The opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
QUENTIN BETTY, UNPUBLISHED
April 25, 2024
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 366214
Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, and LC No. 22-000160-MP
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and JANSEN and MURRAY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff, Quentin Betty, appeals as of right the Court of Claims’ order granting defendants’
motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8). For the reasons stated in this opinion,
we affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS
Betty is incarcerated. He is also a member of the Nation of Islam. Adherents of the religion
abide by dietary restrictions, which include prohibitions against eating peanut butter, potatoes,
beans, soy, or soy by-products. In 2015, Betty signed a document titled “Religious Meal
Participation Agreement.” The document indicated that, if he was approved, defendants would
provide him meals meeting his religious dietary restrictions so long as he did not possess or
consume foods that were prohibited by his religion. In 2022, Betty filed a complaint against
defendants, alleging that the document was a contract and that defendants breached it by offering
him meals that included prohibited foods. Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(8), arguing they were not in a contractual relationship with Betty because religious diets
were part of prison control and management, and defendants were required under a prison policy
directive to provide qualified prisoners with religious diets. The Court of Claims granted summary
disposition in favor of defendants, holding the religious meal arrangement was part of defendants’
preexisting duty and that, as a result, Betty failed to establish valid consideration to support his
contentions that the parties had a binding contract.
-1-
II. CONTRACT
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Betty contends that the Court of Claims erred in granting summary disposition in favor of
defendants on his breach-of-contract claim because there was a binding contract supported by
consideration. Appeals from the Court of Claims are treated as if the Court of Claims were a
circuit court. See MCL 600.6446(1). This Court “review[s] de novo a trial court’s decision on a
motion for summary disposition.” El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934
NW2d 665 (2019). “The existence and interpretation of a contract are questions of law reviewed
de novo.” Kloian v Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 273 Mich App 449, 452; 733 NW2d 766 (2006).
B. LAW AND ANALYSIS
To prevail on a claim for breach of contract, a party must establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that: “(1) there was a contract, (2) the other party breached the contract, and (3) the
breach resulted in damages to the party claiming breach.” Bank of America, NA v First American
Title Ins Co, 499 Mich 74, 100; 878 NW2d 816 (2016). Before determining if a contract was
breached, a court must first inquire whether a valid contract exists. On appeal, Betty argues that
because the document he signed was titled “Religious Meal Participation Agreement”, it is
effectively a contract. Plaintiff bases his contention on the word “agreement” in the document’s
title. However, “[a] valid contract requires five elements: (1) parties competent to contract, (2) a
proper subject matter, (3) legal consideration, (4) mutuality of agreement, and (5) mutuality of
obligation.” Innovation Ventures, LLC v Liquid Mfg, LLC, 499 Mich 491, 508; 885 NW2d 861
(2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
At issue in this case is whether the third element, legal consideration, was present in the
agreement between Betty and defendants. “To have consideration there must be a bargained-for
exchange; [t]here must be a benefit on one side, or a detriment suffered, or service done on the
other.” Innovation Ventures, 499 Mich at 508 (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in
original). “Generally, courts do not inquire into the sufficiency of consideration: [a] cent or a
pepper corn, in legal estimation, would constitute a valuable consideration.” Id. (quotation marks
and citation omitted; alteration in original). However, “[u]nder the preexisting duty rule, it is well
settled that doing what one is legally bound to do is not consideration for a new promise.”
Yerkovich v AAA, 461 Mich 732, 740-741; 610 NW2d 542 (2000). “This rule bars the modification
of an existing contractual relationship when the purported consideration for the modification
consists of the performance or promise to perform that which one party was already required to do
under the terms of the existing agreement.” Id. at 741.
In Spruytte v Dep’t of Corrections, 82 Mich App 145; 266 NW2d 482 (1978)1, this Court
considered a situation where the plaintiff, an incarcerated prisoner, brought suit against the
Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) claiming damages for an alleged breach of a
1
Although we are required to follow cases decided on or after November 1, 1990, see MCR
7.215(J)(1), a published case decided by this Court “has precedential effect under the rule of stare
decisis,” MCR 7.215(C)(2).
-2-
bailment contract, because the plaintiff’s personal property was not returned to him after his
transfer to another prison. This Court held that “[t]he parties did not appear to have any intention
of entering into a contractual relationship since [the transfer] procedure was required as an aspect
of prison management and control. Furthermore, this purported contract lacks consideration since
the parties were only performing a preexisting duty.” Id. at 147.
This Court applied its reasoning from Spruytte in Freiburger v State of Mich Dep’t of
Mental Health, 161 Mich App 316; 409 NW2d 821 (1987), in which the plaintiff’s decedent died
from a self-inflicted gunshot wound after being released from a mental-health clinic. The plaintiff
filed suit against defendants alleging defendants breached their contract with the decedent to
provide appropriate care and treatment. Id. at 317. Relying on Spruytte, this Court held that if
defendants had a preexisting duty to provide the decedent with mental-health treatment, there was
no consideration for the alleged contract; therefore, no contract existed between the parties. Id. at
318.
As relevant to this case, MDOC Policy Directive 05.03.150 provides that “[p]risoners shall
be permitted to abstain from any foods that violate their religious tenets.” This policy directive
made the arrangement of religiously-appropriate meals for prisoners who were approved to eat
from a religious menu a preexisting duty. Thus, the policy was an aspect of prison management
and control. See Spruytte, 82 Mich App at 147; MCL 791.206(1)(d) (stating that “the [MDOC]
director may promulgate rules . . . to provide for . . . the management and control of state penal
institutions”). Because defendants had a preexisting duty to follow this policy, any purported
contract lacked consideration. See Yerkovich, 461 Mich at 740-741. Without consideration, there
was no contract between the parties. See Innovation Ventures, 499 Mich at 508. Without the
existence of a valid contract, Betty’s “claim is so clearly unenforceable that no factual development
could possibly justify recovery.” El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 160. Accordingly, the Court of Claims
did not err when it granted defendants summary disposition.
Lastly, Betty suggests that there is no preexisting duty because a prison policy is not a law
that defendants were legally bound to follow. The preexisting duty rule, however, does not apply
only to legal duties; rather it applies to all duties “which one party was already required to do under
the terms of the existing agreement.” Id. at 741; see also Spruytte, 82 Mich App at 147; Freiburger,
161 Mich App at 318. As discussed above, defendants had a preexisting duty to follow the policy,
so the agreement lacked consideration and cannot be a binding contract.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
-3-