The opinion
NOTICE
2021 IL App (5th) 200216-U
NOTICE
Decision filed 07/19/21. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be
NO. 5-20-0216 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed
the same. under Rule 23(e)(1).
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Franklin County.
)
v. ) No. 15-CF-35
)
MARVIN BEERS, ) Honorable
) Thomas J. Dinn III,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Moore and Cates concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We vacate the trial court’s judgment resentencing the defendant where the
record does not affirmably demonstrate that the defendant was eligible for an
extended-term sentence.
¶2 The defendant, Marvin Beers, pled guilty on October 4, 2017, to one count of
unlawful possession of less than five grams of methamphetamine in violation of section
60(a) of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act (Act) (720 ILCS
646/60(a) (West 2014)). Pursuant to his plea agreement, the defendant was sentence to 30
months of probation.
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¶3 The State filed a petition to revoke the defendant’s probation on April 29, 2019. On
August 28, 2019, the defendant made an admission to the allegations in the State’s petition
to revoke, and on August 30, 2019, the trial court entered a written order finding the
defendant in violation of his probation. On November 21, 2019, the defendant was
resentenced by the trial court to nine years in the Illinois Department of Corrections
followed by a year of mandatory supervised release. The trial court entered its written
judgment on November 25, 2019, indicating that the defendant was eligible for, and
sentenced to, an extended-term sentence pursuant to section 5-8-2 of the Unified Code of
Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-2 (West 2014)).
¶4 The defendant now appeals the trial court’s resentencing judgment arguing that the
record fails to affirmatively establish that the defendant was eligible for an extended-term
sentence. The defendant also argues that the trial court was predisposed to impose a more
severe sentence and improperly considered matters outside of the record in aggravation
while failing to consider a relevant mitigating factor. For the following reasons, we vacate
the trial court’s resentencing judgment.
¶5 BACKGROUND
¶6 On January 11, 2015, the defendant was arrested for driving on a suspended license,
and pursuant to that arrest, a tow inventory was conducted on his vehicle. Inside the
defendant’s vehicle, law enforcement recovered a metal spoon and a plastic bag containing
a white powder that was later determined to be methamphetamine. On October 4, 2017,
the defendant pled guilty to one count of unlawful possession of less than five grams of
methamphetamine in violation of section 60(a) of the Act (720 ILCS 646/60(a) (West
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2014)). Pursuant to his negotiated plea agreement, the defendant was sentenced to 30
months of probation on the same day. The defendant’s initial sentencing hearing was
presided over by the Honorable Judge Eric J. Dirnbeck. At the sentencing hearing, the trial
court asked the State if the defendant was eligible for an extended-term sentence. The State
explained that:
“[Defendant] was convicted in Perry County Case No. 2001-CF-218,
possession of controlled substance, and was sentenced to four years in the Illinois
Department of Corrections. Therefore, I believe he is extended-term eligible, Your
Honor. I believe that must have been a Class 3 felony.”
¶7 The trial court responded:
“Okay. Well, I will advise him then as if he were to be. I don’t know, you
know, whether—you have the issue of timing, too. If that is a ‘1’ case and it is four
years, when did he get out? When was this case—you know, how did that fit
together with when this was alleged to have been committed? But it’s close, so I
will advise him as if he is.
Anyway, so the possible sentencing if you were to be convicted of this
offense and you did not have this agreement are as follows: two to five years in the
Department of Corrections. The extended term is five to ten years, which you might
be eligible for. You could be sentenced in the extended term at the discretion of the
sentencing judge in this case later on or if you did not have his agreement.”
¶8 On April 29, 2019, the State filed a petition to revoke the defendant’s probation.
According to the State’s petition to revoke, the defendant failed to report to his probation
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officer on December 27, 2018, and January 18, 2019, in Williamson County, and failed to
report in February, March, and April 2019 in Franklin County. The State’s petition to
revoke also alleged that the defendant failed to appear at his review hearing on February
22, 2019. On August 28, 2019, the defendant appeared before the trial court, waived his
right to a hearing, and admitted the allegations in the State’s petition to revoke his
probation. The defendant also waived his right to be resentenced by Judge Eric J. Dirnbeck.
The trial court entered a written order on August 30, 2019, finding the defendant in
violation of his probation and ordering the probation officer to prepare a presentence
investigation report (PSI).
¶9 The PSI was filed on October 22, 2019, and set forth the defendant’s history of
delinquency and criminality, which included a 2004 federal conviction for conspiracy to
manufacture and distribute methamphetamine and cocaine. 1 Although the PSI listed the
class of the defendant’s convictions along with the sentences imposed, the PSI failed to
indicate the sentencing dates or the dates that the defendant was in custody pursuant to
each case.
¶ 10 On November 21, 2019, the trial court conducted a resentencing hearing presided
over by the Honorable Judge Thomas Dinn. The State did not present any evidence
regarding the defendant’s prior convictions at the resentencing hearing. Although the State
1
Case No. 03-CR-40051 was filed on July 15, 2003. The judgment of guilty was entered on April
19, 2004, and the defendant was sentenced to 121 months in the Federal Bureau of Prisons and 60 months
of supervised release. The PSI indicated that on August 8, 2011, defendant’s supervised release was
revoked, and he was sentenced to 18 months in the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
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requested that the defendant be resentenced to four years in the Illinois Department of
Corrections, the trial court informed the defendant as follows:
“All right. The Court has considered arguments of the counsel, the
defendant’s statement in allocution, the presentence investigation report, which also
provides the Court with the information that to incarcerate you in the Department
of Corrections would cost the taxpayers $26,000 a year. That was in 2016.
[Defendant], I have been involved as a prosecutor and a judge in this county
for quite some time. You are not a stranger to me. I was aware of some of your
criminal history, but I guess not the full extent of your criminal history. You have
quite possibly one of the worst criminal histories I have seen. Just abysmal,
absolutely horrible criminal history. Which you know full well, right? No secret to
you.
***
You’re extended term eligible. You are looking at two to ten years on this
Class 3 felony. You knew that when you pled guilty and got probation. You
followed that up with two more convictions, it looks like.
You don’t report to probation. You don’t do anything that you are told. That
would be—I think people would question my sanity if I were to put you on
probation. I’m talking now, [defendant]. So that’s not going to happen. Just get that
out of your mind. All right?
I feel that I don’t find any particular factor in mitigation. In aggravation,
obviously, I find a history of prior criminality, which would encompass the ‘17 case
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and the other ‘15 case, which I believe was from another county. All that comes into
play.
I’m going to sentence you to nine years in the Department of Corrections,
nine years. One-year mandatory supervised release, the cost of the proceedings, nine
years. The bill has come due, [defendant]. You have lived the life of the inveterate
criminal. That’s what you are. Okay?
Here’s your pedigree right here, your resume right here. I’m glad to hear that
you think you are doing a little bit better. You think that. We don’t really have any
reason to believe it because you don’t report to probation.
Now, I have seen your son in court. He does, however, seem to have stepped
off the road that you placed him on, I’m sure, some time ago. So I do have some
hope for Corey. I don’t have any hope for you. I would be a fool to feel otherwise.
You have proven what you are and you are getting sentenced as much. That’s it.
Nine years, one-year mandatory supervised release, costs. That’s it. Am I forgetting
anything?”
¶ 11 On November 25, 2019, the trial court entered its written resentencing order
executed by the Honorable Judge Eric J. Dirnbeck. The written resentencing order
indicated that the defendant was eligible for, and given, an extended-term sentence
pursuant to section 5-8-2 of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-2 (West 2014)). The defendant did
not file a postsentencing motion and now appeals the trial court’s resentencing judgment.
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¶ 12 ANALYSIS
¶ 13 The first issue that the defendant raises on appeal is whether the trial court erred in
resentencing the defendant to an extended-term sentence pursuant to section 5-8-2 of the
Code (id.) where the record does not affirmatively demonstrate that he was eligible for an
extended-term sentence. According to the defendant, the record does not affirmatively
establish that the defendant was convicted of a same, similar, or greater class felony within
10 years, excluding time spent in custody, prior to the current conviction. While the
defendant states that he “might” be eligible for an extended-term sentence, the defendant
argues that the record fails to affirmatively establish that he was “actually eligible” for an
extended-term sentence. The defendant acknowledges that he failed to preserve this issue
within a written postsentencing motion but argues that this court should review his
resentence under a plain error analysis. Under a plain error analysis, the defendant argues
that his resentence must be vacated and this matter remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
¶ 14 The State acknowledges that the record is unclear concerning whether the defendant
was eligible for an extended-term sentence and agrees that remand is necessary. The State,
however, argues that the remand should direct the parties and the court to ascertain the time
defendant spent in federal custody for the purpose of determining whether the tolling
provision of section 5-5-3.2(b)(1) of the Code would permit the defendant’s 2004 federal
conviction to be considered a qualifying prior conviction. Id. § 5-5-3.2(b)(1).
¶ 15 Illinois courts have long held that an issue is forfeited on appeal unless a party makes
an objection at the time of the purported error and specifically raises the issue in a written
posttrial motion. People v. Bowens, 407 Ill. App. 3d 1094, 1109 (2011). The purpose of
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this rule is to encourage parties to raise their concerns in the circuit courts so that the lower
courts have an opportunity to correct any alleged errors prior to appeal. 1010 Lake Shore
Ass’n v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 2015 IL 118372, ¶ 14. The plain error doctrine,
however, is a narrow and limited exception to the general rule of procedural default which
allows plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights to be noticed although the error or
defect was not brought to the attention of the trial court. People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539,
545 (2010). An otherwise unpreserved error may be noticed under the plain error doctrine,
codified in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615 (eff. Jan. 1, 1967), if the defendant first
demonstrates that a clear or obvious error occurred and then shows that either “(1) the
evidence at the sentencing hearing was closely balanced, or (2) the error was so egregious
as to deny the defendant a fair sentencing hearing.” Id.
¶ 16 The trial court’s resentencing judgment indicated that the defendant was eligible for,
and sentenced to, an extended-term sentence pursuant to section 5-8-2 of the Code. 730
ILCS 5/5-8-2 (West 2014). Section 5-8-2(a) of the Code provides that a “judge may
sentence an offender to an extended term as provided in Article 4.5 of Chapter V” if a
factor in aggravation set forth in section 5-5-3.2 of the Code is found to be present. Id. § 5-
8-2(a). Here, the applicable factor in aggravation is set forth under subsection (b)(1) of
section 5-5-3.2 of the Code, which states:
“When a defendant is convicted of any felony, after having been previously
convicted in Illinois or any other jurisdiction of the same or similar class felony or
greater class felony, when such conviction has occurred within 10 years after the
previous conviction, excluding time spent in custody, and such charges are
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separately brought and tried and arise out of different series of acts[.]” Id. § 5-5-
3.2(b)(1).
¶ 17 The parties agree, and this court concurs, that the record does not reflect whether
the defendant was eligible for an extended-term sentence. The State did not submit any
evidence regarding the defendant’s prior convictions and, as such, the only documentation
considered by the trial court at the resentencing hearing was the PSI. The PSI set forth the
defendant’s prior offenses, the classification of those offenses, the date of the convictions,
and the sentences imposed. The PSI did not, however, contain the dates that the defendant
spent in custody for his prior offenses or the dates on which the sentences were imposed.
¶ 18 The time a defendant spent in custody on a previous conviction is excluded from
the calculations, and the date of the sentencing order is the date of a conviction for the
purpose of determining the 10-year period under section 5-5-3.2(b)(1) of the Code. Id.;
People v. Lemons, 191 Ill. 2d 155, 159 (2000) (citing People v. Robinson, 89 Ill. 2d 469,
477 (1982)). As such, a defendant’s prior sentencing and custody dates are vital for a trial
court’s determination of whether a current conviction occurred within 10 years after a
previous conviction of the same or similar class felony or greater class felony. While there
may be times in which a trial court can clearly determine whether a prior conviction falls
within or outside of the 10-year period without these dates, that is not the case in this matter.
¶ 19 The State notes that the PSI evidenced three potentially qualifying prior convictions
and acknowledges that two of those convictions would fall outside the 10-year statutory
period. The State indicates, however, that it is uncertain whether the defendant’s 2004
federal conviction for conspiracy to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine and
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cocaine would be a qualifying prior conviction. According to the State, it cannot ascertain
at this time whether defendant’s 2004 federal conviction qualifies as prior conviction under
section 5-5-3.2(b)(1) because neither the record nor the existing online federal inmate
records demonstrate the defendant’s custody dates.
¶ 20 We also note that the State’s calculations provided in its brief utilized the date that
the defendant was adjudicated guilty in the 2004 federal matter and not the date of the
defendant’s sentencing. As noted above, the date of the entry of the sentencing order is the
date of a conviction for the purpose of determining the 10-year period under section 5-5-
3.2(b)(1) of the Code. Lemons, 191 Ill. 2d at 159. Therefore, the defendant’s sentence and
custody dates regarding the defendant’s 2004 federal conviction are crucial for the
determination of whether the defendant’s current conviction fell within 10 years after his
federal conviction. Since neither the sentencing dates nor the custody dates regarding the
defendant’s prior convictions were before the trial court at the resentencing hearing, the
defendant has established that a clear error occurred when the trial court failed to ensure
that the defendant was eligible for an extended-term sentence prior to resentencing the
defendant to an extended-term sentence.
¶ 21 The next step in our plain error analysis is whether the evidence at the resentencing
hearing was closely balanced or the error was so egregious as to deny the defendant a fair
sentencing hearing. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545. When a trial court fails to base its sentence
on the applicable standards and appropriate evidence, the integrity of the judicial process
is undermined and a defendant’s right to a fair sentencing hearing is violated. People v.
Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 48 (2009). In this matter, the trial court resentenced the defendant to
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an extended term of incarceration with no evidence of the defendant’s sentencing or
custody dates regarding his prior convictions on which to base its determination that the
defendant had prior conviction that fell within the statutory requirements for imposing an
extended-term sentence. Therefore, we find that the trial court’s clear error in failing to
affirmatively establish that the defendant was extended-term eligible meets the requirement
of the second prong of the plain error doctrine as the error was so egregious as to deny the
defendant a fair sentencing hearing. Based on the above, we find that the defendant has
met the requirements of the plain error doctrine and that the trial court’s resentencing
judgment must be vacated and this matter remanded.
¶ 22 We disagree, however, with the State’s assertion that the remand should be limited
to directions for the parties and the trial court to ascertain the time defendant spent in
federal custody for purposes of determining whether the tolling provision of section 5-5-
3.2(b)(1) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(1) (West 2014)) would permit the
defendant’s 2004 federal conviction to be considered a qualifying prior conviction. Such a
remand would be futile if the trial court were to determine that the defendant was not
entitled to extended-term sentence since a lower court is prohibited from acting outside the
scope of a remand. See People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 33 (2000) (a trial court has no authority
to act beyond the scope of the mandate, and any order issued by trial court outside the
scope of the mandate is void for lack of jurisdiction). Thus, a limited remand would not
permit the trial court to resentence the defendant, if necessary, without additional appellate
review. The proper remedy for a sentencing error of this nature is to remand for a new
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sentencing hearing. See People v. Young, 2018 IL App (3d) 160003, ¶ 12; People v. Bailey,
2015 IL App (3d) 130287, ¶ 16; People v. Hurley, 277 Ill. App. 3d 684, 688 (1996).
¶ 23 Next, the defendant argues that the sentencing judge improperly considered matters
outside of the record in aggravation. The defendant argues that this court should vacate the
resentence and remand with directions that his resentencing be conducted by a different
judge. As with the defendant’s extended-term sentencing issue, this issue was unpreserved
and the defendant must first demonstrate that a clear or obvious error occurred and then
show that either the evidence at the sentencing hearing was closely balanced, or the error
was so egregious as to deny the defendant a fair sentencing hearing. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at
545. Since we have already determined that the trial court’s resentence judgment is
required to be vacated, we will only address the defendant’s arguments concerning remand
before a different jurist.
¶ 24 The defendant argues that the sentencing judge’s comments during the resentencing
hearing demonstrate that the trial court considered its personal knowledge of the defendant
and his son as an improper aggravating factor. According to the defendant, the sentencing
judge’s comments concerning the defendant’s son indicated that the judge found the
defendant responsible for whatever crimes his son had committed or, at the very least, that
the defendant was a poor parent who placed his son on a road to criminal activity.
¶ 25 The defendant further argues that the PSI indicated that, other than the present case
and a 2014 misdemeanor for the unlawful display of a license plate, the defendant did not
have a conviction in Franklin County since 1990. As such, the defendant states that the
sentencing judge’s comments that the judge had been involved as a prosecutor and a judge
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in the county for “quite some time” and that the defendant was “not a stranger” to him
demonstrate that the sentencing judge was familiar with the defendant in a manner
unrelated to any criminal offenses committed in Franklin County.
¶ 26 The State argues that there is no evidence in the record that explicitly demonstrates
that the judge’s comments concerning the defendant’s son were indicative of the judge
considering an improper aggravating factor in imposing the resentence. The State notes
that the judge’s comments came at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing after the trial
court had already stated that it had considered the defendant’s prior criminality as a factor
in aggravation for its resentencing. As such, the State argues that although the judge’s
comments were unnecessary, the comments did not constitute an aggravating factor which
influenced the ultimate resentence.
¶ 27 A trial court may consider nonstatutory aggravating factors in imposing a sentence
where the evidence considered is both relevant and reliable. People v. Joe, 207 Ill. App. 3d
1079, 1086 (1991). A trial court may not, however, determine a defendant’s sentence based
on its own personal knowledge, prejudice, speculation, or conjecture since the
consideration of an improper factor in aggravation clearly affects the defendant’s
fundamental right to liberty except in circumstances where the factor is an insignificant
element of the defendant’s sentence. See People v. Cervantes, 2014 IL App (3d) 120745,
¶ 47; People v. Dempsey, 242 Ill. App. 3d 568, 597-98 (1993). Where a reviewing court is
unable to determine the weight given to the improper aggravating factor in sentencing,
resentencing is required. Joe, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 1086. Further, it is improper for a trial
court to consider the conduct of another person in aggravation when sentencing a
13
defendant. People v. McPhee, 256 Ill. App. 3d 102, 114 (1993). The fact that a sentencing
judge added some personal observations, however, does not always result in error. People
v. Kolzow, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1, 9 (1998).
¶ 28 In People v. Varela, the trial court’s comment that the defendant “ ‘put in motion
the series of events which eventually got his brother *** in trouble’ ” were found on appeal
to be an improper consideration during sentencing. People v. Varela, 194 Ill. App. 3d 357,
363 (1990). In People v. Joe, this court found that the trial court’s comments concerning
the defendant’s responsibility for his brother’s conduct were based on irrelevant evidence
and an improper consideration in sentencing. Joe, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 1086.
¶ 29 In the case at bar, similar to Varela and Joe, the sentencing court attributed the
defendant’s son’s involvement with criminality to the defendant. The sentencing court
stated:
“Now, I have seen your son in court. He does, however, seem to have stepped
off the road that you placed him on, I’m sure, some time ago. So I do have some
hope for Corey. I don’t have any hope for you. I would be a fool to feel otherwise.
You have proven what you are and you are getting sentenced as much. That’s it.
Nine years, one-year mandatory supervised release, costs. That’s it.”
¶ 30 The record before the trial court did not contain any information regarding
defendant’s son’s past criminality, if any. Therefore, the judge’s statement could have only
been based on the judge’s own personal knowledge. Although the State is correct that the
judge’s comments concerning the defendant’s son were made chronologically after the
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resentence was initially announced, the comments were made during the judge’s elocution
on the resentence and the judge stressed the resentence upon completion of the comments.
¶ 31 When viewing the above statement along with the judge’s other comment that the
defendant was “not a stranger,” we find that the defendant has demonstrated that a clear
error occurred when the sentencing judge considered an improper aggravating factor based
upon his personal knowledge in resentencing the defendant.
¶ 32 Under our plain error analysis, we must next determine whether the evidence at the
sentencing hearing was closely balanced, or the error was so egregious as to deny the
defendant a fair sentencing hearing. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545. As stated above, the
consideration of an improper factor in aggravation during sentencing clearly affects the
defendant’s fundamental right to liberty except in circumstances where the factor is an
insignificant element of the defendant’s sentence. See Cervantes, 2014 IL App (3d)
120745, ¶ 47; Dempsey, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 597-98. Based on the record, we are unable to
determine the weight given to the improper aggravating factor and, as such, cannot
determine that the improper factor was an insignificant element of the defendant’s
sentence.
¶ 33 Therefore, we find that the error was egregious enough as to deny the defendant a
fair sentencing hearing and that remand with directions that the defendant’s resentencing
be conducted before another judge is appropriate to remove any suggestion of unfairness.
Since we are directing that the defendant’s resentencing be conducted by another jurist, we
will not address defendant’s remaining issues of whether the trial court was predisposed to
15
impose a more severe sentence or failed to consider the defendant’s steady employment in
mitigation since the issues are now moot.
¶ 34 Finally, the defendant states that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his
resentencing hearing. In his argument regarding the plain error doctrine, the defendant
asserts that the errors brought within this appeal were also forfeited through his counsel’s
failure to make the proper objections during the resentencing hearing and counsel’s failure
to preserve the errors by filing a proper postsentence motion. The defendant then cites the
two-part analysis set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), without
any argument, citation to the record, or precedent concerning how his counsel’s
representation fell within the Strickland analysis.
¶ 35 As previously noted, issues not raised in a posttrial motion are forfeited for review
on appeal. People v. Nielson, 187 Ill. 2d 271, 296 (1999). In Illinois, issues that must be
raised in a direct appeal include a constitutional claim alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel. People v. Veach, 2017 IL 120649, ¶ 47. If not raised in the direct appeal, a
defendant risks the claim being deemed procedurally defaulted. Id. Forfeiture does not,
however, bar review of an issue when the forfeiture arises from the ineffective assistance
of counsel. People v. Moore, 177 Ill. 2d 421, 428 (1997). A defendant cannot, however,
simply state that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in an effort to avoid
forfeiture. In order to effectively raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
defendant is required to allege both deficient performance and prejudice to the defendant.
People v. Gaines, 105 Ill. 2d 79, 92-93 (1984) (discussing two-part test set forth in
Strickland, 466 U.S. 668). The deficient performance prong of the Strickland analysis
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requires that a defendant demonstrate that counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis requires a
reasonable probability that the results of the proceedings would have been different but for
the unprofessional errors. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504,
525-26 (1984).
¶ 36 The defendant argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel without any
argument, citation to the record, or precedent concerning how counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness or that there was any probability that the
results of the resentencing proceedings would have been different but for counsel’s errors.
We also note that the defendant did not state an ineffective of assistance of counsel claim
as an issue presented for this court’s review nor does he include a prayer for relief that this
court remand with directions for the appointment of new counsel.
¶ 37 A reviewing court is entitled to have all the issues clearly defined and be provided
with meaningful, coherent argument and citation to pertinent authority. Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 341(h)(7) requires, in part, “[a]rgument, which shall contain the contentions of
the appellant and reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the
record relied on.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Subsection (8) of Rule 341(h)
requires a short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(8) (eff.
Oct. 1, 2020). The defendant’s argument on ineffective assistance of counsel has neither
and fails to meet the requirements of subsections (7) and (8) of Rule 341(h). Ill. S. Ct. R.
341(h)(7), (8) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Therefore, the defendant has failed to articulate an
17
organized and cohesive legal argument of ineffective assistance of counsel for this court’s
consideration and has forfeited this issue on appeal.
¶ 38 CONCLUSION
¶ 39 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the resentencing judgment of the trial court
and remand the cause for a new resentencing hearing before a different judge.
¶ 40 Vacated and remanded with directions.
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