Mitchell v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs.

[Cite as Mitchell v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2024-Ohio-2073.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

SABRINA MITCHELL, :

Plaintiff-Appellant, :

No. 113395

v. :

DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT :

OF JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES,

ET AL., :

Defendants-Appellees. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 30, 2024

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CV-23-981159

Appearances:

Sabrina Mitchell, pro se.

Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, and Brian P. Murphy,

Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee ODJFS.

Weston Hurd LLP, Paul M. Shipp, and James M.

McWeeney, for appellee Shaker Heights Schools Board

of Education.

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J.:

Defendant-appellant Sabrina Mitchell (“Mitchell”) appeals from the

trial court’s dismissal of her administrative appeal from the Ohio Unemployment

Review Commission (“Review Commission”). For the following reasons, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural History

Although the procedural history of this case is somewhat convoluted,

this is an administrative appeal from the Review Commission pursuant to

R.C. 4141.82.

In July 2022, Mitchell applied for unemployment compensation

benefits for a benefit year beginning June 26, 2022.

On August 25, 2022, the director of the Ohio Department of Job and

Family Services (“ODJFS”) denied Mitchell’s unemployment benefits, finding that

effective June 26, 2022, Mitchell had a contract or reasonable assurance of

employment with an educational institution for the next academic year or term and,

as a result, was ineligible for unemployment benefits for that period pursuant to

R.C. 4141.29(I)(1)(a). Mitchell appealed this denial, and accordingly, on August 26,

2022, ODJFS transferred jurisdiction to the Review Commission.

On October 18, 2022, the Review Commission held a telephone

hearing. Nellie Brown (“Brown”), a human resources specialist with the Shaker

Heights City School District (“the school” or “the district”), testified that Mitchell

began her employment with the district on August 23, 2021, and worked through

the full academic year, which ended on June 9, 2022. Brown further testified that

in a June 16, 2022 email sent to Mitchell, the district informed her that it would

bring her back as a district substitute for the 2022-2023 school year. Brown

explained that the board approved Mitchell’s employment on July 12, 2022, and

Mitchell returned to the district on August 18, 2022, as a substitute teacher.

Brown confirmed on cross-examination that the district had not

automatically confirmed the status of Mitchell’s employment for the following year

— the 2022-2023 school year — after the end of the 2021-2022 school year. On

June 16, 2022, the school sent an email that confirmed Mitchell’s employment as a

substitute teacher for the next school year.

Mitchell also testified. Mitchell testified that as of June 10, 2022, she

was unemployed and her position with the district was uncertain. She was told that

she could reapply for a position, but that was not necessary. Mitchell contacted the

district and received the June 16, 2022 email confirming her employment for the

2022-2023 school year. Mitchell asserted that because she was unemployed as of

June 10, 2022, and did not have a reasonable belief that she would be reemployed

with the district, she properly applied for unemployment benefits at that time.

The Review Commission issued a decision and made the following

findings of fact:

Claimant filed an Initial Application for Determination of Benefit

Rights on July 1, 2022. Her Application was allowed, and based on her

non-educational base period employment, claimant’s weekly benefit

amount for between school terms and during holiday and vacation

periods was determined to be $0.00.

Claimant was employed by Shaker Heights City Board Local Board of

Education as a Substitute Teacher during the 2021-2022 academic

school year. The 2021-2022 academic school year ended (for summer

break) on June 9, 2022, and the 2022-2023 academic school year

resumed on August 18, 2022.

Shaker Heights City Board of Education informed the claimant that she

had reasonable assurance of employment for the following academic

school year (2022-2023) in the same position as she was employed

during the 2021-2022 school term effective June 26, 2022.

The Review Commission decision went on to find that at the hearing, Mitchell

acknowledged that she had a conversation and was told that the district wanted her

back and she did not need to reapply prior to filing her application for

unemployment benefits. These facts, according to the Review Commission,

established that effective June 26, 2022, Mitchell had a reasonable assurance of

work at a school in the same position as the prior academic school year. As such,

the Review Commission found that Mitchell’s weekly benefit entitlement between

academic school terms based on her noneducational base period employment was

$0.00 and, accordingly, Mitchell was not entitled to any benefits for the period of

June 26, 2022, through August 18, 2022. The Review Commission ultimately

affirmed the ODJFS Director’s August 25, 2022 redetermination.

On October 26, 2022, Mitchell filed a request for review of the Review

Commission’s decision, stating that she wished to have her application back-dated

to June 10, 2022.

On November 2, 2022, the Review Commission disallowed Mitchell’s

request for review. The notice sent to Mitchell notifying her that her request for

review was disallowed also contained a notification to Mitchell of her appellate

rights. Specifically, the notice stated:

An appeal from this decision may be filed to the Court of Common Pleas

of the county where the appellant, if an employee, is resident or was

last employed, or of the county where the appellant, if an employer, is

resident or has the principal place of business in this state, within thirty

(30) days from the date of mailing of this decision, as set forth in

Section 4141.282, Revised Code of Ohio. The appellant must name all

interested parties as appellees in the notice of appeal, including the

Director of the Department of Job and Family Services.

If your appeal is filed more than thirty (30) days from the date of

mailing, then you may ask the Court of Common Pleas to determine the

timeliness of your appeal. The court may find the appeal to be timely if

you did not receive this decision within thirty (30) days after it was

mailed to you. For more information refer to the booklet “Workers’

Guide to Unemployment Compensation (JFS-55213), available from

Ohio Department of Job and Family Services or visit the agency’s

website at https://unemployment.ohio.gov.

This is the final decision of the Review Commission, and will remain

final if not appealed within the time limit described above.

On June 16, 2023, more than six months after receiving the notice

described above, Mitchell filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga County Court of

Common Pleas, naming “Director, Ohio Department Job and Family Services” and

“Business Administrator Shaker Heights City Board of Education” as defendants.

The complaint purported to initiate “a lawsuit seeking damages for being wrongfully

denied for unemployment benefits” and sought damages in the amount of

$3,840.00 plus interest. Mitchell referred to a November 10, 2022 written decision

from the Review Commission; Mitchell’s complaint alleged that, not understanding

her appellate rights, she reached out to the [Unemployment Customer Service Line]

and was told that she could file her case “in a court in which she resided.” Based on

this advice, on December 1, 2022, Mitchell filed a complaint in the Bedford

Municipal Court.

The complaint further alleged that she attempted to transfer the case

to the common pleas court when she became aware that the Bedford Municipal

Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, but she could not afford the cost to transfer

the case. On February 22, 2023, the Bedford Municipal Court case was transferred

to the common pleas court. The common pleas court rejected the transfer, and the

case returned to Bedford Municipal Court, where the Bedford Municipal Court case

was dismissed without prejudice on June 7, 2023.

On August 2, 2023, the director of ODJFS filed a motion to dismiss

the common pleas court case or, alternatively, to dismiss the director as a party to

the case. The motion argued that the common pleas court lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction. Specifically, the motion asserted that, to the extent Mitchell’s

complaint constituted an administrative appeal, she was required to have filed it no

more than 30 days after the Review Commission sent her written notice of its final

decision on November 2, 2022. Therefore, Mitchell was required to have filed her

complaint by December 2, 2022. The motion also argued that, to the extent that the

case was a civil cause of action and Mitchell sought a monetary judgment against a

state department, Mitchell should have filed her case in the court of claims.

On August 7, 2023, Mitchell filed an opposition to the ODJFS

director’s motion to dismiss.

On August 21, 2023, the district filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that

dismissal was warranted on res judicata grounds, for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), and for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Civ.R. 12(B)(1).

On September 5, 2023, Mitchell filed an opposition to the district’s

motion to dismiss.

On November 1, 2023, the common pleas court granted the ODJFS

director’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the case with prejudice. In a

corresponding journal entry, the court found:

Plaintiff has filed an administrative appeal of a decision from the

Unemployment Compensation Review Commission. Individuals who

apply for unemployment compensation benefits may appeal to [sic] the

decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission to

the court of common pleas. Williams v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job and

Family Servs., 129 Ohio St.3d 332, 2011-Ohio-2897, 20. Appellants

“shall file the appeal with the court of common pleas of the county

where the appellant, if an employee, is a resident or was last employed.”

R.C. 4141.282(B). To perfect an administrative appeal under

R.C. 4141.282 and to vest jurisdiction in a court of common pleas to

hear the appeal, a party simply needs to file a notice of appeal in the

specific 30-day time frame established in the statute. R.C. 4141.282(C).

When a statute confers a right to appeal, the appeal can be perfected

only in the mode the statute prescribes. Zier v. Bur. Of Unemp. Comp.,

151 Ohio St. 123, 84 N.E.2d 746 (1949). Compliance with the specific

and mandatory requirements governing the filing of a notice of appeal

“is essential to invoke the jurisdiction of the court of common pleas.”

Id.

The court finds that plaintiff has not complied with the statutory

requirements because the notice of appeal was not filed within 30 days.

Plaintiff’s 30-day window to appeal the commission’s decision closed

on 12/02/2022. Plaintiff did not file the notice of appeal in this court

until 6/16/2023.

The court notes that plaintiff initially filed this appeal in the Bedford

Municipal Court on 12/01/2022. However, R.C. 4141.282 is clear that

the appeal is to be filed in the court of common pleas. Because this

appeal was not filed in the appropriate court until after the 30 day

window closed this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction.

Having construed all material allegations in the pleadings with

reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in favor of plaintiff as the

non-moving party, the court finds that plaintiff’s administrative appeal

does not have a cause of action which the court has authority to decide.

As such the court finds that dismissal of plaintiff’s appeal is proper and

defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Civ.R.

12(B)(1). Case is dismissed with prejudice.

Mitchell appeals, raising five assignments of error for our review:

I. The trial court erred by dismissing Plaintiff’s case when CV-23-

981159 was a refile of case CV-23-977414 that was filed with Bedford

Municipal Court before the 30-day time filing limit and was transferred

to the Court of Common Pleas.

II. The trial court erred by not extending the time for filing an

administrative appeal. The trial court erred by ignoring the fact that if

a case is filed past 30 days, the Court of Common Pleas has the right by

law to determine the timeliness of the appeal and still hear the case if

determined timely. The case should have been determined timely due

to the fact that the case was filed in a court before the 30-day time limit.

III. The trial court erred by ignoring the Plaintiff’s due process rights.

IV. The trial court erred by not granting the Plaintiff the monetary

damages that she seeks.

V. The trial court erred by failing to review the decision of the

Unemployment Review Commission and determining if they acted

unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Law and Analysis

In Mitchell’s first assignment of error, she argues that the trial court

erred when it dismissed her case, because the case filed in common pleas was merely

a “refile” of the case she initially filed with the Bedford Municipal Court. Because

the Bedford Municipal Court case was filed on December 1, 2022, within the 30-day

window for appealing the Review Commission’s decision, Mitchell argues that the

trial court erred by dismissing her case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

A dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction “raises a question

of law, and thus, this court reviews a trial court’s ruling on such a motion under the

de novo standard.” Shampine v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 10th Dist.

Franklin Nos. 11AP-123 and 11AP-384, 2011-Ohio-6057, ¶ 15, citing Crosby-

Edwards v. Ohio Bd. of Embalmers & Funeral Directors, 175 Ohio App.3d 213,

2008-Ohio-762, ¶ 21 (10th Dist.).

“A ‘court has subject matter jurisdiction over a case if the court has

the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate that case.’” Id., quoting Garrett

v. Columbus, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-77, 2010-Ohio-3895, ¶ 13, citing Pratts

v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, ¶ 11. Appeals from decisions of the

unemployment compensation review commission are governed by R.C. 4141.282.

“An applicant seeking unemployment compensation applies for benefits and

submits information to ODJFS to support [their] claim.” Id. at ¶ 16, citing McGee v.

Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-680, 2010-Ohio-

673, ¶ 9. “Initially, the director of ODJFS makes findings of fact and conclusions of

law as to whether the applicant is entitled to unemployment benefits.” Id., citing

R.C. 4141.28. “The director’s decision is subject to an appeal to the commission for

a de novo hearing,” which happened in this case. Id., citing R.C. 4141.281(C)(1) and

(3). “If a party is unsatisfied with the commission’s final determination, [they] may

appeal that decision to the appropriate court of common pleas.” Id., citing McGee

at ¶ 10 and R.C. 4141.282(H).

“[T]he right to dispute the validity of an administrative decision is

only conferred by statute and, if such a statutory right exists, the party aggrieved by

the administrative decision can only seek an appeal via the method articulated in

the statute.” George v. Ohio Dept. of Human Servs., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-

351, 2005-Ohio-2292, ¶ 32. Further, “[s]tatutory deadlines and filing requirements

require strict compliance.” McNamara v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs.,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95226, 2010-Ohio-5619, ¶ 4. Compliance with the specific

and mandatory provisions of the statute “‘is essential to invoke jurisdiction of the

court of common pleas.’” Makris v. Unemp. Comp. Rev. Comm., 7th Dist.

Mahoning No. 11 MA 105, 2013-Ohio-2317, ¶ 8, quoting Zier v. Bur. of

Unemployment Comp., 151 Ohio St. 123, 125, 84 N.E.2d 746 (1949).

Here, Mitchell was unsatisfied with the commission’s final

determination and, rather than appealing this decision to the appropriate court of

common pleas, she initiated an action in Bedford Municipal Court. Because Mitchell

failed to comply with the requirements of the statute, the trial court properly

dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Deciding a similar

question, the Tenth District Court of Appeals found that an administrative appeal

was properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction where it was filed in

the court of claims rather than the court of common pleas: “‘an action in the court

of claims cannot become a substitute for a statutorily created right of appeal [of an

administrative decision] in a different court.’” George at ¶ 35, quoting Swaney v.

Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 98AP-299, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS

5415 (Nov. 10, 1998). Likewise, we find that here, although Mitchell’s filing with the

Bedford Municipal Court was within the statutory 30-day window for filing an

appeal, that action is not a substitute for the perfecting of an appeal in the court of

common pleas, as is clearly prescribed by the statute. Therefore, Mitchell’s first

assignment of error is overruled.

In Mitchell’s second assignment of error, she argues that the trial

court erred by not extending the time for filing an administrative appeal.

Specifically, she contends that R.C. 4141.282(I) provides that “[i]f an appeal is filed

after the thirty-day appeal period, the court of common pleas shall conduct a hearing

to determine whether the appeal was timely filed under division (D)(9) of section

4141.281 of the Revised Code.” We find this argument unpersuasive.

R.C. 4141.281(D)(9) provides for the extension of the statutory time

requirements in four specific circumstances:

When the last day of an appeal period is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal

holiday.

When an interested party provides certified medical evidence stating

that the interested party’s physical condition or mental capacity

prevented the interested party from filing an appeal or request for

review under this section within the appropriate twenty-one-day

period, the appeal period is extended to twenty-one days after the end

of the physical or mental condition, and the appeal or request for

review is considered timely filed if filed within that extended period.

When an interested party provides evidence, which evidence may

consist of testimony from the interested party, that is sufficient to

establish that the party did not actually receive the determination or

decision within the applicable appeal period, then the appeal period is

extended to twenty-one days after the interested party actually receives

the determination or decision.

When an interested party provides evidence, which evidence may

consist of testimony from the interested party, that is sufficient to

establish that the party did not actually receive a decision within the

thirty-day appeal period provided in section 4141.282 of the Revised

Code, and a court of common pleas finds that the interested party did

not actually receive the decision within that thirty-day appeal period,

then the appeal period is extended to thirty days after the interested

party actually receives the decision.

Mitchell does not contend, nor does our review establish, that any of

these four scenarios are relevant in the instant case. Instead, Mitchell reiterates that

she filed a case with the Bedford Municipal Court before the deadline. Mitchell does

not point to any law supporting her position that filing a case in the wrong court

should warrant an exception to the statutory requirements for perfecting an

administrative appeal. Therefore, Mitchell’s second assignment of error is

overruled.

In Mitchell’s third assignment of error, she argues that the trial court

erred by ignoring her due process rights. Specifically, she argues that she fought

tirelessly to receive unemployment benefits to which she believes she is entitled.

Mitchell does not point to any specific place in the record where this error is reflected

— where the trial court specifically violated her due process rights. Further, while

Mitchell generally cites to the Ohio and United States Constitutions, she does not

point to any specific law in support of her third assignment of error.

App.R. 12(A) provides that this court is instructed to “[d]etermine the

appeal on its merits on the assignments of error set forth in the briefs under

App.R. 16[.]” This rule further provides that “errors not specifically pointed out in

the record and separately argued by brief may be disregarded” by the reviewing

court. Stevens v. Little Stars Early Learning Ctr., L.L.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 110602, 2022-Ohio-380, ¶ 20, citing N. Coast Cookies v. Sweet Temptations, 16

Ohio App.3d 342, 343, 476 N.E.2d 388 (8th Dist.1984). Additionally, “‘[t]he

appellant bears the burden of demonstrating error on appeal by reference to the

record of the proceedings below.’” Id., quoting Davis v. Wesolowski, 2020-Ohio-

677, 146 N.E.3d 633, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), citing Stancik v. Hersch, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 97501, 2012-Ohio-1955. App.R. 16(A)(7) provides that the appellant’s brief shall

include “[a]n argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to

each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the

contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on

which appellant relies.”

Mitchell fails to clearly and concisely explain how the trial court

violated her due process rights, and she fails to present any reasons in support of

her contentions with citations to relevant authorities and parts of the record. Based

on Mitchell’s failure to comply with App.R. 12 and 16, this court may disregard

Mitchell’s arguments. Stevens at ¶ 23, citing Bradley v. Bradley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 109792, 2021-Ohio-2514, ¶ 25; Cleveland v. Taylor, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 109371, 2021-Ohio-584, ¶ 87, citing State v. Wells, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 98388, 2013-Ohio-3722, ¶ 55; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Collins, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 109555, 2021-Ohio-508, ¶ 29; State v. Thompson, 2021-Ohio-376,

167 N.E.3d 1072, ¶ 91 (8th Dist.); Wiltz v. Cleveland Clinic, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos.

109147 and 109483, 2021-Ohio-62, ¶ 18. Therefore, Mitchell’s third assignment of

error is overruled.

In Mitchell’s fourth assignment of error, she argues that the trial court

erred by not granting her the monetary damages that she seeks. Specifically,

Mitchell argues that her request for damages in the amount of $3,840 plus interest

is “based upon the money owed to her from unemployment and court costs.” Again,

Mitchell fails to point to any legal authority in support of this assertion. Moreover,

to the extent that the damages Mitchell seeks are unemployment benefits she

believes she is owed, her belief does not change the fact that the Review Commission

determined that she was ineligible for these benefits. Because Mitchell failed to

timely appeal this decision, and the trial court subsequently dismissed her

complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, any arguments regarding the

substantive nature of Mitchell’s case are not properly before this court. Therefore,

Mitchell’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

In Mitchell’s fifth and final assignment of error, she argues that the

trial court erred by failing to review the Review Commission’s decision and

determine if the Review Commission acted unlawfully, unreasonably, or against the

manifest weight of the evidence. Mitchell points to R.C. 4141.282(H), which

provides that

[t]he court shall hear the appeal on the certified record provided by the

commission. If the court finds that the decision of the commission was

unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence,

it shall reverse, vacate, or modify the decision, or remand the matter to

the commission. Otherwise, the court shall affirm the decision of the

commission.

Mitchell’s argument here is rendered moot by our disposition of her

first assignment of error. Because Mitchell clearly failed to perfect her

administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 4141.282(C), the trial court lacked subject-

matter jurisdiction and properly dismissed the case. Therefore, the requirements

for the administrative appeal are inapplicable. For these reasons, Mitchell’s fifth

assignment of error is overruled.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., and

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR