Roman Lee Jones v. Sharon Hawk

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana

Roman Lee Jones, FILED

Appellant-Plaintiff Apr 26 2024, 8:42 am

CLERK

Indiana Supreme Court

v. Court of Appeals

and Tax Court

Sharon Hawk, et al.,

Appellee-Defendants

April 26, 2024

Court of Appeals Case No.

23A-CT-201

Appeal from the Miami Circuit Court

The Honorable Timothy P. Spahr, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

52C01-2012-CT-969

Opinion by Judge Pyle

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-201 | April 26, 2024 Page 1 of 16

Judges Tavitas and Foley concur.

Pyle, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Roman Lee Jones (“Jones”) appeals, pro se, the trial court’s order granting

summary judgment to prison employees, Sharon Hawk (“Hawk”), Brian Hollis

(“Hollis”), and Renee Gall (“Gall”) (collectively, “the prison employees”) on

Jones’ prisoner complaint against the prison employees. In Jones’ complaint,

he alleged that the prison employees had retaliated against him after he had

exercised his First Amendment speech rights. Jones argues that the trial court

erred by granting summary judgment to the prison employees. Concluding that

the trial court did not err, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to

the prison employees.

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Facts1

[3] At all relevant times, Jones was an inmate in the Indiana Department of

Correction (“DOC”) at the Miami Correctional Facility (“the prison”) and was

serving a sentence for murder and attempted murder. Jones had a prison job in

the prison law library. Hawk was the prison’s deputy warden, Hollis was a law

library supervisor, and Gall was a correctional officer at the prison. 2

[4] During the morning of December 19, 2019, Jones was working in the law

library. The law library and some of the prison classrooms are located on the

second floor of the prison’s offender services building (“the OSB”). That day,

Gall was the correctional officer over that education floor. Jones was in the

hallway with at least seven other inmates, and they were waiting to use the

restroom. Jones had a conversation with another inmate about a prison

restroom policy, which was apparently posted on the wall in the hallway. Jones

was “explaining” the policy and rules to the other inmate, and he did so while

in the presence of Gall and the other inmates. (Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 38).

Gall overheard what Jones was saying and, at some point, she “intervened” in

the conversation to inform Jones that his interpretation was not accurate.

(Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 39). Jones told Gall that he was correct, that he was

1

When Jones filed his Appellant Appendix, he did not include all the summary judgment pleadings and

associated designated evidence. Therefore, the prison employees also filed an Appellees’ Appendix to

include the relevant pleadings and documents.

2

Hawk retired from her position at the prison in November 2020.

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not speaking to her, and that what she had said was wrong and was not the

policy. Jones then returned to his job at the law library.

[5] Around this time, Hawk, who was making rounds in the OSB, walked to the

second floor and saw that Gall was “visibly upset.” (App. Vol. 2 at 20;

Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 25). Gall informed Hawk that Jones had been “loud

and disrespectful[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 20; Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 25). Gall

also informed Hawk that Jones had been “disruptive in the hallway” and had

“attempt[ed] to get other offenders upset and to join in[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 20;

Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 25). Additionally, several classroom instructors also

complained to Hawk about “the loud commotion and disruption to their

respective classes.” (App. Vol. 2 at 20; Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 25). At some

point that day, Hollis and Hawk spoke with Jones about the incident. Jones

told them that he had been speaking to another person and that Gall should not

have “interjected herself” into his conversation. (Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 42).

[6] Based on Jones’s behavior, Hawk instructed Gall to fill out an Offender

Evaluation Performance Report (“offender evaluation form”). Gall partially

completed the offender evaluation form by filling out the comments section of

the form as follows:

. . . I opened the restroom in Education for the classes to use. I

enforced the rule per [Deputy Warden] Hawk, one at a time in

[the] restroom. I had approximately 10 offenders in the hall at

this time. Offender Jones . . . became upset with staff and stated

there was nothing in [the] policy to say one at time in [the]

restroom. I informed him it was put in place by [Deputy

Warden] Hawk due to a fight in [the] restroom and was a safety

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and security issue. [Jones] stated [that] [Deputy Warden] Hawk

didn’t know policy and can’t make up things and [that] he knows

policy. At this time[,] other offenders joined in w[ith] his

negative comments regarding [Deputy Warden] Hawk [and]

myself. This incident caused an issue w[ith] multiple offenders.

[Jones’] attitude was bad[,] and he was disrespectful with staff.

(Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 59).

[7] Hollis, who was Jones’ supervisor in the law library, received the partially

completed offender evaluation form and then met with Gall to obtain her

observations of the incident. Hollis then completed the recommendation

section of the offender evaluation form and recommended that Jones be

removed from his library job. (Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 59). Thereafter, the

prison reclassified Jones to “INP, which is idle no pay for 90 days[.]” (App.

Vol. 2 at 55; Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 17). Jones subsequently filed a prison

classification appeal, which the prison denied. Jones later returned to his prison

job in the law library.

[8] On December 2, 2020, Jones filed a pro se prisoner complaint against the prison

employees in their official and individual capacities. In Jones’ complaint, he

alleged that the prison employees had retaliated against him after he had

exercised his protected First Amendment rights. Specifically, Jones alleged that

the prison employees had temporarily removed him from his prison job in the

law library for exercising First Amendment speech by commenting on a prison

restroom policy. According to Jones, the policy at issue related to a

requirement that males needed to wait two hours to use the restroom. Jones

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alleged that his conversation about a restroom policy was “protected under the

First Amendment” and that “due to his conversation[,] he [had] suffered by

being fired from his job and forced to remain idle for ninety (90) days.”

(Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at 6).3 Additionally, Jones alleged that the prison

employees had falsified information on a state document. Jones also alleged

that the prison employees had engaged in a “civil conspiracy” and had engaged

in “defamation of character[.]” (Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 3-4, 8). As his relief,

Jones sought $10,000 from Hawk, $5,000 from Hollis, and $5,000 from Gall.

[9] In February 2022, the prison employees filed a motion to dismiss Jones’

complaint pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6). The trial court granted the

motion in part and denied it in part. Specifically, the trial court granted the

prison employees’ motion to dismiss the defamation claims and the claims

raised against the prison employees in their official capacities. The trial court

denied the prison employees’ motion to dismiss the First Amendment

retaliation claim against the employees in their individual capacities, which

made that claim the only remaining claim.

[10] Thereafter, in October 2022, Jones filed a motion for default judgment and

attached exhibits. Also in October 2022, the prison employees filed a motion

3

Jones’ complaint also references his conversation with Hawk and Hollis as being an exercise of his First

Amendment rights. However, Jones specifically “alleges that his conversation about policy to another

prisoner” in the hallway and in the presence of Gall was the “protected” First Amendment speech that “was

the motivating factor for the retaliation action” by the prison employees. (Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 6).

Accordingly, we will address only that specific First Amendment retaliation allegation in this appeal. Even if

we were to include his other allegation, it would not change the result of this appeal.

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for summary judgment. The prison employees made various arguments in

support of their motion. The argument upon which the trial court relied to

grant their motion was the prison employees’ argument that Jones had not

engaged in activity that was protected under the First Amendment.4 In support

of their argument, the prison employees cited to Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791

(7th Cir. 2010), reh’g denied, in which the Seventh Circuit discussed the elements

that a prisoner must prove when raising a First Amendment retaliation claim,

including the element that the prisoner engaged in an activity protected by the

First Amendment. Watkins, 599 F.3d at 794. The Watkins Court explained that

this “threshold” element requires analyzing whether a prisoner “engaged in

speech in a manner consistent with legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 795,

797. The Court further explained that a prisoner’s acts of speech that are

inconsistent with legitimate penological interests are “unprotected” under the

First Amendment “as a matter of law.” Id. at 799. The Watkins Court

discussed some relevant factors in a “legitimate penological interests test” 5 and

concluded that the prisoner’s acts of speech, during which he “public[ly]

challenge[d]” the law librarian’s directives in the presence of other inmates and

did so in a “confrontational” manner, were inconsistent with the legitimate

penological interests of discipline and order and were, therefore, unprotected

4

The prison employees also argued that they were entitled to summary judgment because: (1) Hawk and

Hollis were not personally involved in any alleged retaliation; (2) Hawk and Hollis were entitled to qualified

immunity.

5

The relevant factors included the impact that accommodating the speech would have on prison officials and

inmates and the availability of alternative means for the prisoner to express his complaints.

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activities under the First Amendment as a matter of law. Id. at 797, 798.

Additionally, the Watkins Court explained that the prisoner generally had a

First Amendment right to criticize prison policies but that he was required to do

so “in a manner consistent with his status as a prisoner[,]” including the use of

a “less disruptive approach of filing a written complaint.” Id. at 797 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

[11] In their designated evidence, the prison employees included Jones’ deposition

from February 2022; State forms that included the offender evaluation form, a

classification hearing report form, and an offender grievance form; Gall’s

interrogatory responses; and affidavits from Hawk, Hollis, and other prison

employees. In Jones’ deposition, he acknowledged that, while in the prison

OSB hallway in the presence of Gall and about seven inmates, he had spoken to

another inmate about a restroom policy and had then told Gall that he was not

speaking to her and that she was wrong about the policy. In Gall’s

interrogatory response, she stated that Jones’ “actions [in the prison hallway on

December 19, 2019] were belligerent, disrespectful, and impacted facility

security by causing other inmates to become upset and angry.” (Appellees’

App. Vol. 2 at 74). In Hawk’s affidavit, she averred that she had instructed Gall

to fill out an offender evaluation form due to Jones exhibiting “disruptive and

disrespectful behavior” and because “his behavior that morning reflected on his

work assignment as a law library clerk.” (Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 25). Hawk

also averred that “[s]everal [classroom] instructors [had] c[o]me out of their

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classrooms to complain because of the loud commotion and disruption to their

respective classes.” (Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 25).

[12] In Jones’ summary judgment response, he argued, in relevant part, that his act

of discussing a prison policy with another inmate in the hallway was a

protected activity under the First Amendment. He did not dispute that his

speech to Gall challenging her interpretation of the restroom policy was done in

the presence of other inmates. Nor did Jones dispute the manner in which he

spoke to Gall. Jones asserted that he “corrected Ms. Gall and explained to her

that she was incorrect and [that] the disputed rule that was posted on the wall

was not policy.” (App. Vol. 2 at 80).

[13] The trial court held a hearing on the parties’ motions in December 2022.

Thereafter, the trial court denied Jones’ default judgment motion. The trial

court also granted the prison employees’ summary judgment motion,

concluding that there was “no genuine issue as to any material fact” and that

the prison employees were “entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.]” (App.

Vol. 2 at 18). In relevant part, the trial court explained that it had “[a]ppl[ied]

the legitimate penological interests test discussed in Watkins” and concluded

that Jones had “not engage[d] in activity protected by the First Amendment.”

(App. Vol. 2 at 17).

[14] Jones now appeals.

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Decision

[15] At the outset, we note that Jones has chosen to proceed pro se. It is well settled

that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys.

Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g denied. Thus, pro

se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be

prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so. Id. We will not

become a party’s advocate, nor will we address arguments that are

inappropriate, improperly expressed, or too poorly developed to be understood.

Id. at 984.

[16] Jones argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the

prison employees. We disagree.

[17] Our standard of review for summary judgment cases is well-settled. When we

review a trial court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment, our standard of

review is the same as it is for the trial court. Knighten v. E. Chi. Hous. Auth., 45

N.E.3d 788, 791 (Ind. 2015). Summary judgment is appropriate only where the

moving party has shown that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that

it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000,

1003 (Ind. 2014). “A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome

of the case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to resolve the

parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts

support conflicting reasonable inferences.” Id. (cleaned up). “Summary

judgment is appropriate when the undisputed material evidence negates one

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element of a claim.” Schmidt v. Indiana Ins. Co., 45 N.E.3d 781, 785 (Ind. 2015)

(cleaned up). A trial court’s grant of summary judgment is “clothed with a

presumption of validity,” and an appellant has the burden of demonstrating that

the grant of summary judgment was erroneous. Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d

756, 762 (Ind. 2009) (cleaned up).

[18] “[C]ourts must take cognizance of the valid constitutional claims of prison

inmates.’” Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 547 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Turner v.

Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987)). “Prison walls do not form a barrier separating

prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution.” Turner, 482 U.S. at

84. “However, [l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or

limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the

considerations underlying our penal system.” Bridges, 557 F.3d at 548 (cleaned

up).

[19] At issue in this summary judgment proceeding, is Jones’ prisoner claim that the

prison employees had retaliated against him after he had exercised his First

Amendment speech rights. To prevail at trial on a First Amendment retaliation

claim, a plaintiff must show at trial that: “(1) he engaged in activity protected

by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter

First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity

was ‘at least a motivating factor’ in the Defendants’ decision to take the

retaliatory action.” Whitfield v. Spiller, 76 F.4th 698, 707-08 (7th Cir. 2023)

(cleaned up). See also Watkins, 599 F.3d at 794. Thus, in this summary

judgment context, in order to get summary judgment granted in their favor, the

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prison employees were required to negate one of these elements of Jones’ First

Amendment retaliation claim. See Schmidt, 45 N.E.3d at 785 (“Summary

judgment is appropriate when the undisputed material evidence negates one

element of a claim.”).

[20] Here, the trial court granted summary judgment after finding that the prison

employees had negated the first element of Jones’ First Amendment retaliation

claim. Specifically, the trial court “[a]ppl[ied] the legitimate penological

interests test discussed in Watkins” and concluded that Jones had “not

engage[d] in activity protected by the First Amendment.” (App. Vol. 2 at 17).

We, therefore, review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment based on that

first element of whether Jones engaged in activity protected by the First

Amendment.

[21] To determine whether Jones’ activity while in the prison hallway was protected,

we must ask “whether ‘he engaged in this speech in a manner consistent with

legitimate penological interests.’” Whitfield, 76 F.4th at 708 (quoting Watkins,

599 F.3d at 796). “The prison setting is distinctive, and it affects many

constitutional rights.” Whitfield, 76 F.4th at 708. An inmate’s speech is not

protected where it is “disruptive” or “confrontational.” Whitfield, 76 F.4th at

708 Id. (citing Watkins, 599 F.3d at 798, 799 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, an inmate’s “backtalk,” which “violates prison [disciplinary

policies],” is also unprotected. Whitfield, 76 F.4th at 708 (citing Kervin v. Barnes,

787 F.3d 833, 835 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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[22] In Watkins, the Seventh Circuit explained that a prisoner generally has a First

Amendment right to criticize prison policies but that he is required to do so “in

a manner consistent with his status as a prisoner[,]” including the use of a “less

disruptive approach of filing a written complaint.” Watkins, 599 F.3d at 797

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Watkins Court concluded

that a prisoner, who worked as a prison law clerk and who had openly

challenged the law librarian in the presence of other inmates, had a “negative

impact on [the librarian’s] legitimate interests in discipline” and had “impeded

her authority” in the library. Id. at 797. The Watkins Court further concluded

that the prisoner’s acts of speech, which were “confrontational” manner, were

inconsistent with the legitimate penological interests of discipline and order and

were, therefore, unprotected activities under the First Amendment as a matter

of law. Id. at 797, 798.

[23] Here, the undisputed facts reveal that when Jones and at least seven other

inmates were in the prison OSB hallway and waiting to use the restroom, Jones

had a conversation with another inmate about a prison restroom policy, which

was apparently posted on the wall in the hallway. Jones was “explaining” the

policy and rules to the other inmate, and he did so while in the presence of Gall

and the other inmates. (Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 38). Gall overheard what

Jones was saying and, at some point, she “intervened” in the conversation to

inform Jones that his interpretation was not accurate. (Appellees’ App. Vol. 2

at 39). Jones told Gall that he was correct, that he was not speaking to her, and

that what she had said was wrong and was not the policy. Jones then returned

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to his job at the law library. Around this time, Hawk walked in the hallway

and saw that Gall was “visibly upset.” (App. Vol. 2 at 20; Appellees’ App. Vol.

2 at 25). Gall informed Hawk that Jones had been “loud and disrespectful[.]”

(App. Vol. 2 at 20; Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 25). Gall also informed Hawk that

Jones had been “disruptive in the hallway” and had “attempt[ed] to get other

offenders upset and to join in[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 20; Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at

25). Additionally, several classroom instructors also complained to Hawk

about “the loud commotion and disruption to their respective classes.” (App.

Vol. 2 at 20; Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 25). Based on Jones’ “disruptive and

disrespectful” behavior, Hawk instructed Gall to fill out an offender evaluation

form. (Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 25).

[24] Here, similar to the prisoner in Watkins, Jones openly challenged Gall in the

presence of other inmates and did so in a manner that was loud, disruptive, and

disrespectful. Jones asserts his actions were protected by the First Amendment

because he was talking to another inmate before Gall spoke to him.6 Jones,

however, fails to recognize that the actions taken by the prison employees to fill

out the offender evaluation form that led to his temporary removal from his

prison law library job were not done because of the specific words that he spoke

6

Jones also makes various derogatory allegations against the prison employees, including accusations that

they committed perjury, gave a false declaration, engaged in a practice of doing “nefarious things.” (Jones’s

Br. 12). Additionally, Jones asserts that Indiana Attorney General’s Office engaged in “attempting a cover-

up” for the prison employees. (Jones’ Br. 13). We note that “we do not look favorably upon disparaging and

disrespectful language in briefs[.]” In re Garrard, 985 N.E.2d 1097, 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), reh’g denied,

trans. denied.

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to the other inmate. Instead, the action taken by the prison employees were

based on Jones’ “disruptive and disrespectful” behavior of challenging Gall in

the presence of other inmates and interrupting several classrooms. (Appellees’

App. Vol. 2 at 25).

[25] Jones’ behavior was inconsistent with the legitimate penological interests of

discipline and order and was, therefore, an unprotected activity under the First

Amendment as a matter of law. See Watkins, 599 F.3d at 798-99 (holding that

the “confrontational” manner in which the prisoner complained and challenged

the prison employee removed his grievances from First Amendment

protection). See also Whitfield, 76 F.4th at 708 (explaining that an inmate’s

activity is not protected by the First Amendment when that activity is

“disruptive[,]” “confrontational” or “backtalk”). Because the prison employees

negated the first element of Jones’ First Amendment retaliation claim, the trial

court did not err by granting summary judgment to the prison employees. See

Schmidt, 45 N.E.3d at 785 (“Summary judgment is appropriate when the

undisputed material evidence negates one element of a claim.”). Accordingly,

we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

[26] Affirmed.

Tavitas, J., and Foley, J., concur.

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APPELLANT, PRO SE

Roman Lee Jones

Miami Correctional Facility

Bunker Hill, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Theodore E. Rokita

Attorney General of Indiana

Frances H. Barrow

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

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