The opinion
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
M&T FARMS, a California General No. 23-15837
Partnership,
D.C. No.
Plaintiff-Appellant, 5:21-cv-09590-
SVK
v.
FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE OPINION
CORPORATION, a wholly-owned
government corporation that
administers the Federal Crop
Insurance Program; RISK
MANAGEMENT AGENCY, the
United States Department of
Agriculture’s agency that manages the
FCIC and administers federal crop
insurance policies,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Susan G. Van Keulen, Magistrate Judge, Presiding*
*
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
2 M&T FARMS V. FCIC
Argued and Submitted April 5, 2024
San Francisco, California
Filed June 4, 2024
Before: Milan D. Smith, Jr., Andrew D. Hurwitz, and
Anthony D. Johnstone, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Hurwitz
SUMMARY**
Administrative Procedure Act / Auer Deference
The panel affirmed the district court’s summary
judgment in favor of the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation
(“FCIC”) in an action by M&T Farms challenging an official
interpretation of an FCIC insurance policy.
M&T Farms is a California general partnership between
two farmers. MT&T Farms and a third farmer sell farm
commodities through a storefront, B&T Farms, which owns
their business name and goodwill and is also a California
general partnership. M&T Farms purchased crop insurance
under the Whole-Farm Revenue Protection Pilot Policy (the
“WFRP Policy”) from Producers Agriculture Insurance
Company (“ProAg”), an insurer approved and reinsured by
the FCIC.
**
This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
M&T FARMS V. FCIC 3
M&T Farms filed a claim seeking the full policy amount,
which ProAg denied. After M&T instituted arbitration, the
parties sought interpretations of the WFRP Policy from the
FCIC, which concluded that the WFRP Policy does not
allow a partner who files taxes on a fractional share of
farming activity conducted by a partnership to be eligible for
WFRP coverage for the fractional share of that farming
activity.
M&T Farms challenged the FCIC’s decision that a
partnership “holding the business name and good will of
[others] (i.e., marketing and selling the commodities
produced)” is engaged in “farming activity” under section
3(a)(4) of the WFRP Policy, and that therefore, any entity
reporting a fractional share of the partnership’s activity on
its tax returns is ineligible for WFRP Policy coverage.
Applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review
under the Administrative Procedure Act, the panel held that
the WFRP Policy contained an ambiguity regarding the
definition of “farming activity.” In light of this ambiguity,
the FCIC’s conclusion that a partnership selling its partners’
products and holding their goodwill and business name was
engaged in “farming activity” under section 3(a)(4) of the
policy had a reasonable basis and was also reasonable as a
matter of policy. Because the FCIC’s interpretation of
“farming activity” in the WFRP Policy was reasonable, it
survived APA arbitrary and capricious review.
Applying deference to an agency interpretation of its
regulation under the framework announced in Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), the panel held that the term
“farming activity” in the WFRP policy was genuinely
ambiguous, the FCIC’s conclusion had a reasonable basis,
4 M&T FARMS V. FCIC
and the FCIC’s conclusion was entitled to controlling
weight.
COUNSEL
Eric D. McFarland (argued) and Darin T. Judd, Thompson
Welch Soroko & Gilbert LLP, San Rafael, California, for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
Christopher F. Jeu (argued), and Stephanie Hinds, Assistant
United States Attorneys; Michelle Lo, Civil Division Chief;
Ismail J. Ramsey, United States Attorney; United States
Department of Justice, Office of the United States Attorney,
San Francisco, California; for Defendants-Appellees.
M&T FARMS V. FCIC 5
OPINION
HURWITZ, Circuit Judge:
In this Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) action,
M&T Farms challenges an official interpretation of an
insurance policy by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation
(“FCIC”).1 The district court granted summary judgment to
the FCIC, and we affirm.
BACKGROUND
M&T Farms is a California general partnership between
two farmers, Paul Missou and Gary Tognetti. M&T Farms
and a third farmer, Ed Tognetti, sell farm commodities
through a storefront, B&T Farms, which owns their business
name and goodwill. B&T Farms is also a California general
partnership, in which two partners, M&T Farms and Ed
Tognetti, hold 65% and 35% interests, respectively.
M&T Farms purchased crop insurance for the 2017 crop
year under the Whole-Farm Revenue Protection Pilot Policy
(“WFRP Policy”) from Producers Agriculture Insurance
Company (“ProAg”), an insurer approved and reinsured by
the FCIC. M&T Farms later filed a claim seeking the full
policy amount, $1,991,876. In January 2019, ProAg
1
The FCIC is a government corporation within the Department of
Agriculture created “[t]o carry out the purposes” of the Federal Crop
Insurance Act (“FCIA”). 7 U.S.C. § 1503; 31 U.S.C. § 9101(3)(D). The
Risk Management Agency (“RMA”) supervises the FCIC and
administers FCIA programs. 7 U.S.C. § 6933(a), (b)(1)–(3). “For all
relevant and practical purposes, the RMA and the FCIC are one and the
same.” William J. Mouren Farming, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., No. 05-
cv-0031, 2005 WL 2064129, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2005). We
therefore refer to the two defendant agencies in this opinion collectively
as “the FCIC.”
6 M&T FARMS V. FCIC
cancelled the policy and denied the claim, stating that M&T
Farms was not a “qualifying person” under section 3(a)(4)
of the WFRP Policy, which provides:
The [IRS] Schedule F, or Substitute Schedule
F, must cover 100 percent of your farm
operation. (A tax entity which reports a
fractional share of farming activity conducted
by a partnership, corporation or any other
“joint venture” does not qualify for WFRP
coverage on the fractional share of farming
activity).
ProAg denied the claim because M&T Farms “reports a
fractional share of farming activity conducted by a
partnership”—B&T Farms.
M&T Farms then instituted arbitration against ProAg.
The arbitrator authorized the parties to seek an interpretation
of the WFRP Policy from the FCIC, as allowed by federal
law. See 7 U.S.C. § 1506(r); 7 C.F.R. § 400.767. In
December 2019, M&T Farms and ProAg each requested an
interpretation of section 3(a)(4).2
2
M&T Farms and ProAg also requested an interpretation of section 3(e)
of the WFRP Policy and paragraph 21(1)(d) of the WFRP Handbook.
Section 3(e) states: “Originating pass-through entities may insure the
allowable revenue from commodities produced by the farm operation
under WFRP. Owners of a pass-through entity that are not the
originating entity may not insure pass-through revenue or loss under
WFRP.” Paragraph 21(1)(d) of the WFRP Handbook largely restates
section 3(a)(4) of the WFRP Policy but also states: “a tax entity may still
qualify for WFRP coverage on a fractional share of a commodity in
which they have an insurable interest.” Those provisions are not at issue
in this litigation.
M&T FARMS V. FCIC 7
In March 2020, the FCIC responded to the requests,
stating that the WFRP Policy “does not allow a partner
whom [sic] files taxes on a fractional share of farming
activity conducted by a partnership [to be] eligible for
WFRP coverage for the fractional share of that farming
activity.”3
In August 2020, M&T Farms submitted another request
for interpretation, providing this hypothetical, in which
Entity A corresponds to B&T Farms and Entity B to M&T
Farms:
Entity A is a general partnership made up of
Entity B (a partnership) and individual C.
Entity A is not a “farm operation” because it
reports no farm activity to the IRS in the form
o[f] revenues or expenses. Moreover, Entity
A is not an “originating entity” because it
physically produces no commodities.
Instead, Entity A is a store-front that holds
the business name and goodwill for Entity B
and individual C.
Entity B is a “single farm operation” because
it reports 100 percent of its farm activity to
the IRS in the form of revenue and expenses
on its tax forms under a single taxpayer
number. Entity B is also an “originating
entity” because it actually physically
produces its percentage share of the
3
In July 2020, M&T Farms submitted a second request for interpretation,
which the FCIC rejected because it contained “specific facts” about the
requestor’s case in violation of 7 C.F.R. § 400.767(a)(8).
8 M&T FARMS V. FCIC
commodities grown nominally under the
name of Entity A.
Individual C is likewise a “single farm
operation” because it reports 100 percent of
its farm activity to the IRS in the form o[f]
revenue and expenses on its tax forms under
a single taxpayer number. Individual C also
actually physically produces its percentage
share of the commodities grown nominally
under the name of Entity A.
M&T Farms then suggested that in this scenario, “Entity A
is not a ‘farm operation’ and has no farming activity,” and
that Entity B therefore qualifies for WFRP coverage under
section 3(a)(4).
The FCIC responded in September 2020, stating that “[a]
farm operation must meet eligibility requirements of both
sections 3(a)(4) and 3(e) for coverage under WFRP.”
Addressing M&T Farms’ hypothetical, it said:
Using the example from the requestor’s
interpretation, Entity A is a partnership that
includes Entity B and individual C. Entity A,
holding the business name and goodwill of
Entity B and individual C (i.e., marketing and
selling the commodities produced), is the
pass-through entity. Although Entity B may
be considered an originating pass-through
entity with regards to itself, it reports a
fractional share of the general partnership
(Entity A). Therefore, Entity B and
individual C do not meet the requirements of
M&T FARMS V. FCIC 9
eligibility within section 3(a)(4) under
WFRP.
M&T Farms then filed this action challenging the
FCIC’s interpretation of section 3(a)(4). The district court
granted summary judgment to the government defendants
and M&T Farms timely appealed.
JURISICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review
a summary judgment de novo. Hells Canyon Pres. Council
v. U.S. Forest Serv., 593 F.3d 923, 929 (9th Cir. 2010).
Under the APA, we must uphold a final agency decision
unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.”4 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A). The “court simply ensures that the agency has
acted within a zone of reasonableness and, in particular, has
reasonably considered the relevant issues and reasonably
explained the decision.” FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project,
592 U.S. 414, 423 (2021).
An agency’s interpretation of a regulation may also be
entitled to deference under the framework announced in
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). Although the WFRP
4
An FCIC regulation provides that its interpretation of a crop insurance
policy is a “final agency action” subject to judicial review under the
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 704. See 7 C.F.R. § 400.765 (defining “final agency
determination” as “[m]atters of general applicability regarding FCIC’s
interpretation of provisions of the [FCIA] or any regulation codified in
the Code of Federal Regulations, including certain policy provisions,
which are applicable to all participants in the Federal crop insurance
program and the appeals process”). Section 33(a)(1)(iii) of the WFRP
Policy additionally provides that “[a]n interpretation by FCIC of a policy
provision is considered a determination that is a matter of general
applicability.”
10 M&T FARMS V. FCIC
Policy is not technically a regulation, the parties do not
challenge the district court’s holding that the FCIC’s
interpretations of the WRFP Policy are entitled to Auer
deference. We therefore assume without deciding that Auer
deference applies. See Bottoms Farm P’ship v. Perdue, 895
F.3d 1070, 1074 (8th Cir. 2018) (“Given the [FCIA’s] broad
grant of authority to the [FCIC], and the specific authority
over the provisions of insurance and insurance contracts . . .
we must give substantial deference to the FCIC’s
interpretation of the special provision.”); see also Davis v.
Producers Agric. Ins. Co., 762 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir.
2014) (“[I]nterpretive issue[s] within the exclusive province
of the FCIC” receive “substantial weight because they were
made by the agency charged with administration of the
statute.”).
DISCUSSION
M&T Farms challenges the FCIC’s decision that a
partnership “holding the business name and good will of
[others] (i.e., marketing and selling the commodities
produced)” is engaged in “farming activity” under section
3(a)(4) of the WFRP Policy and that, therefore, any entity
reporting a fractional share of the partnership’s activity on
its tax returns is ineligible for WFRP Policy coverage.
Under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, a
court cannot
vacate an agency’s decision unless it has
relied on factors which Congress had not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation for its decision that
runs counter to the evidence before the
M&T FARMS V. FCIC 11
agency, or is so implausible that it could not
be ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of agency expertise.
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S.
644, 658 (2007) (cleaned up). If Auer deference applies, we
must also defer to an agency’s interpretation of a “genuinely
ambiguous” regulation if its interpretation is reasonable and
entitled to controlling weight. Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558,
574–76 (2019). We conclude that the FCIC’s interpretation
of “farming activity” in the WFRP Policy passes muster
under both standards of review.
I. APA analysis
APA “arbitrary and capricious” review is “highly
deferential, presuming the agency action to be valid and
affirming the agency action if a reasonable basis exists for
its decision.” Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund v. U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., 499 F.3d 1108, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007)
(cleaned up).
Neither the governing statute, regulations, WFRP Policy,
nor the WFRP Handbook define “farming activity.” See,
e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1502; 7 C.F.R. §§ 400.402, 400.765. And,
as the district court noted, dictionaries provide no definitive
answer about whether the marketing and sales of agricultural
commodities by a “store-front” owned by entities that grow
the commodities is “farming activity.” See Yith v. Nielsen,
881 F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th Cir. 2018) (courts may consult
dictionary definitions when interpreting statutes); Farm,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “to
farm” as “to cultivate land” and “to conduct the business of
farming”).
12 M&T FARMS V. FCIC
M&T Farms argues that, read as a whole, the “WFRP
Policy provides a clear answer.” Its argument begins with
the definition of “farm operation” in the WFRP Policy: “All
of the farming activities for which revenue and expenses are
reported to the IRS under a single taxpayer identification
number.” M&T Farms argues that only a “farm operation”
can carry out “farming activity.” It also notes that the WFRP
Policy ties “allowable revenue” and “allowable expenses”
(used to calculate coverage in the event of losses) to the
production of commodities.5 M&T Farms argues that these
provisions compel the conclusion that an entity like B&T
Farms, which markets and sells commodities produced by its
general partners but does not itself report revenue or
expenses to the IRS (because its general partners do), is not
engaged in “farming activity.”
As the FCIC notes, however, M&T Farms overlooks that
the WFRP Policy defines “[d]irect marketing” as
“[m]arketing commodities directly to consumers without the
involvement of a third party (e.g., farmer’s markets, u-pick,
roadside stands, internet sales, etc.)” and links “[d]irect
5
The WFRP Policy includes the following definitions:
Allowable expenses – Farm expenses, specified by
this policy and adjusted as applicable, that are incurred
in the production of commodities on your farm and
reported to the IRS on farm tax records.
Allowable revenue – Allowable revenue is farm
revenue, specified by this policy and including
applicable adjustments, from the production of
commodities produced by your farm operation, or
purchased for further growth and development by your
farm operation, that the IRS requires you to report on
farm tax records.
M&T FARMS V. FCIC 13
marketing sales records” to “allowable revenue.”6 Thus, the
WFRP Policy envisions that marketing and sales can qualify
as “farming activity.” And, the WFRP Policy’s definitions
of farm operation and allowable costs and expenses do not
directly define “farming activity.” As the FCIC stresses,
these terms all pertain only to insured entities, not affiliated
partnerships that sell the insured’s goods, like B&T Farms.
In light of this ambiguity, the FCIC’s conclusion that a
partnership selling its partners’ products and holding their
goodwill and business name is engaged in “farming activity”
under section 3(a)(4) of the WFRP Policy has a reasonable
basis. Under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review,
“the agency’s action need only be a reasonable, not the best
or most reasonable, decision.” River Runners for Wilderness
v. Martin, 593 F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(cleaned up). The FCIC’s interpretation of “farming
activity” in the WFRP Policy satisfies this requirement.
The example M&T Farms submitted to the FCIC
acknowledged that the “store-front” partnership (i.e., B&T
Farms) “holds the business name and goodwill” for its
general partners (i.e., M&T Farms and Ed Tognetti) and their
farm commodities are nominally grown in B&T Farms’
name. From this information, the FCIC reasonably inferred
that the hypothetical store-front partnership marketed and
sold the commodities produced by its general partners, an
6
The WFRP Policy defines “[d]irect marketing sales records” as:
Contemporaneous records that document the sale of
commodities through direct marketing. If you sell a
commodity through direct marketing, you must
provide the contemporaneous records used to
determine allowable revenue on the Schedule F farm
tax form.
14 M&T FARMS V. FCIC
inference that M&T Farms concedes. That direct marketing
and sales activity, the FCIC concluded, was “farming
activity” under WFRP Policy section 3(a)(4).
This is a reasonable conclusion given the WFRP Policy’s
definitions of “direct marketing” and “direct marketing sales
records.” From there, the FCIC’s conclusion that the store-
front’s general partners are not covered under the WFRP
Policy flows inexorably from the plain language of section
3(a)(4)—“A tax entity which reports a fractional share of
farming activity conducted by a partnership . . . does not
qualify for WFRP coverage on the fractional share of
farming activity.”
The FCIC’s interpretation is also reasonable as a matter
of policy. First, denying WFRP Policy coverage to entities
that report the marketing and sales activities of other entities
allows insurers to effectively evaluate coverage, claims, and
audit records. Second, the interpretation helps to avoid
“double dipping,” under which two entities make claims
arising from the same loss. See Kalvinskas v. Cal. Inst. of
Tech., 96 F.3d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1996) (addressing
“double dipping” in the disability context). Although there
is no allegation of double-dipping in this case, it is
reasonable for the FCIC to interpret the WFRP Policy to
prevent the practice in general.
M&T Farms’ contention that the FCIC’s interpretation
would lead to “clearly absurd” results is unpersuasive. M&T
Farms’ suggestion that the interpretation would only allow
farmers to sell their commodities through direct marketing is
incorrect. As the FCIC points out, farmers selling through
unaffiliated third parties would not report a fractional share
of those parties’ farming activity and would therefore qualify
for WFRP coverage.
M&T FARMS V. FCIC 15
Nor does the fact that neither M&T Farms nor B&T
Farms would qualify for WFRP coverage render the FCIC’s
interpretation unreasonable. Nothing in the governing
statute guarantees that every business structure adopted by
farmers will qualify for WFRP coverage. See 7 U.S.C.
§ 1508(a)(1) (“[T]he Corporation may insure . . . producers
of agricultural commodities . . . under 1 or more plans of
insurance”). And the WFRP Policy makes clear that some
businesses (such as those who do not file a Schedule F) are
ineligible for coverage.7
To be sure, other interpretations of “farming activity,”
including M&T Farms’ proposal, are possible. If we were
simply interpreting the language of an insurance contract in
the first instance, we might well apply the familiar canon of
construing any ambiguity against the insurer. See, e.g., State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 514 P.2d 123, 128
(Cal. 1973). But here, we review a final agency action; we
are not ourselves interpreting the WFRP Policy anew. We
must instead afford considerable deference to the FCIC’s
reasonable interpretation of its policy provisions. See
Muratore v. U.S. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 222 F.3d 918, 922
(11th Cir. 2000); Sternberg v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 299 F.3d 1201, 1205 (10th Cir. 2002). Because the
FCIC’s interpretation of “farming activity” in the WFRP
Policy is reasonable, it survives APA arbitrary and
capricious review.
7
The FCIC suggests that M&T Farms may be eligible for other kinds of
federal crop insurance coverage. We express no opinion whether that is
so.
16 M&T FARMS V. FCIC
II. Auer analysis
A. Ambiguity of the phrase “farming activity”
As discussed, the term “farming activity” under section
(3)(a)(4) of the WFRP Policy is “genuinely ambiguous”
because the governing statute, regulations, WFRP Policy,
and WFRP Handbook do not define the term. See Kisor, 588
U.S. at 575 (holding that, to determine whether a regulation
“is genuinely ambiguous, a court must exhaust all the
traditional tools of construction” (cleaned up)); 7 U.S.C.
§ 1502; 7 C.F.R. §§ 400.402, 400.765. And dictionary
definitions provide little help in clearly identifying whether
non-producing activities like marketing could constitute
“farming activity” under the WFRP Policy. See Yith, 881
F.3d at 1165.
Although M&T Farms and the FCIC offer competing
interpretations of the term, both parties can find support for
their proposed readings of “farming activity” in the WFRP
Policy. Cf. Goffney v. Becerra, 995 F.3d 737, 742 (9th Cir.
2021) (“The parties direct us to various other provisions of
the regulations. One supports Goffney’s reading and others
support the government’s, and they do not clearly resolve the
ambiguity.”). Therefore, the ambiguity requirement for
Auer deference is satisfied.
B. Reasonableness of agency interpretation
An agency’s interpretation of a regulation is only entitled
to deference if it is reasonable. Kisor, 588 U.S. at 575–76.
“In other words, it must come within the zone of ambiguity
the court has identified after employing all its interpretive
tools.” Id. at 576. “It is well established that an agency’s
interpretation need not be the only possible reading of a
regulation—or even the best one—to prevail.” Decker v.
M&T FARMS V. FCIC 17
Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 613 (2013). For the same
reasons outlined above with respect to the APA analysis, the
FCIC’s conclusion that a partnership selling its partners’
products and holding their goodwill and business name is
engaged in “farming activity” under the WFRP Policy has a
reasonable basis. It is consistent with the WFRP Policy’s
definitions of “direct marketing” and “direct marketing sales
records,” is not foreclosed by any other definition, and is
justified by legitimate policy considerations.
C. Weight of agency interpretation
To determine whether an agency’s interpretation of a
regulation is entitled to Auer deference, a court must “make
an independent inquiry into whether the character and
context of the agency interpretation entitles it to controlling
weight.” Kisor, 588 U.S. at 576. Under this inquiry, an
interpretation must (1) “be the agency’s authoritative or
official position,” (2) “in some way implicate its substantive
expertise,” and (3) “reflect [its] fair and considered
judgment.” Id. at 577–79 (cleaned up). The FCIC’s
interpretation of the WFRP Policy satisfies these criteria.
M&T Farms does not dispute that the FCIC’s
interpretation of the WFRP Policy is an authoritative official
position. See 7 C.F.R. § 400.766(b)(2) (FCIC interpretations
are “binding on the parties to the dispute”). Nor does M&T
Farms claim that the interpretation does not reflect the
agency’s fair and considered judgment. See Goffney, 995
F.3d at 745 (“[T]he agency [need not] engage in an
exhaustive interpretive discussion—even an interpretation
implicit in an agency’s order can reflect the agency’s ‘fair
and considered judgment.’”). Indeed, the FCIC carefully
considered M&T Farms’ interpretation request and
responded only after review by nine staff members.
18 M&T FARMS V. FCIC
Rather, M&T Farms only challenges the FCIC’s
substantive expertise, urging that its interpretation “turns on
concepts such as legal entities (e.g., partnerships) and tax
reporting (e.g., Schedule F and the like) for which the RMA-
FCIC has no special knowledge.” But Congress established
the FCIC to administer a system of crop insurance and tasked
it with issuing regulations and interpreting the FCIA and its
regulations. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1502–03, 1506(o), (r). The FCIA
“produced a complex and highly technical regulatory
program,” and “[t]he identification and classification of . . .
eligibility criteria necessarily require significant expertise
and entail the exercise of judgment grounded in policy
concerns.” Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680,
697 (1991). The FCIC’s interpretation of “farm activity” as
part of the WFRP Policy’s eligibility conditions necessarily
implicated the agency’s substantive expertise in
administering crop insurance. And, contrary to M&T
Farms’ argument, the FCIC’s expertise necessarily includes
knowledge of legal entities and tax reporting in the farming
context, as those considerations are essential to properly
administering a crop insurance program.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.