Jailen Parks v. Chacano Christian

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JAILEN PARKS, ) Case No. CV 19-4346-GW (JPR)

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Plaintiff, )

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) ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S

v. ) COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

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CHOCANO CHRISTIAN, )

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Defendants. )

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18 On May 20, 2019, Plaintiff, a state inmate proceeding pro

19 se, filed a civil-rights action against Defendant Chocano

20 Christian in his official capacity, seeking compensatory damages

21 and possibly “plasti[c] surgery” and “therap[]y.” (Compl. at 3,

22 6.) He was subsequently granted leave to proceed in forma

23 pauperis. Plaintiff’s claims arise from his arrest on

24 unspecified charges, during which Defendant, an Inglewood Police

25 Department police officer, allegedly deployed a police dog

26 against him after he had surrendered.

27 After screening the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)

28 and 1915A, the Court finds that his allegations fail to state a

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1 claim on which relief might be granted. Because at least some of

2 his claims might be cured by amendment, they are dismissed with

3 leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th

4 Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding that pro se litigant must be given

5 leave to amend complaint unless absolutely clear that

6 deficiencies cannot be cured). If Plaintiff desires to pursue

7 any of his claims, he is ORDERED to file a first amended

8 complaint within 28 days of the date of this order, remedying the

9 deficiencies discussed below.

10 ALLEGATIONS

11 On December 7, 2017, at “approximately around 10:30/11:00

12 a.m.,” Defendant “attempted to detain [Plaintiff].” (Compl. at

13 1; see id. at 2.) Although Defendant “gave no direction” that he

14 was under arrest, he nonetheless got down on the ground with his

15 hands on his head. (Id. at 1.) While he was “subdu[ed]” on the

16 ground, Defendant allegedly “deployed” a police dog against him.

17 (Id.) The dog “vi[ci]ously” bit his right ear, left bicep, arm,

18 and neck. (Id.) He was then “arrest[ed].” (Id. at 5.) In the

19 arrest report, Defendant “false[ly]” stated that the police dog

20 bit Plaintiff in the leg and chest and only after he had “kicked”

21 and punched it and had attempted to “evade arrest.” (Id.) He

22 doesn’t state what crime he was arrested for but asserts that

23 because he wasn’t charged with “assault on a police officer” or

24 “evad[ing” arrest,” Defendant must be lying. (Id.)

25 He claims that “[e]verything that transpired was . . .

26 premeditated through care less [sic] racism and neglect” and that

27 he was “harass[ed]” and “racial[ly] profil[ed].” (Id. at 3, 6.)

28 He also contends that his “right to be treated equal” under the

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1 14th Amendment was violated, his “22nd Amendment” right was

2 violated through “accessive [sic] brutal force,” and his right to

3 “life liberty and property” under the Declaration of Independence

4 “was abused.” (Id. at 5.) He requests compensatory damages,

5 including that his “plasti[c] surgery bills” be paid. (Id. at

6 6.)

7 STANDARD OF REVIEW

8 A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure

9 to state a claim “where there is no cognizable legal theory or an

10 absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal

11 theory.” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d

12 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (as amended) (citation omitted);

13 accord O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2008). In

14 considering whether a complaint states a claim, a court must

15 generally accept as true all the factual allegations in it.

16 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Hamilton v. Brown,

17 630 F.3d 889, 892-93 (9th Cir. 2011). The court need not accept

18 as true, however, “allegations that are merely conclusory,

19 unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In

20 re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008)

21 (citation omitted); see also Shelton v. Chorley, 487 F. App’x

22 388, 389 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that district court properly

23 dismissed civil-rights claim when plaintiff’s “conclusory

24 allegations” did not support it).

25 Although a complaint need not include detailed factual

26 allegations, it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted

27 as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

28 face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

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1 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); Yagman v. Garcetti, 852 F.3d

2 859, 863 (9th Cir. 2017). A claim is facially plausible when it

3 “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

4 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

5 at 678. “A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’

6 and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held

7 to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

8 lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per

9 curiam) (citations omitted); Byrd v. Phx. Police Dep’t, 885 F.3d

10 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).

11 DISCUSSION

12 I. The Complaint Does Not State Any Official-Capacity Claim

13 Plaintiff sues Defendant exclusively in his official

14 capacity. (Compl. at 3.) The Supreme Court has held that an

15 “official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to

16 be treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham,

17 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); see also Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464,

18 471-72 (1985). Such a suit “is not a suit against the official

19 personally, for the real party in interest is the entity.”

20 Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 (emphasis in original).

21 Municipalities and local-government entities are considered

22 “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore may be liable for

23 causing a constitutional deprivation. See Monell v. Dep’t of

24 Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 694 (1978); see also Long v.

25 Cnty. of L.A., 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). California

26 police departments are independently suable public entities. See

27 Streit v. Cnty. of L.A., 236 F.3d 552, 565 (9th Cir. 2001)

28 (citing Shaw v. Cal. Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788

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1 F.2d 600, 605 (9th Cir. 1986), and Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police

2 Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 624 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988)). Because no

3 respondeat superior liability exists under § 1983, a municipality

4 is liable only for injuries that arise from an official policy or

5 longstanding custom. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; City of Canton v.

6 Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385-87 (1989). A plaintiff must show “that

7 a [municipal] employee committed the alleged constitutional

8 violation pursuant to a formal governmental policy or a

9 longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard

10 operating procedure of the local governmental entity.” Gillette

11 v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)

12 (citation omitted).

13 In addition, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating

14 that the policy was “(1) the cause in fact and (2) the proximate

15 cause of the constitutional deprivation.” Trevino v. Gates, 99

16 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). “Liability for improper custom

17 may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must

18 be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and

19 consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of

20 carrying out policy.” Id.; see also Thompson v. City of L.A.,

21 885 F.2d 1439, 1443-44 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Consistent with the

22 commonly understood meaning of custom, proof of random acts or

23 isolated events are [sic] insufficient to establish custom.”),

24 overruled on other grounds by Bull v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 595

25 F.3d 964, 981 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). “A custom can be shown

26 or a policy can be inferred from widespread practices or

27 ‘evidence of repeated constitutional violations for which the

28 errant municipal officers were not discharged or reprimanded.’”

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1 Pierce v. Cnty. of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1211 (9th Cir. 2008)

2 (as amended) (quoting Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1349).

3 A plaintiff may also establish municipal liability by

4 demonstrating that the alleged constitutional violation was

5 caused by a failure to train municipal employees adequately. See

6 Harris, 489 U.S. at 388. A plaintiff claiming failure to train

7 must allege facts demonstrating the following:

8 (1) he was deprived of a constitutional right, (2) the

9 [municipality] had a training policy that amounts to

10 deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of

11 the persons with whom its police officers are likely to

12 come into contact, and (3) his constitutional injury

13 would have been avoided had the [municipality] properly

14 trained those officers.

15 Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484 (9th Cir. 2007)

16 (citations and alterations omitted). “Proof of a single incident

17 of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose

18 [municipal] liability” under a failure-to-train theory. City of

19 Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985); Szajer v.

20 City of L.A., No. CV 07-07433 SVW (PLAx), 2008 WL 11350227, at *7

21 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2008) (“[M]unicipal liability based upon

22 failure to train cannot be derived from a single incident.”),

23 aff’d, 632 F.3d 607 (9th Cir. 2011).

24 Nowhere in the Complaint does Plaintiff identify an

25 “official policy or longstanding custom” that caused his

26 injuries, reference any events other than his own arrest, or say

27 anything concerning whether or how Defendant was trained.

28 Therefore, his official-capacity claims are insufficient as a

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1 matter of law. See Hayes v. Voong, 709 F. App’x 494, 495 (9th

2 Cir. 2018) (“The district court properly dismissed [plaintiff’s]

3 . . . claims against defendants in their official capacities

4 because [he] failed to identify . . . a policy or custom of the

5 State that allegedly violated federal law.”); Fortson v. L.A.

6 City Att’y’s Off., 852 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2017)

7 (“[Plaintiff’s] official-capacity claims against the Los Angeles

8 Police Department also fail because [he] has not sufficiently

9 alleged an underlying constitutional violation or otherwise

10 identified an official policy or custom that was the ‘moving

11 force’ behind a potential constitutional violation.”); see also

12 Cannon v. City of Petaluma, No. C 11-0651 PJH., 2012 WL 1183732,

13 at *19 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2012) (Plaintiff’s “allegations . . .

14 relate solely to his own, isolated experiences, which cannot

15 support a Monell claim for failure to train or supervise”).

16 II. The Complaint Does Not Comply With Federal Rule of Civil

17 Procedure 8

18 Plaintiff is warned that the Complaint’s allegations are

19 also inadequate to state individual-capacity claims against

20 Defendant. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

21 requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of

22 the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The

23 purpose of this requirement is to “give the defendant fair notice

24 of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

25 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation and alteration omitted).

26 Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket

27 assertion, of entitlement to relief.” See id. at 555 n.3. To

28 comply with Rule 8, a complaint must allege sufficient facts “to

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1 give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend

2 itself effectively,” and it “must plausibly suggest an

3 entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair” to subject the

4 opposing party “to the expense of discovery and continued

5 litigation.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011);

6 see also Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir.

7 1995) (Rule 8 requires that complaint provide “minimum threshold”

8 giving defendant “notice of what it is that it allegedly did

9 wrong”).

10 Plaintiff’s pleadings don’t comport with Rule 8 because he

11 states mostly conclusory allegations that fail to put Defendant

12 on notice of the charges against him. For instance, he claims

13 that his “right to be treated equal” under the 14th Amendment was

14 violated. (Compl. at 3, 6). To state an equal-protection claim,

15 he must show that Defendant acted with an intent or purpose to

16 discriminate against him based on his membership in a protected

17 class. See Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.

18 1998). “Intentional discrimination means that a defendant acted

19 at least in part because of a plaintiff’s protected status.”

20 Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994)

21 (as amended) (emphasis in original). But Plaintiff has not

22 alleged that he is a member of any protected class, let alone

23 stated facts sufficient to support an inference that he was

24 discriminated against because he was a member of that class. His

25 conclusory allegation that he was “racially profile[ed],” without

26 more, is insufficient to state a valid equal-protection claim.

27 Plaintiff alludes to violations of his rights under the

28 “22nd Amendment” and the Declaration of Independence. (See

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1 Compl. at 5.) The 22nd Amendment limits an elected President to

2 two terms in office; neither it nor the Declaration of

3 Independence creates rights cognizable in a § 1983 action. See

4 generally Coffey v. United States, 939 F. Supp. 185, 191

5 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (“While the Declaration of Independence states

6 that all men are endowed certain unalienable rights including

7 ‘Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness,’ it does not grant

8 rights that may be pursued through the judicial system.”

9 (citation omitted)).

10 Plaintiff also appears to claim that Defendant used

11 excessive force while arresting him. (Compl. at 5; see id. at 8

12 (stating in attached grievance that “th[e] peace officer who

13 attempted to arrest [him] used accessive [force]”).) Section

14 1983 claims arising from allegedly excessive force during the

15 “arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free

16 citizen” are governed by the Fourth Amendment. Graham v. Connor,

17 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). The officers’ actions must have been

18 “‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances

19 confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or

20 motivation.” Id. at 397 (citation omitted); see also Byrd, 885

21 F.3d at 642.

22 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant deployed a police dog

23 against him after he had surrendered, resulting in multiple

24 injuries. Although these allegations appear sufficiently

25 specific to show that force was used and that it could have been

26 excessive, see Byrd, 885 F.3d at 643 (allegation that officers

27 “beat the crap out of plaintiff” sufficient to allege excessive

28 force), he has failed to allege the “facts and circumstances

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1 confronting” Defendant before the arrest to demonstrate that the

2 alleged force was unreasonable, such as where the arrest

3 occurred, what he was doing when approached by Defendant, and for

4 what crimes he was arrested. Cf. id. at 642 (plaintiff alleged

5 that officers pulled him over for missing bicycle light despite

6 his being on private property, not engaged in criminal activity,

7 not on probation or parole, and without any outstanding warrants

8 for his arrest); see also Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (factors to be

9 considered in Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim include

10 “severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an

11 immediate [safety] threat . . . , and whether he is actively

12 resisting arrest or attempting to evade [it] by flight”). Should

13 Plaintiff decide to pursue an excessive-force claim in an amended

14 pleading, he must allege additional specific facts showing why

15 the force used was excessive under the circumstances. See

16 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.1

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18 1 Public records confirm that Plaintiff was arrested in

Inglewood on December 7, 2017, and charged with an unspecified

19 felony. See L.A. Cnty. Inmate Info. Ctr.,

https://app5.lasd.org/iic/details.cfm (search for “Parks” with

20 “Jailen”) (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). On July 2, 2018, he was

transferred to California State Prison, Solano. Id.; see Cal.

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Dep’t Corr. & Rehab. Inmate Locator, https://inmatelocator.

22 cdcr.ca.gov (search for CDCR number “BG6807”) (last visited Aug.

15, 2019). It is unclear what he is incarcerated for and whether

23 it stems from the December 7 arrest. Because he has failed to

allege adequate details about the circumstances of that arrest, it

24 is unclear whether his excessive-force claim, if successful, would

necessarily invalidate the conviction for which he is serving time.

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If it would, it would be barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.

26 477 (1994), which held that “if a criminal conviction arising out

of the same facts stands and is fundamentally inconsistent with the

27 unlawful behavior for which section 1983 damages are sought, the

1983 action must be dismissed.” Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d

28 689, 695 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citation omitted). Should

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1 □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ KEK

2 If Plaintiff desires to pursue any of his claims, he is

3 }ORDERED to file a first amended complaint within 28 days of the

4 of this order, remedying the deficiencies discussed above.

5 The FAC should bear the docket number assigned to this case, be

6 |ilabeled “First Amended Complaint,” and be complete in and of

itself, without reference to the Complaint or any other pleading,

8 attachment, or document. He is warned that if he fails to timely

9 a sufficient FAC, the Court may dismiss this action on the

10 |lgrounds set forth above or for failure to diligently prosecute.’*

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12 |DATED: August 28, 2019 hreohlat(~

JE P. ROSENBLUTH

13 U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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17 Plaintiff elect to pursue his excessive-force claim, he should

allege specific facts showing that the Heck doctrine does not

1g || foreclose it, including whether he was convicted as a result of his

December 7 arrest and, if so, on what charges; whether he is

19 | appealing any of those convictions; and whether he claims excessive

force “distinct temporally or spatially from the factual basis” for

20 || any convictions arising from the December 7 arrest. Beets v. Cnty.

of L.A., 669 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2012); cf. Hooper v. Cnty.

of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that

22 | plaintiff’s conviction did not bar § 1983 claim for excessive force

when “conviction and the § 1983 claim [were] based on different

23 || actions during ‘one continuous transaction’”).

24 ° If Plaintiff believes this order erroneously disposes of any

25 of his claims, he may file objections with the district judge

within 20 days of the date of the order. See Bastidas v. Chappell,

26 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2015) (“When a magistrate judge

believes she is issuing a nondispositive order, she may warn the

27] litigants that, if they disagree and think the matter dispositive,

they have the right to file an objection to that determination with

28 || the district judge.”).

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