United States v. Jonathan Blanco

USCA11 Case: 22-10419 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 05/23/2024 Page: 1 of 29

[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10419

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JONATHAN GUERRA BLANCO,

a.k.a. Abu Zahra Al-Andalusi,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cr-20245-RNS-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10419

Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

JORDAN, Circuit Judge:

Jonathan Guerra Blanco appeals his 192-month sentence fol-

lowing his guilty plea to attempting to provide material support to

ISIS, a designated foreign terrorist organization, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). First, he contends that at sentencing the gov-

ernment improperly used evidence obtained from testimony he

had provided pursuant to a proffer agreement and argues that the

district court erred in not holding an evidentiary hearing on the

matter. Second, he challenges the application of a 12-point sen-

tencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4(a) for promoting a

federal crime of terrorism. Third, he asserts that the district court

erred by not applying a 3-level reduction for acceptance of respon-

sibility from his maximum statutory sentence of 240 months.

After a review of the record, and with the benefit of oral ar-

gument, we affirm.

I

In early December of 2020, the government charged Mr.

Guerra by information with one count of attempting to provide

material support to ISIS, a designated foreign terrorist organiza-

tion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). Later that month he

pled guilty and agreed to the government’s factual proffer.

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22-10419 Opinion of the Court 3

A

The facts set out below are taken from the factual proffer

used to support Mr. Guerra’s guilty plea and the unobjected-to fac-

tual narrative in the presentence investigation report.

ISIS, or the “Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham,” is the infa-

mous foreign terrorist organization responsible for countless ter-

rorist attacks across the world. Mr. Guerra knew what ISIS stood

for, and he also knew that the U.S. Secretary of State had designated

ISIS as a foreign terrorist organization.

Sometime between October of 2019 and September of 2020,

Mr. Guerra ran two unofficial ISIS media networks primarily di-

rected at Spanish speakers. One of those networks was called

“Muntasir Media.” Mr. Guerra’s operation of the media networks

involved the production and dissemination of ISIS propaganda, re-

cruiting materials, and instructional guides for committing acts of

terror.

ISIS has relied more on these sorts of decentralized net-

works due to significant losses in the past few years. Indeed, ISIS

has said that the propaganda work on its behalf is just as valuable

to its efforts as are ISIS militants committing acts of violence.

Via the two media networks, Mr. Guerra produced and dis-

seminated the following:

◆ A November 2019 video threatening terrorist attacks on

the Spanish National Police and the Spanish subway system. The

video featured a masked individual stating that ISIS cells in Spain

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10419

remained intact despite the arrest of a Muntasir-affiliated ISIS oper-

ative.

◆ A December 2019 video threatening and encouraging at-

tacks on behalf of ISIS in Madrid, Spain. The video included foot-

age of a popular public square in Madrid with a narration: “don’t

let them celebrate in peace,” and “kill them, give them jihad!”

◆ A second and similar December 2019 video threatening

attacks in Spain and calling for supporters to take up arms for ISIS.

◆ A February 2020 video, titled “Called to Islam,” threaten-

ing “non-believers” to convert to a radicalized version of Islam.

The video featured footage of a well-known hotel in Miami and the

Las Vegas Strip, along with clips of a suicide bomber’s farewell ad-

dress and an ISIS execution.

◆ A February 2020 instruction manual titled “Open Source

Jihad [1] . . . How to Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom.”

The manual provided instructions in Spanish on how to build a

home-made bomb for use in a terrorist attack.

◆ A February 2020 instruction manual titled “Open Source

Jihad 2 . . . The Ultimate Mowing Machine.” The manual provided

instructions, in Spanish, on how to effectively conduct a vehicle at-

tack against a pedestrian crowd. The manual had long been pub-

lished in English, but Mr. Guerra provided a Spanish translation

and included original content on how to avoid detection online by

the authorities.

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To help him operate the media networks, Mr. Guerra re-

cruited other ISIS sympathizers with foreign language abilities.

Unbeknownst to Mr. Guerra, however, some of his prospective re-

cruits were undercover FBI operatives and sources. Mr. Guerra

told one such recruit that “[w]ithout us . . . [ISIS] in the online

world is dead,” and that, although he was loyal to ISIS, he could not

“express things which are clearly [a] ‘crime’ where I am.” Using

coded language, Mr. Guerra asked another recruit to help him

translate an instruction manual on building a mail bomb.

Mr. Guerra was skilled at obfuscating his true identity and

location online. He used a combination of tools (e.g., virtual pri-

vate networks and encrypted messaging platforms) to evade detec-

tion by the authorities. And he instructed his recruits to do the

same.

Although skilled at concealing his identity online, Mr.

Guerra eventually slipped up by revealing his true identity to a re-

cruit (an undercover FBI operative) whom he was pursuing roman-

tically. On a trip to Miami on September 11, 2020, to meet that

recruit, Mr. Guerra was arrested by the authorities. A subsequent

search of his home revealed the same software and hardware that

he instructed his recruits to use for online anonymity and a hand-

drawn ISIS flag under his mattress.

B

Around the time of the plea, the government executed a

proffer letter agreement with Mr. Guerra (and his counsel) setting

out the parameters of a debriefing. See D.E. 82, Exh. A. The letter

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agreement required Mr. Guerra to give the government a truthful

account and to provide a password for the computer and electronic

devices that were seized at the time of his arrest. See id. at 1.

For its part, the government “agree[d] that no statements

made by [Mr. Guerra] during the debriefing(s) w[ould] be offered

into evidence against him as part of any government direct case,”

but “remain[ed] free to use information derived from the debrief-

ing directly or indirectly for the purpose of obtaining leads to other

evidence, which may be used against [him] in any investigations or

prosecutions.” Id. Mr. Guerra “expressly waive[d] any right to

claim that such evidence should not be introduced because it was

obtained as a result of the debriefing.” Id. This “provision [wa]s

necessary in order to avoid the necessity for a Kastigar hearing.” Id.1

In addition, the government’s “agreement to not use state-

ments against [Mr. Guerra] made during th[e] proffer d[id] not ex-

tend to statements concerning violent acts, or violence in any

form.” Id. at 1–2. 2

1See generally Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972) (holding that the

government cannot use, directly or indirectly, compelled testimony obtained

under a grant of statutory immunity in the prosecution of the witness who

was compelled to testify).

2In an email to Mr. Guerra’s counsel, the Assistant U.S. Attorney stated that

“[t]his letter would cover what we obtain from any devices we access with the

password(s) provided. The letter specifically excludes any violence.” D.E. 82,

Exh. B.

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With respect to sentencing, the letter agreement contained

additional language. It stated that “pursuant to [U.S.S.G.]

§ 1B1.8 . . . none of the information provided to the [government]

during these debriefings shall be used against [Mr. Guerra] in deter-

mining the applicable guideline range.” Id. at 2. 3

C

The presentence investigation report recommended a total

offense level of 37 for Mr. Guerra. This resulted from (a) a 12-level

increase to the base offense level of 26 under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4(a)

because the offense involved, or was intended to promote, a federal

crime of terrorism; (b) a 2-level increase to the base offense because

he served as an organizer or leader under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c); and

(c) a 3-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G.

§ 3E1.1(a)–(b).

The terrorism enhancement also increased Mr. Guerra’s

criminal history category from I to VI, which, when combined

with a total offense level of 37, yielded an advisory guideline im-

prisonment range of 360 months to life. But because the statutory

3As relevant here, § 1B1.8(a) provides as follows: “Where a defendant agrees

to cooperate with the government by providing information concerning un-

lawful activities of others, and as part of that cooperation agreement the gov-

ernment agrees that self-incriminating information provided pursuant to the

agreement will not be used against the defendant, then such information shall

not be used in determining the applicable guideline range, except to the extent

provided in the agreement.” This provision, however, does not restrict the use

of information “known to the government prior to entering into the coopera-

tion agreement.” § 1B1.8(b)(1).

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8 Opinion of the Court 22-10419

maximum for the offense was 240 months, the guideline term also

became 240 months. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a)

Mr. Guerra raised two objections to the report before his

sentencing hearing.

First, he objected to the application of the terrorism en-

hancement. He asserted that a violation of the material support

statute does not per se warrant the imposition of the terrorism en-

hancement. For that enhancement to apply, he argued, the govern-

ment had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that his con-

duct was “calculated to influence or affect the conduct of govern-

ment by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against govern-

ment conduct.” D.E. 45 at 5 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A)).

And that, he further maintained, required a showing of specific in-

tent. See id. at 7.

Second, he objected to applying the 3-level reduction for ac-

ceptance of responsibility to the adjusted offense level of 40 (result-

ing in a total offense level of 37) rather than to the 240-month max-

imum statutory sentence. See id. at 18. He argued that if the 3-

level reduction was not applied to the 240-month maximum statu-

tory sentence, his acceptance of responsibility would be rendered

“effectively meaningless.” Id. He maintained that the district court

could depart or vary to make his acceptance of responsibility

meaningful under United States v. Rodriguez, 64 F.3d 638, 643 (11th

Cir. 1995) (“[A] district court has the discretion to reward a defend-

ant’s acceptance of responsibility by departing downward

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when [U.S.S.G.] § 5G1.1(a) renders [U.S.S.G.] § 3E1.1 ineffectual in

reducing the defendant’s actual sentence.”). See D.E. 45 at 18–19.

Mr. Guerra also filed a motion for a downward departure or

variance pursuant to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. In support of

a sentence below the advisory guidelines, he pointed to his lack of

criminal history, his “very serious medical and psychological ail-

ments,” and his acceptance of responsibility. See D.E. 76 at 2 (filed

under seal).

The government opposed Mr. Guerra’s objections and mo-

tion for a downward departure or variance. In part, the govern-

ment relied on some materials obtained from Mr. Guerra’s com-

puter, including a video threatening the assassination of a Spanish

judge for which Mr. Guerra had inserted subtitles in English. See

D.E. 102 at 14. One of the subtitles reads “you will die with a sticky

bomb.” See id. at 34; D.E. 94-4 at 5. 4

In response to the government’s opposition, Mr. Guerra

filed an emergency motion for a Kastigar hearing. See generally

United States v. Schmidgall, 25 F.3d 1523, 1528 (11th Cir. 1994)

(“[W]hen presented with a Kastigar challenge, a court’s task is to

determine whether any of the evidence used against the defendant

was in any way derived from his compelled immunized

4 The government knew that Muntasir Media disseminated the video before

the execution of the proffer letter agreement, but only learned that Mr. Guerra

had inserted English subtitles after looking at his computer by using the pass-

word he provided. See, e.g., D.E. 102 at 18, 31–32 (statements by the Assistant

U.S. Attorney and by Mr. Guerra’s counsel).

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10 Opinion of the Court 22-10419

testimony.”). He asserted that the government was improperly us-

ing evidence—such as the video threatening the assassination of a

Spanish judge and three documents titled “Open Source Jihad”—

that it had obtained from his immunized proffer. See D.E. 82 at 2–

3.

D

The sentencing hearing began with argument on Mr.

Guerra’s motion for a Kastigar hearing.

Mr. Guerra explained that, pursuant to the proffer letter

agreement, he provided the government with the passwords

needed to access his computer and electronic devices, which con-

tained incriminating evidence. He argued that the government had

agreed not to use any of the evidence it obtained against him, in-

cluding at his sentencing. He understood the letter agreement to

not cover any violent acts that he personally participated in—had

there been evidence of him planting a bomb, that would be fair

game—but that it would cover his translation and dissemination of

materials containing calls for violence.

Importantly, however, Mr. Guerra clarified that he was not

objecting, under the proffer letter agreement, to the government’s

presentation of the two February 2020 instruction manuals—the

ones he translated and published in Spanish on how to build a

home-made bomb (Open Source Jihad 1) and how to use a vehicle

against a pedestrian crowd (Open Source Jihad 2)—because the

government knew about them prior to his arrest. His objection

was limited to the use of two videos—one threatening the

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22-10419 Opinion of the Court 11

assassination of a Spanish judge and another in which he pledged

allegiance to ISIS.

The government responded that the proffer letter agree-

ment’s exclusion for “violent acts, or violence in any form,” applied

to the evidence it sought to introduce. As to the video threatening

the assassination of a Spanish judge, the government asserted that

it knew before execution of the letter agreement that Muntasir Me-

dia had disseminated the video. Mr. Guerra agreed the govern-

ment knew about the video, but asserted that it did not learn about

his insertion of English subtitles until it searched his computer us-

ing the password he provided.

The district court denied Mr. Guerra’s motion for a Kastigar

hearing. It found that the objected-to evidence fell within the prof-

fer letter agreement’s exclusion for evidence concerning violent

acts. The court also ruled that the Assistant U.S. Attorney’s email

to Mr. Guerra’s counsel was parol evidence that it could not con-

sider given that the letter agreement was unambiguous.

The next matter taken up at the hearing was Mr. Guerra’s

objection to the terrorism enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4(a).

The government introduced four exhibits in support of the en-

hancement: (1) Open Source Jihad 1, the manual on home-made

bombs; (2) Open Source Jihad 2, the manual on using a vehicle

against a pedestrian crowd; (3) Open Source Jihad 3, a manual on

how to use arson to commit a terrorist act; and (4) the video threat-

ening the assassination of a Spanish judge. All four were produced

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12 Opinion of the Court 22-10419

and disseminated by Muntasir Media—the network that Mr.

Guerra admitted to “direct[ing] and coordinat[ing].”

Open Source Jihad 1 called itself “America’s worst night-

mare” and a “disaster for the repressive imperialistic nations.”

Open Source Jihad 2 explained that:

This idea [of driving a truck through a crowd] could

be implemented in countries like Israel, the U.S., . . .

and other countries where the government and public

sentiment is in support of the Israeli occupation of

Palestine, the American invasion of Afghanistan and

Iraq . . . . In such countries, we may strike at the public

at large. As long as they target our noncombatants,

we will target theirs.

Mr. Guerra then called Dr. Michele Quiroga, a psychologist,

as an expert witness to testify about his alleged inability to form the

requisite intent for the terrorism enhancement. Dr. Quiroga ex-

plained that Mr. Guerra was “wired differently” due to his various

health conditions, including autism. She concluded that he did not

form the “specific intent to retaliate against the government” and

was instead lured into the fold as a result of his deep desire for ac-

ceptance. But she also conceded that he knew what a crime is “at

a certain level.”

The district court overruled Mr. Guerra’s objection and ap-

plied the terrorism enhancement. The court did not find credible

Dr. Quiroga’s testimony that Mr. Guerra lacked specific intent. It

instead reasoned that Open Source Jihad 1 and Open Source Jihad

2 “on their own establish[ed]” that “the offense was calculated to

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influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or

coercion or retaliat[ion] against government conduct.” In its view,

the references to western governments in both exhibits made clear

that Mr. Guerra was not promoting the killing of people “for no

reason whatsoever, but in retaliation for the United States[’] public

support of Israel and [its] invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq.” The

court stressed that it was making “a clear finding that, even without

[the video threatening the assassination of the Spanish judge],

there is more than enough evidence to meet the government’s bur-

den in this case.” The court added that this video made the finding

“overwhelming, but even without [it], there’s more than sufficient

evidence to meet the government’s burden.”

The district court then addressed Mr. Guerra’s objection to

applying the 3-level acceptance of responsibility reduction to the

adjusted offense level of 40 rather than to the statutory maximum

sentence of 240 months. The court considered that to be a “vari-

ance request . . . . because he’s not effectively getting the value of

it[,]” but not an issue as to “calculation” of the advisory guidelines.

Seemingly in agreement, Mr. Guerra again brought up the issue in

the context of arguing for a variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) after

the court had already ruled on his objections to the guideline

range. The court adopted the guideline calculations in the presen-

tence investigation report as previously described—240 months.

Mr. Guerra presented testimony from Dr. Jaime Ghitelman,

an expert in cardiology, on his various health conditions. The dis-

trict court later heard directly from Mr. Guerra and his mother.

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14 Opinion of the Court 22-10419

In support of a variance under § 3553(a), Mr. Guerra argued

that the district court should “consider his acceptance of responsi-

bility” by applying the 3-level reduction to the statutory maximum

sentence of 240 months, which would yield a guideline range of

151–188 months. Mr. Guerra cited to a previous case involving

money laundering in which the district court had done something

similar. From that proposed guideline range, Mr. Guerra requested

a sentence of 78 months because of his serious health conditions,

his age at the time of the crime, and his cooperation.

After hearing from the parties, the district court considered

and discussed the § 3553(a) factors. In its view, the offense “was a

very serious” one that warranted “a significant prison sentence” to

promote respect for the law, to protect the public, and to deter oth-

ers who might consider getting involved in similar offenses. But it

also found that there were “several factors that weigh[ed] in miti-

gation of a lengthy sentence.” It departed under U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4

due to Mr. Guerra’s serious health conditions, including his neuro-

developmental disorder and level 3 autism. It also found mitigating

Mr. Guerra’s lack of prior arrests, age and immaturity, psychologi-

cal trauma, and acceptance of responsibility. And it explained that

“the way the guidelines have worked out, he doesn’t really get

credit for the acceptance of the responsibility, so it is warranting

some variance from the guidelines range.”

The district court imposed a 192-month sentence—48

months below the 240-month guideline sentence—with a lifetime

term of supervised release to follow. It did not explain how many

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of the 48-months were attributable to the § 5H1.4 departure and

how many were due to the variance to give Mr. Guerra some ben-

efit for his acceptance of responsibility.

This appeal followed.

II

Mr. Guerra argues that the district court erred in failing to

hold a Kastigar hearing. He asserts that the government breached

the proffer letter agreement by using against him, at sentencing,

evidence it obtained from the information he provided pursuant to

the agreement. His argument with respect to breach is limited to

the government’s use of the video threatening the assassination of

a Spanish judge. See Appellant’s Br. at 17–18. 5

The government responds that, even assuming there was

any breach, Mr. Guerra suffered no harm. It points out that the

district court expressly found that Open Source Jihad 1 and Open

Source Jihad 2 were sufficient to apply the terrorism enhancement,

and Mr. Guerra did not and does not object to the consideration of

those two manuals because the government knew about them

5As noted, at the sentencing hearing Mr. Guerra agreed that the government

could use Open Source Jihad 1 and Open Source Jihad 2 because it had them

before the execution of the proffer letter agreement. And at oral argument,

Mr. Guerra’s counsel stated that there was also no objection to the govern-

ment’s use of Open Source Jihad 3, a manual on how to use arson to commit

a terrorist act. As a result, the only evidence at issue on appeal is the video

threatening the assassination of a Spanish judge.

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16 Opinion of the Court 22-10419

before execution of the proffer letter agreement. See Appellee’s Br.

at 31–32.

A

Our interpretation of the proffer letter agreement is plenary.

See United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807, 874 (11th Cir. 2011). “And

because due process requires us to enforce the government’s agree-

ment . . . , we apply the same rules and method of analysis to an

informal grant of use or transactional immunity as we would to a

formal grant.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

“The construction of proffer agreements, like plea agree-

ments, is governed generally by the principles of contract law, as

we have adapted it for the purposes of criminal law.” United States

v. Pielago, 135 F.3d 703, 709 (11th Cir. 1998). “This analogy, how-

ever, should not be taken too far. A hyper-technical reading of the

written agreement and a rigidly literal approach in the construction

of language should not be accepted. The written agreement should

be viewed against the background of the negotiations. Any ambi-

guities in the terms of a proffer agreement should be resolved in

favor of the . . . defendant.” Id. at 709–10 (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). See also 3 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal

Procedure § 8.11(e) (4th ed. 2023) (“For informal immunity, unlike

statutory use/derivative-use immunity, issues relating to the scope

of the immunity cannot be answered by reference to the commen-

surate protection provided under the self-incrimination privilege.

Here, scope may be broader or narrower than what would be re-

quired to supplant the privilege, and the crucial question is what

scope was agreed to by the parties.”).

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If “the government breaches [a proffer] agreement [at sen-

tencing], the defendant must either be resentenced by a new judge

or allowed to withdraw his plea, regardless of whether the judge

was influenced.” See United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d 1049, 1055–56

(11th Cir. 1989) (“As the Supreme Court held in Santobello v. New

York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971), it makes no difference whether the

judge was (or was not) influenced by information divulged through

the government’s breach.”). And when the government’s breach is

after a trial, “the only available and sufficient remedy is to require

specific performance of the agreement, which means that [the de-

fendant] must be resentenced by a different judge.” Id. at 1056.

The “consensus view” in the circuits seems to be that under

Santobello “harmless-error analysis does not apply when the gov-

ernment breaches a plea agreement.” See United States v. Mosley,

505 F.3d 804, 810 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing cases from ten circuits). But

that view is not unanimous, at least not when it comes to the

breach of a proffer agreement at sentencing. The Seventh Circuit,

for example, has concluded that if the government breaches a prof-

fer agreement at sentencing, thereby violating the provisions of

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.8(a), the breach is subject to harmless error review.

See United States v. Bennett, 708 F.3d 879, 886 (7th Cir. 2013).

B

The parties do not cite Foster. Nor do they discuss whether

it precludes a harmless error analysis should we find that the gov-

ernment breached the proffer letter agreement. Fortunately, we

do not need to consider Foster today, as we agree with the district

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18 Opinion of the Court 22-10419

court that the government’s use of the video threatening the assas-

sination of a Spanish judge—with English subtitles inserted by Mr.

Guerra—did not constitute a breach. We therefore do not address

whether the district court’s reliance on Open Jihad 1 and Open Ji-

had 2 for the imposition of the terrorism enhancement rendered

harmless the government’s alleged breach of the letter agreement.

As a reminder, the proffer letter agreement stated that “pur-

suant to [U.S.S.G.] § 1B1.8 . . . none of the information provided to

the [government] during these debriefings shall be used against

[Mr. Guerra] in determining the applicable guideline range.” The

letter agreement also contained limiting language providing that

the government’s promise “to not use statements against [Mr.

Guerra] made during th[e] proffer d[id] not include statements con-

cerning violent acts, or violence in any form.”

The parties proceed on the assumption that, under the lan-

guage of the proffer letter agreement, this violence exclusion ap-

plies to the use of statements or information at sentencing. See

Appellee’s Br. at 28–31; Appellant’s Reply Br. at 4–7. We will do the

same.

Mr. Guerra contends that the violence exclusion only covers

violent acts or violence that he “participated in.” Appellant’s Reply

Br. at 6. He says that the government drafted the violence exclu-

sion only so that it could prosecute “someone being debriefed who

reveals that [he] had committed violent acts or violence.” Id. We

disagree. Both the text of the agreement and the context of the

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22-10419 Opinion of the Court 19

negotiations support the government’s use of the Spanish judge

video.

We turn first to the language of the proffer letter agreement.

The exclusion’s relevant phrase is “statements concerning violent

acts, or violence in any form.” The last clause is broad. See Cassell’s

Dictionary of English Idioms 301 (2002) (“in any shape or form”

means “of any kind”); McGraw-Hill’s American Idioms Dictionary

251 (4th ed. 2007) (“in any way, shape or form” means “in any man-

ner”). One of the English subtitles that Mr. Guerra inserted in the

video reads “you will die with a sticky bomb.” See D.E. 102 at 34;

D.E. 94-4 at 5. In our view, inserting that English subtitle in a video

threatening the assassination of a Spanish judge falls squarely

within the violence exclusion.

Our cases caution against a “hyper-technical reading” of a

proffer agreement that does not consider the “background of the

negotiations.” See Pielago, 135 F.3d at 709. In this vein, Mr. Guerra

argues that a broad reading essentially runs counter to the spirit of

the agreement because it would “permit [the government] to uti-

lize anything he told them during the briefing.” Appellant’s Reply

Br. at 6 (emphasis in original). If that were the case, his argument

seems to go, then why would he have ever entered into the agree-

ment?

As Mr. Guerra acknowledges, however, the government

sought his cooperation to identify other targets and thwart poten-

tial terrorist attacks. In exchange, the government agreed not to

use his statements against him unless they concerned violent acts

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20 Opinion of the Court 22-10419

or violence in any form. Had the proffer sessions proved fruitful,

he could have received a motion for a downward departure. See

U.S.S.G § 5K1.1. That was the bargain, and because the govern-

ment agreed not to use his statements unless the violence exclusion

applied, the agreement was not illusory. See generally Restatement

(Second) of Contracts § 77 cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 1981) (“Words of

promise which by their terms make performance entirely optional

with the ‘promisor’ do not constitute a promise.”). 6

III

Mr. Guerra also challenges the district court’s application of

the terrorism enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4(a). “A challenge

to the application of the Sentencing Guidelines is a mixed question

of law and fact.” United States v. Mandhai, 375 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th

Cir. 2004). We review factual findings for clear error, but the “ap-

plication of those facts to justify a sentencing enhancement is re-

viewed de novo.” United States v. Castaneda-Pozo, 877 F.3d 1249, 1251

(11th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Contrary to Mr. Guerra’s con-

tention that the government’s standard of proof is clear and con-

vincing evidence, “our circuit’s settled law is that the preponder-

ance of the evidence standard is sufficient to establish the predicate

facts for a sentencing adjustment or enhancement.” United States v.

Arcila Ramirez, 16 F.4th 844, 855 n.8 (11th Cir. 2021).

6 Even if we consider the Assistant U.S. Attorney’s email, the result remains

the same. That email reiterated that the proffer letter agreement “specifically

excludes violence.”

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22-10419 Opinion of the Court 21

The terrorism enhancement provides that:

(a) If the offense is a felony that involved, or was in-

tended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism, in-

crease by 12 levels; but if the resulting offense level is

less than level 32, increase to level 32.

(b) In each such case, the defendant’s criminal history

category from Chapter Four (Criminal History and

Criminal Livelihood) shall be Category VI.

U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4. Application Note 1 to § 3A1.4 explains that a

“‘federal crime of terrorism’ has the meaning given [to] that term

in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5).” In turn, § 2332b(g)(5) defines a “federal

crime of terrorism” as an offense that:

(A) is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of

government by intimidation or coercion, or to retali-

ate against government conduct; and

(B) is a violation of . . . [18 U.S.C. §] 2339B (relating to

providing material support to terrorist organiza-

tions)[.]

Mr. Guerra concedes that his conviction under 18 U.S.C.

§ 2339B(a)(1) is in violation of an enumerated statute under subsec-

tion (g)(5)(B). As a result, only subsection (g)(5)(A) is at issue.

We recently held that the term “calculated” in subsection

(g)(5)(A) imposes “an intent requirement,” such that “the govern-

ment must show that the defendant’s offense was planned to influ-

ence, affect, or retaliate against government conduct, even if that

was not the defendant’s personal motive.” Arcila Ramirez, 16 F.4th at

854 (emphasis added). Because defendants rarely admit their “full

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22 Opinion of the Court 22-10419

knowledge or intentions,” district courts may rely on “circumstan-

tial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the facts.” Id.

For instance, though a defendant’s “[p]ersonal motive is not rele-

vant,” his “knowledge that a terrorist organization solicited his ac-

tions to attack the government could demonstrate” that his con-

duct was “calculated to influence government.” Id. (emphasis

added).

The district court found that by translating and disseminat-

ing Open Source Jihad 1 and Open Source Jihad 2, Mr. Guerra was

“knowingly promoting activities . . . . to retaliate against government

conduct.” D.E. 102 at 73 (emphasis added). It also found, alterna-

tively, that by inserting English subtitles in the video threatening

the assassination of a Spanish judge, Mr. Guerra was acting in a way

“calculated to influence the conduct of government by intimida-

tion or coercion[.]” Id.

Mr. Guerra’s arguments against the terrorism enhancement

can be summed up as follows: (1) being convicted under the ma-

terial support statute does not per se warrant the enhancement; (2)

to show retaliation, the government had to prove that he “intended

to respond to specific government action;” and (3) the government

failed to prove specific intent. None are convincing.

The first two arguments can be quickly dispensed with. As

to the first, the district court never said anything to even remotely

suggest that it was applying a per se rule. Its findings were thorough

and clearly set out at the sentencing hearing. See id. at 69–74. As

for the second, though we doubt that a defendant like Mr. Guerra

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22-10419 Opinion of the Court 23

must be shown to be responding to a “specific government action,”

the record here supports such a finding. One example of suffi-

ciently intentional retaliation provided by Mr. Guerra in support of

his second argument is that of a defendant who attacked an em-

bassy “to retaliate against the U.S. government[’s] . . . presence in

Libya.” Appellant’s Br. at 30–31. Here, through Open Source Jihad

2, Mr. Guerra promoted acts of terror in countries “where the gov-

ernment and public sentiment is in support of the Israeli occupa-

tion of Palestine [and] the American invasion of Afghanistan and

Iraq . . . . ” Under Mr. Guerra’s proposed standard, that is specific

enough.

The third argument requires more discussion, but it is none-

theless unavailing. We have not gone so far as to say that “specific

intent” is required under § 2332b(g)(5)(A). In Arcila Ramirez, our

most recent published case in this area, we held that the “calcu-

lated” prong of § 2332b(g)(5)(A) imposes an intent requirement

such that “the government must show that the defendant’s offense

was planned to influence, affect, or retaliate against government

conduct, even if that was not the defendant’s personal motive.” 16

F.4th at 854.

“[W]hether a defendant’s offense is calculated (i.e., in-

tended) to influence, affect, or retaliate against government con-

duct is a highly fact specific inquiry that requires examining the rec-

ord as a whole.” Id. There is no need for us to decide whether

specific intent, in the form described by Mr. Guerra, is required.

That is because the district court found that Mr. Guerra, by

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24 Opinion of the Court 22-10419

inserting the English subtitles in the video threatening the assassi-

nation of a Spanish judge, had such an intent—his conduct was

“calculated to influence the conduct of government by intimida-

tion or coercion.” D.E. 102 at 73. This finding is not clearly erro-

neous, as the targeted political killing of a judge—a government

official—can be for the purpose of influencing, affecting, or retali-

ating against government conduct. See United States v. Matchett, 802

F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th Cir. 2015) (“We may affirm a sentencing en-

hancement ‘for any reason supported by the record, even if not re-

lied upon by the district court.’”) (citation omitted). 7

Mr. Guerra attempts to minimize his conduct by character-

izing himself as a mere translator and an oblivious operator of ter-

rorist media accounts. The problem for Mr. Guerra is that he ad-

mitted to so much more in his factual proffer. He stipulated to,

among other things, knowing that ISIS is an active foreign terrorist

organization; directing and coordinating the efforts of ISIS media

networks; recruiting other ISIS sympathizers; concealing his iden-

tity online and instructing his recruits on how to do the same; stat-

ing that “[w]ithout us [ISIS] in the online world is dead”; and, in

addition to translating and disseminating Open Source Jihad 2 to a

broader audience, “featur[ing] original content” to help others

7At oral argument, Mr. Guerra’s counsel pointed to United States v. Stewart, 590

F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2009), as the best case on the issue of specific intent. Stewart,

however, is distinguishable. In that case the government sought the terrorism

enhancement even though it conceded that the defendant “ha[d] committed

neither a federal crime of terrorism nor any other crime with the intent to

promote such a crime.” Id. at 138. That is not the case here.

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22-10419 Opinion of the Court 25

evade detection online. The fact of the matter is that Mr. Guerra’s

conduct places him a long ways away from being a mere translator

or unknowing participant.

IV

Mr. Guerra’s third and final issue on appeal concerns the

manner in which the district court applied the 3-level reduction for

acceptance of responsibility. Mr. Guerra argues that, under Rodri-

guez, 64 F.3d at 642–43, the district court “should have” varied

downward so as to calculate the reduction from the 240-month

statutory maximum sentence.8

In Rodriguez—a case decided when the Sentencing Guide-

lines were still mandatory—we held that a district court may, in its

discretion, depart downward if the reduction for acceptance of re-

sponsibility gives the defendant no actual benefit because the

guideline sentence far exceeds the statutory maximum. See id. at

643. We came to this conclusion because we thought that “the

[Sentencing] Commission failed to consider that [U.S.S.G.]

§ 5G.1(a) [which provides that where the statutory maximum sen-

tence is less than the low end of the guideline range, the statutory

maximum sentence becomes the guideline sentence] might

8 Mr. Guerra argues for the first time in his reply brief that the district court

misunderstood its authority to apply the reduction for acceptance of responsi-

bility as a departure rather than a variance. By not raising that argument in

his opening brief, Mr. Guerra forfeited its consideration, and we see no reason

to exercise our discretion to address it. See generally United States v. Campbell,

26 F.4th 860, 873–74 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc). In any event, there is nothing

in the record which suggests that the district court believed it could not depart.

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26 Opinion of the Court 22-10419

operate to negate the [U.S.S.G.] § 3E1.1 [acceptance of responsibil-

ity] adjustment and undermine the ‘legitimate societal interests’

served by the adjustment.” See id.

The Sentencing Commission in 2003—after Rodriguez, but

still before the Supreme Court made the Sentencing Guidelines ad-

visory in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)—promulgated

U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0(d)(2). This provision prohibits district courts from

departing from the applicable guideline range, outside of § 3E1.1,

based on acceptance of responsibility. In other words, § 5K2.0(d)(2)

appears to make § 3E1.1 the exclusive means by which a district

court may account for acceptance of responsibility within the Sen-

tencing Guidelines. The government, in fact, argues that

§ 5K2.0(d)(2) abrogated Rodriguez.

As far as we can tell, no other circuit has addressed the im-

pact of § 5K2.0(d)(2) under a similar circumstance. Only the Third

Circuit has come close to doing so. In a pre-Booker case, the Third

Circuit held that “a sentencing court may depart downward when

the circumstances of a case demonstrate a degree of acceptance of

responsibility that is substantially in excess of that ordinarily pre-

sent.” United States v. Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989, 996 (3d Cir. 1992),

abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Douglas, 885 F.3d 124 (3d

Cir. 2018). Then, in a post-Booker case, the Third Circuit noted that

a district court “reasonably questioned the continued vitality of

Lieberman under § 5K2.0(d)(2),” but explained that it need only de-

cide whether the district court “understood [§ 5K2.0(d)(2)] to mean

that it lacked the authority to consider extraordinary acceptance of

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22-10419 Opinion of the Court 27

responsibility in issuing a variance pursuant to the [18 U.S.C.] §

3553(a) factors.” United States v. Severino, 454 F.3d 206, 210 n.2 (3d

Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).

We likewise see no reason to decide the effect of

§ 5K2.0(d)(2) on Rodriguez. As a procedural matter, the district

court understood Mr. Guerra to be seeking a downward variance

(and not a downward departure) to give him the benefit of his ac-

ceptance of responsibility, see D.E. 102 at 75, and Mr. Guerra’s

counsel did not tell the court that it was wrong to view the request

that way.

The district court considered Mr. Guerra’s acceptance of re-

sponsibility to be a mitigating factor under § 3553(a), among oth-

ers, in varying downward 48 months, from 240 months to 192

months. Although the court did not say how many months of the

variance were attributable to acceptance of responsibility and how

many months were attributable to its departure under § 5H1.4, Mr.

Guerra does not argue that the court committed any procedural

error in that regard. His argument, in essence, is that by not vary-

ing downward more, the court abused its discretion and imposed a

substantively unreasonable sentence. 9

9 To the extent that Mr. Guerra contends that the district court erred by not

departing downward to account for acceptance of responsibility, that claim is

not cognizable. See United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1342 (11th Cir.

1997) (a refusal to depart downward cannot be a ground for appeal unless the

district court believed it had no authority to depart).

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28 Opinion of the Court 22-10419

A district court abuses its discretion and imposes a substan-

tively unreasonable sentence “when it (1) fails to afford considera-

tion to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives

significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) com-

mits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.”

United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)

(citation omitted). We may only vacate a sentence “if [ ] we ‘are

left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court

committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) fac-

tors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reason-

able sentences dictated by the facts of the case.’” Id. at 1190 (quot-

ing United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008)). And

“[a]lthough we do not automatically presume that a sentence

within the guidelines range is reasonable, we ordinarily expect such

a sentence to be reasonable.” United States v. Perkins, 787 F.3d 1329,

1342 (11th Cir. 2015).

The district court considered Mr. Guerra’s offense to be very

serious, and believed it required a significant sentence. Neverthe-

less, it varied and departed downward 48 months below the 240-

month statutory maximum sentence after expressly considering

and weighing the § 3553(a) factors. We find no abuse of discretion

with respect to substantive reasonableness. Cf. United States v.

Tounisi, 900 F.3d 982, 987–88 (7th Cir. 2018) (upholding, as substan-

tively reasonable, a 180-month sentence imposed on a defendant

who violated § 2339B(a)(1) by attempting to provide material sup-

port to a foreign terrorist organization).

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22-10419 Opinion of the Court 29

V

We affirm Mr. Guerra’s sentence.

AFFIRMED.