The opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA
ARMIDA RUELAS et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
COUNTY OF ALAMEDA et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
S277120
Ninth Circuit
21-16528
Northern District of California
4:19-cv-07637-JST
April 22, 2024 (reposted corrected version)
Justice Evans authored the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger,
Groban, and Jenkins concurred.
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
S277120
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.
Inmates at the Santa Rita Jail in Alameda County work
in the kitchen preparing meals for the county jail population and
staff under an agreement between the county and a private
contractor. They are not paid for their labor. A group of
nonconvicted individuals who were performing this labor while
detained at the jail sued the county and the private contractor
in federal court for failing to pay minimum wage and overtime.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
asked us to decide whether nonconvicted incarcerated
individuals working in a county jail for a private company have
a claim for minimum wage and overtime under California law.
We conclude the answer is no.
I. BACKGROUND
Because this matter arises from an interlocutory appeal of
the denial of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, rule 12(b)(6) (28 U.S.C.), we recite the facts as
alleged in the operative complaint. We treat the factual
allegations as true for the purpose of addressing the certified
question. (See Kuciemba v. Victory Woodworks, Inc. (2023) 14
Cal.5th 993, 1004.)
Under a contract with defendant Alameda County,
defendant Aramark Correctional Services, LLC (Aramark) has
undertaken the responsibility for operating the food service
program and delivery of meals for inmates and staff at all
1
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.
Alameda County Sheriff’s Office facilities and satellite facilities.
Satellite facilities include county jails located elsewhere in the
state. Aramark, a private, for-profit company, provides the
contracted-for food services using the industrial kitchen at the
Santa Rita Jail. Jail inmates prepare and package the food in
the industrial kitchen each day and clean and sanitize the
kitchen after the conclusion of the day’s food preparation.
Plaintiffs Armida Ruelas et al. are or were pretrial or
other nonconvicted detainees confined at Santa Rita Jail who
either prepared and packaged food or cleaned and sanitized the
kitchen for Aramark. No party has suggested the analysis turns
on the basis for the nonconvicted detainees’ detention, so we
refer generally in this opinion to pretrial detainees. Sometimes
plaintiffs work in excess of eight hours a day or 40 hours a week,
six or seven days a week. Nonetheless, plaintiffs are not paid
any wages for their work on Aramark’s behalf.
On November 20, 2019, plaintiffs filed a complaint in
federal district court against the County of Alameda, Alameda
County Sheriff Gregory J. Ahern (together, the County), and
Aramark on behalf of themselves and the class of Santa Rita Jail
inmates who perform services for Aramark under its contract
with the County. After the district court granted in part and
denied in part defendants’ motions to dismiss, plaintiffs filed a
first amended complaint limited to themselves and other
nonconvicted detainees. The amended complaint asserted nine
causes of action, including causes of action for minimum and
overtime wages. The district court granted in part and denied
in part defendants’ motions to dismiss the causes of action for
minimum and overtime wages. The court reasoned that “while
the Penal Code explicitly addresses employment and wages of
state prisoners, both in relation to the minimum wage [see Pen.
2
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.
Code, § 2811] and in the context of incarcerated individuals
working for a private company through a joint venture program
[see Pen. Code, § 2717.8], the Penal Code does not address such
matters for pretrial detainees confined in county jails . . . .
Similarly, although the Penal Code authorizes ‘the board of
supervisors or city council’ to require ‘[a]ll persons confined in
the county jail . . . under a final judgment of imprisonment
rendered in a criminal action or proceeding to perform labor on
the public works or ways in the county or city,’ there is no
similar provision regarding non-convicted incarcerated persons.
[Citation.] The Court reads these omissions to imply that the
California legislature did not intend to exclude non-convicted
detainees working for a private corporation from the Labor
Code’s protections.” The court did, however, agree with the
County that government entities “are exempt from state
overtime laws” and therefore granted the County’s motion to
dismiss the claim for overtime wages.
In a simultaneously filed order, the district court certified
for interlocutory appeal the legal question of pretrial detainees’
entitlement to minimum and overtime wages. The Ninth
Circuit accepted the appeal and then certified the following
question of state law to this court (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.548(b)(2)): “Do non-convicted incarcerated individuals
performing services in county jails for a for-profit company to
supply meals within the county jails and related custody
facilities have a claim for minimum wages and overtime under
Section 1194 of the California Labor Code in the absence of any
local ordinance prescribing or prohibiting the payment of wages
for these individuals?” (Ruelas v. County of Alameda (9th Cir.
3
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.
2022) 51 F.4th 1187, 1188.) On January 11, 2023, we agreed to
answer the certified question.1
II. DISCUSSION
To determine whether pretrial detainees working in
county jails for private companies are entitled to minimum
wage,2 we examine the interplay among the Penal Code, the
Labor Code, and the constitutional provisions governing public-
private contracts for inmate labor. We conclude that such
individuals do not have a claim for minimum wage under the
Labor Code.
Aramark and the County begin with Penal Code section
4019.3 (all further statutory references are to this code unless
otherwise specified), which creates a discretionary scheme for
the payment of wage credits to county jail inmates, subject to a
cap: “The board of supervisors may provide that each prisoner
confined in or committed to a county jail shall be credited with
a sum not to exceed two dollars ($2) for each eight hours of work
done by him in such county jail.” This wage credit, which has
1
To the extent plaintiffs allege they were forced to work, we
note those claims are being litigated in the district court. The
Ninth Circuit’s question to this court proceeds from the
assumption that nonconvicted incarcerated individuals
participating in the public-private program do so voluntarily.
2
We do not separately address pretrial detainees’
entitlement to overtime wages. No one in this proceeding has
articulated a separate argument for payment of overtime wages,
distinct from payment of minimum wages. Moreover, the right
to premium pay for overtime logically and legally depends on a
right to some wage for regular work. (See Lab. Code, § 510,
subd. (a) [basing overtime compensation on a multiple of the
employee’s “regular rate of pay”].)
4
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.
remained unchanged since 1975, is far below the state minimum
wage for other workers. (See Lab. Code, § 1182.12.)
Defendants argue, and we agree, that section 4019.3
applies broadly to all county inmates, including pretrial
detainees, working in the county jail. The federal district court
was therefore mistaken in asserting that the Penal Code “does
not address” wages for “pretrial detainees confined in county
jails.”
By its terms, section 4019.3 encompasses all prisoners
“confined in or committed to” a county jail. We also note the
broad construction accorded similar language — a prisoner
“confined in or committed to a county jail” — in nearby section
4019 to describe who is eligible for custody and worktime
credits. (§ 4019, subds. (a)(1)–(3), (b), (c); see also id., § 4000,
subd. 2 [authorizing county jails to be used for detaining persons
charged with a crime and “committed for trial”].) We have
construed this language to include not only those who are
serving a sentence in county jail, but also those who have merely
been detained following an arrest as well as those who have been
convicted but not yet sentenced. (See People v. Dieck (2009) 46
Cal.4th 934, 938–939 & fn. 2.) Because sections 4019 and 4019.3
deal “ ‘with the same subject matter’ ” — i.e., the class of county
jail inmates who are eligible for an important benefit — the
category of inmates confined in or committed to a county jail
“should be accorded the same interpretation” in both instances.
(See Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Services, Inc. (2021) 11
Cal.5th 158, 175 (Kaanaana).)
An Attorney General opinion, which is entitled to
“considerable weight” (Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th
1050, 1087, fn. 17), reached the same conclusion nearly 50 years
5
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.
ago. (57 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 276, 283 (1974).) As the Attorney
General then noted, the Legislature enacted section 4019.3 to
equalize the wage credits for inmates working in jail with those
already authorized by section 4125 for individuals working at
industrial farms or road camps. (See 57 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen.,
supra, at p. 283; Assem. Com. on Crim. Procedure, Analysis of
Sen. Bill No. 1394 (1959 Reg. Sess.) as introduced May 4, 1959,
p. 1.) The “underlying purpose” of both provisions, the Attorney
General observed, “is ‘to make possible the substitution of
constructive labor for profitless prison confinement in order that
those who are charged with or convicted of public offenses and
deprived of their liberty may become better citizens because of
their disciplinary experience.’ ” (57 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at
p. 283, quoting § 4100.) “Penal Code section 4019.3 therefore
applies to pre-sentence as well as post-sentence work time, the
same beneficial purpose being served in both instances.” (57
Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 283.) We find the Attorney
General opinion about the scope of section 4019.3 especially
persuasive because the Legislature “left intact the language
construed” by the Attorney General (California Assn. of
Psychology Providers v. Rank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1, 17) when it
amended section 4019.3 in 1975 to increase the cap on inmate
wage credits from 50 cents to two dollars per eight-hour shift
(Stats. 1975, ch. 350, § 1, p. 797).
Counties therefore may — but are not required to — credit
inmates, including pretrial detainees, up to two dollars per
eight-hour shift, notwithstanding the legal minimum wage,
which is much higher. Indeed, plaintiffs concede that section
4019.3, not the state’s minimum wage law, governs the legal
wage for “county jail inmates working in public works
programs.”
6
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.
To support their claim for minimum wage, plaintiffs focus
on a different part of section 4019.3. In their view, section
4019.3 is inapplicable where, as here, the individual is
participating in a public-private work program. While there
may be sound policy reasons for and against such a distinction,
we find no indication section 4019.3 is limited in the way
plaintiffs suggest.
No such limitation appears in the statutory text.
Plaintiffs instead attempt to infer one from the phrase “in such
county jail” in section 4019.3. They argue that because this
phrase “appears after the description of the type of prisoners to
whom the provision applies — i.e., “each prisoner confined in or
committed to a county jail” — “the phrase ‘in such county jail’
. . . cannot also serve to signify the state of being detained.”
Plaintiffs conclude: “Thus, ‘in such county jail’ must refer to
work done for a county jail.” We agree with plaintiffs that it
would be surplusage to read “in such county jail” to identify the
class of inmates who are subject to section 4019.3; the statute
accomplishes that by its earlier reference to “each prisoner
confined in or committed to a county jail.” But it does not follow
that “work done . . . in such county jail” (§ 4019.3) must be
construed to mean the inmate’s work must be done exclusively
for the county jail. The word “in” ordinarily describes where an
event takes place: “inside of, within the bounds or limits of.”
(General American Indemnity Co. v. Pepper (Tex. 1960) 339
S.W.2d 660, 662.)
We find further support for this definition in the
legislative history. An analysis of the bill that became section
4019.3 described the purpose of equalizing wage treatment
between those inmates “assigned to honor farms,” who were
already eligible for what the analysis called “a small wage,” and
7
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.
those “working in the jail kitchens, laundry or various
maintenance assignments” (Assem. Com. on Crim. Procedure,
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1394, supra, as introduced May 4, 1959,
p. 1 [comparing § 4125]). The latter assignments are all
consistent with work that occurs “in” the jail. We also note that
where the public-private work takes place has significance in
determining the applicability of the minimum wage under the
federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. § 201 et
seq.). (See, e.g., Burrell v. Staff (3d Cir. 2023) 60 F.4th 25, 42–
43, 44–48 [nonconvicted inmates working outside the facility for
a private employer stated a claim for minimum wage under
federal and Pennsylvania law]; Watson v. Graves (5th Cir. 1990)
909 F.2d 1549, 1553–1556 [inmates working for a private
construction business outside the jail were entitled to the
federal minimum wage and overtime].) All this leads us to
conclude that “work done in such county jail” means work done
at the jail.
Plaintiffs argue next that section 4019.3 should be limited
to public works programs because two neighboring statutes —
sections 4017 and 4018 — likewise are limited to public works
programs. Plaintiffs’ premise is flawed: section 4017 is not
limited to public works programs, which it defines narrowly and
only “[a]s used in this section.” In reality, section 4017 has a
broader scope; it applies to inmates working “in the prevention
and suppression of forest, brush and grass fires” in addition to
“labor on the public works or ways.” (See Parsons v. Workers’
Comp. Appeals Bd. (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 629, 634
[distinguishing inmates who “ ‘labor on the public works’ ”
under § 4017 from inmates who “fight and prevent forest fires”].)
Moreover, plaintiffs do not fall within section 4017, which
applies exclusively to inmates confined “under a final judgment
8
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.
of imprisonment” or “as a condition of probation” and “required
. . . to perform labor,” or section 4018, which authorizes county
boards of supervisors to make rules for the work required under
section 4017. In any event, the reference to “public works” in
section 4017 and its omission from section 4019.3 (as well as
from dozens of other provisions in pt. 3, tit. 4, ch. 1 of the Pen.
Code) indicates the Legislature knows how to restrict the scope
of a provision to public works if it wishes to do so. (See People v.
Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 979 [“Had the Legislature intended”
one subdivision to share the limitation included in a different
subdivision, “it no doubt would have included similar
language”].) “It is not for us to insert a limitation the
Legislature excluded.” (Kaanaana, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 171.)3
Plaintiffs contend that section 4019.3 cannot apply to
public-private work programs because such partnerships were
prohibited under the law at the time the statute was enacted.
As Aramark points out, though, plaintiffs’ premise is
questionable. At the time section 4019.3 was enacted, the state
Constitution barred contracting out “[t]he labor of convicts . . .
to any person, copartnership, company or corporation” and
further provided that “the Legislature shall, by law, provide for
the working of convicts for the benefit of the State.” (Cal. Const.,
former art. X, § 6, italics added.) It’s not immediately apparent
the bar applied to the labor of convicted persons in county jails,
let alone nonconvicted persons such as plaintiffs. (See Pitts v.
Reagan (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 112, 115 [“It has been the practice
3
Reading a “public works” limitation into the statutes that
form Part 3, Title 4, Chapter 1 of the Penal Code would also strip
many inmates of important statutory rights, including the
ability to earn worktime credits under section 4019.
9
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.
in California, at least in some areas, for ‘local county prisoners’
to aid in crop harvesting during periods when a farm labor
shortage was believed to exist”]; Copeland v. County of Kern
(1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 821, 825–826 [noting the issue but
declining to resolve it]; but see Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6,
1990), analysis of Prop. 139 by Legis. Analyst, p. 65 (Ballot
Pamphlet) [“the California Constitution prohibits contracting
with any private agency for the use of state prison or local jail
inmate labor”].) Yet even assuming that public-private
partnerships for the labor of county jail detainees were not
permitted at the time of section 4019.3’s enactment, it does not
follow that the statute cannot apply to such partnerships.
Where, as here, “lawmakers choose broad statutory language ‘it
is unimportant that the particular application may not have
been contemplated.’ ” (Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v.
Garcia (2013) 58 Cal.4th 175, 192, quoting Barr v. United States
(1945) 324 U.S. 83, 90; see People v. Bell (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th
315, 344 [“Courts have applied these interpretive methods in
countless cases, refusing to read an exception into a statute
merely because a particular application was likely
unanticipated by the enacting legislature”].) Indeed, section
4019.3, by its terms, does not turn on the identity of the
employer. Rather, it depends on who performs the work
(“prisoner[s] confined in or committed to a county jail”) and
where the work is performed (“in such county jail”). And while
section 4019.3 constrains what “[t]he board of supervisors may
provide” as a wage credit, plaintiffs do not dispute that it is the
board of supervisors that is ultimately responsible for the terms
of work performed by detainees pursuant to a public-private
partnership.
10
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.
Plaintiffs argue next that even if section 4019.3 has a
broad scope and could apply to inmates working at the jail for a
public-private partnership, it would not preclude “the
application of the Labor Code . . . here” because section 4019.3
is “permissive” and sets forth “how the board of supervisors
‘may’ act, not how it is required to act.” Consequently, plaintiffs
assert, section 4019.3 and the minimum wage protections in the
Labor Code “ ‘can occupy the same domain without any inherent
antagonism.’ ” But plaintiffs fail to explain how that could be
so. A county may not simultaneously comply with Penal Code
section 4019.3, which sets the compensation ceiling at no more
than two dollars per eight-hour shift, and at the same time
comply with the Labor Code, which sets a minimum wage floor
that is far above that. Properly understood, section 4019.3 is
permissive in that, as the legislative history reveals, it “will
permit a County Board of Supervisors to pay a county jail
prisoner up to” the amount specified in the statute. (Assem.
Com. on Crim. Procedure, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1394, supra,
as introduced May 4, 1959, p. 1.) But it does not ensure county
jail inmates working in the county jail will be paid anything at
all.
Finally, nothing in Proposition 139, the Prison Inmate
Labor Initiative of 1990, imposes an obligation on local
governments or private entities to comply with the Labor Code’s
minimum wage provisions for detainees working in county jails.
Proposition 139 repealed the constitutional prohibition on
contracting for “[t]he labor of convicts” and provided instead
that “[t]he Director of Corrections or any county Sheriff or other
local government official charged with jail operations[] may
enter into contracts with public entities, nonprofit or for profit
organizations, entities, or businesses for the purpose of
11
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.
conducting programs which use inmate labor.” (Ballot Pamp.,
supra, text of Prop. 139, §§ 3, 4, p. 136, strikethrough omitted;
see Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 5.) Although the ballot measure
granted this power to both state and local custodial officials, it
articulated distinct frameworks for each. State prisoners were
guaranteed by statute compensation “comparable to wages paid
by the joint venture employer to non-inmate employees
performing similar work for that employer,” subject to
deductions for taxes, room and board, restitution, and family
support, “as determined by the Director of Corrections, which
shall not in the aggregate exceed 80 percent of gross wages.”
(Ballot Pamp., supra, text of Prop. 139, p. 137.) More generally,
the measure provided that programs for state prisoner labor
“shall be operated and implemented pursuant to statutes
enacted by or in accordance with the provisions of the Prison
Inmate Labor Initiative of 1990 and by rules and regulations
prescribed by the Director of Corrections.” (Ballot Pamp., supra,
text of Prop. 139, § 4, p. 136.) But none of the wage requirements
in the initiative were applied to labor involving county jail
inmates. For the latter category, Proposition 139 said only that,
in addition “to statutes enacted by or in accordance with the
Prison Inmate Labor Initiative of 1990,” the public-private
programs “shall be operated and implemented pursuant to . . .
local ordinances.” (Ballot Pamp., supra, text of Prop. 139, § 4, p.
136.)
The ballot measure was conspicuously silent as to how
counties should structure and operate their programs. It did
not, for example, “specify the content of the local ordinances.”
(Ballot Pamp., supra, analysis by the Legis. Analyst, p. 65.) Nor
was it “possible” for the Legislative Analyst “to estimate the
[fiscal] impact of the measure on local governments,” since “local
12
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.
ordinances that would implement contracts for use of jail labor
are not required to contain specific fiscal provisions.” (Ibid.,
italics added.)
The question posed by the Ninth Circuit asks us to assume
that no local ordinance governs plaintiffs’ work at the jail —
and, indeed, the parties agree that no such ordinance exists.
Plaintiffs argue that in the absence of a local ordinance, the
Labor Code necessarily applies. But they fail to grapple with
section 4019.3, which sets a specific wage range, well below the
state minimum, for convicted and nonconvicted inmates
working in a county jail. Notably, plaintiffs do not argue that
Proposition 139 displaced section 4019.3, and we would not
lightly adopt such a construction. The electorate is presumed to
be aware of existing laws — including the compensation scheme
in section 4019.3 for nonconvicted county jail inmates — at the
time Proposition 139 was enacted. (See Professional Engineers
in California Government v. Kempton (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1016,
1048.) And unless a conflict between a statute and a provision
of the state Constitution is “clear and unquestionable,” we must
uphold the statute. (California Housing Finance Agency v.
Elliott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 594; see California Cannabis
Coalition v. City of Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924, 945 [applying
the “strong presumption” against implied repeal].)
Consequently, we must “try to harmonize constitutional
language with that of existing statutes if possible.” (Santos v.
Brown (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 398, 410.)
We conclude that article XIV, section 5 of the California
Constitution and Penal Code section 4019.3 can be harmonized.
(See Penziner v. West American Finance Co. (1937) 10 Cal.2d
160, 176 [“nor are the provisions of the two acts so inconsistent
or repugnant that the later repealed the earlier by
13
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.
implication”].) Under the state Constitution, public-private
programs for county jail inmate labor “shall be operated and
implemented pursuant to statutes enacted by or in accordance
with the provisions of the Prison Inmate Labor Initiative of
1990, and by rules and regulations prescribed by . . . local
ordinances.” (Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 5, subd. (a).) Penal Code
section 4019.3, which concerns the operation and
implementation of public-private partnerships for county
inmate labor, appears to be “in accordance with” the provisions
of Proposition 139, in that the two enactments can coexist
where, as here, no local ordinance provides otherwise.
Plaintiffs and their amici curiae advance several policy
arguments for paying a minimum wage to nonconvicted
detainees who work in jail. Plaintiffs emphasize, in particular,
that “[n]on-convicted detainees have not been convicted of
crimes,” but their right to payment for their work is less than
that granted to fellow inmates who have been convicted. They
note that the wages for convicted state prisoners, who can be
forced to work without pay (U.S. Const., 13th Amend.;4 Cal.
Const., art. I, § 6;5 Pen. Code, § 2700), must be “comparable” to
non-inmate workers when the prisoners are laboring, even
voluntarily, for a public-private partnership (Pen. Code,
§ 2717.8). In contrast, nonconvicted detainees working for a
4
The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “[n]either slavery
nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States . . . .” (Italics added.)
5
Article I, section 6 of the California Constitution provides
that “[s]lavery is prohibited. Involuntary servitude is prohibited
except to punish crime.”
14
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.
public-private partnership in the county jail, who cannot be
forced to work, may be paid nothing.
Plaintiffs and their amici curiae also point out that the
mere fact of detention may cause detainees to lose wage income
and potentially their jobs during their incarceration, and thus
their ability to support themselves and their families. They
assert that detainees (or their families) in many jurisdictions
must also pay to maintain contact through phone calls, video
calls, and visits — and to obtain what amici curiae have
described as necessary items from the commissary. (See In re
Humphrey (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1006, 1032, fn. 13.) The
provision of a minimum wage for detainee labor could
ameliorate some of these burdens. Yet the wage rate for county
jail inmates laboring in the jail remains capped at a level set
nearly 50 years ago.
Plaintiffs recognize that they receive certain nonmonetary
benefits by working at the jail. According to the First Amended
Complaint, “working in the kitchen means that plaintiffs can get
out of their cells for some portion of the day, which is beneficial
to their physical and mental health, and obtain additional food
for their own enjoyment and nutrition.” Detainees also receive
worktime credits for their labor (see Pen. Code, § 4019, subd.
(b)), but these credits end up providing no benefit to those
detainees who are not ultimately convicted of an offense and
punished with a term of incarceration.
Defendants and their amici curiae acknowledge these
concerns, although they also elaborate on other benefits
nonconvicted incarcerated people may receive. They explain
that participation in voluntary work programs offers an
opportunity to acquire job skills and training; facilitates post-
15
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.
incarceration employment and reduction of recidivism; and, in
addition to defraying the costs of room and board, creates an
incentive for good behavior, which affects the level of jail
security. Mandating a minimum wage, they argue, would
increase the costs of these programs, potentially reducing work
opportunities or diverting resources from other inmate
programs.
We acknowledge the policy concerns raised by the parties,
their amici curiae, and others.6 Whether the result here, based
on an interpretation of the current statutory scheme, “is a
desirable policy is a matter beyond our purview, but it is not
beyond the Legislature’s. The Legislature can, if it sees fit,
adjust” its approach to the payment of wages or wage credits for
those awaiting adjudication of their cases as well as for
convicted persons. (Kaanaana, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 182 (conc.
opn. of Kruger, J.).)
Under the law as it currently stands, however, we
conclude that nonconvicted incarcerated individuals performing
services in county jails for a for-profit company to supply meals
within the county jails and related custody facilities do not have
a claim for minimum wages and overtime under Section 1194 of
the California Labor Code, even in the absence of a local
6
The California Reparations Task Force (Gov. Code, former
§ 8301 et seq.) has recommended that “the Legislature provide
payment of the fair market value of the labor provided by
incarcerated persons, whether they are in jail or prison.” (Cal.
Task Force to Study and Develop Reparation Proposals for
African Americans, Final Report (2023) p. 645.)
16
RUELAS v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.
ordinance prescribing or prohibiting the payment of wages for
these individuals.7
EVANS, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
JENKINS, J.
7
This is sufficient to answer the question posed by the
Ninth Circuit. We express no views as to whether a different
rule would apply to nonconvicted incarcerated individuals
working for a for-profit company outside the county jail.
17
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion Ruelas v. County of Alameda
__________________________________________________________
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding XX on request by 9th Circuit (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.548)
Review Granted (published)
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S277120
Date Filed: April 22, 2024
__________________________________________________________
Court:
County:
Judge:
__________________________________________________________
Counsel:
Covington & Burling, Cortlin H. Lannin, Isaac D. Chaput, Adam Z.
Margulies, Eric C. Bosset and Kevin F. King for Defendant and
Appellant Aramark Correctional Services, LLC.
Hanson Bridgett, Paul B. Mello, Adam W. Hofmann, Samantha D.
Wolff, Gilbert J. Tsai, Winston K. Hu and Gary A. Watt for Defendants
and Appellants County of Alameda and Sheriff Gregory J. Ahern.
Jennifer Bacon Henning for California State Association of Counties
and California State Sheriffs’ Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Defendants and Appellants.
Siegel, Yee, Brunner & Mehta, Dan Siegel, Anne Butterfield Weills,
EmilyRose Johns and Sara Beladi for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Kyle Virgien; Summer Lacey; and Shilpi Agarwal for American Civil
Liberties Union Foundation, American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of Southern California, American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of Northern California, Fines and Fees Justice Center,
Prison Law Office, Prison Policy Initiative, Roderick & Solange
MacArthur Justice Center and Worth Rises as Amici Curiae on behalf
of Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Bradan Litzinger, Molly Lao and Sabina Crocette for Legal Aid at
Work, California Employment Lawyers Association, Communities
United for Restorative Youth Justice, Impact Fund, National
Employment Law Project and Root & Rebound as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Kellie Walters for Legal Services for Prisoners with Children as
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):
Dan Siegel
Siegel, Yee, Brunner & Mehta
475 14th Street, Suite 500
Oakland, CA 94612
(510) 839-1200
Gary A. Watt
Hanson Bridgett LLP
425 Market Street, 26th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94105
(415) 777-3200
Kevin F. King
Covington & Burling LLP
850 Tenth Street NW
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 662-5488