People v. Reynoza

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RAYMOND GREGORY REYNOZA,

Defendant and Appellant.

S273797

Sixth Appellate District

H047594

Santa Clara County Superior Court

C1775222

April 22, 2024

Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in

which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and

Evans concurred.

PEOPLE v. REYNOZA

S273797

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

We granted review in this case to interpret a witness

dissuasion statute. Penal Code section 136.1, subdivision (b)(2)

makes it a crime to attempt to dissuade a victim or witness from

“[c]ausing a complaint . . . to be sought and prosecuted, and

assisting in the prosecution thereof.”1 (Italics added.) A jury

found defendant Raymond Gregory Reynoza guilty of violating

this statute based on actions that occurred entirely after the

complaint in the underlying criminal case had been filed.

The question before us is whether section 136.1(b)(2)

supports this disjunctive interpretation — in which the statute

independently applies where a defendant dissuades a witness

from “assisting in the prosecution” of a case after the charging

document has already been filed — or whether a conjunctive

interpretation precludes a conviction under such circumstances.

On the one hand, the word “and,” which joins the subject clauses

of section 136.1(b)(2), is ordinarily used as a conjunction (In re

C.H. (2011) 53 Cal.4th 94, 101). On the other hand, the word

“and” also “is sometimes, in a fair and rational construction of a

statute, to be read as if it were or, and taken disjunctively”

(People v. Pool (1865) 27 Cal. 572, 581 (Pool)), which would lead

us to apply section 136.1(b)(2) to situations where a defendant

1

Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the

Penal Code. We refer to section 136.1, subdivision (b)(2) as

section 136.1(b)(2).

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dissuades a witness from “assisting in the prosecution” of a case

only after a charging document has already been filed.

After considering the text, statutory context, legislative

history, and the experiences of other jurisdictions when faced

with similar statutory language, we conclude that section

136.1(b)(2) is equally susceptible to both the conjunctive and

disjunctive constructions. Accordingly, the rule of lenity

counsels in favor of adopting the “interpretation more favorable

to the defendant.” (People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 57

(Avery).) Here, that is the conjunctive construction, which does

not permit a conviction to be based solely on proof of dissuasion

from “assisting in the prosecution” of an already-filed charging

document.

Because there is no dispute that defendant’s conduct

amounted to, at most, dissuasion after a complaint was filed, we

affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal reversing his

conviction.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant and two others (Guillermo Cervantes and

Cesar Chavez) were charged with murder (§ 187) and

dissuading a witness (§ 136.1(b)(2))2 with allegations that the

dissuasion was “accompanied by force” (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1)) and

done “in furtherance of a conspiracy” (id., subd. (c)(2)). The

prosecution’s theory was that defendant was trying to dissuade

2

The parties stipulated, and the jury was instructed that

“[t]he phrases ‘Witness Intimidation,’ ‘Intimidating a Witness,’

and ‘Witness Dissuasion’ have the same meaning.” We use

variations of these terms interchangeably. And for convenience

we occasionally use the term “witness” rather than “witness or

victim,” although the statute includes both terms.

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a witness, Rafael Cornejo, in a criminal case against defendant’s

brother, Francisco Rosales. We briefly summarize the

underlying criminal case involving defendant’s brother, and the

instant case of witness dissuasion.

In February 2017, Gilroy police arrested Rosales, Cornejo,

and Benjamin Valladares after finding an unregistered firearm

in their vehicle. In April, Rosales, Cornejo, and Valladares were

charged with misdemeanor possession of a firearm. Valladares

was also charged with one felony count of assault with a firearm

and one misdemeanor count of causing a firearm to be carried in

a vehicle. Between April and June, these three defendants

made several appearances at the Morgan Hill courthouse —

including on June 15, when one of the defendants in this witness

dissuasion case (Cesar Chavez) and his brother (Gilbert Chavez)

attended despite not having any business before the court.

The charged witness dissuasion in this case occurred one

week later outside a bar in San Jose. Cornejo and Valladares

were drinking in the bar when the manager warned Valladares

that a group of men were outside. The manager gave this

warning because there had been an incident at the bar a few

weeks earlier involving Valladares and one of the men outside.

When Valladares went outside to see if everything was all right,

someone asked him, “Where’s your bitch-ass uncle at?”

(Valladares considered Cornejo to be his uncle.) Valladares

went back inside and told Cornejo not to go outside but Cornejo

disregarded the warning.

The group outside — which included defendant, Chavez

(who had gone to the Morgan Hill courthouse the week before),

and Cervantes — approached Cornejo in the parking lot. A

bouncer at the bar who had approached the men heard someone

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say “[d]rop the charges” and “it will be all good” or “[y]ou have

nothing to worry about.” Valladares then heard a member of

defendant’s group say, “[W]e don’t fuck with snitches.”

Cervantes then punched Cornejo once in the head. Cornejo fell

to the ground, struck his head on the pavement, and died hours

later from blunt force trauma to the head and acute alcohol

intoxication.

The jury found defendant not guilty of murder and guilty

of witness dissuasion, found the dissuasion in furtherance of a

conspiracy allegation true, and found the dissuasion

accompanied by force allegation not true. The trial court

sentenced defendant to two years in prison, which the court

deemed satisfied by defendant’s presentence custody credits,

and placed him on parole for three years.

Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting his conviction and the jury’s true finding on

the conspiracy allegation. He argued that section 136.1(b)(2)

“includes two elements, first, that the witness is being dissuaded

from ‘[c]ausing a complaint . . . to be sought and prosecuted’ and

second, ‘assisting in the prosecution thereof.’ ” (Boldface

omitted.) He maintained the evidence was insufficient to

support either ostensible element. As to the first ostensible

element, defendant argued “[t]here was no substantial evidence

supporting the theory that Cornejo was going to ‘cause’ any

criminal actions to be sought in [the Morgan Hill] case” because

“charges were already brought in that case, and several court

appearances had already taken place” by the time of the incident

leading to Cornejo’s death. Thus, according to defendant, there

was an “impossibility of meeting the first element.” (Boldface

omitted.)

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The Court of Appeal agreed that section 136.1(b)(2)

requires proof that the defendant attempted to prevent or

dissuade another person from causing an accusatory pleading to

be filed. (People v. Reynoza (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 181, 189

(Reynoza).)3 The court explained that “section 136.1(b)(2)

requires proof that, among other things, the defendant

attempted to prevent or dissuade another person from causing

a complaint, indictment, information, probation or parole

violation to be filed. If the defendant was aware the relevant

charging document had already been filed, and the defendant

did not attempt to prevent or dissuade the filing of any amended

or subsequent charging document, the defendant has not

violated section 136.1(b)(2).” (Reynoza, at p. 189.) The court

further explained that “[o]ther statutory provisions prohibit

attempts to dissuade victims or witnesses where charges have

already been filed.” (Ibid., citing §§ 136.1, subd. (a)(1) & (2)

[dissuasion of a witness from testifying or attending trial], 137,

subd. (c) [attempting to influence testimony or information

given to law enforcement].)

In so holding, the Reynoza court expressly disagreed with

People v. Velazquez (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 219 (Velazquez),

which stated that section 136.1(b)(2) “clearly encompasses more

than prearrest efforts to dissuade, inasmuch as it includes

attempts to dissuade a victim from causing a complaint . . . to be

3

Because the Court of Appeal found insufficient evidence

on the first ostensible element of section 136.1(b)(2), the court

did not reach defendant’s argument that the evidence was also

insufficient to establish the second ostensible element or the

conspiracy finding. (Reynoza, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 185,

fn. 2.)

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prosecuted or assisting in that prosecution.” (Velazquez, at

p. 233, italics added.)

We granted review to determine whether

section 136.1(b)(2) requires proof of an attempt to dissuade a

witness from causing a charging document to be sought and

prosecuted — as the court below held — or whether the statute

also independently applies where a defendant dissuades a

witness only from “assisting in the prosecution” of a case after

the charging document has already been filed.

II. DISCUSSION

The Attorney General contends the Court of Appeal erred

in reversing defendant’s conviction on the basis of insufficient

evidence. Although we ordinarily review such challenges under

the deferential substantial evidence standard (People v.

Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357), because the Court of

Appeal’s ruling is based on the interpretation of

section 136.1(b)(2), we review that legal determination de novo

(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961). “ ‘When we

interpret a statute, “[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to determine

the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We

first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and

commonsense meaning. . . . If the language is clear, courts must

generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation

would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not

intend. If the statutory language permits more than one

reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such

as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.”

[Citation.] “Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in

the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of

which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase,

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sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative

purpose.” ’ ” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th

608, 616–617 (City of San Jose).)

A. The Text and Statutory Context of Section

136.1(b)(2) Support Both a Conjunctive and a

Disjunctive Construction

Section 136.1, subdivision (b) states in relevant part:

“[E]very person who attempts to prevent or dissuade another

person who has been the victim of a crime or who is witness to a

crime from doing any of the following is guilty of a public offense

and shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not

more than one year or in the state prison: [¶] . . . [¶] (2)

Causing a complaint, indictment, information, probation or

parole violation to be sought and prosecuted, and assisting in

the prosecution thereof.”4 The crux of the issue before us is

whether the connecting “and” should be read conjunctively, as

defendant contends, or whether it should be read disjunctively,

as the Attorney General contends. Under the latter disjunctive

interpretation, it is not necessary to establish that any

dissuasion occurred before the filing of a charging document.

Dissuasion could be shown through evidence that the defendant

attempted to dissuade a victim or witness from either causing a

charging document to be sought and prosecuted, or solely based

on assisting in the prosecution of an already-filed charging

document.

4

For brevity and convenience, we refer to (1) the clause that

begins with “[c]ausing a complaint” as the “causing clause,”

(2) the clause that begins with “assisting in the prosecution” as

the “assisting clause,” and (3) the word “and” that appears

between the causing and assisting clauses as “the connecting

‘and.’ ”

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For reasons discussed below, section 136.1(b)(2) is

reasonably susceptible to both proffered interpretations and,

thus, is ambiguous. (See People v. Ruiz (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100,

1106 [a statute is ambiguous if its “ ‘language supports more

than one reasonable construction’ ”].)

On its face, section 136.1(b)(2) is reasonably susceptible to

the conjunctive reading, which rests largely on the presence of

the connecting “and.” “The ordinary and usual usage of ‘and’ is

as a conjunctive, meaning ‘ “an additional thing,” ’ ‘also’ or

‘plus.’ ” (In re C.H., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 101; see Dr. Leevil,

LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 474, 479

[“the use of the conjunctive word ‘and’ to connect the three

conditions can only mean that all three conditions must be

satisfied”].) By contrast, “ ‘[U]se of the word “or” in a statute

indicates an intention to use it disjunctively so as to designate

alternative or separate categories.’ ” (People ex rel. Green v.

Grewal (2015) 61 Cal.4th 544, 561.) Thus, according to the

Court of Appeal and defendant, had the Legislature intended for

the connecting “and” to be read disjunctively, the Legislature

would instead have used the word “or.” (See Reynoza, supra,

75 Cal.App.5th at p. 188 [stating that a disjunctive reading

“pass[es] over the drafters’ use of the conjunctive [‘and’] rather

than the disjunctive [‘or’]”].) As defendant observes, this

argument is bolstered by the Legislature’s use of the word “or”

in other parts of section 136.1 that were clearly intended to be

read disjunctively. Specifically, section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1)

and (3) exclusively use “or” to convey a disjunctive meaning and

section 136.1(b)(2) uses “or” earlier in its first clause to convey a

disjunctive meaning when listing the different charging

documents. With this context, the Legislature’s use of “and”

twice in section 136.1(b)(2) stands out, thus suggesting the

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Legislature understood the difference between the typically

conjunctive “and” and the typically disjunctive “or.” Overall, the

Legislature’s use of the connecting “and” more firmly supports

the conjunctive construction of section 136.1(b)(2).

“But the word and is not always to be taken conjunctively.

It is sometimes, in a fair and rational construction of a statute,

to be read as if it were or, and taken disjunctively . . . .” (Pool,

supra, 27 Cal. at p. 581; see People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d

731, 755 [“the word ‘and’ is often carelessly used when ‘or’ is

intended”]; 1A Singer & Singer, Statutes and Statutory

Construction (7th ed. 2022) § 21:14 [“There has been . . . such

laxity in the use of these terms [‘and’ and ‘or’] that courts have

generally said the words are interchangeable and that one may

be substituted for the other, if consistent with legislative

intent”].) Nevertheless, while “[i]t is true that courts will

sometimes substitute ‘or’ for ‘and,’ and vice versa, when

necessary to accomplish the evident intent of the statute, . . .

doing so is an exceptional rule of construction.” (In re C.H.,

supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 102–103.) For example, we might do so

to correct a “drafting error” where “it appears clear that a word

has been erroneously used, and a judicial correction will best

carry out the intent of the adopting body.” (People v. Skinner

(1985) 39 Cal.3d 765, 775.) The Attorney General argues that

another consideration — the canon against surplusage —

suggests that this is a circumstance when the word “and” should

be given a disjunctive meaning. Under this canon of

construction, “we generally must ‘accord[] significance, if

possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the

legislative purpose,’ and have warned that ‘[a] construction

making some words surplusage is to be avoided.’ ” (People v.

Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 357.)

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We agree with the Attorney General that certain aspects

of the canon against surplusage support the disjunctive

construction of section 136.1(b)(2). The Attorney General

reasons that dissuasion done to prevent a witness from causing

a charging document “to be sought” also is an attempt to prevent

the witness from “assisting in the prosecution thereof.”

(§ 136.1(b)(2).) In other words, causing a complaint to be sought

is one form of assisting in the prosecution of a complaint — such

that dissuasion from doing the former will also always

constitute dissuasion from doing the latter — and thus will

constitute a violation of section 136.1(b)(2). In this context, the

Attorney General posits that the conjunctive reading overlooks

the other ways in which a victim or witness can assist in the

prosecution of a case after it has been filed, and would

potentially immunize attempts to dissuade such conduct if the

defendant had not also attempted to dissuade the victim or

witness from causing the case to be sought and prosecuted in the

first place. This approach would effectively render the assisting

clause surplusage.5

The Attorney General also reasons that if we were to

accept defendant’s characterization of the causing and assisting

clauses as stating separate elements of a unified offense, we

could “avoid superfluity” under a conjunctive reading only by

“requir[ing] two acts of dissuasion at different times: the

defendant would first have to unsuccessfully attempt to

5

This approach does not require us to view the assisting

clause as some broad “catch-all” that covers all postcharging

dissuasion. Indeed, doing so would create surplusage problems

of its own. As we explain further below (see pt. II.C., post), while

we conclude the assisting clause must be narrowly construed,

we have no occasion here to define its particular contours.

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dissuade the witness from causing a complaint to be sought and

prosecuted, and then would have to attempt to dissuade that

witness from assisting in the prosecution of the filed complaint.

That is, section 136.1(b)(2) could be violated only when the first

dissuasion attempt was unsuccessful.”

The Attorney General argues that the Legislature did not

intend to establish an offense that effectively requires separate

acts at separate times — the first of which must have been

unsuccessful — to constitute a violation. First, as the Attorney

General observes, construing section 136.1(b)(2) this way would

ignore the Legislature’s clarification that attempts at dissuasion

are prohibited just the same as accomplished dissuasion. (See

§ 136.1, subd. (d).)6

Second, the Attorney General contends that this

construction ignores the context of the statutory scheme of

which section 136.1(b)(2) is a part by adopting a construction

that would require us to conclude that the Legislature intended

for section 136.1(b)(2) to operate in a significantly different

manner than analogous subdivisions and statutes. The

Attorney General argues that it would be anomalous for us to

conclude that the Legislature intended for section 136.1(b)(2) to

require the commission of separate acts at separate stages of a

potential criminal prosecution — before and during a

prosecution — while enacting at the same time analogous

subdivisions that require the commission of only a single act at

6

Section 136.1, subdivision (d) provides: “Every person

attempting the commission of any act described in subdivisions

(a), (b), and (c) is guilty of the offense attempted without regard

to success or failure of the attempt. The fact that no person was

injured physically, or in fact intimidated, shall be no defense

against any prosecution under this section.”

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a single stage of a potential criminal prosecution. For example,

similar to the precharging stage of a case addressed by the

causing clause, subdivision (b)(1) of section 136.1 prohibits

attempting to dissuade a person from “[m]aking any report

of . . . victimization to a[] . . . prosecuting agency.” 7 No

additional conduct is required at another time. Similarly,

somewhat analogously to the ongoing stages of a prosecution

that appear to be addressed by the assisting clause,

section 136.1, subdivision (a)(1) prohibits dissuading a person

from “attending or giving testimony at any trial,”8 and

section 137, subdivision (c) prohibits “induc[ing] . . . false

testimony.”9 Neither provision requires further conduct at

another stage of the criminal proceeding. It seems questionable

that the Legislature intended for only section 136.1(b)(2) to

7

More fully, section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1) prohibits

attempting to dissuade a victim or witness from “[m]aking any

report of that victimization to any peace officer or state or local

law enforcement officer or probation or parole or correctional

officer or prosecuting agency or to any judge.”

8

Section 136.1, subdivision (a)(1) provides in full: “Except

as provided in subdivision (c), any person who does any of the

following is guilty of a public offense and shall be punished by

imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or in

the state prison: [¶] (1) Knowingly and maliciously prevents or

dissuades any witness or victim from attending or giving

testimony at any trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by

law.”

9

Section 137, subdivision (c) provides in full: “Every person

who knowingly induces another person to give false testimony

or withhold true testimony not privileged by law or to give false

material information pertaining to a crime to, or to withhold

true material information pertaining to a crime from, a law

enforcement official is guilty of a misdemeanor.”

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require two different acts of misconduct at different stages of a

criminal proceeding.

The two exceptions to the conjunctive reading of section

136.1(b)(2) articulated by the Court of Appeal — that the

defendant was unaware that a charging document had been

filed, or attempted to dissuade the filing of an amended charging

document (Reynoza, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 189) — do not

fully solve the conjunctive construction’s surplusage problem.

This is because both exceptions pertain to the causing clause —

they have little bearing on the assisting clause, which remains

effectively read out of the statute under the conjunctive reading.

However, “ ‘the canon against surplusage is [merely] a

guide to statutory interpretation and is not invariably

controlling.’ ” (Skidgel v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals

Bd. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 1, 21.) Indeed, the Attorney General’s

proposed interpretation also raises serious questions. The word

“prosecute” appears in close proximity in both the causing clause

and the assisting clause — “[c]ausing a complaint . . . to be

sought and prosecuted, and assisting in the prosecution thereof.”

(§ 136.1(b)(2), italics added.) We understand the term “[c]ausing

a complaint . . . to be sought and prosecuted” (§ 136.1(b)(2)) in

the causing clause to refer to the filing of initial charging

documents or the initial pursuit of an action. But under the

Attorney General’s view, the term “assisting in the prosecution

thereof” in the assisting clause would refer to postcharging

conduct that includes the continuation of legal action on charges

that have already been filed. Under this view, the word

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“prosecute” would curiously have different meanings, even

though the terms are used just a few words apart. 10

On balance, we conclude the parties each offer equally

plausible interpretations of the statute — defendant relying on

the ordinarily conjunctive meaning of “and,” and the Attorney

General relying on the canon against surplusage. While the

parties offer additional textual arguments in support of their

respective proffered interpretations, none of them disturbs the

relative equipoise in which the parties’ primary arguments

stand.

For his part, defendant argues his proposed conjunctive

reading is further supported by the presence of the word

“thereof” at the end of the assisting clause — “assisting in the

prosecution thereof” (§ 136.1(b)(2), italics added) — which he

posits “refers back to the complaint . . . which is to be sought”

under the causing clause. Even assuming that is the case,

however, the reference does no more than indicate that the

assisting clause relates to the prosecution of the same list of

charging documents and violations identified in the causing

clause — namely, “a complaint, indictment, information,

probation or parole violation.” (§ 136.1(b)(2).) Using the word

“thereof” as shorthand simply spared the Legislature from

repeating the same list at the end of the assisting clause.

Moreover, even if the Legislature intended the word “thereof” to

be a term of specific reference that suggests that the assisting

clause refers not just to any complaint, but specifically to the

10

Yet we also note the causing clause itself plainly lists two

acts — “sought and prosecuted” — thus adding to any

uncertainty about whether the Legislature meant dissuasion

under section 136.1(b)(2) to require multiple acts.

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complaint referred to in the first clause — that is, the one sought

by the victim or witness — this would still suggest only that the

causing and assisting clauses are tied together in some way; the

relationship does not necessarily compel a conjunctive reading.

Meanwhile, the Attorney General relies on the

interpretive principle that “[t]he wording of the lead-in” to a

statute “may be crucial to the meaning” of the word “and.”

(Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal

Texts (2012) p. 122 (hereinafter Scalia & Garner).) For example,

“If the introductory phrase is any one or more of the following,

then the satisfaction of any one element . . . will suffice.” (Ibid.)

That is, the word “and” may be read disjunctively as the word

“or” where, as the Attorney General emphasizes here, the

relevant introductory language of the dissuasion statute

prohibits a defendant from engaging in “any of the following”

acts, including those specified in the causing clause and the

assisting clause. (§ 136.1, subd. (b), italics added.)

Focusing on this aspect of section 136.1(b)(2)’s text and

statutory context, the Attorney General observes that

subdivision (b)(2) is bookended by the word “any,” which he

maintains supports a disjunctive reading of the connecting

“and.” The first significant “any” appears in the introductory

paragraph of subdivision (b), which makes it a crime to “do[] any

of the following.” (§ 136.1, subd. (b), italics added; see Scalia &

Garner, supra, at p. 122 [“If the introductory phrase is any one

or more of the following, then the satisfaction of any one

element . . . will suffice”].) The Attorney General notes this

introductory phrase is then followed by “a variety of present

participles that introduce a gerund phrase: ‘(1) Making any

report of that victimization . . . . [¶] (2) Causing a complaint,

indictment, information, probation or parole violation to be

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sought and prosecuted, and assisting in the prosecution thereof.

[¶] (3) Arresting or causing or seeking the arrest of any person

in connection with that victimization.’ ” Thus, the Attorney

General reasons, the phrase “any of the following” in the

introductory paragraph of subdivision (b) criminalizes any type

of conduct described in each of the gerund phrases found in

subdivision (b)’s subparts — “[m]aking any report” (§ 136.1,

subd. (b)(1)), “[c]ausing a complaint . . . to be sought and

prosecuted” (§ 136.1(b)(2)), “assisting in the prosecution thereof”

(ibid.), and “arresting . . . any person” (id., subd. (b)(3)).

The second “any” cited by the Attorney General appears in

subdivision (d) of section 136.1, which provides that “[e]very

person attempting the commission of any act described in

subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) is guilty of the offense attempted

without regard to success or failure of the attempt.” (Italics

added.)11 The acts described in subdivision (b) include each of

the gerund phrases found in that subdivision. Thus, for section

136.1(b)(2), it includes “[c]ausing a complaint . . . to be sought

and prosecuted” as well as “assisting in the prosecution thereof.”

The Attorney General maintains that the combination of the

Legislature’s use of the word “any” together with the gerund

phrases in subdivision (b) of section 136.1 suggests that the

Legislature may have intended the connecting “and” to be read

disjunctively when viewed in connection with the gerund

assisting clause. (See Scalia & Garner, supra, at p. 122.)

11

The word “any” also appears in section 136.1, subdivision

(c), which increases the penalty when the commission of “any of

the acts described in subdivision (a) or (b)” is accompanied by

certain aggravating factors.

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The Attorney General’s reading is plausible. But an

equally — if not more — plausible alternative reading is that

the word “any,” as it appears in subdivision (b) of section 136.1,

refers to each enumerated part of subdivision (b) as a whole and

not to each part’s constituent elements. Specifically, subdivision

(b) prohibits a person from doing “any of the following” and then

lists three enumerated subparts. “[A]ny of the following” can

simply be in reference to each of the three subparts that follow,

as opposed to a suggestion that the three subparts should be

broken down further into their constituent elements.

Because we conclude from the text and statutory context

of section 136.1(b)(2) that the statute is equally susceptible to

the parties’ competing constructions, we turn to other

interpretive aids.

B. The Legislative History of Section 136.1(b)(2)

and Other Jurisdictions’ Experiences

Implementing Similar Statutory Language Do

Not Resolve the Statute’s Ambiguity

The legislative history of section 136.1(b)(2) and other

jurisdictions’ experiences implementing similar statutory

language are likewise inconclusive on the question of whether

to read the statute conjunctively or disjunctively. (See City of

San Jose, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 616–617 [“ ‘ “If the statutory

language permits more than one reasonable interpretation,

courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose,

legislative history, and public policy” ’ ”].)

1. Legislative History of Section 136.1(b)(2)

a. Prior law

Before the Legislature enacted section 136.1, witness

dissuasion was prohibited by former section 136. (See People v.

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Newton (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 187, 189; former § 136.) As

originally enacted in 1872, former section 136 prohibited

“willfully prevent[ing] or dissuad[ing] . . . a witness . . . from

attending upon any trial.” (Former § 136; see Newton, at

p. 190.)

By 1979, the Legislature had amended former section 136

by subdividing it into misdemeanor and felony offenses for

nonforcible and forcible witness dissuasion, respectively. (Stats.

1979, ch. 944, § 1, p. 3252; see Babalola v. Superior Court (2011)

192 Cal.App.4th 948, 956, fn. 6 (Babalola).) Thus, former

section 136, subdivision (a) made it a misdemeanor to “willfully

and unlawfully prevent[] or dissuade[] . . . a witness . . . from

attending upon any trial.” (Stats. 1979, ch. 944, § 1, p. 3252.)

And former section 136, subdivision (b) made it a felony to do so

“by means of force or threats of unlawful injury to person or

damage to the property of another.” (Stats. 1979, ch. 944, § 1,

p. 3252.)

b. The ABA model statute

In 1979, an American Bar Association (ABA) committee

issued a report that found “[e]xisting state statutes . . . largely

inadequate to deal with intimidation.” (ABA Section of Criminal

Justice, Committee on Victims, Reducing Victim/Witness

Intimidation: A Package (1979) p. 1 (hereinafter ABA Report);

see Babalola, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 956.) The ABA

Report contained a model statute intended “to broaden

substantially the coverage of many state laws.” (ABA Rep. at

p. 8; see Babalola, at p. 956.) One area identified for potential

broadening was protection against dissuasion for victims who

were not also witnesses. (ABA Rep. at p. 8 [“The addition of

language proscribing the act of threatening someone not to

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report their victimization is an important advance, and is not

clearly covered by existing statutes”].) The ABA’s “House of

Delegates approved the recommendations in the report in

August 1980.” (Babalola, at p. 956, fn. 5.)

Section 1 of the ABA model statute provided definitions

for various statutory terms. (ABA Rep., supra, at pp. 6–7.)

Section 2 of the model statute — which would serve as the

basis for Penal Code section 136.1, subdivisions (a) and (b) —

established a misdemeanor offense for “knowingly and

maliciously prevent[ing] or dissuad[ing] or attempt[ing] to so

prevent or dissuade any witness or victim from attending or

giving testimony at any trial . . . or . . . attempt[ing] to prevent

or dissuade another person who has been the victim of a crime

or who is a witness to a crime or a person acting on behalf of the

victim of a crime from (a) making any report of such

victimization to any peace officer or state or local or federal law

enforcement officer or probation or parole or correctional officer

or prosecuting agency or to any judge; (b) causing a complaint,

indictment, information, probation or parole violation to be

sought and prosecuted and assisting in the prosecution thereof;

(c) arresting or causing or seeking the arrest of any person in

connection with such victimization . . . .” (ABA Rep., supra, at

pp. 7–8, italics added.)

Section 3 of the model statute made the conduct described

in section 2 a felony if the conduct was accompanied by certain

aggravating factors. (ABA Rep., supra, at pp. 8–9.) Section 4

addressed attempted dissuasion. (Id. at p. 9.) Sections 5 and 6

addressed protective orders. (Id. at pp. 9–11.) And Section 7

addressed pretrial release. (Id. at p. 12.)

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c. The Legislature adopts the ABA model statute

In 1980, Assembly Bill No. 2909 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.)

(Assembly Bill No. 2909) was introduced in the Legislature “to

pattern the California witness intimidation statute” after the

ABA model statute. (Assem. Com. on Crim. Justice, Analysis of

Assem. Bill No. 2909 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.) as introduced

Mar. 6, 1980, p. 2; see Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of

Assem. Bill No. 2909 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 9,

1980, pp. 1–2 [Assem. Bill No. 2909 “would enact a new

intimidation of witnesses and victims law patterned after the

Model Statute drafted by the ABA Section on Criminal Justice”];

People v. Wahidi (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 802, 807–808 (Wahidi);

Babalola, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 956.) The ABA Report

was referenced in Assembly and Senate committee analyses,

and relevant portions were attached to an Assembly analysis.

(Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2909,

supra, at pp. 1–2; Assem. Com. on Crim. Justice, Analysis of

Assem. Bill No. 2909, supra, at pp. 2, 5–10.) As with the ABA

Report, the Legislature observed that existing California law

made no provision “for the intimidation of victims unless they

are also witnesses or potential witnesses.” (Assem. Off. of

Research, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2909 (1979–

1980 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 16, 1980, p. 1.)

As initially introduced, Assembly Bill No. 2909 proposed

to repeal former section 136 and replace it with a new section

136 implementing sections 1 through 4 of the ABA model statute

nearly verbatim. (Compare Assem. Bill No. 2909, supra, as

introduced Mar. 6, 1980, with ABA Rep., supra, at pp. 6–9.) The

Legislative Counsel’s Digest that prefaced Assembly Bill

No. 2909 when introduced characterized the portion of the bill

that would eventually become section 136.1, subdivision (b) as

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prohibiting the dissuasion of a victim or witness “from

performing specified acts relating to assisting law enforcement

or prosecution activities.”12 (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill

No. 2909 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Mar. 6, 1980,

p. 1.)

After the Assembly passed Assembly Bill No. 2909, the

Senate Committee on the Judiciary observed in its analysis of

the bill — under the heading “Redrafting necessary” — that

because the bill was based on the ABA’s “draft model

intimidation statute[,] . . . it has numerous rough edges and the

quality of language is far worse than that produced by our

Legislative Counsel. [¶] The syntax is cumbersome and the

sentences extremely lengthy.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary,

Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2909, supra, as amended Apr. 9,

1980, p. 5.) As an example, the committee analysis cited the fact

that Assembly Bill No. 2909’s implementation of section 2 of the

model statute “contains a single sentence of 17 lines and 150

words.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, at p. 5.) The analysis

suggested, “At some point the bill should be cleaned-up and

rewritten in order to smooth out such rough spots.” (Id. at p. 6.)

The Senate amended Assembly Bill No. 2909 by, among

other things, keeping the definitions (section 1 of the model

12

“ ‘The Legislative Counsel’s Digest is printed as a preface

to every bill considered by the Legislature.’ [Citation.] The

Legislative Counsel’s summaries ‘are prepared to assist the

Legislature in its consideration of pending legislation.’

[Citation.] Although the Legislative Counsel’s summaries are

not binding [citation], they are entitled to great weight.

[Citation.] ‘It is reasonable to presume that the Legislature

[acted] with the intent and meaning expressed in the Legislative

Counsel’s digest.’ ” (Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership

(2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1169–1170.)

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statute) in section 136, and moving the misdemeanor, felony,

and attempt provisions (sections 2, 3, and 4 of the model statute,

respectively) to a new section 136.1. (Sen. Amend. to Assem.

Bill No. 2909 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.) June 18, 1980; Sen.

Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 2909 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.) July 1,

1980.) During this process, and without explanation, the Senate

also inserted a comma immediately before the connecting “and.”

(Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 2909, supra, June 18, 1980.)

Assembly Bill No. 2909 was enacted as so amended.

(Stats. 1980, ch. 686, § 2.1, p. 2076.) The Legislative Counsel’s

Digests that prefaced each iteration of the bill as it progressed

through the Legislature consistently characterized

section 136.1, subdivision (b) as prohibiting the dissuasion of a

victim or witness “from performing specified acts relating to

assisting law enforcement or prosecution activities.” (Legis.

Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2909, supra, as introduced

Mar. 6, 1980, p. 1; Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2909

(1979–1980 Reg. Sess.), as amended Apr. 16, 1980, pp. 1–2

[same]; Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2909 (1979–1980

Reg. Sess.), as amended June 18, 1980, pp. 1–2 [same]; Legis.

Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2909 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.), as

amended July 1, 1980, pp. 1–2 [same]; Legis. Counsel’s Dig.,

Assem. Bill No. 2909 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.), 2 Stats. 1980,

Summary Dig., p. 188 [same].)13

13

An early analysis in each house of the Legislature initially

characterized Assembly Bill No. 2909 as prohibiting dissuasion

from “[c]ausing an accusatory pleading to be filed.” (Assem.

Com. on Crim. Justice, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2909, supra,

as introduced Mar. 6, 1980, p. 1; see Sen. Com. on Judiciary,

Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2909, supra, as amended Apr. 9,

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As enacted, section 136.1(b)(2) read: “Except as provided

in subdivision (c), every person who attempts to prevent or

dissuade another person who has been the victim of a crime or

who is witness to a crime from doing any of the following is

guilty of a misdemeanor: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) Causing a complaint,

indictment, information, probation or parole violation to be

sought and prosecuted, and assisting in the prosecution

thereof.” (Stats. 1980, ch. 686, § 2.1, p. 2076.)14

2. Other Jurisdictions’ Implementations of the ABA

Model Statute

At least eight other jurisdictions have enacted witness

dissuasion statutes premised on the ABA model statute.

Delaware’s version makes it a felony to dissuade a victim

or witness from “[c]ausing a complaint, indictment, information,

probation or parole violation to be sought or prosecuted, or from

assisting in the prosecution thereof.” (Del. Code Ann. tit. 11,

§ 3532(2), italics added; see State v. Stovall (Del.Super.Ct.,

Sept. 30, 1996, No. IN94-06-1461) 1996 Del. Super. Lexis 438,

1980, p. 3.) However, a subsequent analysis by the Assembly

Office of Research performed in connection with the third

reading of the bill in the Assembly characterized it broadly —

consistent with the Legislative Counsel’s Digests — as

prohibiting dissuasion from “[a]ssisting law enforcement or

prosecution activities.” (Assem. Off. of Research, 3d reading

analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2909, supra, as amended Apr. 16,

1980, p. 1.) Notably, these analyses were performed before

Assembly Bill No. 2909 reached its final form, as amended by

the Senate.

14

“Effective 1998, subdivisions (a) and (b) [of section 136.1]

were revised from straight misdemeanor status to provide for

alternative felony-misdemeanor punishment,” referred to as a

“ ‘wobbler.’ ” (People v. McElroy (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 874,

880; Stats. 1997, ch. 500, § 1, pp. 3123–3124.)

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p. *8, fn. 8 [stating the law “is modeled after” the ABA model

statute, with differences that are, “for the most part, . . .

inconsequential”].)

Florida’s statute makes it a crime to dissuade a person

from “[c]ausing a criminal prosecution, or a parole or probation

revocation proceeding, to be sought or instituted, or from

assisting in such prosecution or proceeding.” (Fla. Stat. Ann.

§ 914.22(3)(d), italics added.)

Georgia’s statute makes it a crime to dissuade a person

from “[c]ausing a criminal prosecution, or a parole or probation

revocation proceeding, to be sought or instituted, or assisting in

such prosecution or proceeding.” (Ga. Code Ann. § 16-10-

32(b)(4), italics added.)

Kansas’s statute makes it a crime to dissuade a victim,

witness, or person acting on a witness’s behalf from “causing a

complaint, indictment or information to be sought and

prosecuted or causing a violation of probation, parole or

assignment to a community correctional services program to be

reported and prosecuted, and assisting in its prosecution.”

(Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5909(a)(2)(B); State v. Doyle (Kan.Ct.App.

July 12, 2019, No. 119,174) 2019 WL 3047432, p. *6 [noting

Kansas’s statute “stems from” the ABA model statute].)

Missouri’s statute makes it a crime to dissuade a victim or

a person acting on the victim’s behalf from “[c]ausing a

complaint, indictment or information to be sought and

prosecuted or assisting in the prosecution thereof.” (Mo. Ann.

Stat. § 575.270(1)(2)(b), italics added.)

As originally enacted in 1981, Wisconsin’s statute made it

a misdemeanor to dissuade a victim from “[c]ausing a complaint,

indictment or information to be sought and prosecuted and

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assisting in the prosecution thereof.” (Wis. Stat. Ann. former

§ 940.44(2); see State v. Freer (Wis.Ct.App. 2009) 779 N.W.2d 12,

14 (Freer).) As we explain further below, after a Wisconsin

appellate court found this provision ambiguous and construed

the connecting “and” disjunctively (Freer, at pp. 17, 18),

Wisconsin’s Legislature amended the statute to conform to the

court’s interpretation. (Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.44(2).) It now

prohibits dissuading a victim from “[c]ausing a complaint,

indictment, or information to be sought or prosecuted, or

assisting in the prosecution thereof.” (Ibid., italics added.)

The District of Columbia’s statute makes it a crime to

dissuade a person from “[c]ausing a criminal prosecution or a

parole or probation revocation proceeding to be sought or

instituted, or assisting in a prosecution or other official

proceeding.” (D.C. Code Ann. § 22-722(a)(3)(D), italics added.)

And federal law makes it a crime to dissuade a person

from “causing a criminal prosecution, or a parole or probation

revocation proceeding, to be sought or instituted, or assisting in

such prosecution or proceeding.” (18 U.S.C. § 1512(d)(4), italics

added; see Sen.Rep. No. 97-532, 2d sess. (1982), reprinted in

1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 2521 [“Section

1512 . . . draws heavily upon a model statute developed by the

ABA Victims Committee”].)

Each jurisdiction’s statute contains clauses that are

substantially similar to section 136.1(b)(2)’s causing and

assisting clauses. And each jurisdiction has treated the clauses

disjunctively. Six did so legislatively by replacing the ABA

model statute’s connecting “and” with some formulation

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including the word “or.”15 The other two states’ legislatures

retained the connecting “and,” which their courts have

construed disjunctively. (See Freer, supra, 779 N.W.2d at p. 18;

State v. Shields (Kan.Ct.App., Feb. 7, 2020, No. 119,844) 2020

Kan.App. Unpub. Lexis 60, pp. *1, *3, *8 [rejecting, without

analysis, a sufficiency of the evidence challenge premised on

dissuasive conduct that occurred after charges had been filed].)

In Freer, supra, 779 N.W.2d 12, the Wisconsin Court of

Appeals thoroughly examined the causing and assisting clauses

in the relevant portion of a statute premised on the model ABA

statute and determined it operated disjunctively,

notwithstanding that the statute — like California’s —

connected the two clauses with the word “ ‘and.’ ” As noted,

Wisconsin’s Legislature originally adopted the relevant portion

of the ABA model statute as-is, retaining the connecting “and”

without modification. (Wis. Stat. Ann. former § 940.44(2); see

Freer, at p. 17.) After the defendant in Freer was charged with

disturbing the peace stemming from an altercation with a local

performer, the defendant left a voicemail threatening to harm

the performer’s reputation if the performer insisted on

“ ‘get[ting] into a spitting contest’ ” and “ ‘denounc[ing] people in

an unjustified way.’ ” (Freer, at p. 13.) It was “undisputed that

this alleged act of intimidation did not occur in time to prevent

or dissuade [the victim] from ‘causing a complaint to be

15

Delaware and Florida replaced the connecting “and” with

“, or from.” (Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 3532(2); Fla. Stat. Ann.

§ 914.22(3)(d).) Georgia, the United States, and the District of

Columbia replaced the connecting “and” with “, or.” (Ga. Code

Ann. § 16-10-32(b)(4); 18 U.S.C. § 1512(d)(4); D.C. Code Ann.

§ 22-722(a)(3)(D).) And Missouri replaced the connecting “and”

with “or.” (Mo. Ann. Stat. § 575.270(1)(2)(b).)

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sought.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Wis. Stat. Ann. former § 940.449(2).)16

After a jury found the defendant guilty, he argued on appeal

that insufficient evidence supported his conviction because

there was no evidence showing that he violated the Wisconsin

statute’s equivalent of section 136.1(b)(2)’s causing clause. The

“heart of [the defendant]’s argument” was that the legislature

“connected” the statute’s clauses “with the conjunctive ‘and,’ not

the disjunctive ‘or.’ ” (Freer, at p. 14.) The Wisconsin Court of

Appeals rejected this claim. (Id. at pp. 14–19.)

The Freer court found the statute ambiguous, reasoning

that “ ‘and’ in statutes is not always interpreted as a conjunctive

term” (Freer, supra, 779 N.W.2d at p. 15), and that treating it as

such would render the assisting clause surplusage and create

gaps in coverage with Wisconsin’s other dissuasion laws

depending on when in the legal process a person committed an

act of dissuasion (id. at pp. 16–17). In consulting the statute’s

legislative history, the court observed that Wisconsin’s

legislative analyst consistently summarized the relevant

portion of the statute as relating to dissuasion from “assisting

the prosecution.” (Id. at p. 17.) The court reasoned from this

that “the legislature intended ‘causing a complaint . . . to be

sought and prosecuted’ to be an example of the broader category

of . . . ‘assisting in the prosecution.’ ” (Id. at p. 18, quoting Wis.

Stat. Ann. former § 940.449(2).) By contrast, the court observed

that the legislative analyst did “not even mention language . . .

about ‘[c]ausing a complaint . . . to be sought and prosecuted,’

16

The state did not dispute the defendant’s contention that

the victim had “caused a complaint to be sought against him

when [the victim] reported the incident to the police . . . and the

police issued a misdemeanor citation for disorderly conduct.”

(Freer, supra, 779 N.W.2d at p. 14, fn. 2.)

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much less state that the purpose of this language is to limit the

reach of the statute to acts of intimidation occurring before a

complaint is sought.” (Freer, at p. 18.) Accordingly, the Freer

court read the connecting “ ‘and’ ” in the Wisconsin statute “in

the disjunctive,” thus concluding the statute did not require that

a defendant dissuade a person from both causing a complaint to

be sought and prosecuted and assisting in that prosecution.

(Ibid.)

The Wisconsin Legislature later amended Wisconsin’s

counterpart to section 136.1(b)(2) to replace the connecting

“and” with “or” so it would “comply with the interpretation set

forth in the Freer case.” (2015 Wis. Assem. Bill No. 5, 2015 Wis.

Sess. Laws 14; see Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.44(2).)

3. Analysis

As with the statutory text and context of section

136.1(b)(2), we conclude that the legislative history and other

jurisdictions’ experiences implementing the same or

substantially similar provisions are likewise inconclusive as to

whether to read section 136.1(b)(2) conjunctively or

disjunctively.

The Legislature expressly modeled section 136.1(b)(2)

after the ABA model statute. It referenced the ABA Report in

legislative committee analyses, and attached pages from the

report to the analyses. The ABA Report stated that the model

statute was intended “to broaden substantially the coverage of

many state laws” regarding witness dissuasion. (ABA Rep. at

p. 8; see Babalola, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 956.) We find it

reasonable to infer from the references to, and presence of, the

ABA Report within the committee materials that the

Legislature was aware of — and joined in — the stated intent to

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substantially broaden the coverage of California’s witness

dissuasion laws. Indeed, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary

analysis explained that the bill “adapts in large part the

provisions of the draft proposal [i.e., the ABA model statute]”

(Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2909,

supra, as amended Apr. 9, 1980, p. 2) and that “[t]he purpose of

the bill is to expand the coverage of the law prohibiting the

intimidation of witnesses” (ibid.; see Wahidi, supra,

222 Cal.App.4th at p. 808 [courts may consider committee

materials when determining legislative intent]).

However, even a conjunctive (and thus, narrower) reading

of section 136.1(b)(2) would still provide broader coverage than

that afforded by former section 136 as it existed when the

Legislature replaced it with section 136.1.17 And both the ABA

Report and Assembly committee materials specifically identify

the need to broaden the coverage of existing laws to protect

against dissuasion of victims who are not also witnesses. (ABA

Rep. at p. 8; Assem. Off. of Research, 3d reading analysis of

Assem. Bill No. 2909, supra, as amended Apr. 16, 1980, p. 1.)

Thus, the stated legislative intent to substantially broaden the

prohibition on dissuasion supports resolving statutory

ambiguities in favor of a broader reading — the disjunctive one

that prohibits more, rather than less, dissuasive conduct. Yet,

this intent is also consistent with a narrower, conjunctive

construction because such a construction would also

17

When the Legislature replaced former section 136 with

section 136.1, former section 136 then addressed only dissuasion

from attending trial (Stats. 1979, ch. 944, § 1, p. 3252; Babalola,

supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 956, fn. 6), which is now addressed

by section 136.1, subdivision (a).

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substantially broaden protections against dissuasion as

compared to prior law.

The Legislative Counsel’s Digests to Assembly Bill

No. 2909 are similarly unenlightening. As noted, they

consistently characterized the relevant portions of the bill

broadly as prohibiting dissuading a victim or witness “from

performing specified acts relating to assisting law enforcement

or prosecution activities.” (Ante, pp. 21–22.) While the

reference to “assisting . . . prosecution activities” is broad

enough to encompass “assisting in the prosecution” of a charging

document (§ 136.1(b)(2)), we interpret the preceding phrase

“performing specified acts” as a reference to the acts specified in

section 136.1(b)(2). In other words, the digests simply refer to

the ambiguous statutory language we are construing here.

Moreover, two early legislative committee analyses

characterized an earlier version of the bill as prohibiting

dissuasion from “[c]ausing an accusatory pleading to be filed, or

parole or probation violation sought” (Assem. Com. on Crim.

Justice, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2909, supra, as introduced

Mar. 6, 1980, p. 1; Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem.

Bill No. 2909, supra, as amended Apr. 9, 1980, p. 3), which tends

to suggest that the Legislature was focusing on the causing

clause, which could be seen as consistent with a conjunctive

reading that gives effect to both clauses. (See ante, fn. 13.) Yet,

a subsequent Assembly committee analysis adopted the broader

reading reflected in the Legislative Counsel’s Digests, and

nothing in the earlier materials suggests their characterizations

of the statutory language were intended “to limit the reach of

the statute to acts of intimidation occurring before a complaint

is sought.” (Freer, supra, 779 N.W.2d at p. 18.)

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Nor can the Legislature’s silent insertion of the comma

immediately before the connecting “and” reasonably be deemed

dispositive. (See Roland v. Superior Court (2004)

124 Cal.App.4th 154, 163 [“While not of controlling importance,

punctuation is part of a statute and should be considered in its

interpretation in attempting to give the statute the construction

intended by the drafter”]; Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001)

26 Cal.4th 735, 747 (Renee J.) [“We agree generally that the

presence or absence of commas is a factor to be considered in

interpreting a statute”].) As noted, this was the only change the

Legislature made to the text of the causing or assisting clauses

when implementing the ABA model statute. A comma is

“normally used to divide and isolate ideas” (In re S.C. (2009)

179 Cal.App.4th 1436, 1441), thereby supporting a disjunctive

reading. Indeed, while it is unclear from the statutory text in

isolation what the Legislature was intending to divide and

isolate, when viewed against the backdrop of the stated

legislative intent to substantially broaden the coverage of

witness dissuasion laws, and in light of the Legislative Counsel’s

broad characterization of the provision as prohibiting dissuasion

from assisting in prosecution activities, we find it at least

plausible that the Legislature intended for the comma to signify

that the two clauses independently prohibit separate conduct.

This interpretation is both supported and undermined by

the experiences, discussed above, of other jurisdictions

implementing the ABA model statute. On the one hand, six of

the eight jurisdictions implemented the model statute by

replacing the connecting “and” with some formulation involving

the word “or,” thereby expressly indicating that the causing and

assisting clauses are to be viewed disjunctively in those

jurisdictions. This near-universal disjunctive treatment of the

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clauses by other states’ legislatures suggests that our

Legislature might also have intended for its insertion of a

comma immediately before the connecting “and” to likewise

convey that the clauses are to be viewed disjunctively. That is,

the fact that our Legislature inserted a punctuation mark that

signifies divided or isolated ideas (see In re S.C., supra,

179 Cal.App.4th at p. 1441) precisely where other legislatures

inserted a word that signifies independent operation, could

suggest that our Legislature intended the comma to

communicate the same disjunctive meaning communicated by

the word “or.”

But on the other hand, our Legislature’s decision to not do

just as other jurisdictions have done, and simply replace “and”

with “or” instead of silently inserting a comma, may well suggest

that the Legislature had chosen to not give the clause a

disjunctive meaning. And it is possible that the Legislature

intended the comma to serve some other unspecified purpose.

In the end, while the Legislature’s insertion of the comma

“is a factor to be considered in interpreting” section 136.1(b)(2)

(Renee J., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 747), we decline to accord it

dispositive weight, particularly given the opposing and

conflicting meanings the Legislature could have ascribed to its

unexplained insertion of a comma during the drafting process.

Turning to the Freer court’s adoption of the disjunctive

interpretation of Wisconsin’s implementation of the ABA model

statute — which, like section 136.1(b)(2), retained the model

statute’s connecting “and” — we find that the decision cuts both

ways on the question of whether to read section 136.1(b)(2)

conjunctively or disjunctively. (See San Jose Crane & Rigging,

Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1314, 1321 [“It

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PEOPLE v. REYNOZA

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is well settled that decisions of sister state courts are

particularly persuasive when those decisions construe similar

statutes or a uniform act”]; see Peralta Community College Dist.

v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1990) 52 Cal.3d 40, 59

[“we find persuasive the reasoning of the numerous courts in our

sister states with statutes similar to ours”].)

In support of the disjunctive construction, the Freer court

noted that under Wisconsin law, “ ‘and’ in statutes is not always

interpreted as a conjunctive term.” (Freer, supra, 779 N.W.2d

at p. 15.) The same is true in California. (See Pool, supra,

27 Cal. at p. 581.) The Freer court also found that, as the

Attorney General argues here, the doctrine against surplusage

supports reading the connecting “and” disjunctively so as not to

read the assisting clause out of the statute. (Freer, at pp. 16–

17.)

But Freer is distinguishable in at least one material

respect that supports the conjunctive construction. The Freer

court observed that the Wisconsin legislative analyst generally

referred to the statute as addressing dissuading a victim from

“ ‘assisting in the prosecution,’ ” without “even mention[ing]

language in [the statute] about ‘[c]ausing a complaint . . . to be

sought and prosecuted.” (Freer, supra, 779 N.W.2d at p. 18; see

id. at p. 17 [Wisconsin legislative analyst’s “analysis of a bill is

printed with and displayed on the bill when it is introduced in

the legislature; as such, it is indicative of legislative intent”].)

Furthermore, the Wisconsin legislative analyst specifically used

an “ ‘or’ ” and thereby expressed a disjunctive meaning when

referring to “ ‘assisting in the prosecution’ ” in a list of witness

dissuasion misdemeanors that the bill would create. (Id. at

p. 17 [“ ‘A person who maliciously prevents or dissuades . . . a

crime victim from making a report, assisting the prosecution or

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seeking an arrest will be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor’ ”

(italics added)].) The Freer court was also clear that this

legislative history was key to its decision. (See id. at p. 18 [“In

light of the LRB analysis, we conclude that the legislature

intended the victim intimidation statute to prohibit any act of

intimidation that seeks to prevent or dissuade a crime victim

from assisting in the prosecution” (italics added)].)

In this way, the Wisconsin legislative analyst was

singularly focused on the assisting clause, which supports the

disjunctive construction, whereas the Legislative Counsel’s

Digests pertaining to Assembly Bill No. 2909 broadly

encompassed both the causing and assisting clauses, which

lends at least some support to the conjunctive construction.

Arguably, these differing legislative histories in Wisconsin and

California — both of which pertain to implementation of the

same model statutory language — may reflect the fact that the

two states’ legislatures were seeking to fill different gaps in

their dissuasion statutes.

At bottom, we see nothing in the legislative history of

section 136.1(b)(2) or in other jurisdictions’ experiences

implementing similar statutory language that suggests section

136.1(b)(2) is more susceptible to either the conjunctive

construction or the disjunctive construction.

C. Overlap with Other Dissuasion Statutes

Counsels in Favor of a Narrow Construction of

the Assisting Clause, but Is Otherwise

Inconclusive

As previously observed, the Court of Appeal below also

justified its narrow, conjunctive interpretation of

section 136.1(b)(2) on the ground that other statutes “prohibit

attempts to dissuade victims or witnesses where charges have

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already been filed.” (Reynoza, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 189,

citing §§ 136.1, subd. (a)(1), (2) [prohibiting dissuasion or

attempted dissuasion of a victim or witness from giving

testimony or attending trial] and 137 [prohibiting attempts to

influence testimony or information given to law enforcement].)18

The Attorney General disagrees. While we agree that a broad,

disjunctive interpretation of the assisting clause as a “catch-all”

for postcharging dissuasion creates overlap with other statutes,

it does not necessarily follow that those concerns warrant a

conjunctive construction of section 136.1(b)(2) as a whole.

To begin with, even if a disjunctive reading of section

136.1(b)(2) would result in some slight overlap with other

dissuasion statutes, that fact would not be dispositive. Although

“[t]he Legislature has taken pains to distinguish the various

methods of” dissuasion (People v. Fernandez (2003)

106 Cal.App.4th 943, 950 (Fernandez)), “[i]t is axiomatic the

Legislature may criminalize the same conduct in different ways”

(People v. Superior Court (Caswell) (1988) 46 Cal.3d 381, 395;

see § 654 [“An act . . . that is punishable in different ways by

different provisions of law may be punished under either of such

provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished

under more than one provision”]). Indeed, the Legislature

contemplated that there may be overlap under certain

circumstances of witness dissuasion. (See, e.g., § 140, subd. (b)

[“A person who is punished under another provision of law for

an act described in subdivision (a) [prohibiting the use of force

or threats because the witness, victim, or other person has

18

Defendant also asserts section 137, subdivision (b), may

be “an alternate charging option in this case.” (Boldface

omitted.) We express no opinion on this question.

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provided any assistance or information to a law enforcement

officer or prosecutor] shall not receive an additional term of

imprisonment under this section”].)

We acknowledge there are differences between section

136.1(b)(2) and other dissuasion provisions that suggest the

Legislature intended to address a wide spectrum of dissuasive

conduct. For example, section 136.1(b)(2) does not contain a

malice requirement like section 136.1, subdivision (a)(1) or (2).

Nor does section 136.1(b)(2) establish a family member

exemption like section 136.1, subdivision (a)(3)19 or section 137,

subdivision (f).20 And section 136.1(b)(2) is a wobbler, whereas

section 137, subdivision (c) is a straight misdemeanor. But

section 136.1(b)(2) is not the outlier in these respects — the cited

provisions are. None of the other general dissuasion provisions

contains a malice requirement, family member exemption, or

provides for straight misdemeanor treatment. (See §§ 136.1,

subds. (a), (b) [wobblers], 136.1, subd. (c) [felony], 137, subds.

(a), (b) [felonies].) The concerns implicated by these differences

speak little to whether section 136.1(b)(2) should be read

conjunctively or disjunctively, because the potential for overlap

still exists under either construction.

In addition, although it is unnecessary for us to decide the

issue, there is some question as to whether defendant’s conduct

19

Section 136.1, subdivision (a)(3) provides: “For purposes

of this section, evidence that the defendant was a family

member who interceded in an effort to protect the witness or

victim shall create a presumption that the act was without

malice.”

20

Section 137, subdivision (f) provides: “The provisions of

subdivision (c) shall not apply to an attorney advising a client or

to a person advising a member of his or her family.”

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here falls within the ambit of the statutes cited by the Court of

Appeal. The cited statutes relate to attending or testifying at

trial (§ 136.1, subd. (a)) and influencing testimony or

information provided to law enforcement (§ 137, subds. (b), (c)).

But as the Attorney General observes, courts have reached

different conclusions about the extent to which a request to

“drop the charges” necessarily relates to attendance at a trial or

testimony.21 Defendant maintains that the significance of the

phrase “must be examined on a case-by-case basis.” On the facts

of this case, he maintains “ ‘drop the charges’ does not make

sense” because “there is no evidence that [Cornejo] planned to

separately ‘assist in the prosecution.’ ” We decline to wade into

this issue in the first instance because it relates to defendant’s

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the

assisting clause, which the Court of Appeal found unnecessary

to reach in light of its ruling as to the causing clause. Because

we ultimately conclude the Court of Appeal correctly resolved

the case on this basis, we need not reach the issue either.

To summarize, although the assisting clause may overlap

with other dissuasion provisions, that circumstance does not

21

Among other cases, the Attorney General compares People

v. Cribas (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 596, which held that a request

that the victim “drop the charges” implies a request not to testify

at trial only if the defendant knows “the only way she could drop

the charges was by refusing to testify” (id. at p. 608) with

Sullivan v. State (Ga.Ct.App. 2014) 761 S.E.2d 377, which held

that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for

offering a benefit “ ‘with the intent to deter [the victim] . . . from

testifying freely, fully, and truthfully’ ” where the evidence

showed that the defendant encouraged an intermediary “to

contact the victim about dropping the charges” (id. at p. 383).

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provide direct instruction on whether we should read

section 136.1(b)(2) conjunctively or disjunctively.

D. Case Law Discussing Section 136.1 Is Not

Particularly Instructive

The Attorney General argues that cases cited by the Court

of Appeal and defendant in support of a conjunctive construction

of section 136.1(b)(2) are not persuasive “because none

addressed the ambiguity in section 136.1(b)(2) or applied the

canons of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity.” (See

Reynoza, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 187–188, citing People v.

Hallock (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 595 (Hallock), Fernandez, supra,

106 Cal.App.4th 943, and People v. Brown (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th

1074 (Brown).) We agree.

The Court of Appeal in Fernandez relied on an earlier

court’s characterization of section 136.1, subdivision (b) as

“punish[ing] a defendant’s pre-arrest efforts to prevent a crime

from being reported to the authorities.” (Fernandez, supra,

106 Cal.App.4th at p. 950, citing Hallock, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d

at pp. 605–607.) Neither Fernandez nor Hallock involved

section 136.1(b)(2).

The defendant in Fernandez attempted to induce his

victim to testify falsely at a preliminary hearing — conduct

covered by section 137, subdivision (c). (Fernandez, supra,

106 Cal.App.4th at pp. 945–946.) But he was charged and

convicted under section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1), which pertains

to dissuading the reporting of a crime. (Fernandez, at p. 946.)

Thus, although the Fernandez court broadly characterized

section 136.1, subdivision (b) as addressing pre-arrest conduct,

it did so in the context of contrasting “pre-arrest efforts to

prevent a crime from being reported to the authorities” under

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section 136.1, subdivision (b), with “effort[s] to prevent a

witness from giving testimony after a criminal proceeding has

been commenced” under section 137, subdivision (c).

(Fernandez, at p. 950, citing Hallock, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at

pp. 605–607.) “There was simply no issue before the court

concerning section 136.1, subdivision (b)(2).” (Brown, supra,

6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1083; see People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th

1, 110 [“It is axiomatic that a case is not authority for an issue

that was not considered”].)

In Hallock, the defendant threatened his victim, “ ‘[I]f you

tell anybody anything that happened . . . I’ll blow your house

up.’ ” (Hallock, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 598.) The defendant

was charged with violating section 136.1, subdivision (c) by

means of violating subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(3) — dissuading a

victim from reporting a crime or seeking an arrest, respectively.

(Hallock, at p. 605.) However, the trial court instructed the jury

regarding section 136.1, subdivision (a), which prohibits

dissuasion from attending or testifying at trial. (Hallock, at

p. 606.) In comparing subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 136.1,

the Hallock court described subdivision (b)(2) as prohibiting

dissuasion of a victim or witness from “causing a complaint or

similar charge to be sought.” (Hallock, at p. 606.) But the

defendant was not charged under section 136.1(b)(2), nor was

the jury instructed regarding it. Thus, the Hallock court had no

occasion to consider the nuances of section 136.1(b)(2); its

characterization is therefore dicta.

The Court of Appeal also cited Brown, in which the

appellate court compared section 136.1(b)(2) to section 137,

subdivision (b), but did not examine the ambiguity within

section 136.1(b)(2). (Brown, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1080–

1082.) The defendant in Brown was convicted of violating

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section 136.1, subdivision (c) by means of violating

section 136.1(b)(2) after he threatened his victim’s life unless

she agreed to “take back her report to the police.” (Brown, at

pp. 1078, 1079.) No charging document had yet been filed. (Id.

at p. 1084.) On appeal, the defendant argued he should have

been charged, if at all, with violating section 137, subdivision

(b), which makes it a felony — but not a serious felony, like

section 136.1, subdivision (c) — to induce false testimony by

force or threat. (Brown, at p. 1080.) The defendant reasoned

his conduct was covered by both statutes, which required that

he be charged with the more specific of the applicable statutes,

which he maintained was section 137. (Brown, at pp. 1080–

1081.) In assessing this claim, the Brown court examined the

elements of a section 136.1(b)(2) violation and concluded that,

“under section 136.1, subdivision (b)(2), the perpetrator must

attempt to prevent a person from causing a charging document

to be sought and prosecuted and from assisting in the

prosecution. Thus, the prevention must occur before the

relevant charging document has been filed.” (Brown, at

p. 1082.) In other words, the Brown court read section

136.1(b)(2)’s connecting “and” conjunctively. In doing so,

however, the Brown court simply applied the ordinarily

conjunctive meaning of “and” without considering the

interpretive aids we have considered here. Nor did the Brown

court cite or discuss Velazquez, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th 219,

which stated that a violation of section 136.1(b)(2) may be

premised on conduct that occurs after the relevant charging

document has been filed. (Velazquez, at pp. 232–233.) Finally,

Brown is factually distinguishable in that all the dissuasive

conduct there occurred before any charging document had been

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

filed (Brown, at p. 1084), thus rendering the court’s analysis of

section 136.1(b)(2)’s assisting clause dicta.

By the same token, we acknowledge that Velazquez, supra,

201 Cal.App.4th 219, on which the Attorney General heavily

relies, has limited persuasive value. The defendant in Velazquez

was convicted of violating section 136.1(b)(2) after he told a

victim that if she “drop[ped] all the charges” against the

defendant’s fellow gang members “nothing would happen to

her.” (Velazquez, at p. 224.) In distinguishing the basis on

which the Fernandez court concluded that “section 136.1,

subdivision (b) punishes a defendant’s pre-arrest efforts to

prevent a crime from being reported to the authorities”

(Fernandez, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 950, italics added), the

Velazquez court held that “[s]ubdivision (b)(2) clearly

encompasses more than prearrest efforts to dissuade, inasmuch

as it includes attempts to dissuade a victim from causing a

complaint or information to be prosecuted or assisting in that

prosecution.” (Velazquez, at p. 233, italics added.) In reaching

this conclusion, however, the Velazquez court uncritically read

section 136.1(b)(2)’s connecting “and” disjunctively, without

considering any interpretative aids. Moreover, because the

Velazquez court concluded the defendant’s conviction was

supported under the causing clause alone (Velazquez, at p. 233),

the court had no occasion to consider the interplay between the

causing and assisting clauses, thus rendering its observations

regarding the same dicta.

Because none of the cases that the Court of Appeal cited

actually addresses the ambiguity at issue here, we find they

offer little insight to the proper interpretation of

section 136.1(b)(2).

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E. Defendant’s Remaining Arguments Are

Unhelpful

Defendant contends several additional considerations

support his conjunctive reading of section 136.1(b)(2). We

disagree.

First, defendant asserts that the pattern jury instruction

corresponding to section 136.1(b)(2) — CALCRIM No. 2622 —

supports his reading because it “clearly presents the offense as

unified conduct.” Specifically, the pattern instruction states

that the prosecution must prove that the defendant dissuaded a

victim or witness “from cooperating or providing information so

that a . . . complaint . . . could be sought and prosecuted, and

from helping to prosecute that action.” (CALCRIM No. 2622,

italics added.) “We have cautioned,” however, “that ‘jury

instructions . . . are not themselves the law, and are not

authority to establish legal propositions or precedent.’ ” (People

v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 876, fn. 16, quoting People

v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 48, fn. 7.) “At most, when they

are accurate, . . . they restate the law.” (Morales, at p. 48, fn. 7.)

All that CALCRIM No. 2622 does is restate section

136.1(b)(2) — including the ambiguous connecting “and” at issue

here.

Second, defendant asserts that if the Legislature intended

the assisting clause “to exist as a separate prohibited act, the

drafters would have structured that phrase differently and

added it as a stand-alone subsection.” Had the Legislature been

drafting on a blank slate, we would agree that this would have

been a logical way to structure the statute. But that is not what

happened here. Instead, the Legislature imported nearly

verbatim the ABA model statute. Notably, none of the other

jurisdictions that have implemented the ABA model statute (or

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

substantially similar language) — including those that

expressly created separate prohibited acts by replacing the

model statute’s ambiguous connecting “and” with a clearly

disjunctive “or” — set out the causing and assisting clauses in

separate subdivisions, as defendant suggests. (See, ante,

pp. 23–25.)

Additionally, although the Legislature could have

structured the statute differently, the format it chose is not

illogical. The different parts of section 136.1, subdivision (b)

refer generally to different stages of a criminal proceeding:

subdivision (b)(1) refers to reporting crimes, subdivision (b)(2)

refers to prosecutions, and subdivision (b)(3) refers to arrests.

Because the causing and assisting clauses both relate to

prosecutions, the Legislature could conclude they logically

belong together in the same subpart.

F. The Rule of Lenity Counsels in Favor of

Adopting the Conjunctive Construction

As a final argument, defendant asserts that the ambiguity

in section 136.1(b)(2) “triggers the rule of lenity.” “ ‘That rule

generally requires that “ambiguity in a criminal statute should

be resolved in favor of lenity, giving the defendant the benefit of

every reasonable doubt on questions of interpretation. But . . .

‘that rule applies “only if two reasonable interpretations of the

statute stand in relative equipoise.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]”

[Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘The rule of lenity does not apply every

time there are two or more reasonable interpretations of a penal

statute. [Citation.] Rather, the rule applies “ ‘only if the court

can do no more than guess what the legislative body intended;

there must be an egregious ambiguity and uncertainty to justify

invoking the rule.’ ” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Nuckles (2013)

56 Cal.4th 601, 611; accord, Smith v. LoanMe, Inc. (2021)

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

11 Cal.5th 183, 202; see Scalia & Garner, supra, at p. 299 [“The

criterion we favor is this: whether, after all the legitimate tools

of interpretation have been applied, ‘a reasonable doubt

persists’ ”].) “ ‘ “Application of the rule of lenity ensures that

criminal statutes will provide fair warning concerning conduct

rendered illegal and strikes the appropriate balance between

the legislature, the prosecutor, and the court in defining

criminal liability. [Citation.]” ’ ” (Avery, supra, 27 Cal.4th at

p. 57.)

“Having consulted the usual aids to eliminating ambiguity

in statutory construction — text, context and structure, overall

purpose, relevant case law, legislative history — and having

found a satisfactory answer in none of them, we conclude that

this is one of those rare cases where the rule of lenity applies.”

(People v. Reyes (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 972, 989 [applying the

rule of lenity to § 136.1, subd. (b)(1)].) That is, we can do no

more than simply venture a guess as to whether the Legislature

intended for section 136.1(b)(2) to operate conjunctively or

disjunctively. In this rare circumstance in which it is unclear

whether the Legislature intended to accord the word “and” its

traditionally conjunctive meaning, a disjunctive reading of the

statute would fail to “provide fair warning concerning conduct

rendered illegal.” (Avery, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 57.) The rarity,

and egregiousness, of the ambiguity here is underscored by the

Legislature’s unusual words in adopting the statute. It

recognized it was passing a criminal law despite believing from

the very outset that “redrafting” was “necessary,” as it had too

closely hewn to an ABA model statute with “numerous rough

edges” and language quality “far worse” than typical. (Sen.

Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2909, supra, as

amended Apr. 9, 1980, p. 5.)

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Accordingly, we adopt the construction more favorable to

defendants: section 136.1(b)(2) is to be read conjunctively such

that the language “assisting in the prosecution thereof” provides

no independent basis for a conviction under the statute.22

Where criminal charges have already been filed, postcharging

dissuasion alone does not constitute an offense under

section 136.1(b)(2).

Because it is undisputed that all of defendant’s dissuasive

conduct here occurred after the underlying charging document

had been filed, the Court of Appeal correctly concluded that

substantial evidence does not support the causing-clause

element of the charged offense. Like the Court of Appeal, we

therefore have no occasion to explore the assisting clause’s

contours.

As noted, in response to Freer, the Wisconsin Legislature

codified the court’s clarification that the statute’s causing and

assisting clauses are to be read disjunctively. Likewise, our

Legislature remains free to clarify section 136.1(b)(2), as the

Senate Committee on the Judiciary suggested it do “[a]t some

point” to smooth out the statute’s “numerous rough edges.”

(Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2909,

supra, as amended Apr. 9, 1980, pp. 6, 5.)

22

We disapprove of People v. Velazquez, supra,

201 Cal.App.4th 219 to the extent it is inconsistent with this

holding.

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.

GUERRERO, C. J.

We Concur:

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.

JENKINS, J.

EVANS, J.

46

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Reynoza

__________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted (published) XX 75 Cal.App.5th 181

Review Granted (unpublished)

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S273797

Date Filed: April 22, 2024

__________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Santa Clara

Judge: Charles E. Wilson II

__________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Nancy Susan Brandt, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant

Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General,

Catherine A. Rivlin, Seth K. Schalit, Bruce M. Slavin and Katie L.

Stowe, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for

publication with opinion):

Nancy Susan Brandt

Attorney at Law

P.O. Box 6680

Albany, CA 94706

(510) 545-4920

Katie L. Stowe

Deputy Attorney General

455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102

(415) 510-3863