Monteria Najuda Robinson v. William Sauls

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[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-10719

____________________

MONTERIA NAJUDA ROBINSON,

as the natural parent of Jamarion Rashad Robinson, and The of

Estate of Jamarion Rashad Robinson,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

WILLIAM SAULS,

Atlanta Police Officer,

STEVE SCHRECKENGOST,

Atlanta Police Detective,

STEVE O'HARE,

Atlanta Police Detective,

KRISTOPHER HUTCHENS,

Clayton County Police Officer,

JOSHUA MAUNEY,

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10719

Fayette County Sheriff's Officer, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees,

DANIEL DOYLE, et al.,

Fulton County Detective,

Defendants.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-00131-TCB

____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge:

This case arises out of the shooting death of Jamarion

Robinson (Mr. Robinson). The shooting occurred when deputy

United States Marshals and local police officers from departments

across the Atlanta area—working together on a task force overseen

by the United States Marshals Service (USMS) to apprehend

fugitives—attempted to arrest Mr. Robinson on two outstanding

state warrants. When officers went to arrest him at his girlfriend’s

apartment, a shootout ensued, and he was killed.

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The issue in this appeal is whether his mother, Monteria

Robinson (Ms. Robinson), may bring an excessive-force claim for

money damages arising under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents

of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), against two of the

task force members. To answer this question, we look to the

Supreme Court’s recent decision in Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482

(2022). After carefully considering Egbert, and with the benefit of

oral argument, we conclude that no Bivens cause of action is

available here. We thus affirm the district court’s judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

In a previous opinion, we recounted in detail the facts giving

rise to Ms. Robinson’s excessive-force claim. See Robinson v. Sauls

(Robinson I), 46 F.4th 1332, 1336–39 (11th Cir. 2022). We refer to

that decision for the relevant facts about the shooting that occurred

when members of the Southeast Regional Fugitive Joint Task

Force went to arrest Mr. Robinson.

Ms. Robinson sued several individuals and entities whose

actions she believed caused her son’s death. The defendants

included deputy United States Marshal Eric Heinze, Clayton

County police officer Kristopher Hutchens, and Fulton County

police officer Daniel Doyle. 1 The second amended complaint

asserted, among other claims not relevant here, a claim under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and one under Bivens, both alleging that the

1 While this litigation was pending, Officer Doyle died. The district court

substituted the administrator of Officer Doyle’s estate as a defendant. For ease

of reference, we call this defendant “Doyle.”

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officers violated Mr. Robinson’s constitutional rights by using

excessive force.

At the pleading stage, the district court dismissed the § 1983

claim. It explained that § 1983 provided a cause of action for a

plaintiff who was “deprived of a federal right by a person acting

under color of state law.” Doc. 85 at 16 (internal quotation marks

omitted). 2 Because the officers were acting as part of a federal task

force, the court concluded they were acting “under color of federal

and not state law” and could not be held liable under § 1983. Id. at

16–17.

Ms. Robinson then filed a third amended complaint. In this

pleading, she again asserted an excessive-force claim under Bivens

against Officers Heinze, Hutchens, and Doyle, among others.3

After the parties completed discovery, the district court granted

summary judgment to the officers, concluding that they were

entitled to qualified immunity because their use of force was not

unreasonable under the circumstances.

Ms. Robinson appealed, challenging only the district court’s

order granting summary judgment on her Bivens claim. She did not

challenge the district court’s earlier order dismissing her § 1983

claim.

2 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.

3 In the third amended complaint, she did not assert a § 1983 claim against the

officers.

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We affirmed in part and reversed in part. See Robinson I,

46 F.4th at 1335–36. We explained that the evidence, when viewed

in the light most favorable to Ms. Robinson, showed that when the

officers went to arrest Mr. Robinson a shootout ensued and

Officers Doyle and Heinze continued to shoot Mr. Robinson after

seeing that he was unresponsive and had lost consciousness. Id. at

1337–38, 1342–44. 4 We reversed the grant of summary judgment

to Officers Doyle and Heinze, concluding that they were not

entitled to qualified immunity on Ms. Robinson’s claim that they

used excessive force when they continued to shoot after Mr.

4 The first opinion acknowledged that a genuine dispute of material fact

existed as to whether the shooting stopped or continued after Mr. Robinson

was unresponsive. Robinson I, 46 F.4th at 1335–36. After the shootout, “Officer

Hutchens thew a flashbang device behind Mr. Robinson” to “test whether Mr.

Robinson remained a danger.” Id. at 1337. “The device exploded, but Mr.

Robinson did not react.” Id. Officers Heinze and Hutchens maintained that

“no member of the Task Force team fired a weapon after the flashbang

exploded.” Id.

But in a video recorded by a bystander from a nearby apartment, “[a]bout 20

seconds after the flashbang exploded, there [is audio of] another burst of

gunfire.” Id. at 1338. A task force team member who reviewed the bystander

video testified that the subsequent gunfire-burst sound (1) “was consistent

with the noise produced by Officer Doyle’s” weapon and (2) also could have

been produced by Officer Heinze’s weapon “if Officer Heinze fired ‘in the

right sequence’ alongside someone else who was shooting.” Id. We concluded

that this evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Robinson,

“created a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Officer Doyle

individually or Officers Doyle and Heinze together shot Mr. Robinson after

the flashbang exploded.” Id. at 1343.

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Robinson was confirmed to be unconscious. Id. at 1342–46. We

otherwise affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

While Ms. Robinson’s initial appeal was pending, the

Supreme Court issued its Egbert decision. When the case returned

to the district court, Officers Heinze and Doyle moved for

judgment on the pleadings, arguing based on Egbert that the

excessive-force claim against them was not “cognizable under

Bivens.” Doc. 330 at 4–5. The district court granted their motion.

This is Ms. Robinson’s appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss a

Bivens claim. Lee v. Hughes, 145 F.3d 1272, 1274 (11th Cir. 1998).

III. DISCUSSION

The issue in this appeal is whether a judicially crafted Bivens

cause of action is available for the claim alleging that Officers

Heinze and Doyle used excessive force in violation of Mr.

Robinson’s Fourth Amendment rights.5 We agree with the district

5 On appeal, Ms. Robinson also argues that the district court erred when it

concluded that the local law enforcement officers were not acting under color

of state law when they participated in the joint task force and thus dismissed

her § 1983 claim against them. The district court dismissed the § 1983 claim

early in the case, well before the appeal in Robinson I. When Ms. Robinson

appealed in Robinson I, she could have challenged the dismissal of the § 1983

claim but did not. Instead, she challenged only the grant of summary

judgment on her Bivens claim for excessive force. Given this procedural

history, Ms. Robinson is barred under the law-of-the-case doctrine from

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court that no Bivens cause of action is available here. To explain

why, we first outline the framework we use to review when a

Bivens cause of action is available. We then apply this framework

to conclude that Ms. Robinson has no cause of action.

A. The Bivens Framework

In Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized a private right of

action under the Fourth Amendment for damages against agents

of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics who allegedly manacled the

plaintiff and threatened his family while searching his home and

arresting him for narcotics violations. 403 U.S. at 389. In his

complaint, the plaintiff sought damages for his claims that the

agents violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they

performed a warrantless search, arrested him without probable

challenging the dismissal of the § 1983 claim in this appeal. See United States v.

Escobar-Urrego, 110 F.3d 1556, 1560 (11th Cir. 1997) (explaining that “a legal

decision made at one stage of the litigation, unchallenged in a subsequent

appeal when the opportunity existed, becomes the law of the case,” meaning

the “parties are deemed to have waived the right to challenge that decision at

a later time”).

Ms. Robinson attempts to get around the law-of-the-case bar by arguing that

“newly discovered evidence” shows that the local law officers were acting

under color of state law when they participated in the task force. Appellant’s

Br. 5. It is true that there is an exception to the law-of-the-case doctrine for

newly discovered evidence. Escobar-Urrego, 110 F.3d at 1561. But the evidence

to which Ms. Robinson points is not new; she had it when Robinson I was

appealed. The record reflects that in November 2019 she filed the same

evidence with the district court for another purpose. Because the appeal in

Robinson I was not brought until 2021, she could have raised her challenge

regarding the dismissal of the § 1983 claim in the earlier appeal.

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cause or a warrant, and used “unreasonable force . . . in making the

arrest.” Id. at 389–90. “Although the Fourth Amendment does not

in so many words provide for its enforcement by an award of

money damages,” in Bivens “the Court held that it could authorize

a remedy under general principles of federal jurisdiction.” Egbert,

596 U.S. at 490 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bivens,

403 U.S. at 392, 396. After Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized

two other causes of action for damages for constitutional

violations: for a former congressional staffer’s sex-discrimination

claim under the Fifth Amendment, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,

245–49 (1979), and for a federal prisoner’s inadequate-care claim

under the Eighth Amendment, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16, 18–

20 (1980). Egbert, 596 U.S. at 490–91.

Since these three cases, however, the Supreme Court has

repeatedly refused to extend Bivens and has not recognized any

other implied causes of action under the Constitution. Ziglar v.

Abassi, 582 U.S. 120, 132, 135 (2017). It has warned that “expanding

the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity” because it

impinges on “separation-of-powers principles.” Id. at 135.

The Court considered whether to recognize a Bivens cause

of action in Egbert. The plaintiff in that case, Robert Boule, operated

a bed-and-breakfast and worked as a confidential informant for the

United States Border Patrol. 596 U.S. at 487. He alleged that a

border patrol agent violated the Fourth Amendment by using

excessive force when searching his property. Id. at 489–90.

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The Supreme Court considered whether there was an

implied cause of action for damages against the border patrol agent

for this alleged constitutional violation. Id. at 492–94. The Court

traced the history of its cases addressing when a Bivens cause of

action is available. See id. at 490–91. It acknowledged that it had not

“dispense[d] with Bivens altogether.” Id. at 491. But given the

“tension between judicially created causes of action and the

Constitution’s separation of legislative and judicial power,” it

warned that courts must use “caution” when deciding whether “to

imply a Bivens action.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Before recognizing an implied right of action for damages, a court

“must evaluate a range of policy considerations,” including

“economic and governmental concerns, administrative costs, and

the impact on governmental operations systemwide.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). “If there are sound reasons to think

Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages

remedy,” a court “must refrain from creating it.” Id. (alterations

adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Following these observations, the Court recited its well-

established two-part test for deciding whether to recognize a cause

of action under Bivens. Id. at 492. First, a court must ask “whether

the case presents a new Bivens context—i.e., is it meaningfully

different from the three cases in which the Court has implied a

damages action.” Id. (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks

omitted). The Court observed that “a new context arises when

there are potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did not

consider.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). It gave as an

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example of a new context when a case “involve[d] a new category

of defendants,” observing that in this situation “a court [was] not

undoubtedly better positioned than Congress to create a damages

action.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the case presents

a new context, a court must consider, second, whether “there are

special factors indicating that the Judiciary is at least arguably less

equipped than Congress to weigh the costs and benefits of allowing

a damages action to proceed.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). “If there is even a single reason to pause before applying

Bivens in a new context, a court may not recognize a Bivens

remedy.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court observed that these two steps “often

resolve to a single question: whether there is any reason to think

that Congress might be better equipped to create a damages

remedy.” Id. When such a reason exists, a court may not expand

Bivens. See id.

Significantly, “a court may not fashion a Bivens remedy if

Congress already has provided, or has authorized the Executive to

provide, an alternative remedial structure.” Id. at 493 (internal

quotation marks omitted). When such an alternative remedial

scheme is in place, no cause of action for damages is available even

when “existing remedies do not provide complete relief.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). The Court reasoned that when

alternative remedial structures are available, the Judiciary is not

“better equipped” than the “political branches” to decide “whether

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existing remedies should be augmented by the creation of a new

judicial remedy.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court then turned to whether a Bivens cause of action

was available to Boule. It framed the inquiry as “whether a court is

competent to authorize a damages action . . . against Border Patrol

agents generally” and concluded that no cause of action was

available. Id. at 496. It gave two “independent reasons” for this

conclusion: (1) Congress was “better positioned to create remedies

in the border-security context,” and (2) the government “already

has provided alternative remedies that protect plaintiffs like

Boule.” Id. at 494.

In concluding that Congress was better positioned to create

a damages cause of action, the Court began with the premise that

Boule’s claim arose in the “border-security” area and thus

presented a new context. Id. at 494–95. Special factors counseled

hesitation before recognizing a cause of action in the border-

security context because allowing an action against a border patrol

agent implicated sensitive matters of foreign policy and national

security, which were “rarely proper subjects for judicial

intervention.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court acknowledged that Boule’s complaint included

allegations of excessive force by a federal officer that were similar

to the allegations against the federal agents in Bivens. Id. at 495. But

the Court rejected the argument that the fact that Boule was

bringing a “conventional excessive-force claim” in the “sphere of

law enforcement” meant that a Bivens cause of action was available.

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Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court concluded that

there were only “superficial similarities” with Bivens, which were

“not enough to support the judicial creation of a cause of action.”

Id.

The Court gave an alternative reason for concluding that

there was no cause of action under Bivens: Congress had already

“provided alternative remedies for aggrieved parties in Boule’s

position.” Id. at 497. The Court explained that a grievance

procedure was available and that Boule had, in fact, taken

advantage of this procedure, which prompted an internal

investigation into the agent’s conduct. Id. Although Boule could

not participate in this grievance procedure and had no right to

judicial review of any decision issued through the procedure, the

Court nevertheless concluded that there was an alternative

remedial scheme. See id. at 497–98 (explaining that an alternative

remedial scheme did not need to “afford rights to participation or

appeal”). It emphasized that Bivens was concerned with deterring

individual federal officers from committing unconstitutional acts.

Id. at 498. Because the grievance process was “sufficient to secure

an adequate level of deterrence,” the Court held that Boule was

“afforded . . . an alternative remedy,” which foreclosed a Bivens

action. Id.

B. Application of the Bivens Framework

We now consider whether Ms. Robinson has a cause of

action under Bivens for the claim that Officers Doyle and Heinze

used excessive force when they continued to shoot Mr. Robinson

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after he was unconscious and unresponsive. Egbert compels us to

conclude that no cause of action is available, for two independent

reasons. First, Congress is better positioned than the Judiciary to

determine whether a cause of action is available in the new context

of the USMS operating a joint state and federal task force to

apprehend fugitives, particularly given that Congress has legislated

in this area and has created no damages remedy. Second, the fact

that Congress and the Executive Branch have created alternative

procedures to review a claim that a task force member used

excessive force forecloses a Bivens action here.

First, no Bivens remedy is available because Ms. Robinson’s

excessive-force claim arises in a new context—the USMS operating

a joint state and federal task force to execute arrest warrants, and

special factors counsel hesitation before recognizing a cause of

action in this context. This case presents a new context because the

Supreme Court has never recognized a cause of action for excessive

force against officers operating as part of a USMS joint federal and

state task force apprehending fugitives. Notably, in Egbert, the

Supreme Court recognized that a case presents a new context

when it involves a “new category of defendants.” 596 U.S. at 492

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Officers participating in a USMS joint task force are a new

category of defendants. We reach this conclusion after considering

the statutory authority under which the USMS operates,

particularly when it directs a joint state and federal task force

organized to arrest fugitives.

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The USMS traces its origins to the founding of the nation.

As the Supreme Court has explained, “just one year after the

ratification of the Fourth Amendment, Congress vested federal

marshals with ‘the same powers in executing the laws of the United

States, as sheriffs and their deputies in the several states have by

law, in executing the laws of their respective states.’” Atwater v. City

of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 339 (2001) (quoting Act of May 2, 1792,

ch. 28, § 9, 1 Stat. 265). Congress has continued to authorize

“United States marshals [and] deputy marshals,” when “executing

the laws of the United States within a State,” to “exercise the same

powers which a sheriff of the State may exercise in executing the

law thereof.” 28 U.S.C. § 564.

Congress has carved out several roles for the USMS. Its

“primary role and mission” is to “provide for the security” of and

to “execute[] and enforce all orders of the United States District

Courts [and] the United States Courts of Appeals.” Id. § 566(a). It

thus is responsible for “provid[ing] for the personal protection of

Federal jurists, court officers, [and] witnesses.” Id. § 566(e)(1)(A).

Along with these responsibilities, Congress has assigned the

USMS responsibility for investigating “fugitive matters . . . as

directed by the Attorney General.” Id. § 566(e)(1)(B). Since at least

the 1980s, Congress has authorized the USMS to participate in

capturing fugitives. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.

100-690 § 7608, 102 Stat. 4181, 4514. The USMS has regularly

operated and participated in joint task forces with state and local

law enforcement officers to arrest fugitives wanted on state or

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federal charges. See Authority of FBI Agents, Serving as Special

Deputy United States Marshals, to Pursue Non-Federal Fugitives,

19 U.S. Op. O.L.C. 33, 34 (1995) (recounting history of USMS’s

participation in these joint task forces). In 2000, Congress

mandated that the USMS establish permanent regional task forces

to apprehend fugitives. Presidential Threat Protection Act of 2000,

Pub. L. No. 106-544, 114 Stat. 2715, 2718–19; 34 U.S.C. § 41503(a)

(providing for the establishment of “permanent Fugitive

Apprehension Task Forces consisting of Federal, State, and local

law enforcement authorities in designated regions of the United

States, to be directed and coordinated by the United States

Marshals Service, for the purpose of locating and apprehending

fugitives,” including state fugitives). When state and local law

enforcement officers participate in these task forces, they are

deputized and perform the functions of deputy marshals. See

28 C.F.R. § 0.112(b).

Given the distinct statutory scheme within which both state

and federal officers operate when they participate in a USMS joint

task force apprehending fugitives, we conclude that claims against

such officers present a new context for Bivens purposes. 6

6 Officers Heinze and Doyle raise other arguments about why Ms. Robinson’s

excessive-force claim arises in a new context. They point out that they entered

the apartment pursuant to a warrant, but the officers in Bivens were not acting

pursuant to a warrant. They also point out that the excessive-force claim here

arises out of a “gunfight between officers and a fugitive,” which was “wholly

unlike the facts of Bivens.” Appellees’ Br. 34 (internal quotation marks

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We cannot say that the Judiciary is undoubtedly in a better

position than Congress to authorize a damages remedy in this

context. Recognizing a cause of action for money damages against

a task force member could impact cooperation among law

enforcement agencies and the operation of these task forces. See

34 U.S.C. § 41503(a). Allowing claims for damages against task

force members could chill recruitment for the task forces, which

could negatively affect their operations in apprehending fugitives

at both the state and federal level. See Egbert, 596 U.S. at 499

(“Recognizing any new Bivens action entails substantial social costs,

including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and

harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of

their duties.” (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

We acknowledge that there are some similarities between

this case and Bivens. Certainly, it is true that both this case and

Bivens involved a claim that federal law enforcement officers used

excessive force when making an arrest. But Egbert makes clear that

even when this type of “superficial similarit[y]” is present, a case

nonetheless may arise in a new context. 596 U.S. at 495. Because of

the unique circumstances present when the USMS operates joint

task forces to apprehend state and federal fugitives, including “the

impact of potential liability on cooperation among law-

enforcement agencies,” we conclude “‘that the Judiciary is not

omitted). Because we conclude that this case arises in a new context for the

reasons given above, we need not address these other arguments.

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undoubtedly better positioned than Congress to authorize a

damages action.’” Logsdon v. U.S. Marshal Serv., 91 F.4th 1352,

1358–59 (10th Cir. 2024) (quoting Egbert, 596 U.S. at 495).

In addition, although Congress has more than once enacted

legislation governing these fugitive-apprehension task forces, see

34 U.S.C. §§ 20989, 41503(a), it has created no private right of

action against task force members who commit constitutional

violations. This congressional silence further counsels against

creating a Bivens cause of action for money damages in this context.

See Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 143–44 (“[I]n any inquiry respecting the likely

or probable intent of Congress, the silence of Congress is

relevant.”).7

Bolstering our conclusion that there is no Bivens cause of

action here is the existence of alternative processes and remedies in

place to deter unconstitutional acts by task force members.

Congress and the Executive branch have created at least two

administrative procedures to review complaints of excessive force

arising out of USMS-led task force actions.

The first administrative procedure available for review of

excessive-force complaints is the USMS’s internal grievance

procedure. The USMS director is obligated by statute to “supervise

7 Notably, by the time Congress enacted the statutes addressing USMS fugitive

task forces, the Supreme Court had given notice that it was not inclined to

expand Bivens to new contexts. See Abassi, 582 U.S. at 135 (laying out history

of Supreme Court’s Bivens decisions). Given this timing, Congress’s “failure to

provide a damages remedy” suggests “more than mere oversight.” Id. at 143.

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and direct the [USMS].” 28 U.S.C. § 561(g). And, by regulation, the

director must investigate “alleged improper conduct on the part of

[USMS] personnel.” 28 C.F.R. § 0.111(n). The USMS thus has

implemented a procedure for reviewing grievances alleging

improper action by any task force member, whether a USMS

employee or a local or state officer deputized to participate in the

task force. See Off. of Pro. Resp., Internal Affs., Misconduct

Investigations Policy Directive 2.3, U.S. Marshals Serv. 1 (Oct. 7, 2020),

https://www.usmarshals.gov/sites/default/files/media/docume

nt/usms-policy-directive-misconduct-investigations.pdf

[https://perma.cc/Q3QN-RPRL]. Importantly, any aggrieved

individual may submit a grievance by filling out an online form. See

Complaint Regarding United States Marshals Service (USMS) Personnel

or Programs, U.S. Marshals Serv.,

https://www.usmarshals.gov/sites/default/files/media/docume

nt/complaint-form.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6VM-ZNXU]. Under

the USMS’s procedure, any “[i]ntentional, reckless or negligent

violation of rules governing searches and seizures” may be

punished with penalties ranging from reprimand to removal of the

officer. See Table of Disciplinary Offenses and Penalties, U.S. Marshals

Serv. 6,

https://www.usmarshals.gov/sites/default/files/media/docume

nt/united-states-marshals-guidance-table-of-disciplinary-offenses-

and-penalties.pdf [https://perma.cc/48RT-429H].

The second administrative procedure available to an

excessive-force aggrieved party is to file a complaint with the

Department of Justice’s Office of Inspector General (OIG). The

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USMS is a bureau within the Department of Justice. 28 U.S.C.

§ 561(a). The Department’s OIG is authorized to “investigate

allegations of criminal wrongdoing or administrative misconduct

by an employee of the Department of Justice.” 5 U.S.C. § 413(b)(2).

Any person can report misconduct “related to” the USMS by

submitting an online complaint form to the OIG. Off. of the

Inspector Gen., Submitting a Complaint, U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

https://oig.justice.gov/hotline/submit_complaint

[https://perma.cc/GPN7-9B7V]. “OIG investigations sometimes

lead to criminal prosecution or civil or administrative action.”

Logsdon, 91 F.4th at 1360 (internal quotation marks omitted). If the

OIG decides not to investigate an allegation, “it may refer the

complaint to the internal-affairs office of the relevant [Department

of Justice] component (here, the USMS).” Id.

These administrative procedures serve to deter misconduct

by officers participating in USMS task forces. Because these

administrative procedures are sufficient to “secure[] adequate

deterrence,” we conclude that they foreclose a Bivens action here.

Egbert, 596 U.S. at 497–98; see also Logsdon, 91 F.4th at 1359–61

(declining to recognize a Bivens cause of action against officers

participating in USMS joint task force because of USMS’s and OIG’s

grievance procedures).

Ms. Robinson does not dispute that these alternative

procedures are available. She argues instead that they are

inadequate because they are not “equally effective” as a cause of

action for damages under Bivens. Appellant’s Br. 17–18 (internal

USCA11 Case: 23-10719 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/04/2024 Page: 20 of 20

20 Opinion of the Court 23-10719

quotation marks omitted). But the Court in Egbert rejected this

argument. It held that alternative administrative procedures

foreclosed a Bivens cause of action even though they were “not as

effective as an individual damages remedy.” 596 U.S. at 497–98

(internal quotation marks omitted).

After considering Egbert, we decline to create an implied

cause of action against task force members for use of excessive

force. Given the possibility that recognizing a damages remedy

could complicate the operation of joint task forces, Congress’s

failure to create an express damages remedy in this context, and the

availability of other administrative procedures that deter officer

misconduct, we conclude that there “are sound reasons to think

Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages

remedy” here. Id. at 491 (internal quotation marks omitted). We

must therefore “refrain from creating” a cause of action for the

officers’ alleged constitutional violations. Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we affirm the district court.

AFFIRMED.