The opinion
2024 IL App (5th) 220797-U
NOTICE
NOTICE
Decision filed 05/13/24. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-22-0797
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of
IN THE limited circumstances allowed
the same. under Rule 23(e)(1).
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Champaign County.
)
v. ) No. 20-CF-575
)
JAMES B. BROWN, ) Honorable
) Randall B. Rosenbaum,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Welch and McHaney concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence but remand this matter for the
limited purpose of allowing the trial court to conduct the necessary preliminary
examination into the factual basis of the defendant’s allegations against his
appointed counsel.
¶2 On July 22, 2022, after a bench trial, the defendant, James B. Brown, was convicted of one
count of aggravated domestic battery in violation of section 12-3.3(a-5) of the Criminal Code of
2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a-5) (West 2020)). The defendant was sentenced on September
8, 2022, to 12 years’ incarceration within the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). The
defendant filed a timely notice of appeal and now challenges his conviction and sentence. The
defendant also raises the issue of whether the trial court erred in not conducting an inquiry under
People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), and its progeny, regarding the defendant’s pro se
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posttrial allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. For the following reasons, we affirm the
defendant’s conviction and sentence, but remand this matter for the limited purpose of allowing
the trial court to conduct the necessary preliminary examination into the factual basis of the
defendant’s allegations against his appointed counsel.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On May 29, 2020, the defendant was charged by information with one count of aggravated
domestic battery in violation of section 12-3.3(a-5) of the Code (id.). The charge alleged that the
defendant had, on May 21, 2020, intentionally strangled Lauren Barnes, a family, or household
member of the defendant.
¶5 A bench trial was conducted on July 22, 2022. At trial, the State called two witnesses. The
first witness to testify was Lauren Barnes. Lauren testified that the defendant was her former
boyfriend and that they had one child together: a daughter, one and a half years old at the time of
the incident. Lauren stated that on the day of the incident, she was not living with the defendant,
but that he regularly visited her residence since they were still in “[a] very rocky” dating
relationship. Lauren testified that the defendant received his mail at her address, but that he did
not have clothing items at her residence.
¶6 Lauren testified that on the day of the incident, she and the defendant had gotten into an
argument regarding the manner in which the defendant was speaking to their daughter. The
argument started in the kitchen of her home, and then moved into the living room area. Lauren
stated that the defendant “was in my face, yelling, and getting physical” while she was backing
away from him. Lauren admitted that she was yelling back at the defendant and telling him that
she was going to call the police. Lauren stated that she had her cellular phone in her hands, and
that the defendant was pushing her, had put his hands on the side of her face, and grabbed her jaw
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and mouth area. Lauren testified that the defendant stated that he was tired of her causing him so
many problems and that she was “suffocating him in the relationship, so he was going to suffocate
me.”
¶7 Lauren testified that they ended up in one of the bedrooms, where Lauren was attempting
to call 911, and the defendant was attempting to get her phone away from her. Lauren stated that
the defendant pushed her down and pinned her on the bed. Lauren stated that they were still
fighting over the phone, and then at one point, the defendant stopped trying to get the phone and
put both his hands around her neck, causing her to struggle to breathe. At that point, Lauren stated
that she dropped her phone and was attempting to pry the defendant’s hands off her neck telling
him that she could not breathe. Lauren testified that she “was just really scared in—in that
moment.” Lauren estimated that she could not breathe for approximately 30 seconds. Lauren
testified that the defendant then let go of her neck, grabbed her phone, and took off down the
hallway. Lauren stated that she got up, ran out of the house to her neighbor’s home, and called
911.
¶8 While outside of her neighbor’s house, Lauren stated that she saw the defendant leaving in
her vehicle. Lauren returned to her home where she discovered that the defendant had taken their
daughter with him. Lauren testified that the police arrived and took photographs of her injuries.
Lauren also stated that she had taken photographs of her injuries a few days later. The State then
moved to admit the photographs taken by Laren into evidence, at which time the defendant
objected on the grounds that there were no time or date data on the photographs and no information,
other than Lauren’s testimony, regarding when, or under what circumstances, the photographs
were taken. Over the defendant’s objection, the trial court admitted the photographs into evidence.
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¶9 The State then published the photographs and Lauren testified that the photographs showed
“a bruise that was on my chin from him grabbing my face,” “bruises on my upper arm, on my right
arm,” and an injury to the inside of her right arm. Lauren stated that after the incident, she
discontinued her relationship with the defendant.
¶ 10 On cross-examination, Lauren could not recall exactly what she had stated to law
enforcement when they arrived after the incident. Lauren did recall having a conversation with an
Officer Dedecker. Portions of Officer Dedecker’s body-worn camera video was then played in
open court. Lauren admitted that she had an ice pack on her neck area when speaking with Officer
Dedecker and that an ice pack can cause some redness. Lauren also stated that she was very upset
that the defendant had taken their daughter but could not recall saying, “If I say yes, will that make
you find her faster?” when asked by Officer Dedecker whether she believed her daughter was in
danger. Shortly after speaking with Officer Dedecker, Lauren stated that the defendant’s mother
arrived and returned her daughter. Lauren stated that she had never been to court regarding custody
of their daughter.
¶ 11 The State then called Officer Collin Dedecker to testify. Officer Dedecker testified that he
was a police officer who was employed by the City of Urbana and that on May 21, 2020, he was
dispatched to Lauren’s residence for a domestic incident report. When he arrived, Officer
Dedecker stated that Lauren was outside of her neighbor’s house, was crying, and was visibly
upset. Officer Dedecker stated that he observed redness on Lauren’s cheek and neck, so he took
photographs. The State then moved to admit and publish the photographs taken by Officer
Dedecker, and the defendant had no objection.
¶ 12 Officer Dedecker stated that the first photograph showed redness on Lauren’s chest, just
above the V-neck of her shirt. The next photograph showed “redness above the V-neck of
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[Lauren’s] collar or of her shirt, and then a little bit of redness on the front of her neck.” The next
photograph showed “redness on the side of [Lauren’s] neck.” Officer Dedecker stated that the
redness was on the right side of Lauren’s neck and the next photograph showed no redness on the
left side of Lauren’s neck. Officer Dedecker testified that, “I took one of her right side to show
that there is redness on it, the left side to show that there’s no redness on it, to show the different
coloration, indicating that there possibly was an injury due to the right side of her neck.”
¶ 13 Officer Dedecker stated that while he was speaking with Lauren, the defendant’s mother
arrived. Officer Dedecker testified that he spoke with the defendant’s mother and informed her of
the allegations that the defendant had taken the child, Lauren’s phone, and Lauren’s vehicle “so
we wanted the child, the phone, and the car back, and I wanted to speak to [the defendant].” At
some point, Officer Dedecker stated that the defendant’s mother left and returned a short time later
with Lauren’s vehicle, phone, and the child. Officer Dedecker testified that the defendant’s mother
also gave him information where he could locate the defendant, but that the information was not
accurate.
¶ 14 Officer Dedecker went on to testify that, at some point, he was able to contact the defendant
by phone. Officer Dedecker informed the defendant that Officer Dedecker wanted to speak with
the defendant and wanted the defendant to come into the Urbana Police Department. Officer
Dedecker stated that the defendant did not come in and that Officer Dedecker had never spoken in
person with the defendant.
¶ 15 On cross-examination, Officer Dedecker acknowledged that he was wearing a body-worn
camera that was recording during his conversation with Lauren. A portion of the video recording
from Officer’s Dedecker’s body-worn camera was then played in open court. Officer Dedecker
5
confirmed that Lauren had not mentioned the defendant using both of his hands to choke her and
that he had, in fact, directly asked her that question.
¶ 16 The State rested, and the defendant moved for a directed verdict. The trial court noted that
“there may be some contradictory statements here—that in some way, shape, or form [the
defendant] put his arm or his hands on her neck.” Based on the evidence in the light most favorable
to the State, the trial court denied the defendant’s directed verdict request. Defense counsel then
called the defendant to testify on his own behalf.
¶ 17 The defendant stated that he was 26 years old and resided in Champaign County. The
defendant testified that he had dated Lauren for approximately a year and a half, and that they had
a daughter together. On the day of the incident, the defendant stated that he was living with Lauren,
that he received his mail at Lauren’s residence, and that he maintained personal items at Lauren’s
residence. The defendant further testified that he had permission to drive Lauren’s vehicle at that
time.
¶ 18 On the day of the incident, the defendant stated that he was in the kitchen when Lauren
returned from a walk with their daughter. Lauren left their daughter in the kitchen with him and
went to take a shower. The defendant stated that he started to feed their daughter and that their
daughter was “throwing a fit.” The defendant told his daughter that “we eat at the table like big
girls, and we don’t throw fits.” The defendant then stated that Lauren stormed out of the shower
“wrapped in her towel, dripping wet, stating she don’t like the way that I’m talking to [our
daughter].” The defendant stated that Lauren continued to make other statements, yelling as she
walked towards the bedroom.
¶ 19 At that point, the defendant stated that he grabbed their daughter and yelled that he was
taking her for a drive, since that was how they typically got their daughter asleep. The defendant
6
testified that he did not push Lauren; did not take her phone; did not grab the side of her face; did
not place his forearm on her neck; nor, did he strangle her with both of his hands. He left with his
daughter to take her for a drive and while driving, his phone and Lauren’s phone began ringing.
The defendant stated that Lauren’s phone was in the car since they were following COVID
protocols, “so she leaves her keys and phone in the car for after she takes a shower, she comes
back out and she sanitizes with a wipe.” The defendant stated that he was not aware that Lauren’s
phone was in the car when he left the residence.
¶ 20 The defendant stated that Lauren’s dad was calling so he answered. The defendant stated
that he also spoke with a police officer, but that he did not meet the officer in person. The defendant
testified that the reason that he did not meet with the officer was because the officer “didn’t make
it seem like it was a priority.” The defendant further stated that he had a “bad history” with Urbana
police officers and that he thought the situation was handled over the phone. The defendant stated
that he was not avoiding being arrested since there were no warrants for his arrest, but four or five
days later, when he was in the hospital, he was arrested.
¶ 21 Returning to the incident, the defendant stated that one of the statements that Lauren had
made was, “You are systematically suppressed against me, and I’ll do whatever I can for you to
never see [our daughter] again. Me and [our daughter] are a care package. You don’t get one
without the other.” The defendant stated that he had left the residence to defuse the situation and
once he realized, through his mother, that “it was made into a bigger issue,” he returned their
daughter through his mother.
¶ 22 On cross-examination, the defendant stated that he left the residence believing that he
would drive around for a little bit, come back, and everything was going to be okay. The defendant
stated that he returned to Lauren’s residence the next day and that Lauren gave him his property.
7
The defendant testified that was the first time he knew that the relationship was over. The
defendant acknowledged that he and Lauren had arguments in the past, but that this argument was
different because she got the police involved. The defendant admitted there was a prior incident in
which the police were involved, but that Lauren’s father had called the police, not Lauren. The
defendant stated, “That’s why I was on 18 months’ probation, for her father.”
¶ 23 The defendant went on to testify that his mother did not tell him to come back to Lauren’s
residence but told him that Lauren was saying that I had “put my hands on her.” The defendant
stated that was when he realized that Lauren was saying those things to the police and that he had
no idea where Lauren’s injuries came from. No further evidence was presented by either party.
¶ 24 The trial court then asked whether there was any lesser charge that the defense was asking
the trial court to consider. The defense asked the trial court to consider a lesser charge of
misdemeanor domestic battery. The State informed the trial court that it would object to the lesser
charge, but that it had nothing further on that issue. The trial court stated it would consider the
lesser charge as well, and then heard closing arguments from the parties.
¶ 25 After arguments, the trial court discussed the evidence and then stated, in part, as follows:
“All right. Well, this has been a very brief, a very important trial. The State has
alleged that the defendant committed aggravated domestic battery; essentially that on the
date in question he strangled [Lauren]. And the statute doesn’t define what strangulation
is, but it tends to be where you do something around someone’s neck, their windpipe, which
prevents them from breathing well.
I don’t think there’s any case law that says it must be hands or fingers. I think you
can strangle people with rope. I think people can put objects over their throat to be enough
8
for strangulation. But this really boils down to whether or not I believe [Lauren], or whether
or not I believe [the defendant], because their stories are diametrically opposed.
***
When I look at the totality of the evidence here, judging the credibility, which is
the demeanor, the interest, the bias, the testimony that’s consistent or inconsistent with
other testimony here, I find that [Lauren] was credible. I find that she seemed upset on the
stand. When she didn’t know the answer, she said she couldn’t remember the answer. She
may have had some minor inconsistencies about the officer in the statement she made about
whether it was his arm on the neck or hands around her neck.
***
Again, when I listen to all the evidence here, I do believe the victim. I don’t give
much weight to the believability of the defendant, and therefore on the charge of aggravated
domestic battery I do find that the State has found—proven him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.”
¶ 26 The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing on September 8, 2022. At sentencing, the
State introduced two sets of incident reports from the correctional facility where the defendant was
being detained and a victim impact statement for the trial court’s consideration. The State then
called Lieutenant Jenna Good to testify.
¶ 27 Lieutenant Good testified that she was a lieutenant at the Champaign County correction
facility in charge of the classification of the inmates’ housing, medical, and mental health needs.
Lieutenant Good stated that she had been employed with the sheriff’s office since 2006, and that
she had an opportunity to review the disciplinary reports submitted by the State. Lieutenant Good
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stated that, in addition to those reports, there had been other instances involving the defendant that
were not necessarily documented in disciplinary reports.
¶ 28 Lieutenant Good stated that the defendant was initially housed in the Kankakee County
correctional facility for over a year, but that the Kankakee facility had returned the defendant back
to Champaign County because of behavioral issues. When the defendant returned from Kankakee,
Lieutenant Good stated that the defendant was on a hunger strike, which the defendant had
indicated was going to last “40 days and 40 nights, like Moses,” so mental health met with the
defendant. Lieutenant Good testified that mental health had met with the defendant several times
but had not been able to ascertain that the defendant did, in fact, have a mental illness.
¶ 29 Lieutenant Good stated that when mental health met with the defendant on June 2, 2022,
the defendant had indicated that he had previously been banging his head on the wall, had
attempted to hang himself, and that he was going to smear feces onto the wall. Lieutenant Good
stated that the defendant had also indicated that he wanted to be on a hunger strike because he
could, and because he wanted the correctional officers to do paperwork. Lieutenant Good testified
that she had then classified the defendant as a high risk or high security inmate.
¶ 30 Lieutenant Good also stated that on June 4, 2022, the defendant had made threats to a
correctional officer that the defendant would find the correctional officer, follow him home, harm
his family, and rape his kids. Lieutenant Good testified that on multiple occasions, the defendant
had indicated that he would throw urine and feces on the correctional officers. On July 21, 2022,
Lieutenant Good stated that the defendant had indicated that he was going to spit in her face the
next time he saw her. The defendant also informed a correctional officer that the defendant wanted
to get the most amount of time that the jail had ever seen for disciplinary infractions.
10
¶ 31 Lieutenant Good also testified that, on August 9, 2022, the defendant had injured a
correctional officer who was attempting to check for contraband in the defendant’s cell. Lieutenant
Good testified that the defendant stated afterwards as follows:
“The next time there are high security checks, there will be another staff assault. I
cannot wait for round two. There will be more blood this time after I beat your all a***. In
the morning, you all about to get a workout. I’m gonna start swinging at them. The next
mother*** who walks into my cell is done. Next time, instead of letting them hit me with
a shield, I’m gonna run out this b*** and make them work. I’m gonna kill their a***.”
¶ 32 Lieutenant Good stated that the above was pretty standard of how the defendant spoked to
the correctional officers. Lieutenant Good then discussed the incident report of August 23, 2022,
which documented that the defendant had threatened to burn down the home of a specific
correctional officer and rape the correctional officer’s daughter when the defendant got out of jail.
Lieutenant Good further stated that there was an incident on the bus to Kankakee on April 20,
2022, where the defendant caused blunt force trauma to a correctional officer. In her 16 years as
an employee at the correctional facility, Lieutenant Good stated that the defendant’s behavior was
one of the worst she had seen. On cross-examination, Lieutenant Good testified that she was not
present during any of the above incidents, so she had no personal knowledge of the incidents. No
further evidence in aggravation was submitted by the State.
¶ 33 In mitigation, the defense asked the trial court to consider a letter sent by the defendant to
the trial court dated August 12, 2022, in which the defendant had stated that he was sorry for the
crimes he had committed. No further evidence in mitigation was submitted by the defendant.
¶ 34 The trial court then heard arguments by the parties. Defense counsel noted that the
presentencing report indicated that the defendant had been removed from his mother’s care as a
11
young child because of abuse, and that he had multiple placements while in the care of Department
of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Defense counsel stated that the defendant had been
separated from his siblings, which were the defendant’s only stable family. Defense counsel
acknowledged that the defendant needed anger management, mental health treatment, and
substance abuse treatment to teach the defendant some coping mechanisms. Defendant counsel
also acknowledged that the defendant’s criminal history went back to 2012, and that the current
incident would be his third felony conviction but argued that “most of it happened while [the
defendant] was a juvenile.” Defense counsel further argued that the defendant had been failed by
his parents, and then failed by the State of Illinois. Finally, defense counsel requested that the trial
court consider this matter separately from the new charge pending against the defendant.
¶ 35 The trial court then gave the defendant an opportunity to make a statement. The defendant
told the trial court that he was sorry and that he was ready to serve whatever sentence was given.
The defendant stated that he was ready to become a better person, not just for himself, but for his
daughter. The defendant further stated that during his time in IDOC, he planned on taking higher
education and self-help classes to learn better coping skills to control his impulses. The defendant
again apologized to Lauren and asked the trial court to impose a fair sentence.
¶ 36 Upon completion of the defendant’s statement, the trial court stated as follows:
“The Court has considered the evidence from trial, the presentence investigation,
the evidence presented here, both statutory and non-statutory factors in aggravation and
mitigation. I’ve considered the arguments of the counsel and the Defendant. I’ve also
considered the history and character of the Defendant. I have a due regard for the
seriousness of the offense, but it’s always with the objective of restoring the defendant to
useful citizenship.
12
I do find—I want to make the following observations. There is very little mitigation
here. This was a bench trial. He did accept responsibility here today and he wrote a letter
to me indicating that. And to some extent, he had a rough upbringing in DCFS care, and
may have suffered trauma from that. That can’t be an excuse forever. He’s offered the
ability to work through these issues throughout his life, and he needs to take advantage of
it. Not everybody who goes through DCFS care turns out to be a criminal and act as badly
as [the defendant] has. But to some small degree, I do find that to have some mitigating
factor.
There is aggravation here. There is deterrence to send a message to [the defendant]
that he cannot continue to commit crimes like this. This is not the first time that he has
committed a battery-type offense. It’s also to send a message to people in the community
who might be in the same situation that he should not commit crimes like this.
I also have to consider in aggravation the prior record. Goes back to being a
juvenile. He has an adult record. Misdemeanors for battery, criminal damage to property,
another battery. He has a resisting. He also has a number of felonies, including robbery—
two different robberies. And now this case of aggravated domestic battery, a Class 2 felony.
***
On the one hand, I would think that maybe he has mental health issues, but he did
not really identify having any kind of mental health issues other than depression and anger
control, really. He denied suicidal thoughts. He’s been assessed at the jail. They don’t come
up with a diagnosis of schizophrenic or paranoid or any diagnosis like that.
***
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I recognize that he’s 26 years old. He has a three-year-old child. He doesn’t have
his GED. He was able to work before his arrest. I recognize he had alcohol and other issues
prior to his incarcerations. He would take a lot of drugs as well, many times to ease the
pain, which I can understand.
***
Based on the totality of the evidence presented at trial, presented in the PSI, what
I’ve heard here today, [the defendant’s] rehabilitative potential I find is very low despite
his comments to the Court here today. Therefore, upon the conviction after a trial of
aggravated domestic battery, a Class 2 felony, the Court hereby sentences the Defendant
to service a period of 12 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections.”
¶ 37 On October 11, 2022, the defendant, through counsel, filed a motion to reconsider sentence.
The defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence argued that the defendant’s sentence was excessive,
and not in keeping with the defendant’s history of criminality, family situation, economic status,
age, and potential for rehabilitation. Thereafter, on October 17, 2022, the defendant filed a pro se
motion for reduction of sentence. The defendant’s pro se motion stated, inter alia, that “Defense
counlse [sic] failed to properly defened [sic] me at trail [sic] and sentencing hearing. I was not
informed of extended-term sentencing until the day of trial.” On November 1, 2022, the trial court
struck the defendant’s pro se motion to reconsider sentence as untimely, and because the defendant
was represented by counsel.
¶ 38 The trial court conducted a hearing the defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence on
November 30, 2022. At the beginning of the hearing, the trial court noted that the defendant was
not present due to the failure of a writ being executed. Defense counsel stated that, “I would be—
for my motion to reconsider, I would be waiving his presence.” The trial court gave defense
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counsel an opportunity to adopt the defendant’s pro se motion and defense counsel declined to do
so. Upon completion of the hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to reconsider the
defendant’s sentence. Thereafter, the defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
¶ 39 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 40 On appeal, the defendant raises three issues for this court’s consideration. First, the
defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove the defendant guilty of aggravated
domestic battery by way of strangulation. Second, the defendant argues that the trial court abused
its discretion by failing to adequately consider the defendant’s troubled childhood, lifelong
struggles with mental illness, and overall rehabilitative potential at sentencing. Third, that the trial
court erred by failing to conduct a preliminary Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, inquiry into the factual
matters underlying the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel raised by the
defendant in his pro se posttrial motion. We will address each issue in the order raised.
¶ 41 A. Sufficency of the Evidence
¶ 42 The defendant argues that the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove the defendant
guilty of aggravated domestic battery by way of strangulation. According to the defendant’s
argument, Lauren’s testimony as to strangulation was significantly impeached by defense counsel
and the photographic evidence admitted did not support Lauren’s testimony that she was strangled
by the defendant placing his hands around her neck. The defendant also argues that Lauren’s
statement that “If I say yes, will that make you find her faster?” to Officer Dedecker, when he
inquired whether Lauren believed her daughter was in danger, suggested that Lauren was willing
to exaggerate the truth. As such, the defendant argues that this court should reduce the aggravated
domestic battery conviction (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a-5) (West 2020)) to a conviction of domestic
battery (id. § 12-3.2(a)(1)) and remand for sentencing on the reduced offense.
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¶ 43 We first note that the defendant did not raise any issues related to his trial within his
posttrial motion. Generally, for a criminal defendant to preserve an issue for review on appeal, the
defendant must object at trial and raise the issue in a written posttrial motion. People v. Reese,
2017 IL 120011, ¶ 60. Failure to do so will normally result in the forfeiture of any review of the
error. People v. Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶ 15. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain a conviction, however, presents an exception to the forfeiture rule and is therefore
reviewable notwithstanding any failure to raise the issue in a posttrial motion. People v. Hall, 194
Ill. App. 3d 532, 535 (1990). Accordingly, we will review defendant’s contention.
¶ 44 Our standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case
has been stated by our supreme court as follows:
“When considering a challenge to a criminal conviction based upon the sufficiency of the
evidence, this court will not retry the defendant. [Citation.] Rather, in such cases the
relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] Thus, it is our duty in the case at bar to carefully
examine the evidence while giving due consideration to the fact that the court and jury saw
and heard the witnesses. [Citations.] If, however, after such consideration we are of the
opinion that the evidence is insufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, we must reverse the conviction. [Citations.] The testimony of a single
witness, if it is positive and the witness is credible, is sufficient to convict. [Citations.]
While credibility of a witness is within the province of the trier of fact, and the finding of
the jury on such matters is entitled to great weight, the jury’s determination is not
conclusive. Rather, we will reverse a conviction where the evidence is so unreasonable,
16
improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt.
[Citations.]” People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541-42 (1999).
¶ 45 The defendant argues that Lauren’s testimony that the defendant had “put his hands around
my neck” was inconsistent with her telling Officer Dedecker, immediately following the incident,
that the defendant had “placed his arm across [her] neck.” The defendant further argues that the
photographic evidence did not support Lauren’s testimony that the defendant had strangled her
since the photographs depicted some light redness on the right side of Lauren’s neck and no redness
on the left side of her neck. According to the defendant’s argument, none of the photographs
admitted at trial supports Lauren’s trial testimony that the defendant placed both of his hands
around her neck and strangled her for 30 seconds.
¶ 46 Subsection 12-3.3(a-5) of the Code defines “strangle,” for the purpose of that subsection,
as “intentionally impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of an individual by
applying pressure on the throat or neck of that individual or by blocking the nose or mouth of that
individual.” 720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a-5) (West 2022). The statute does not state a specific manner in
which the pressure must be applied on the throat or neck of an individual or that a victim must
have been strangled for any specific length of time; only that such pressure impeded the normal
breathing or circulation of the blood of the individual. Id.; see also People v. Inyang, 2022 IL App
(2d) 200087-U, ¶ 28.
¶ 47 Here, the trial court acknowledged that Lauren had “some minor inconsistencies” about
whether it was the defendant’s arm or hands around her neck. These inconsistencies, however, did
not make it impossible for the finder of fact to reasonably accept any part of Lauren’s testimony.
The trial court only needed to find that the defendant impeded Lauren’s breathing by applying
17
pressure on her throat or neck, and Lauren testified that she had difficulty breathing for
approximately 30 seconds due to the defendant’s applying pressure on her throat.
¶ 48 Contrary to the defendant’s argument, the photographic evidence does demonstrate redness
on Lauren’s chest and neck. Officer Dedecker also testified to his observation of redness on
Lauren’s chest and neck. Although the absence of redness on the left side of Lauren’s neck could
arguably tend to indicate that the defendant had not placed both of his hands around Lauren’s neck,
it does not preclude a finding of strangulation as the circuit court heard evidence that the defendant
impeded Lauren’s breathing by placing his arm across her neck. We further find that Lauren’s
statement to Officer Dedecker, regarding her daughter’s safety, does not impeach Lauren’s
credibility since it was a single statement in regard to her child, and was not a statement related to
the specific conduct of the defendant during the incident in question.
¶ 49 The trial court took into consideration “the demeanor, the interest, the bias, the testimony
that’s consistent or inconsistent with other testimony here.” Upon consideration of those factors,
the trial court found Lauren to be credible. It has been long held that the trial court is in the best
position to make credibility determinations and that great weight is to be given to those
determinations. People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319 (1979). The trial court found Lauren to be credible, and the testimony of a single witness, if it
is positive and the witness is credible, is sufficient to convict. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d at 541.
¶ 50 After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that the
evidence in this matter was not so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify a
reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt, and further find that any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we find that the
trial court did not err in finding the defendant guilty of aggravated domestic battery.
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¶ 51 B. Sentence
¶ 52 The defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to adequately
consider the defendant’s troubled childhood, lifelong struggles with mental illness, and overall
rehabilitative potential at sentencing. The defendant states that the presentence investigation report
(PSI) described the defendant’s difficult childhood and his removal from his mother’s custody due
to physical abuse. Concerning his mental health, the defendant points to the trial court’s comment
that the defendant “did not really identify having any kind of mental health issues other than
depression and anger control.” The defendant argues that the PSI demonstrated that the defendant
was diagnosed with a learning disability in elementary school and had at least two mental health
crises requiring hospitalization between the ages of six and nine. The PSI also indicated that the
defendant had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and
oppositional defiant disorder.
¶ 53 Finally, the defendant argues that he has rehabilitative potential having earned certificates
in construction and forklift operation, which were stated in the PSI. As such, the defendant argues
that the trial court did not properly consider all the mitigation evidence presented in the PSI but
focused primarily on the defendant’s criminal history and the evidence presented at the hearing
regarding his behavior in jail.
¶ 54 The trial court is in the best position to fashion a sentence that strikes an appropriate balance
between the goals of protecting society and rehabilitating the defendant. People v. Risley, 359 Ill.
App. 3d 918, 920 (2005). To achieve the constitutionally mandated balance between the retributive
and rehabilitative purposes of punishment, the trial court must carefully consider all aggravating
and mitigating factors, including, inter alia, the defendant’s age, demeanor, habits, mentality,
credibility, criminal history, general moral character, social environment, and education, as well
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as the nature and circumstances of the crime and the defendant’s conduct in the commission of the
crime. People v. Quintana, 332 Ill. App. 3d 96, 109 (2002). This court will not substitute our
judgment for the trial court because we may have weighed the sentencing factors differently.
People v. Decatur, 2015 IL App (1st) 130231, ¶ 12. “There is a presumption that the trial court
considered all relevant factors in determining a sentence, and that presumption will not be
overcome without explicit evidence from the record that the trial court did not consider mitigating
factors or relied on improper aggravating factors.” People v. Boots, 2022 IL App (2d) 200640,
¶ 43. As such, a trial court’s sentencing determination will not be disturbed absence an abuse of
discretion. Id. ¶ 42. A sentence within the statutory limits will only be an abuse of discretion if “it
is at variance with the spirit and purposes of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature
of the offense.” Decatur, 2015 IL App (1st) 130231, ¶ 12.
¶ 55 The sentencing range for aggravated domestic battery, when extended-term eligible, is 7
to 14 years’ incarceration. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(b) (West 2020). In this matter, the defendant was
sentenced to 12 years’ incarceration, which is within the statutory limits, evoking the presumption
that the trial court considered all relevant factors in determining the sentence. The defendant
attempts to overcome this presumption by arguing that the trial court failed to properly consider
the defendant’s troubled childhood, lifelong struggles with mental illness, and overall
rehabilitative potential at sentencing. The record on appeal, however, disputes the defendant’s
argument.
¶ 56 The report of proceedings in this matter demonstrates that the trial court considered the
defendant’s childhood and noted that “he had a rough upbringing in DCFS care.” The report of
proceeding also demonstrates that the trial court considered the defendant’s mental health. The
trial court noted that the defendant’s mental health evaluation conducted at the jail did not “really
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identify having any kind of mental health issues other than depression and anger control, really.”
Although the defendant’s argument stresses the numerous mental health challenges that the
defendant had faced in the past, the PSI stated that the most recent mental health evaluation,
conducted on September 24, 2019, resulted in a recommendation that the defendant complete anger
management and individual counseling as noted by the trial court. We further note that the
defendant stated at the hearing that he “needs mental health treatment,” but presented no evidence
that he was currently suffering from any mental health issues other than those identified in his
most recent mental health evaluation.
¶ 57 With regard to the defendant’s rehabilitative potential, the trial court noted the defendant’s
age, his education, and that the defendant “was able to work before his arrest.” The trial court also
noted the defendant’s criminal history, character, and the seriousness of the offense “with the
objective of restoring the defendant to useful citizenship.” The trial court, however, found that
“[b]ased on the totality of the evidence presented at trial, presented in the PSI, what I’ve heard
here today, [the defendant’s] rehabilitative potential I find is very low.”
¶ 58 The defendant does not argue that the trial court failed to consider any of the required
statutory factors but argues that the trial court failed to “carefully” consider the above mitigation
factors. A sentencing court is not, however, required to recite and assign value to each factor in
aggravation and mitigation, nor is a sentencing court required to award a defendant’s rehabilitative
potential greater weight than the seriousness of the offense. People v. Bryant, 2016 IL App (1st)
140421, ¶¶ 16-17. We presume that the trial court considered only appropriate factors in
sentencing the defendant and the record in this matter does not affirmatively show otherwise. We
therefore find that the trial court’s sentencing determination was not an abuse of discretion.
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¶ 59 C. Pro se Allegation of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 60 The final issue raised by the defendant on appeal is whether the trial court erred by failing
to conduct a preliminary Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, inquiry into the factual matters underlying the
defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel raised by the defendant in this pro se
posttrial motion. Because no Krankel inquiry was conducted, the defendant argues that this matter
should be remanded for a Krankel inquiry, and the State agrees with the defendant on this issue.
¶ 61 Our supreme court has developed, through Krankel and its progeny, a procedural
framework for the resolution of pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. People
v. Murray, 2017 IL App (3d) 150586, ¶ 21. The procedural framework requires the trial court to
make a preliminary inquiry into a pro se claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and, if the claim
shows a possible neglect of the case, appoint new counsel to pursue the claim at a full hearing. Id.
It has consistently been held that the goal of any Krankel proceeding is to facilitate the trial court’s
full consideration of a defendant’s pro se claim, thereby potentially limiting issues on appeal, and
creating the necessary record for any claims raised on appeal. People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071,
¶ 13.
¶ 62 To initiate a preliminary Krankel inquiry, a defendant simply needs to bring the claim to
the trial court’s attention. Id. ¶ 11. The defendant does not have to file a written motion but can
simply send a note or letter to the trial court or raise the issue orally. Id.; People v. Bates, 2019 IL
124143, ¶ 15. The trial court should examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegedly
ineffective representation with the purpose of determining what further action, if any, is warranted
on a defendant’s claim. People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 77-78 (2003). The trial court may deny
the pro se posttrial allegations of ineffective representation, without the appointment of new
counsel and without holding further proceedings, if the court determines that the claim lacks merit
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or pertains only to matters of trial strategy. Id. at 78. If the defendant’s allegations show possible
neglect of the case, however, new counsel should be appointed to represent the defendant at a
hearing on the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Id. Where it is not clear what
concern a defendant is attempting to raise, the trial court should conduct a “minimal inquiry” to
determine the nature of the defendant’s complaint. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 15.
¶ 63 Our standard of review of an alleged Krankel error depends upon what action, if any, the
trial court undertook. If the trial court took no action, or expressed no opinion on the merits, then
our review is de novo. People v. McLaurin, 2012 IL App (1st) 102943, ¶ 41. De novo review means
that this court performs the same analysis that a trial judge would perform. Id. If the trial court
reached a determination on the merits of the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
this court will only reverse if the trial court’s action was manifestly erroneous. Id. In this matter,
the trial court took no action regarding the defendant’s posttrial allegations and as such, our review
is de novo.
¶ 64 Here, both the defendant and the State agree that the trial court should have conducted at
least some minimal inquiry to determine the basis of the defendant’s pro se claim that his trial
counsel had failed to properly defend the defendant at trial and at sentencing, thus ensuring that an
adequate record was made of the defendant’s claim. We agree, and accordingly, we conclude that
the trial court erred in failing to conduct the necessary preliminary examination as to the factual
basis of the defendant’s allegations against his appointed trial counsel. We therefore remand this
matter for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to conduct the necessary preliminary
examination as to the factual basis of the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel allegation.
¶ 65 If the trial court determines that the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
is spurious or pertains only to trial strategy, the trial court may then deny the claim and leave
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standing the defendant’s conviction and sentence. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 81. If the trial court finds
that the defendant did not, in fact, receive effective assistance of counsel, then it shall order a new
trial. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d at 189.
¶ 66 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 67 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence, but remand
this matter to the trial court of Champaign County for the limited purpose of allowing the trial
court to conduct the necessary preliminary examination into the factual basis of the defendant’s
allegation of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
¶ 68 Affirmed and remanded.
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