The opinion
Filed 4/15/24; Certified for Publication 5/9/24 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ROBERT BASSI, H049873
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 2012FL009065)
v.
SUSAN BASSI,
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT1
Susan Bassi appeals the denial of her anti-SLAPP motion2 to strike a petition for a
domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) brought by her ex-husband, Robert Bassi.3
Robert filed the petition for DVRO in response to a series of e-mails from Susan that he
contends were harassing, disturbed his peace, interfered with his business, and affected
his standing in the community. Susan asserts the e-mails are protected free speech and
1
Before Danner, Acting P. J., Wilson, J., and Bromberg, J.
An anti-SLAPP motion is “a special motion to strike a ‘strategic lawsuit against
2
public participation (SLAPP).’ ” (Parrish v. Latham & Watkins (2017) 3 Cal.5th 767,
773–774.)
3
We refer to the parties by their first names for clarity. (See Rubenstein v.
Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1136, fn. 1.)
litigation correspondence informing Robert of her intent to file an “agricultural
racketeering RICO”4 action against him and others.
The trial court denied Susan’s anti-SLAPP motion after deciding that several of
the e-mails were not privileged or protected speech, and Robert had demonstrated a
likelihood of prevailing on the merits of his DVRO petition. We affirm the order.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND5
A. Petition For Domestic Violence Restraining Order
This appeal arises from a DVRO petition filed toward the end of a protracted and
contentious marital dissolution between Susan and Robert. In 2018, the trial court
entered judgment in the marital dissolution; this court affirmed the judgment in 2023.6
In 2021, Robert filed a petition for DVRO (hereafter, petition) and obtained a
temporary restraining order against Susan. The petition indicated that Robert and Susan
were previously married, had initiated a divorce action in 2012, and that Susan was
previously declared a vexatious litigant by the superior court.
The 2021 petition cited a “barrage” of e-mail communications from Susan as the
basis of the requested restraining order. Robert asserted, “Susan Bassi has been harassing
me for months by email, disturbing my peace, and interfering with my business. The
harassing emails make accusations that I have engaged in criminal acts, fraud, vast
4
Susan states she is bringing a federal action against Robert and others under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.).
5
We draw the following facts from the pleadings and supporting declarations
submitted in the trial court. We accept Robert’s factual assertions as true for the purpose
of resolving whether the trial court erred in denying Susan’s anti-SLAPP motion and
consider only whether any contrary evidence from Susan establishes her entitlement to
prevail as a matter of law. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 (Park); Laker v. Board of Trustees of California State
University (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 745, 754 (Laker).)
6
A panel of this court affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion (In re the
Marriage of Bassi (June 22, 2023, H046284)), and the California Supreme Court denied
review (Marriage of Bassi (Sept. 13, 2023, S281233)).
2
conspiracies, and threaten me directly. The emails are often copied to business associates
and customers, subjecting me to contempt, ridicule, and lost opportunities. My lawyer
asked [the] lawyer for Susan Bassi to stop with the harassing emails and all she did was
step up the number of harassing emails.”
Robert contended that the e-mails served “no legitimate purpose” because he and
Susan were each represented by counsel and there was no need for her to personally
contact him. He interpreted the e-mails as threats, including statements about Robert’s
girlfriend (calling her a “ ‘RICO bookkeeper’ ”), and statements accusing Robert of
involving his and Susan’s children and grandchildren and of being “an ‘AG mob boss,’ ”
likening him to “Bernie Madoff,” and telling him that his “ ‘window is narrow’ ” and he
“ ‘will have to answer for [his conduct].’ ”
The petition included copies of e-mails sent by Susan to Robert in June and July
2021,7 which he asserted were “just the recent emails.”
B. Special Motion to Strike DVRO Petition (Anti-SLAPP Motion)
The trial court continued the hearing on the petition to allow for proper service on
Susan, during which time Susan filed a substitution of attorney to represent herself. She
subsequently filed a notice of limited scope representation identifying attorney Patrick
Evans, her attorney for the future RICO action, as her attorney for purposes of the DVRO
petition. On October 25, prior to the scheduled DVRO hearing, Susan filed the anti-
SLAPP motion at issue in this appeal (motion).
The motion alleged that Robert filed the petition not to protect himself from
harassment but to “suppress and punish his ex-wife [Susan]’s exercise of free and
litigation privileged speech.” Susan asserted that Robert sought to restrain her from
“voicing claims that he and co-conspirators engage in racketeering to produce and sell
counterfeit seed used to grow phony ‘organic’ lettuce for consumers”—conduct she
7
Unless otherwise indicated, all dates were in 2021.
3
argued was of great public interest because “it cheats seed patent holders out of
intellectual property and defrauds consumers into believing they are buying ‘organic.’ ”
The motion claimed that it was not harassment that prompted the petition, which was
filed “months” after the purportedly offending e-mails, but rather “Robert’s alarm at
Susan’s fact-based RICO complaint” of which she had informed Robert and his family
law counsel, Carlos Martinez. Susan argued that Robert never designated an attorney to
receive communications about the forthcoming RICO action, and because Martinez
refused to receive any communications from Susan’s attorney related to her proposed
RICO action and blocked those e-mails, her only option was to contact Robert directly.
On the merits, the motion maintained as to the first step of the anti-SLAPP
analysis that the e-mails to Robert consisted of speech related to litigation and made
before government agencies, including law enforcement and executive agencies such as
“the USDA, the IRS, the CCOF [organic certification], and the SEC.” The motion
identified the litigation to which the e-mails related as “seed RICO.”
For each e-mail identified in Robert’s petition, Susan sought to explain the “seed
RICO” litigation-related purpose of the communication, acknowledging the e-mails
would otherwise “seem ‘off topic.’ ” She argued that each of the e-mails pertained to the
forthcoming RICO action—for example, by informing Robert of information related to
the RICO draft complaint, suggesting that he keep the RICO matter confidential and
avoid involving their children and grandchildren, and asserting she had evidence that
“tied” Robert’s girlfriend to the alleged racketeering and made her a target defendant.
Susan also claimed that her communications were protected speech because she is an
investigative journalist who reports to the public on agricultural topics, and that Robert’s
petition seeks to discredit her and “restrain journalistic inquiry.”
As to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the motion asserted that the
petition cannot prevail as a matter of law because Robert has not shown the e-mails
constituted “abuse” within the meaning of the applicable restraining order statute and
4
moreover, cannot show that her speech was not protected by the litigation privilege. The
motion characterized Robert’s declaration that he is “disturbed” by the “seed RICO”
allegations as an “adoptive admission of RICO charges,” the truth of which, according to
the motion, Robert has not denied.
The motion included the declarations of Susan and Evans (Susan’s limited scope
attorney for the proposed RICO action and petition), exhibits, and a series of evidentiary
objections to the statements set forth in Robert’s declaration in support of his petition.
The exhibits included a copy of a revised draft RICO complaint, which Evans had sent to
Robert’s attorney Martinez, and copies of Evans’s correspondence to Martinez and to
counsel for one of the target corporate defendants in the proposed RICO action.
Evans’s declaration stated that he is Susan’s attorney investigating the agricultural
racketeering scheme, is “skilled at assessing how individuals and firms are conducting
themselves unlawfully but covering with a legitimate business façade,” and based on his
review and due diligence “contend[s] there is basis for probable cause to believe that the
claims and allegations in the discussion draft RICO complaint . . . are true.” Evans’s
declaration summarized the basis for the draft seed RICO case, which alleges that Robert
and others are engaged in the manufacture and sale of counterfeit stock seed sold as
“ ‘organic’ ” seed, in alleged violation of federal law and state and local trade association
regulations.
In her declaration, Susan described the seed businesses that she and Robert had
formed, her prior consulting work in organic seed and agriculture, her discovery of the
“racket,” and Robert’s purported efforts through the decade of divorce proceedings to
“completely shut [her] out from knowing about or investigating the businesses.” Susan
declared that after gaining access to certain books and records through the divorce
proceedings in 2014, she learned of transactions that concerned her but was barred from
reporting on the alleged tax and regulatory violations by the appointed discovery referee
in the divorce case. Susan further declared that various family court orders denied her
5
access to the “ ‘double books’ for seed RICO that [she] believe[s]” Robert’s girlfriend
“maintains for the RICO enterprise.” Susan asserted that through her preparation of the
“seed RICO allegations,” she filed complaints to government agencies including the
USDA and SEC, reported her concerns to law enforcement, and engaged with the IRS
about tax issues, leading the IRS to request a copy of her draft RICO complaint. Susan
asserted that she “will file the seed RICO federal complaint.”
Robert filed written opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion and requested an award
of attorney fees and costs. Robert objected to the declarations of Susan and Evans “in
their entirety” on grounds including lack of relevance or foundation, hearsay, and
“argumentative nonsense that is at best merely conclusory rather than stating any actual
facts based on personal knowledge.” Robert contended that speech that violates the
Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) under Family Code sections 6203 and
6320—which together define “abuse” to include conduct that “ ‘destroys the mental or
emotional calm of the other party’ ”—is not protected speech. Robert argued that the e-
mails could not qualify as prelitigation communications due to the lack of factual
foundation for the proposed RICO action, which he maintained Susan had threatened in
order to exact a settlement from him in the dissolution matter. Robert pointed to case
authority clarifying that threats to commence litigation are not privileged if made only as
a means of inducing settlement of a claim and not in good faith contemplation of a
lawsuit. Robert further contended that even if Susan were able to show the e-mails were
protected litigation speech, his DVRO petition claims are sufficient to prevail. Robert
asserted that the grant of a temporary restraining order demonstrates he “has already
made a legally and factually sufficient case as a matter of law.”
Robert submitted a declaration in support of the opposition. He responded to the
facts asserted by Susan and Evans and declared them to be wildly speculative and lacking
any factual basis. Robert explained his seed farming business, methods for growing
(multiplying) stock seed provided by customers, and reasons that the claimed “seed
6
RICO allegations” involving the “ ‘manufacture’ ” of “ ‘counterfeit’ ” seeds exhibited a
lack of knowledge of the seed farming industry and of the relationship between seed
growing and organic farming. Robert addressed statements regarding his girlfriend and
asserted she does not have access to the financial records and has never worked for him
or his businesses as a “bookkeeper.” He declared that Susan has been pressing her RICO
theories on him “for at least a year” and though he is unconcerned about the “phony
lawsuit” intended for federal court, he is seeking DVRO protection to stop her
harassment of him. Martinez, Robert’s counsel, also submitted a declaration in support
of the opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion and in support of Robert’s request for
attorney fees and costs.
Susan filed a reply brief in further support of her anti-SLAPP motion. She
contended that Robert “admits that the communications are meant to exact settlement”
and argued that he offers no authority that settlement communications “are sufficient for
a DVRO.” She likewise contended that Robert had not demonstrated that speech “on the
national news topic of agricultural fraud with phony ‘inorganic’ labels” may be subject to
a DVRO, maintained that the RICO lawsuit is not frivolous, and asserted the suit is “on
track for filing.” (Boldface & capitalization omitted.) She also disputed his likening of
her settlement related communications to extortion and asserted that the litigation
privilege is absolute, and if extortion were at issue, then Robert’s remedy would be to sue
for civil extortion.
C. Order Denying the Anti-SLAPP Motion
The trial court issued a written tentative ruling denying the anti-SLAPP motion.
After hearing argument from both sides, the court adopted its tentative ruling as its final
order and overruled, for purposes of the anti-SLAPP motion only, Susan’s evidentiary
objections to Robert’s declaration in support of his petition.
The order denying the anti-SLAPP motion addressed both steps of the anti-SLAPP
analysis. It explained, citing case authority, that prelitigation statements and writings
7
made in connection with litigation contemplated in good faith are protected under the
anti-SLAPP statute, while communications “substantially extraneous to the judicial
proceedings” are not protected. As applied to the e-mails cited in Robert’s petition, the
court rejected Robert’s assertion that Susan’s missives were mere empty threats, given
that she had retained counsel for purposes of the proposed RICO litigation and provided a
detailed draft complaint. Nevertheless, the court concluded that “several of the subject e-
mails are not substantially related to the substantive issues in the litigation.”
The trial court further concluded that even if Susan did meet her burden at the first
step, the motion would fail because Robert had met his burden of demonstrating a
probability of success on the merits of his petition. The court noted that it had previously
found, in granting the requested temporary personal conduct and stay-away order, that
Robert’s petition was sufficient to establish a prima facie case for a permanent DVRO
under the applicable Family Code provisions. It therefore denied Susan’s anti-SLAPP
motion and further denied both parties’ request for attorney fees and costs awards.
Susan appealed from the order denying her anti-SLAPP motion. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 904.1, subd. (a)(13).8)
II. DISCUSSION
Susan challenges the trial court’s denial of her anti-SLAPP motion. She asserts
her e-mails are protected speech under the categories enumerated in the anti-SLAPP
statute (§ 425.16, subds. (b)(1), (e)) and to which the statutory litigation privilege applies
(Civ. Code, § 47). Susan also contends that case law does not support imposition of a
domestic violence restraining order based on nonthreatening e-mail communications sent
by one litigant to another. She asserts that Robert never gave a clear “ ‘no party
contact’ ” directive or designated an attorney to receive RICO related communications.
She maintains that under these circumstances, the court’s denial of her anti-SLAPP
8
Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
8
motion creates a “dangerous precedent that chills settlement effort[s]” for family law
litigants. (Boldface & capitalization omitted.)
A. The Anti-SLAPP Statute
Section 425.16 provides that a cause of action arising from an act in furtherance of
a person’s constitutional right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue
is subject to a special motion to strike, unless the plaintiff—here, Robert as the party
seeking the DVRO—establishes a probability of prevailing on the claim. (§ 425.16,
subd. (b)(1).) The statute “allows defendants to request early judicial screening of legal
claims targeting free speech or petitioning activities.” (Wilson v. Cable News Network,
Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 880-881 (Wilson).)
A court evaluates a special motion to strike in two steps. The first examines the
nature of the conduct that underlies the plaintiff’s allegations to determine whether it is
protected by section 425.16; the second assesses the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.
(Barry v. State Bar of California (2017) 2 Cal.5th 318, 321 (Barry); see also Laker,
supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 760.) The anti-SLAPP statute is to “be construed broadly” in
furtherance of its stated goals. (§ 425.16, subd. (a); Barry, at p. 321.)
In the first step, the trial court determines whether the claim “ ‘arises from’ an
‘ “ ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United
States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue.’ ” ’ ” (Laker, supra,
32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 759—760, quoting City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th
409, 422.) The court must evaluate whether the moving defendant has shown the speech
or act underlying the plaintiff’s claim falls within one or more of the four categories of
protected acts set out in section 425.16, subdivision (e) (hereafter, section 425.16(e)).
(Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884.) The categories protect any written or oral statement
or writing made (1) “before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other
official proceeding authorized by law,” (2) “in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official
9
proceeding authorized by law,” (3) “in a place open to the public or a public forum in
connection with an issue of public interest,” or (4) “any other conduct in furtherance of
the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech
in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16(e).)
If the defendant prevails at the first step, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate the merit of the claim. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1); Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
p. 884.) In the second step, the plaintiff must show “ ‘that the complaint is both legally
sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a
favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ ” (Soukup v.
Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291 (Soukup).) “If the plaintiff is
unable to demonstrate that his or her claim has at least minimal merit, then the trial court
should deem the cause of action a SLAPP and should strike it.” (Laker, supra, 32
Cal.App.5th at p. 760.) “Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the
anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even
minimal merit—is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.” (Navellier v.
Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89.)
B. Standard of Review
“We review de novo the grant or denial of any anti-SLAPP motion. [Citation.]
We exercise independent judgment in determining whether, based on our own review of
the record, the challenged claims arise from protected activity.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th
at p. 1067.) We consider the pleadings and declarations, accepting as true the evidence
that favors the plaintiff (here, Robert) and evaluating the defendant’s (Susan’s) evidence
“ ‘ “ ‘only to determine if it has defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of
law.’ ” ’ ” (Barry, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 321.)
C. Analysis
We first address Susan’s framing of the issue on appeal. Susan contends that the
trial court recognized that her e-mail communications were made in connection with
10
forthcoming litigation but erroneously “carved out one email” as outside the scope of
protected speech. She argues that the “sole question” on appeal “is whether the single
email and others like it are privileged, and anti-SLAPP protected.”
We disagree with Susan that the trial court based its decision only on the e-mail
that it quoted in its order, or even “found” (as Susan contends) “that most of the email
was litigation privileged.” The court cited the language of an e-mail from June 27 and
concluded that “this e-mail (and several others like it) are not protected activity as
contemplated by” section 425.16(e)(1) and (2).
We independently review the court’s determination that Susan failed to meet her
burden at step one. We are not bound by the trial court’s findings with respect to the
nature of the communications and review the trial court’s ruling, not its reasoning.
(Trinity Risk Management, LLC v. Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2021) 59
Cal.App.5th 995, 1002 (Trinity).)
There is no dispute that Robert’s petition arises generally from speech activity,
namely, Susan’s e-mails communicating what she contends is litigation related
information. The disputed question is whether Susan has shown that the e-mails fall
within one or more of the four categories of “ ‘act[s]’ ” set out in section 425.16(e).
1. First Step: Protected Acts
In her anti-SLAPP motion, Susan asserted that her e-mails fall under all four anti-
SLAPP categories but focused on section 425.16(e)(1) and (2), asserting only in a
conclusory manner that “(3) and (4) also apply.” On appeal, Susan generally reiterates
this position. However, she proffers argument only to support her claim that the e-mails
come under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) (hereafter, § 425.16(e)(2)) as “ ‘writing
made in connection with an issue under consideration by . . . a judicial body,’ that being
the family court.” While she also asserts that her e-mail qualifies as protected speech
under section 425.16(e)(4) “because it concerned the food supply and chain, the mis-
labeling of ‘organic’ lettuce,” she provides no additional analysis or authority to support
11
the application of this provision to her e-mail communications. Insofar as Susan has
failed to support any argument on the applicability of section 425.16(e)(1), (3), and (4) to
the communications underlying the petition, we deem those points forfeited. (L.O. v.
Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 620; see Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37
CalApp.5th 270, 277.) We therefore consider only whether Susan’s e-mails come within
the intended scope and meaning of section 425.16(e)(2).
Section 425.16(e)(2) protects “any written or oral statement or writing made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or
judicial body.” (§ 425.16(e)(2), italics added.) This does not require that the “ ‘issue
under consideration’ ” concern a matter of public interest. (Neville v. Chudacoff (2008)
160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1261 (Neville).) The protection is not limited to statements made
after the commencement of a legal or other official proceeding. (Digerati Holdings, LLC
v. Young Money Entertainment, LLC (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 873, 886–887 (Digerati).)
“In the anti-SLAPP context, ‘ “[a]ny act” includes communicative conduct such as
the filing, funding, and prosecution of a civil action.’ ” (Timothy W. v. Julie W. (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 648, 658 (Timothy W.), quoting Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048,
1056.) This includes communications made in anticipation of litigation. (Neville, supra,
160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1263; Trinity, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1005.) However,
protection is not accorded to statements “having any connection, however remote, with
an official proceeding.” (Paul v. Friedman (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 853, 866 (Paul).)
Rather, “[t]he statements or writings in question must occur in connection with ‘an issue
under consideration or review’ in the proceeding” or the anticipated action. (Ibid.)
As interpreted by the Courts of Appeal, a statement or writing is “made ‘in
connection with’ ” litigation under section 425.16(e)(2)—including anticipated
litigation—“if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons
having some interest in the litigation.” (Neville, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266.)
12
Drawing guidance from the scope of the litigation privilege set forth in Civil Code
section 47, subdivision (b),9 courts have articulated the standard to reflect the reasonable
relevancy requirement incorporated in the litigation privilege. (Neville, supra, 160
Cal.App.4th at p. 1266 [“The reasonable relevancy requirement of [Civil Code] section
47 is analogous to the ‘in connection with’ standard of section 425.16, subdivision
(e)(2).”].) “To be protected by the litigation privilege, a communication must be ‘in
furtherance of the objects of the litigation.’ ” (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of
Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1251 (Action Apartment).)
Put differently, the statement must “ ‘be connected with, or have some logical
relation to, the action, i.e., . . . not be extraneous to the action.’ ” (Action Apartment,
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1251; see Neville, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266.) “A
prelitigation communication is privileged only when it relates to litigation that is
contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration.” (Action Apartment, at
p. 1251.) “ ‘Good faith’ in this context refers to a good faith intention to file a lawsuit
rather than a good faith belief in the truth of the communication.” (Digerati, supra, 194
Cal.App.4th at p. 887.) Courts have concluded on this basis that “a prelitigation
statement falls within clause (1) or (2) of section 425.16, subdivision (e) if the statement
‘ “concern[s] the subject of the dispute” and is made “in anticipation of litigation
‘contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration.’ ” ’ ” (Digerati, at p. 887;
accord, Neville, at p. 1268.)
Robert asserts that the e-mails from Susan do not qualify as protected litigation
related communications because there was no “legitimate litigation” being
9
The litigation privilege applies to a publication or broadcast made as part of a
“judicial proceeding.” (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b).) Though the litigation privilege is not
substantively the same as the anti-SLAPP protection, it may be viewed as an aid at the
first step in the anti-SLAPP analysis when deciding “whether a given communication
falls within the ambit of subdivisions (e)(1) and (2)” of section 425.16. (Flatley v. Mauro
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 323 (Flatley).)
13
communicated. We agree that, even under the broad construction afforded section
425.16, not all communications that reference proposed or threatened litigation satisfy the
relevancy and good faith criteria for a statement or writing “made in connection with an
issue under consideration . . . by a . . . judicial body” within the ambit of section
425.16(e)(2).
Robert’s petition contains 10 e-mails from Susan. Many of the communications
lack logical relevance to the threatened “seed RICO” dispute and fail to further any
discernible object of the anticipated litigation or address an issue under review in
connection with that proceeding.10 (See Neville, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266; Paul,
supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 866.) In particular, the June 11, June 12, June 15, June 17,
June 27, and first July 1 e-mails are irrelevant or highly peripheral to the proposed RICO
litigation. By contrast, the other e-mails in the petition (the second e-mail on July 1 and
the e-mails on July 2 and July 7) make direct assertions about the alleged facts underlying
Susan’s proposed RICO action. Nevertheless, Robert contends the e-mails are not
protected because they were not made in anticipation of litigation “ ‘contemplated in
good faith and under serious consideration.’ ” (Digerati, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at
p. 887.)
Having reviewed each e-mail under the applicable standard for protected speech
under section 425.16(e)(2), we conclude that certain e-mails (namely, the second July 1
10
Susan asserts on appeal that both “the marital dissolution and seed RICO were
the subjects of the” e-mails that prompted Robert’s DVRO petition. However, in
reviewing de novo the anti-SLAPP motion, we look to the record before the trial court.
Specifically, “[w]e consider ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits . . .
upon which the liability or defense is based.’ (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).)” (Soukup, supra,
39 Cal.4th at p. 269, fn. 3.) Susan’s declaration in the trial court centered on the
proposed RICO action as the basis for her anti-SLAPP claim, with the ongoing family
law litigation provided only for context. The declaration of Susan’s counsel, Evans, in
support of her motion similarly addresses the RICO action as the basis for the anti-
SLAPP claim. Accordingly, we focus our analysis of the e-mails as “seed RICO”
litigation related speech.
14
e-mail and the July 2 and both July 7 e-mails) qualify as protected conduct under the anti-
SLAPP statute as written statements “made in connection with” (§ 425.16(e)(2)) the
proposed RICO litigation. The other e-mails (on June 11, June 12, June 15, June 17, June
27, and the first July 1 e-mail) bear no meaningful connection to the litigation and are not
protected by the statute.
For example, the June 11 e-mail describes the allegedly unethical behavior of
Robert’s former family law counsel. The e-mail neither appears to “ ‘concern[] the
subject of the dispute’ ” in the proposed RICO action nor reflect good faith contemplation
of the RICO-related action. (See Neville, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1268.) The spate
of references in the June 17 e-mail to the alleged involvement of Robert’s girlfriend
(M.)11 in the “racket” (calling her “Legal Assistant to Private Judge Mobster, Bookkeeper
for the Midnight Shovel Breeder Mob, Paralegal for the GA based Mobster lawyer, and
legal affairs manager for the seed counterfeiter divorce cases”) similarly do not render the
communication relevant in any meaningful way “to the substantive issues” in the
proposed RICO litigation. (Id. at p. 1266.) And despite making offhand references to the
seed companies “stealing” varieties, “stealing” genetics and “illegally growing seed,” the
June 12, 15, and June 27 e-mails offer no information on any “substantive issue[]” in the
proposed RICO litigation (ibid.) and contain numerous comments extraneous to any such
proposed action (Action Apartment, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1251).
The first July 1 e-mail also lacks substantive connection to the anticipated
litigation, instead expressing hostility to Robert, warning him not to underestimate Susan,
and asserting that she has copied Robert’s girlfriend’s second divorce case files from the
public court file and has “the first case ready to scan when [she] feel[s] like it.”
None of these e-mails, or related evidence, suggests a “good faith intention to file
a lawsuit” (Digerati, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 887) and the e-mails bear little
11
We refer to third parties named in the e-mails by first initial to protect their
privacy interests. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(10).)
15
resemblance to communications in other cases that have found prelitigation or litigation
related communications protected under section 425.16(e)(2). (See, e.g., Digerati, at
pp. 887–888 [holding that musician’s statements in film dispute were made in furtherance
of the musician’s right of petition under § 425.16(e)(2), where the statements asserted the
musician’s final right of approval for the film, advised distributors that the film was
unauthorized, and threatened litigation]; Neville, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1267–1268
[deciding that employer’s letters to a former employee’s third-party customers were
protected where letters “related directly to” the alleged misappropriation of confidential
information by the former employee, sought to prevent further misuse of proprietary
information, and “contained no statements of fact concerning [the former employee] that
were not based on or related to the allegations” at issue]; Trinity, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1005 [explaining that e-mails sent on behalf of the plaintiff corporation requesting
information about insurance coverage dispute “were ‘ “communications preparatory to or
in anticipation of the bringing of an action” ’ ” because the e-mail preceded the filing of
litigation, asked for documents and posed questions about the workers’ compensation
insurance policy at issue, and served “essentially” as informal discovery prior to the filing
of any civil complaint].)
The June 11, June 12, June 15, June 17, June 27, and the first July 1 e-mails are
largely or wholly composed of assertions and innuendo that bear no clear relation to
Susan’s anticipated RICO action. This lack of relatedness more closely resembles the
circumstances in Paul, a case involving intentional infliction of emotional distress,
invasion of privacy, and other tortious interference claims arising from a lawyer’s
investigative acts while prosecuting his client’s arbitration claims against a security
broker. (Paul, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 864.) The appellate court held that the
attorney’s “intrusive pre-hearing investigation of and disclosures concerning” the security
broker’s personal affairs extended beyond the scope of issues related to the arbitration
(id. at p. 867) and did not pertain to “ ‘an issue under consideration or review’ ” in that
16
proceeding. (Id. at p. 868.) The attorney failed to establish that his investigation and
disclosures were acts “in connection with” an official proceeding protected by the anti-
SLAPP statute. (Ibid.)
As the court did in Paul, we conclude it is insufficient for Susan to generally aver
a connection between her communications to Robert and the anticipated exercise of her
petitioning rights by filing a federal RICO action. The statements must be “in connection
with” the subject of the dispute and “an issue under consideration or review” in the
anticipated litigation. (§ 425.16(e)(2); Paul, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at pp. 867–868.)
Susan disputes this characterization of her e-mails and insists that nonthreatening
(nonviolent) communications between divorcing spouses, however angry in tone,
bothersome, or offensive, remain litigation privileged. She points to the recent decision
in Hansen v. Volkov (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 94 (Hansen) for the proposition that her
communications to Robert, however “annoying,” were constitutionally protected. (Id. at
p. 97.)
Hansen is not an anti-SLAPP case and does not assist Susan. The appeal in that
case addressed the imposition of a civil harassment restraining order in a dispute between
opposing counsel in a dissolution proceeding. (Hansen, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 97.)
In reversing the order granting the restraining order, the appellate court observed that the
e-mails sent by the defendant attorney to his opposing counsel after he learned she had
canceled his client’s deposition were “seriously annoying” but “did not contain any
threats of violence” and “were constitutionally protected litigation activity” that could not
be “properly considered part of a course of conduct of harassment.” (Id. at p. 105.) The
e-mails in question specifically addressed a disputed deposition appearance in the context
of the ongoing litigation. (Id. at p. 100.) The court’s observation that they constituted
protected litigation activity therefore offers no authority for the entirely different
proposition that e-mails between divorcing spouses are per se litigation related within the
meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute, however remote the topics addressed might be from
17
the subject of the litigation raised in the anti-SLAPP motion. (B.B. v. County of Los
Angeles (2020) 10 Cal.5th 1, 11 [“ ‘ “[C]ases are not authority for propositions not
considered.” ’ ”].)
We reach a different conclusion as to the remaining e-mails (the second e-mail on
July 1, and e-mails on July 2 and July 7) giving rise to the petition. They are different
because they pertain more directly to Susan’s anticipated RICO lawsuit and include or
refer to a draft complaint in that action. The second July 1 e-mail attached a revised
RICO draft complaint (citing the possibility that Robert’s counsel had “failed to forward”
it to him) and advised Robert to “not underestimate [Susan’s] ability to get people to
come forward with records, facts and information that would support this federal RICO
case.” Susan asserted in the e-mail that she had witnesses (“[c]urrent and former
T[animura] & A[ntle] employees” whom Robert’s brother “[S.]” had “stepped on, and
over these past 40 years”) who could validate the allegations in the draft complaint.
Susan wrote again on July 2, after Robert’s attorney had requested that Susan
cease sending e-mails to Robert. Her e-mail suggested that Martinez (Robert’s attorney)
was “engaging in conduct that may lead to the civil RICO drafts being placed in the
public court file.” She asserted that while her hope had always been “to settle our issues
without further harm to the reputations of not only those involved, but our associates and
family members” and “to be able to address these issues without continuing to place
deeply personal and financial issues in the public domain as Robert has insisted on for
nearly 10 years,” Martinez’s conduct calling her “152- page civil RICO seed
counterfeiting draft complaint and accompanying letter ‘stupid’ ” could result in the
public filing of the complaint, which “would impact all of [their] children, and
grandchildren.”
Additional e-mails on the morning and evening of July 7 again raised the subject
of the proposed RICO action. The July 7 e-mail asserted that Robert should “find a
lawyer who can help you read the federal complaint instead of spending more money on
18
[] Martinez who sounds more and more like a mobster’s lawyer” and protect their
children, who would be harmed by Robert “trying to continue the family law case as your
effort to marginalize what you have done in the federal matter.”
Broadly construed, in view of the anti-SLAPP statute’s goals to screen legal
claims targeting protected litigation related activity (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
pp. 880-881), we decide that the statements in these e-mails were arguably “made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review” in anticipated litigation within
the scope of section 425.16(e)(2).
Having decided that Robert’s claim for DVRO arises in part from protected
activity under the anti-SLAPP statute (and in part on unprotected activity), we turn to the
second step of the analysis.
2. Second Step: Prima Facie Case
Our Supreme Court in Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376 has explained that
“[w]hen relief is sought based on allegations of both protected and unprotected activity,
the unprotected activity is disregarded” at the first stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis, and
the court assess whether relief is sought based on allegations arising from the protected
activity. (Id. at p. 396.) “If the court determines that relief is sought based on allegations
arising from activity protected by the statute, the second step is reached. There, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected
activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated. The court, without resolving
evidentiary conflicts, must determine whether the plaintiff's showing, if accepted by the
trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. If not, the claim is
stricken.” (Ibid.)
In addition to the e-mails we have decided are unprotected activity, Robert’s
petition seeks relief based on allegations of abuse (Fam. Code, § 6203) arising from
protected activity—namely, Susan’s second July 1, July 2 and July 7 e-mails in
anticipation of filing her proposed RICO action. To avoid the court striking his petition
19
claims that arise out of protected conduct as a SLAPP, Robert must show that, with
respect to those claims, his petition has “ ‘at least “minimal merit” ’ ” and he can
overcome any affirmative defense Susan has raised. (Laker, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at
p. 760; Dziubla v. Piazza (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 140, 154.)
A plaintiff cannot show a probability of prevailing on the merits for anti-SLAPP
purposes where the claim is barred by the litigation privilege codified in Civil Code
section 47. (Flickinger v. Finwall (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 822, 840.) Susan asserts that
the litigation privilege applies and prevents Robert from making the showing required at
the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. She maintains that her protected e-mails
“were not domestic violence” because they come within the litigation privilege, and “[a]
litigant has [a] free speech right to speak forcefully and potently to the opposing litigant.”
She argues that her e-mails were “designed to ‘get under the skin’ of the opposing
litigant” and asserts that “litigation communication has that prick purpose – to make the
opponent uncomfortable” and promote settlement efforts.
Robert disagrees. He disputes Susan’s assertion of the litigation privilege,
maintains that e-mails that qualify as “abuse” under the DVPA are not privileged, and
points out that the California Supreme Court has recognized “exceptions to the litigation
privilege based on irreconcilable conflicts between the privilege and other co-equal state
laws.” (Action Apartment, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1247.) Robert contends that the
repetitive, harassing, and irrelevant nature of the e-mails places them within the intended
purview of the DVPA’s “disturbing the peace” provision. (Fam. Code, §§ 6203, subd.
(a)(4), 6320, subd. (a).) Since the DVPA is narrower than the generally applicable
litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47, Robert argues his legal and factual
showing in support of a claim for a DVPA restraining order is sufficient to carry his
burden.
We reject the proposition that because Susan’s second July 1, July 2, and July 7 e-
mails, broadly construed, come within section 425.16(e)(2) at the first step of the anti-
20
SLAPP analysis, the litigation privilege necessarily applies. “[A]cts falling within the
anti-SLAPP statute because of their connection with judicial proceedings do not
‘inevitably’ fall within the litigation privilege. (Crossroads Investors, L.P. v. Federal
National Mortgage Assn. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 757, 787 (Crossroads); see Navellier v.
Sletten (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 763, 770 [rejecting the presumption “that acts falling
within the anti-SLAPP statute because of their connection with judicial proceedings also
inevitably fall within the litigation privilege”].)
While the litigation privilege is relevant to construing the scope of section
425.16(e)(1) and (2), the statutes are not coextensive and serve different purposes.
(Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 324.) “Section 47 establishes a privilege that bars
liability in tort for the making of certain statements.” (Hagberg v. California Federal
Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 360.) The litigation privilege “serves broad goals of
guaranteeing access to the judicial process, promoting the zealous representation by
counsel of their clients, and reinforcing the traditional function of the trial as the engine
for the determination of truth.” (Flatley, at p. 324.) It affords litigants “ ‘the utmost
freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative
tort actions.’ ” (Id. at p. 321.)
The litigation privilege, however, does not apply in the face of more specific
statutes. Courts have applied this principle to conclude that “the litigation privilege does
not bar an action filed under a more specific statute when application of the privilege
would render the specific provision ‘significantly or wholly inoperable.’ ” (People ex rel.
Alzayat v. Hebb (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 801, 808, quoting Action Apartment, supra, 41
Cal.4th at p. 1246.) For example, the litigation privilege has been found inapplicable to
crimes like perjury, false report of a criminal offense, and attorney solicitation through
the use of “ ‘ “runners” ’ ” or “ ‘ “cappers” ’ ” (Action Apartment, at p. 1246), due to
“irreconcilable conflicts between the privilege and other co-equal state laws.” (Id. at
p. 1247.) These exceptions are “guided by the ‘rule of statutory construction that
21
particular provisions will prevail over general provisions.’ ” (Id. at p. 1246.) The
statutes for the crimes excepted from the privilege “would be significantly or wholly
inoperable if [their] enforcement were barred when in conflict with the privilege.” (Ibid.)
Robert appears to argue that any e-mails that constitute protected conduct are not
privileged because they constitute abuse under the DVPA. We disagree with this
statement as a general principle of law. The statutory authority for issuance of a domestic
violence restraining order under the DVPA does not generally present an “irreconcilable
conflict[]” with the litigation privilege. (Action Apartment, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1247.)
Nor does there appear to be any categorical exclusion from the litigation privilege for
domestic violence restraining order claims. Nevertheless, we agree with Robert that the
litigation privilege does not apply on these facts.
Robert’s petition for domestic violence restraining order does not seek liability in
tort but invokes the narrow statutory protection afforded by the DVPA. As in other
contexts involving non-tort claims, we consider whether application of the privilege in
this case furthers the purposes behind it based on the underlying facts. (See, e.g.,
Timothy W. v. Julie W. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 648, 663–664 [noting that “[b]reach of
contract claims are not categorically excluded from the [litigation] privilege” and
examining “whether the privilege furthers the purposes behind it based on the underlying
facts”]; accord, Wentland v. Wass (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1492; McNair v. City
and County of San Francisco (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1154, 1169–1170; see also Olson v.
Doe (2022) 12 Cal.5th 669, 687 [declining to reach the issue of “under what
circumstances the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) applies to
contract claims”].)
A court may issue a restraining order under the DVPA based on an affidavit or
testimony that “shows, to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past act or
acts of abuse.” (Fam. Code, § 6300, subd. (a).) The burden of proof is preponderance of
the evidence. (Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1, 11 (Curcio).) For purposes of the
22
DVPA, “ ‘abuse’ ” includes “contacting . . . or disturbing the peace of the other party.”
(Fam. Code, §§ 6320, subd. (a), 6203, subd. (a)(4).) “ ‘[D]isturbing the peace’ ” means
“conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or
emotional calm of the other party.” (Fam. Code, § 6320, subd. (c); see In re Marriage of
Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1497.) A court exercises discretion to enjoin
contact under the DVPA more liberally than in the civil harassment context. (Curcio, at
p. 11; Nakamura v. Parker (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327, 334.)
In this case, the conduct that under the DVPA allegedly constitutes “contacting . . .
or disturbing the peace of the other party” (Fam. Code, §§ 6320, subd. (a), 6203, subd.
(a)(4)) also arguably constitutes a “publication” made as part of a “judicial proceeding”
(Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)) for purposes of the litigation privilege. However, applying
the litigation privilege to bar Robert’s DVRO petition based on the four protected e-mails
would not advance the policies behind the privilege. As the trial court noted in its ruling,
the petition for domestic violence restraining order seeks only to prevent Susan from
directly contacting Robert, who is represented by counsel. It does not inhibit Susan’s
access to judicial determination of her rights with respect to her “seed RICO” claims,
restrain her from vigorously pursuing her proposed action in federal court, or from
directing legitimate litigation related communications, including settlement overtures, to
Robert’s counsel or other individuals.12 In these circumstances, applying the privilege
would not serve the goal of “guaranteeing access to the judicial process” (Flatley, supra,
39 Cal.4th at p. 324) because the DVRO does not limit or constrain Susan’s access to
those processes.
12
Susan points to the fact that Robert’s divorce attorney, Martinez, has refused to
receive RICO-related communications, and Robert has not designated other counsel for
this purpose. However, this refusal would not preclude Susan from contacting Martinez
regarding settlement overtures related to the then-pending family law litigation. Nor
would that refusal prevent Susan from filing her federal complaint and effecting service
of process on Robert through a process server.
23
Further, application of the litigation privilege in this circumstance would defeat
the goal of guaranteeing Robert’s access to the courts by frustrating his ability to seek a
protective order enjoining Susan from a course of conduct in which she continues to
contact him about the now-final judgment in their marital dissolution under the guise of
presaging her RICO claims against him. (See Crossroads, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at
p. 788 [rejecting application of the litigation privilege based on an alleged oral
agreement, where the privilege would effectually “immunize [the defendant] against any
enforcement of its purported violations of the deed” and preclude the plaintiff from
seeking judicial enforcement of its contract].) Because Robert’s DVRO petition is based
in part on communications related to Susan’s anticipated legal action and in large part on
other, unprotected e-mails, application of the privilege would render the DVPA
“significantly or wholly inoperable,” were its enforcement barred in these circumstances.
(Action Apartment, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1246.) Accordingly, we conclude that under
the facts presented, the litigation privilege does not bar Robert’s petition for DVRO.
Turning to whether Robert’s DVPA claim shows “minimal merit,” we agree with
Robert that conduct involving communications such as text messages and e-mail can
constitute abuse under the “disturbing the peace” provision of the DVPA. In Sabato v.
Brooks (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 715, the appellate court affirmed the issuance of a three-
year DVRO based on evidence that the defendant attempted frequent contact with the
plaintiff after their divorce, including sending her texts and e-mails on about a weekly
basis (which he characterized as “ ‘non-threatening’ ”) (id. at pp 719, 725). The court
reasoned that even without considering other allegations related to the defendant taking
the plaintiff’s house key and “threats and/or violence,” the defendant’s “unilateral,
unwanted and harassing contacts supported the issuance of the domestic violence
restraining order.” (Id. at p. 725.)
In In re Marriage of Ankola (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 369 (Ankola), a panel of this
court upheld a DVRO against the plaintiff’s ex-husband based on substantial evidence
24
not only that he had stalked the plaintiff but had repeatedly failed “to respect [her] wishes
that he not contact her” and continued to make contact in e-mails and telephone calls.
(Id. at p. 81.) Similarly, in Burquet v. Brumbaugh (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1147
(Burquet), the appellate court affirmed the imposition of a DVRO after the defendant
ignored his former romantic partner’s requests that he not contact her. The evidence
showed the defendant had engaged “in a course of conduct of contacting [her] by phone,
e-mail, and text, which messages contained inappropriate sexual innuendos” and had
appeared at her residence uninvited and then refused to leave. (Id. at p. 1144.) The court
explained that the defendant’s actions “ ‘disturb[ed] the peace of the other party’ ” (id. at
p. 1146) and constituted an act of “ ‘abuse’ ” under the DVPA. (Id. at p. 1147.)
By contrast, in Curcio, the appellate court held that the defendant’s “single,
private Facebook post accusing [the plaintiff] of abusing her” during the time in which
the two women dated was upsetting but did not “rise to the level of destruction of [the
plaintiff]’s mental and emotional calm, sufficient to support the issuance of a domestic
violence restraining order.” (Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 13.) The court
contrasted the evidence with that in other cases involving repeated episodes of unwanted
contact. (Id. at pp. 12–13.) It explained, “[t]he DVPA was not enacted to address all
disputes between former couples, or to create an alternative forum for resolution of every
dispute between such individuals.” (Id. at p. 13.)
We decide, based on the evidence in the record, and accepting Robert’s factual
assertions in his declaration as true for purposes of resolving the anti-SLAPP motion
(Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067), that Robert has met his burden to establish a prima
facie showing of abuse warranting further consideration of his claim for protective order
under the DVPA. (Fam. Code, § 6203.) Considered in isolation, Susan’s e-mails to
Robert might be considered mere annoyances. The broad authority conferred by the
DVPA for issuance of a DVRO, however, allows the court to consider “the totality of the
25
circumstances” in determining whether the conduct “destroys the mental or emotional
calm of the other party” (Fam. Code, § 6320, subd. (c)).
Unlike in Curcio, which involved only a single, private social media post and no
“harassing, threatening, or unwanted texts or e-mails” (Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at
p. 13), Susan’s e-mails repeatedly addressed Robert (though he had counsel), intending to
“ ‘get under the skin’ ” and make him “upset, nervous, or worried.” Although the e-mails
contained no threats of physical harm or violence, and there is no evidence in the record
that Susan engaged in other forms of unwanted contact with Robert during the post-
dissolution period (cf. Burquet, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1142; Ankola, supra, 53
Cal.App.5th at pp. 380–381), “the DVPA’s definition of abuse ‘is not confined to
physical abuse but specifies a multitude of behaviors which does not involve any physical
injury or assaultive acts.’ ” (In re Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney (2015) 237
Cal.App.4th 1416, 1425.) Nor does the DVPA require, as a prerequisite to issuance of a
restraining order, proof that the alleged victim (Robert) formally asked the alleged
perpetrator (Susan) to stop the harassing contact (Susan’s e-mails threatening to file the
RICO action). The statute requires only a showing, to the court’s satisfaction, of
“reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse” (Fam. Code, § 6300, subd. (a)), where
such abuse includes “contacting . . . or disturbing the peace of the other party.” (Fam.
Code, §§ 6320, subd. (a), 6203, subd. (a)(4).)
Under the totality of the circumstances, Robert has made a prima facie showing of
facts sufficient to sustain a favorable result on his DVRO petition if the facts he alleges
are substantiated. Robert’s claim under the DVPA thus has at least the requisite minimal
merit to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP. (Laker, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 760.)
III. DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying appellant Susan Bassi’s special motion to strike
under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 is affirmed. Respondent Robert Bassi is
26
entitled to recover his reasonable costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1),
(2).)
27
Filed 5/9/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ROBERT BASSI, H049873
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 2012FL009065)
v.
SUSAN BASSI,
Defendant and Appellant.
BY THE COURT13:
The opinion in this case filed April 15, 2024, was not certified for publication.
After the court’s review of a request under California Rules of Court, rule 8.1120(a), and
it appearing that the opinion meets the standards for publication under California Rules of
Court, rule 8.1105(c)(2), (3), (4), and (6), it is therefore ordered that the opinion be
published in the Official Reports.
13
Before Danner, Acting P. J., Wilson, J., and Bromberg, J.
1
Trial Court: Santa Clara County Superior Court
Trial Judge: Hon. Andrea E. Flint
Counsel for Appellant Susan Bassi: Patrick Joseph Evans
Counsel Respondent Robert Bassi: Carlos Martinez
Christine Fumi Kawamoto
Bay Area Law Firm
H049873
Bassi v. Bassi
2