance are “saved” but
do not reach self-funded employee benefit
plans because the plans may not be deemed
to be insurance companies, other insurers,
or engaged in the business of insurance for
purposes of such state laws. On the other
hand . . . [a]n insurance company that
insures a plan remains an insurer for
purposes of state laws “purporting to
regulate insurance” after application of the
deemer clause. The insurance company is
therefore not relieved from state insurance
regulation.
Id. at 61 (internal alteration omitted).
21. Under ERISA, the term “employee benefit plan”
includes an “employee welfare benefit plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3).
The term “employee welfare benefit plan” is defined to include:
any plan, fund, or program . . . maintained
by an employer or by an employee
organization, or by both, to the extent that
such plan, fund, or program was established
or is maintained for the purpose of
providing for its participants or their
beneficiaries, through the purchase of
insurance or otherwise, (A) medical,
surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or
benefits in the event of sickness, accident,
[or] disability . . . .”
Id. § 1002(1).
22. The Plan at issue is an employee welfare benefit plan
for purposes of ERISA. Therefore, ERISA’s preemption provisions
apply to the Plan.
23. Because the Plan is self-funded, ERISA’s deemer
clause exempts the Plan from the savings clause, thereby relieving
the Plan “from state laws that ‘regulat[e] insurance’ within the
meaning of the saving clause.” FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 61
(alteration in original). Therefore, “ERISA preempts § 10110.6 as
applied to” the Plan. Williby, 867 F.3d at 1136.
2) The Court Will Not Consider Documents with the
Bates Stamp SAMAANAETNA in Reviewing
Defendants’ Claims Determinations
24. In reviewing an administrator’s claims determination,
a district court generally “review[s] only the evidence presented to
the [claims administrator].” Jones v. Laborers Heath & Welfare
Trust Fund, 906 F.2d 480, 482 (9th Cir. 1990).
25. There are two exceptions to this general rule: “First, a
district court may hear” evidence outside the administrative
record “when the court must determine if a plan administrator’s
decision was affected by a conflict of interest.” Banuelos v. Constr.
Laborers’ Trust Funds for S. Cal., 382 F.3d 897, 904 (9th Cir.
2004). Plaintiff does not argue that this exception applies.
26. “Second, the court can hear evidence outside the
administrative record when the standard of review of the
administrative decision is de novo.” Id. For the reasons stated
above, the applicable standard of review of Defendants’ claims
determinations is abuse of discretion, not de novo.
27. For these reasons, the Court will only review evidence
presented to Defendants during the claims administration process
in reviewing Defendants’ claims determinations.
28. Plaintiff failed to show that he presented the
documents containing the Bates designation SAMAANAETNA to
Defendants during the claims administration process. Therefore,
the Court will not consider these documents in reviewing
Defendants’ claims determinations.
3) Defendants’ Denials on the Grounds of Services Not
Provided
29. To the extent Defendants denied a claim on the
grounds that, based on the information received, the services were
not provided, Plaintiff’s access to the evidence needed to show that
the ground for denial failed to comply with the terms of the Plan is
better than, or at least equal to, Defendants’ access. Therefore,
Plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that Defendants abused their discretion in denying any
of Plaintiff’s claims on this ground.
a. Plaintiff Fails to Meet His Burden of Showing
that Defendants Abused Their Discretion in
Denying A Claim Where Plaintiff Did Not
Provide Supporting Medical Documentation
30. For several of the claim events at issue, there is no
evidence that Plaintiff submitted to Defendants any medical
documentation purportedly supporting his claims during the
claims administration process. Finding of Fact 24. Defendants’
decision to deny these claims was not illogical, implausible, or
without support in inferences that may be drawn from the record.
31. Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of showing that
Defendants abused their discretion in denying these claims.
b. Defendants’ Denials of Plaintiff’s Claims for
Administering B6 and B12 Injections
32. Defendants denied Plaintiff’s claim for administering
B6 and B12 injections to Patient X/AE on March 26, 2015, and to
Patient A on July 6, 2015. Defendants’ decision was not illogical,
implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn
from the record. Plaintiff submitted medical records in support of
these claims, but the records were not legible and did not evidence
that any B6 or B12 injections were administered.
33. Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of showing that
Defendants abused their discretion in denying these claims.
34. Plaintiff submitted claims for administering B6 and
B12 injections to Patient A on April 4, 2015 and July 16, 2015.
Defendants’ stated ground for denial in the EOB was that, based
on the information received, the services were not provided. In
the ATV Service Offering Engagement, Defendants further
specified that the records did not include the dosage of the
injection, the specific route of administration, or the signature of
professional who purportedly administered the injections. This
decision was not without support in inferences that may be drawn
from the record. The records Plaintiff submitted stated that B6
and B12 injections were administered but did not provide further
information. There is also no evidence Plaintiff provided
Defendants with additional information about the injections after
receiving Defendants’ notification of the grounds for denial.
35. Defendants’ decision to deny these claims was also not
implausible or illogical. Dr. Krominga opines that the industry
standard is to record the dosage of the injection, the specific route
of administration, and the signature of professional who
purportedly administered the injections.12 Plaintiff does not
provide any evidence to rebut Dr. Krominga’s testimony.
12 Plaintiff objects to Dr. Krominga’s opinion on several grounds. Dkt. 62-1 at
3. Plaintiff’s objections are overruled. First, Dr. Krominga’s opinion
regarding the industry standard for documenting injections is relevant to
Defendants’ decision to deny Plaintiff’s claims on the grounds that Plaintiff
36. Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of showing that
Defendants abused their discretion in denying these claims.
37. Finally, Plaintiff submitted claims for administering
B6 and B12 injections during the following claim events:
- Patient X/AE (DOS 06/26/2015);
- Patient X/AE (DOS 07/10/2015);
- Patient X/AE (DOS 07/27/2015);
- Patient X/AE (DOS 8/4/2015);
- Patient DD (DOS 12/8/2015); and
- Patient DD (DOS 12/19/2015).
For each of these claim events, Plaintiff submitted records
purporting to show that B6 and B12 injections were administered
to patients. Unlike their claim decisions as to Patient A,
Defendants’ claims decisions as to these patients did not inform
Plaintiff that he failed to provide specific information about the
injections per the industry standard. Defendants stated only that
failed to provide sufficient documentation. Second, Dr. Krominga has
provided sufficient information to show that he is qualified to give this
opinion. Fed. Rule Evid. 702; Findings of Fact 15-17. Third, Dr. Krominga’s
opinion regarding the industry standard is not “speculation.” Fourth, Dr.
Krominga’s opinion in not objectionable as a “conclusion.” Rule 704 provides
that “[a]n opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate
issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 704(a) (emphasis added). Finally, the best evidence rule
is not applicable. The best evidence rule requires the proponent of a
document to produce the original version to prove its contents, unless a
statutory exception applies. Fed. R. Evid. 1002; see also United States v.
Lopez, 625 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he rule requires not, as its
common name implies, the best evidence in every case but rather the
production of an original document instead of a copy.”) Dr. Krominga does
not describe the contents of any document in his opinion.
Patient’s records did not “support” the injections, without further
explanation. In light of Plaintiff’s submission of some medical
documentation showing the injections were administered,
Defendants’ stated ground for denial was without support in
inferences that may be drawn from the record. And to the extent
Defendants intended to deny Plaintiff’s claims for failing to
include the specific dosage, route of administration, or other
information about the purported injections, Defendant did not
provide Plaintiff “adequate notice of the reasons for denial,”
Abatie, 458 F.3d at 974. Defendants did not inform Plaintiff of the
“additional material or information necessary for [Plaintiff] to
perfect the claim,” 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503–1(g)(1)(iii), which
precluded Plaintiff from “effectively responding to that rationale
for denial,” Abatie, 458 F.3d at 974.
38. Plaintiff meets his burden of showing that Defendants
abused their discretion in denying these claims under the Plan.
c. Plaintiff Fails to Meet His Burden of Showing
that Defendants Abused Their Discretion in
Denying Plaintiff’s Claims for Providing a
Comprehensive Office Visit
39. Defendants denied several claims for providing a
comprehensive office visit. Finding of Fact 44. For each of these
claims, Defendants explained why the documentation Plaintiff
submitted did not support those claims. Plaintiff does not show
that Defendants’ decisions were implausible, illogical, or without
support in inferences that may be drawn from the record.
Plaintiff does not explain what a comprehensive office visit entails
under the Plan, does not explain why the services he provided on
those dates satisfy the criteria for a comprehensive office visit,
and does not explain why Defendants’ determinations did not
comply with the terms of the Plan.
40. Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of showing that
Defendants abused their discretion in denying these claims.13
4) Plaintiff Fails to Meet His Burden of Showing that
Defendants Abused Their Discretion in Denying
Plaintiff’s Claims on the Grounds of Lack of
Medical Necessity
41. To the extent Defendants denied Plaintiff’s claims on
the grounds that the service was not accepted under recognized
professional standards, was experimental, or was still under
clinical investigation, Plaintiff’s access to the evidence needed to
show that the ground for denial failed to comply with the terms of
the Plan is better than, or at least equal to, Defendants’ access.
Therefore, Plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that Defendants abused their discretion in denying
any of Plaintiff’s claims on these grounds.
a. Patient K
42. Plaintiff meets his burden of showing that the services
he provided to Patient K on December 29, 2014 constitute
“surgical services” for purposes of the Plan.
43. Defendants determined that the surgery was not
medically necessary because Plaintiff did not document a history
and physical exam (H&P) prior to the surgery, and did not
document whether there had been attempts at conservative
treatment for Patient K’s symptoms. Defendants’ decision to deny
Plaintiff’s claim on these grounds was not without support in
inferences that may be drawn from the record. The only evidence
Plaintiff submitted to Defendants during the claims process was
13 For the same reason, Plaintiff fails to show that Defendants abused their
discretion in denying Plaintiff’s other claim for services provided to Patient Z
on August 6, 2016. See Findings of Fact 44, 49.
the operating report. Plaintiff did not document whether he
performed an H&P, nor discuss any prior attempts at treatment
for Patient K’s symptoms in the operating report.
44. Nor was Defendants’ decision to deny Plaintiff’s claim
implausible or illogical. Dr. Krominga opines that it is standard
industry practice to attempt conservative treatment prior to
electing to perform surgery and, prior to surgery, to perform an
H&P and take a detailed history. Dr. Krominga’s opinion lends
support to Defendants’ claim decision.14
45. After receiving notification of Defendants’ claim denial,
Plaintiff did not establish that he had performed an H&P, nor did
he describe attempts at conservative treatment. This further
lends support to Defendants’ decision to deny Plaintiff’s claim for
lack of medical necessity.
46. In the operating report, Plaintiff described the history
of K’s symptoms which, in Plaintiff’s opinion, indicated the need
for surgery. Although the information contained in the report
lends some support to Plaintiff’s position that the surgery was
medically necessary, it is insufficient to show that Defendants’
contrary decision was implausible, illogical, or without support in
14 Plaintiff objects to Dr. Krominga’s opinion on several grounds. Dkt. 62-1 at
4. Plaintiff’s objections are overruled. First, Dr. Krominga’s opinion
regarding the industry standard for steps taken prior to elective surgery is
directly relevant to Defendants’ decision to deny Plaintiff’s claims on the
grounds that the services were not medically necessary. Second, Dr.
Krominga has provided sufficient information to show that he is qualified to
give this opinion. Fed. Rule Evid. 702; Findings of Fact 15-17. Third, Dr.
Krominga’s opinion regarding the industry standard is not “speculation.”
Fourth, Dr. Krominga’s opinion is not objectionable as a “conclusion.” See
Fed. R. Evid. 704(a). Finally, Dr. Krominga does not refer to the contents of
any documents in his opinion, so the best evidence rule is not applicable.
Fed. R. Evid. 1002.
inferences that may have been drawn from the record, as available
to Defendants at the time.
47. Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of showing that
Defendants abused their discretion in denying Plaintiff’s claims
for services provided to Patient K on December 29, 2014.
b. Other Claims
48. Defendants determined that Plaintiff’s services were
not medically necessary for five additional claim events at issue.
Finding of Fact 53. For 2 of the claim events, Plaintiff did not
submit medical documentation supporting the claim to
Defendants during the claims administration process. Defendants
decision to deny these claims was not illogical, implausible, or
without support in inferences that may be drawn from the record.
49. For the other 3 claim events, Plaintiff did not describe
the services he purportedly provided that allegedly entitle him to
benefits under the Plan, nor did he explain why the service was
medically necessary. Plaintiff only cited to the medical
documentation and stated in his declaration that all of his services
were medically necessary, without further explanation. That is
insufficient to show that Defendants’ decision to deny these claims
was illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that
may be drawn from the record.
50. Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of showing that
Defendants abused their discretion in denying these claims.
5) Plaintiff Fails to Show that Defendants Abused
Their Discretion in Denying Plaintiff’s Claims on
the Grounds that the Services Were Included as
Part of a Global Care Surgery Event
51. For one of the claim events at issue, Defendants denied
Plaintiff’s claims on the grounds that Plaintiff’s services were
post-operative services included as part of a global care event, for
which Plaintiff submitted a separate claim. Finding of Fact 67.
Plaintiff has at least equal access to the evidence needed to show
that this ground for denial failed to comply with the terms of the
Plan. Therefore, Plaintiff has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that Defendants abused their
discretion in denying Plaintiff’s claims on this ground.
52. Defendants’ decision to deny Plaintiff’s claims on this
ground was not without support in inferences that may be drawn
from the record. Plaintiff submitted separate claims for providing
surgery services to the same patient shortly before submitting the
claim.
53. Plaintiff’s only supporting evidence is his own
statement that, in his experience, surgeons generally do not
provide post-operative services free of charge. This is not
sufficient to show that Defendants’ decision was illogical or
implausible. Plaintiff fails to explain the basis of his assertion or
provide additional supporting evidence.
54. Plaintiff also fails to show that the Plan precludes
Defendants from including post-operative services as part of a
claim for “global care.”
55. Plaintiff fails to show that Defendants abused their
discretion in denying this claim.
6) The Court Will Not Consider Claims Where
Defendants Made a Partial Payment
56. For three of the claim events at issue, Defendants paid
part of Plaintiff’s claims. Findings of Fact 23, 70, 71. As
previously noted, the current phase includes only Plaintiff’s claims
for allegedly unpaid benefits. The next phase includes Plaintiff’s
claims for allegedly underpaid benefits. The Court will not
consider these claims at this time.
7) Plaintiff Fails to Show that Defendants Abused
Their Discretion in Denying the Remainder of
Plaintiff’s Claims
57. For the remainder of the claim events at issue,
Defendants’ stated ground for denial was one of the following:
- Plaintiff failed to provide additional information requested
by Defendants.
- Plaintiff billed the claim event at the incorrect service level,
or the Plan only provides benefits for covered expenses at the
prevailing charge level in the geographic area.
To the extent Defendants denied a claim on any of these grounds,
Plaintiff’s access to the evidence needed to show that the ground
for denial failed to comply with the terms of the Plan is better
than, or at least equal to, Defendants’ access. Therefore, Plaintiff
has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
Defendants abused their discretion in denying any of Plaintiff’s
claims on theses grounds.
58. Defendants denied four of Plaintiff’s claim on the
grounds that Plaintiff failed to provide additional information
requested by Defendants. Finding of Fact 72. Plaintiff does not
explain what information Defendants previously requested, does
not explain whether he complied with the request, and does not
explain why Defendants’ request failed to comply with the terms
of the Plan. Plaintiff’s statement that it is not the industry
standard for insurers to request medical records in support of
every patient visit is not sufficient to show that Defendants’
request was illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences
that may be drawn from the record.
59. Plaintiff did not argue that Defendants’ stated grounds
for denying Plaintiff’s claims for services provided to Patient X/AE
on December 28, 2107 failed to comply with the terms of the Plan,
nor otherwise explain why Defendants abused their discretion in
refusing to provide benefits. Findings of Fact 74, 75.
60. Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of proving that
Defendants abused their discretion in denying all or a portion of
the remainder of Plaintiff’s claim events.
D. The Court Will Not Determine the Amount Plaintiff is
Entitled to Recover at This Time
61. Defendants ask that the Court decline to determine the
amount Defendants owe Plaintiff for any claim for which Plaintiff
is entitled to benefits. Defendants argue that the parties will brief
how benefits are paid under the Plan during the next phase.
Plaintiff did not adequately address this issue in his briefing. The
Court declines to rule at this time and will permit the parties to
address this issue during the next phase.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Plaintiff meets his burden of showing
that he is entitled to recover benefits for administering B6 and
B12 injections during the following claim events: Patient X/AE
(DOS: 06/26/2015, DOS: 07/10/2015, DOS: 07/27/2015, and DOS
8/4/2015); and Patient DD (DOS: 12/08/2015 and 12/19/2015).
Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of showing that he is entitled to
recover benefits arising from any other claim event considered
during this phase of the action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: August 30, 2019 hoe A. cAVP
Dale 8S. Fischer
United States District Judge