Connie Reguli v. Rogers Anderson as Mayor of Williamson County, Tennessee

04/22/2024

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

May 2, 2023 Session

CONNIE REGULI v. ROGERS ANDERSON AS MAYOR OF

WILLIAMSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Williamson County

No. 22CV-51293 Joseph A. Woodruff, Judge

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No. M2022-00705-COA-R3-CV

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What began as a public records request ended with the trial court imposing sanctions upon

the requester for violations of Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial

court concluded that the public records requester violated Rule 11 by including a false

statement and deceptive exhibit in her Public Records Act Petition, by failing to conduct

an adequate inquiry before filing her Petition, and by having an improper purpose in

connection with her anticipated speech regarding any public records that she might obtain

via the Public Records Act. The trial court imposed multiple sanctions upon the requester

including a $5,000 penalty, a requirement to associate counsel in any future pro se filing

within the judicial district, and a dismissal with prejudice of her Petition. We conclude the

trial court properly determined the requester violated Rule 11 by including a false statement

and deceptive exhibit in her Petition. Given the context of the Public Records Act, we

conclude, however, that the trial court erred with regard to its conclusion that the requester

made an inadequate inquiry prior to filing her Petition and had an improper purpose in

connection with the requester’s anticipated use of any documents she obtained. We also

conclude the monetary penalty imposed by the trial court violates the Fifty-Dollar Fine

Clause of the Tennessee Constitution. Because of our other findings, we vacate the trial

court’s imposition of all three sanctions, and remand for determination of an appropriate

sanction in light of our decision.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

in Part; Vacated in part; Reversed in part; and Remanded

JEFFREY USMAN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR.,

P.J., M.S., and ANDY D. BENNETT, J., joined.

Connie Reguli, Brentwood, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Jeffrey D. Moseley and Lisa Carson, Franklin, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Rogers

Anderson as Mayor of Williamson County, Tennessee.

OPINION

I.

What began as a public records request ended with an imposition of Rule 11

sanctions upon the requester. A challenge to these sanctions stands at the epicenter of this

appeal. Appellant Connie Reguli requested Williamson County public records. She was

seeking public records that would reveal the extent of the County’s expenditures, if any,

related to the legal defense of a former County employee in civil and criminal proceedings

stemming from allegations of a sexual assault by the former employee in 2013 at a County

juvenile detention center. Specifically, Ms. Reguli sought public records related to the

County’s expenditures on the defense of Mr. Juan Cruz, who had worked for the County

as a detention monitor. For a number of years, Ms. Reguli represented the alleged victim,

J.H., in civil cases in federal and state courts against Mr. Cruz in connection with his

alleged sexual assault of J.H. These suits, which also addressed other mistreatment of J.H.,

also named as defendants Williamson County, County employees Betsy Adgent (Director

of Juvenile Services) and Steve McMahon (Juvenile Detention Center Supervisor), and

Williamson County Juvenile Court Judge Sharon Guffee.

The civil suits raised multiple concerns related to the alleged mistreatment of J.H.

at the Williamson County juvenile detention facility in 2013. J.H., who was fourteen at

the time of alleged conduct giving rise to the litigation, suffers from Pediatric Autoimmune

Neuropsychiatric Disorder Associated with Streptococcal Infections (“PANDAS”).1 J.H.

alleged that he was placed in solitary confinement for an excessive period of time, did not

receive adequate medical and mental health services, and was sexually assaulted by a

juvenile detention center employee. The alleged sexual assault resulted in criminal charges

being brought against Mr. Cruz, who was acquitted following a trial.

Civil litigation, however, also proceeded. Ms. Reguli, on behalf of J.H., filed suit

in federal court alleging civil rights violations, J.H., by next friend Betty H[.] v. Williamson

County, Tennessee, No. 3-14-cv-02356 (M.D. Tenn.) (“the Federal Civil Rights Case”),

and in state court setting forth tort claims, Betty H[.], as Conservator of J.H. v. Williamson

County and Juan Cruz, Williamson County Circuit Court, Case No. 2014-CV-588 (“the

State Tort Case”). In both cases, suit was brought against Mr. Cruz and Williamson

County; Williamson County was dismissed from both suits. See generally J.H. v.

1

PANDAS often manifests itself in multiple psychiatric symptoms, such as an abrupt onset of

Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (“OCD”), impulsivity, eating disorders, depression, dysgraphia, and

problems with sleep.

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Williamson Cnty., Tenn., 951 F.3d 709 (6th Cir. 2020); Betty H. v. Williamson Cnty., No.

M-2022-00300-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 5193537 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2023).

In February 2022, Ms. Reguli filed a public records request that would become the

genesis of this appeal. Therein, she sought the employment records of the Williamson

County Juvenile Court Judge Sharon Guffee, whom suit had been brought against as part

of the litigation. She also sought the following:

From December 1, 2013 to date: Attorney fees and legal expenses, experts,

court reporters, transcripts, paid for Juan Cruz from December 1, 2013 to

date, including but not limited to payments for criminal defense to any

attorneys, expert, investigator, or other person in the Case of State v. Juan

Cruz, the original indictment having been executed in or about July 2014;

including but not limited to payments to Attorneys Karl Pulley, Raquel Abel,

Kelli Haas, Jacques Cabell, and any other expert, investigator, legal

assistants, or other persons for the defense of Juan Cruz in [the State Tort

Case] and [the Federal Civil Rights Case].

Responding to Ms. Reguli’s public records request, Mr. Cruz filed a motion in the

Federal Civil Rights Case seeking a protective order to prohibit the disclosure of the billing

records, classifying those records as protected materials pursuant to attorney-client

privilege and the work product doctrine. Mr. Cruz also raised concerns in his motion

regarding how Ms. Reguli may put the public records to use with regard to seeking to

defund his defense through public advocacy in opposition to the County covering his legal

expenses, and he requested an admonishment of Ms. Reguli for her inflammatory

extrajudicial comments regarding him and the case. Ms. Reguli and J.H.’s mother had

previously complained publicly and privately to County elected officials about the County

paying for Mr. Cruz’s defense, which they believed to be an unnecessary and improper

expenditure of public funds. Ms. Reguli filed in federal court a response in opposition to

Mr. Cruz’s motion for a protective order.

In March 2022, the County produced a redacted employment file of Judge Guffee.

The County, however, denied Ms. Reguli’s open records request insofar as it related to its

expenditures on the defense of Mr. Cruz. The County’s stated basis for denial in a letter

written to Ms. Reguli was: “We are currently unable to provide the requested information

due to the motion for protective order filed in the Federal case. Please see attached denial

form.” On the form accompanying the denial letter, the marked basis for denial is: “Your

request has been denied pursuant to the following law: . . . Court Case: J.H., by Conservator

Betty H[.] v. Williamson County, et al. Motion for protective order filed February 21, 2022.

The request is denied until the motion for protective order is heard.”

The form provided by the County is a standard form that lists a variety of potential

reasons for denial of public records request. Noticeably not marked on the form

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accompanying the denial letter is the box appearing next to the reason “The records do not

exist.” Accordingly, the County indicated that non-existence of the records was not the

basis for denial of the records she had requested. In addition to the form, there is no

indication in the written denial letter sent to Ms. Reguli that the records she requested did

not exist. Nor is there any indication in the letter or on the form that some of the records

she requested exist and others do not.

Having received the County’s denial, Ms. Reguli promptly filed in March 2022,

citing the Tennessee Public Records Act, a Petition for Show Cause Order and Compel the

Production of Public Records on Williamson County (“Petition”). In her Petition, Ms.

Reguli noted that she had “sought to obtain records of invoices and payments county

taxpayers made for the criminal and civil defense of Juan Cruz” and that the County had

denied her access to these public records. Ms. Reguli noted the County’s basis for denial

of her request and provided as exhibits to her Petition, among others, the County’s denial

letter and accompanying denial form as well Mr. Cruz’s motion for a protective order and

his memorandum in support thereof.

Ms. Reguli also asserted in her Petition the following:

1. The petitioner, Connie Reguli, is a citizen of Williamson County and an

attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Tennessee. I am also the

attorney of record for J.H. who is the plaintiff in two civil lawsuits. Case

3:14-2356 is a federal civil rights action and Case 2014CV- 588 is a state

court tort case. In both cases, Williamson County was a named defendant

but has been released from the cases on separate grounds. These cases arose

from the abusive and neglectful treatment of J.H. in the Williamson County

detention center in the winter of 2013. Fourteen-year-old J.H. was placed in

solitary confinement and was assaulted by a Williamson County employee.

The Sixth Circuit Court found that holding J.H. in solitary confinement was

excessive punishment and violated his constitutional right as a pre-trial

detainee. The perpetrator of the assault was Juan Cruz, a Williamson County

employee.

The case referenced by Ms. Reguli, J.H. v. Williamson Cnty., Tenn., 951 F.3d 709 (6th Cir.

2020), is a published decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

In her Petition, Ms. Reguli did not include the reporter citation for the decision, a copy of

the full reported decision, or pages from the published decision, but she instead included

four pages taken from the slip opinion of the case as an exhibit.

In opposition to Ms. Reguli’s Petition, the County filed its Answer to Petition for

Show Cause Order and to Compel the Production of Public Records by Williamson County

(“Answer”). Therein, for the first time, the County indicated that any expenditure records

provided to Ms. Reguli would be limited to records related to expenditures on Mr. Cruz’s

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defense in the civil cases. The County indicated that it did not fund Mr. Cruz’s criminal

defense; accordingly, no records existed of County expenditures related to Mr. Cruz’s

criminal defense: “While Petitioner sought these records for both Mr. Cruz’s criminal and

civil cases, any response would necessarily be limited to the civil cases, as no funding was

provided by Williamson County for counsel to participate in Mr. Cruz’s criminal defense.”

The County added that “[t]o the best of [the] County’s knowledge, Mr. Cruz retained and

paid his criminal attorney.” The trial court, however, suggested during a subsequent

hearing that Mr. Cruz’s criminal defense was instead paid for by the State. The record is

clear that Mr. Cruz’s criminal defense was not paid for by the County, but there is

ambiguity in the record as to whether his defense in the criminal case was privately paid

for or covered by the State.

In its Answer, the County rejected Ms. Reguli’s characterization of the Sixth Circuit

decision in J.H.’s case. In doing so, the County stated the following:

Williamson County denies that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that

J.H.’s actual conditions of confinement violated his constitutional rights.

Rather, the Sixth Circuit held that, at the summary judgment stage, taking all

of Plaintiff s allegations as true, the allegations made by Plaintiff in that case,

if proven, would constitute excessive punishment and would potentially

violate his constitutional rights as a pre-trial detainee. Because the Court

granted the Motion for Summary Judgment, a factfinder has not ever

weighed the credibility of those allegations.

The County also raised concerns regarding Ms. Reguli’s “public lobby” in opposition to

the County’s funding of Mr. Cruz’s defense in the civil cases against him.

Turning to its legal basis in opposition to Ms. Reguli’s Petition, the County indicated

in its Answer that

Mr. Cruz has asked the United States District Court for the Middle District

to intervene and put a stop to Petitioner’s interference with his ability to fund

a defense by precluding Petitioner from obtaining any information about the

fees incurred in his defense. Williamson County has not refused to produce

the records, but rather has simply indicated that it is appropriate to defer any

production until such time as the U.S. District Court can act. To do otherwise

leaves Mr. Cruz without a remedy.

The County conceded that “[o]rdinarily, Williamson County would respond to any request

for attorney invoices by providing an estimate for the cost of copying the invoices and

redacting attorney work product and attorney-client privileged information.” In the present

case, however, based upon the pending motion for a protective order in the Federal Civil

Rights Case, what the County expressly sought in its Answer to Ms. Reguli’s Petition

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before the trial court was delay: “Williamson County simply seeks to give the Middle

District Court an opportunity to consider Mr. Cruz’s request before producing the records

in question.” The County did not seek sanctions against Ms. Reguli under Tennessee Rule

of Civil Procedure 11; the County did not argue in its Answer that Ms. Reguli had violated

Rule 11. The County also did not argue that in the absence of a protective order being

issued by the federal court, there was any legal basis upon which Ms. Reguli’s Petition

should be denied.

This case was assigned to Twenty-First Judicial District Circuit Judge Joseph

Woodruff. The trial court held a hearing in March 2022 on Ms. Reguli’s petition. At the

hearing, the trial court judge disclosed that he had recently received a campaign message

from Ms. Reguli, who was a candidate for Juvenile Court Judge, that discussed the Federal

Civil Rights Case and the State Tort Case.2 The trial court judge indicated that he did not

think that the campaign mailer warranted recusal, but he stated that he would hear any

concerns raised by the parties. At the time, neither party voiced any concerns or suggested

recusal was needed. At the hearing, the trial court judge indicated his view that Ms.

Reguli’s Petition may have violated Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. In

noting concerns during the hearing on Ms. Reguli’s Petition, the trial court primarily

focused upon the seeming falsity of Ms. Reguli’s statement in her Petition related to the

Sixth Circuit’s decision and Ms. Reguli having sought records related to the County’s

expenditures on Mr. Cruz’s criminal defense. With regard to the former, the trial court

indicated that Ms. Reguli appeared to have falsely represented the Sixth Circuit’s decision.

With regard to the latter, the trial court observed that there were no public records as to the

County’s expenditures upon Mr. Cruz’s criminal defense because the County had not paid

for his criminal defense.

The County cross examined Ms. Reguli during this hearing. Much of the County’s

questioning focused on her comments to County elected officials both publicly and

privately in opposition to the County paying for Mr. Cruz’s defense in the civil suits against

him. Ms. Reguli and the mother of Mr. Cruz’s alleged victim, J.H., believed that these

expenditures by the County were an improper and unwarranted allocation of public funds.

The County also inquired about whether Ms. Reguli had been making documents under

seal publicly available. In the context of this hearing upon Ms. Reguli’s Petition, the

purpose of the County’s questions appeared to be focused on establishing the need for delay

in releasing the public records. In its Answer, the County had sought delay to allow the

federal court to consider Mr. Cruz’s motion for a protective order. The theory undergirding

the County’s questions appeared to be that delay was needed because Ms. Reguli could not

be relied upon to honor a later issuance of a protective order by the federal court. The trial

court questioned Ms. Reguli in relation to her failure to review the complete original record

from the criminal case prior to those records having been expunged. The trial court

2

Ms. Reguli had qualified to run as a candidate in the Republican Primary for Williamson County

Juvenile Court Judge in the spring of 2022.

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suggested that Ms. Reguli should have familiarized herself fully with the original records

from the criminal case prior to the records being expunged. Ms. Reguli conceded that she

had not done so.

Regarding her reliance on the Sixth Circuit opinion, Ms. Reguli insisted that she had

not relied upon the case as a fundamental predicate for her petition. Instead, Ms. Reguli

explained, she merely intended to provide a summary statement of the case. Additionally,

concerning the County’s allegation that any remaining, unproduced records were protected

by attorney-client privilege, Ms. Reguli argued that while communications are protected

by the privilege, the underlying facts of a particular communication are not equally

protected. Ms. Reguli argued that billing statements, for example, would not be protected

by attorney-client privilege.

Following the hearing, the trial court issued an Order providing written notice of

potential Rule 11 violations to Ms. Reguli in connection with the filing of her Petition.

Therein, the trial court stated that Ms. Reguli appeared to be involved in a public campaign

to argue to the County’s elected officials and voters that the County should not provide

funding for Mr. Cruz’s defense. The trial court indicated that failure to fund Mr. Cruz’s

defense would be contrary to the true interests of the County while being favorable to Ms.

Reguli’s client J.H. Additionally, the trial court expressed concerns about deceptive public

statements from Ms. Reguli regarding the defense of Mr. Cruz that could taint a jury pool

and undermine the County’s actual interests. In addressing potential Rule 11 violations,

the trial court also noted that Ms. Reguli’s Petition appeared to contain a false statement in

setting forth the finding of the Sixth Circuit in J.H.’s litigation. The trial court observed

that what Ms. Reguli said was a finding of the Sixth Circuit in J.H.’s case was not actually

the Sixth Circuit’s finding. Furthermore, the trial court indicated that there were no records

as to the County’s funding Mr. Cruz’s criminal defense because the County had not funded

Mr. Cruz’s criminal defense. The trial court stated that this reality could have been

discovered by a reasonable inquiry prior to filing her Petition. Finally, the trial court set a

hearing date related to addressing whether Ms. Reguli had violated Rule 11 and, if so, to

determine appropriate sanctions.

In the same Order, the trial court also addressed the substance of Ms. Reguli’s

Petition. The trial court found the County’s argument for delay persuasive. In ruling in

the County’s favor, the trial court stated the following:

[T]he objection raised by the County to the immediate release of the records

is SUSTAINED, pending a ruling on the motion for a protective order

currently pending before the United States District Court for the Middle

District of Tennessee, after which time the County shall make the records

available to the extent of the protective order.

In the wake of the trial court sustaining the County’s request for delay in order to

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allow the federal court to rule upon Mr. Cruz’s protective order motion and the trial court

providing notice to Ms. Reguli of potential Rule 11 violations, Ms. Reguli sought recusal

of the trial court judge. She filed multiple documents in connection therewith. Ms. Reguli

submitted her first recusal motion on April 11, 2022. This motion was based upon the trial

court judge having previously recused himself in a criminal case in which Ms. Reguli was

the defendant without offering an explanation. Mr. Reguli had been aware of Judge

Woodruff’s prior recusal. Despite her awareness, Ms. Reguli had proceeded forward

without seeking Judge Woodruff’s recusal until after the judge ruled in favor the County’s

argument for delay in relation to her Public Records Act Petition and after the judge

indicated that her Petition potentially violated Rule 11. Ms. Reguli also suggested in this

motion that Judge Woodruff was aware of her entry into the Republican Primary for

Juvenile Court judge, and that her political ambitions might also provide a reason for

recusal. Ms. Reguli also used this motion as a vehicle to further develop her arguments

related to her original public records request, specifically arguing that there is not a “bad

faith” exception to the Tennessee Public Records Act. In her motion to recuse, Ms. Reguli

sought as relief (1) the trial court judge disclosing his reasoning and judicial deliberation

regarding recusal in Ms. Reguli’s criminal case, (2) the trial judge recusing in this case,

and (3) the trial court setting aside the March 2022 order in which the judge had put Ms.

Reguli on notice regarding potential Rule 11 sanctions.

The trial court entered an order denying Ms. Reguli’s motion for recusal on April

20, 2022. In doing so, the judge noted that a recusal motion is not the proper vehicle to

request that an order be set aside; rather, Ms. Reguli should have filed a motion to alter or

amend in accordance with the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Addressing her

argument for recusal, the trial court further noted that Rule of Judicial Conduct 2.11(A)

provides a non-exclusive list of reasons for a trial court judge to recuse. This point from

the trial court was made in response to a presumption set forth in Ms. Reguli’s motion for

recusal. Ms. Reguli had asserted that, because the trial court judge recused himself from

the criminal case without stating a reason for doing so, it should be presumed that the

reason for his recusal must be personal bias or prejudice against her. In response, the trial

court stated that “[f]or Ms. Reguli to pick one item off that non-exclusive list, and conclude

it must be the reason for the court’s action, is a leap of logic that lands nowhere.”

Additionally, Judge Woodruff concluded that he was not required to disclose his reason for

recusal in the criminal case, and indicated that the reason for recusal in the criminal case

did not warrant recusal in the present matter. Additionally, the trial court also found Ms.

Reguli’s motion for recusal to be untimely and subject to denial on that basis.

After the denial of her motion to recuse, Ms. Reguli filed two additional documents

related to recusal, both of which she styled as declarations. On April 22, 2022, Ms. Reguli

filed a declaration in support of her previous motion for recusal. In her declaration, Ms.

Reguli stated that she observed Judge Woodruff in the courtroom at her criminal trial for

facilitation of custodial interference and two counts of accessory after the fact, see State v.

Reguli, No. M2022-00143-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 913212 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 4,

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2024), during portions of the proceedings on April 19 and 20. In addition, Ms. Reguli

asserted that the trial court judge opened an email sent to him from Ms. Reguli’s campaign,

which she indicated was sent to all registered Republican voters in Williamson County.

The trial court judge had previously noted receipt of a campaign mailer from Ms. Reguli

bringing it to the attention of the parties at an earlier hearing and indicating that he did not

think that it warranted recusal. No contemporaneous concerns related to recusal were

raised by either Ms. Reguli or the County. In her later filing, Ms. Reguli asserts that the

trial court judge should have excluded himself from Ms. Reguli’s campaign emails by

utilizing the unsubscribe option on the email. Ms. Reguli filed a second declaration on

April 23, 2022, again in support of recusal. In the second declaration, Ms. Reguli pointed

to comments made by an adult son of the trial court judge about the upcoming Rule 11

hearing scheduled for April 26, 2022. She suggested that the trial court judge was

improperly providing information to his son.

The trial court understood the first declaration to functionally be a motion to alter

or amend under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04. The trial court reached this

conclusion because the first declaration focused on recusal on the same basis as the initial

recusal motion, which had been denied for the reasons set forth above. The trial court

viewed the second declaration as functionally constituting a new motion for recusal

because it did not share the same focus as the April 11, 2022 motion for recusal.

The trial court noted two procedural failings with regard to what it considered to be

a second motion for recusal. Notably, “[t]he Second Declaration does not contain any of

the required assurances of good faith and purpose required by Section 1.01 of Rule 10B.

Moreover, it is filed less than ten days before the next scheduled hearing in this case which

is the Rule 11.03 show cause hearing set for Tuesday, April 26, 2022.” The trial court also

addressed the merits of Ms. Reguli’s argument for recusal, which the judge found to be

lacking. The trial court judge acknowledged his presence in the courtroom at Ms. Reguli’s

criminal trial. The judge stated that he went to the trial for two purposes: (1) to see how

the timing of the trial was progressing because he would also be presiding over a

companion case and (2) to hear the verdict announced by the jury. The trial court judge

indicated the comments his son made were all related to information found in public

records. The trial court judge noted that the information was readily available from public

sources, including newspaper articles, the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility

website, and the clerk’s office. The trial court found that “[f]or Ms. Reguli to conclude, as

she does, that [the judge’s son] received non-public information about the upcoming Rule

11 hearing from the undersigned is an inference with no factual support.” The trial court

determined that none of the reasons advanced by Ms. Reguli required recusal and,

therefore, denied recusal again.

Between the trial court’s March hearing on Ms. Reguli’s Petition and its April

hearing related to Rule 11 sanctions, the federal court overseeing the Federal Civil Rights

Case issued an order denying Mr. Cruz’s motion for a protective order. The federal court

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did, however, conclude that Ms. Reguli had been violating Local Rule 83.04 of the United

States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee3 through her extrajudicial

statements about Mr. Cruz. The federal court admonished Ms. Reguli, as Mr. Cruz had

requested, for her extrajudicial statements in violation of Local Rule 83.04 and ordered Ms.

Reguli to abide thereby going forward. In accordance with Local Rule 83.04, the federal

3

LR83.04 − RELEASE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING CIVIL PROCEEDINGS

(a) By Attorneys Concerning Civil Proceedings.

(1) Limitation on Extrajudicial Statements. A lawyer who is participating in or has

participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter, either directly or indirectly,

must not make any extrajudicial statement (other than a quotation from or reference to

public records) that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated

by public communication and will have substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing

an adjudicative proceeding in the matter, including especially that will interfere with a

fair trial.

(2) Comments More Likely Than Not to Have Material Prejudicial Effect. Comment

relating to the following matters is more likely than not to have a material prejudicial

effect on a proceeding, and the burden is upon the person commenting upon such

matters to show that the comment did not pose such a threat:

(A) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved;

(B) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness, or prospective

witness; or

(C) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the refusal or failure of a

party to submit to an examination or test.

(D) Information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be

inadmissible as evidence at trial or that would, if disclosed, create a substantial

risk of prejudicing an impartial trial.

(3) Optional Lawyer Statement. Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a

statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from

the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer

or the lawyer’s client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph must be limited to

such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.

(4) Application to Law Firms and Agencies. The provisions of this rule concerning

lawyers apply to the law firm and government agencies or offices, and the partners and

employees of such firms, government agencies or offices, with which the lawyer is

associated.

(b) Provision for Special Orders in Widely Publicized and Sensational Cases. In widely publicized

cases the Court, on motion of either party or on its own motion, may issue a special order governing such

matters as extrajudicial statements by parties and witnesses likely to interfere with the rights of a party to a

fair trial by an impartial jury, the seating and conduct in the courtroom of spectators and news media

representatives, the management and sequestration of jurors and witnesses, and any other matters that the

Court may deem appropriate for inclusion in such an order.

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court directed Ms. Reguli to desist in public comments from referring to Mr. Cruz as a

“pedo,” “pedophile,” “rapist,” and “pervert.” Ms. Reguli was also directed to desist in

publicly commenting on the evidence in J.H.’s civil suit against Mr. Cruz.

Addressing the federal court’s decision during the course of the hearing on the

possible Rule 11 violations and sanctions, the County represented to the trial court the

following: “[W]e have taken the position that the Protective Order has been resolved and

therefore, we have, pursuant to statute, sent Ms. Reguli a letter saying we can redact those

records and provide them within 30 days, if she pays the cost as per statute.” In other

words, the legal basis for the County’s opposition to providing redacted versions of the

public records requested by Ms. Reguli had been eliminated as a result of the federal court’s

decision. The trial court expressly agreed that the County’s approach in the wake of the

federal court decision as to the motion for a protective order was in accordance with its

prior Order following the hearing upon Ms. Reguli’s Petition.

The trial court afforded the parties an opportunity at the April hearing on the

potential Rule 11 violations and sanctions to present further evidence and argument. The

additional evidence presented was less substantial than the testimony at the initial March

hearing, addressed above. At the direction of the trial court, the County also presented

evidence as to its costs of addressing Ms. Reguli’s Public Records request. The trial court

also questioned Ms. Reguli regarding past Rule 11 sanctions imposed upon her and whether

she had complied with the terms thereof.

After the hearing, the trial court ultimately concluded that Ms. Reguli had violated

Rule 11 and imposed sanctions. The trial court found that Ms. Reguli filed the Petition for

an improper purpose, made false allegations, and did not conduct a reasonable investigation

into the veracity of her assertion that the County had paid for Mr. Cruz’s criminal legal

defense. Among the critical findings of the trial court were the following:

...

2. The Petition was presented in part for the improper purpose of (i)

harassing the Williamson County Government, and one or more public

officials including the sitting juvenile court judge, and (ii) pressuring

Williamson County to cease or deny further payments for insurance defense

counsel currently being provided to Juan Cruz, under a reservation of rights,

and (iii) thereby obtaining an unfair advantage over the County in the

pending state court civil action, Betty H[.], as Conservator of J. H. v.

Williamson County & Juan Cruz, Williamson County Circuit Court, Case

No. 2014-CV-588.

3. The Court understands Ms. Reguli’s legal argument that the “improper

purpose” prohibition of Rule 11.02(1) applies only to purposes directly

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impacting the specific litigation in which the alleged offending conduct

occurred, and does not extend to improper purposes impacting ancillary

litigation between the same parties. The Court, however, respectfully

disagrees with Ms. Reguli’s legal argument. The Court’s disagreement is

based, in part on the rule’s use of the expansive phrase “any improper

purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase

in the cost of litigation.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11.02(1) (emphasis added). Had

the drafters intended to circumscribe the reach of Rule 11.02(1) to the

specific litigation in which the offending conduct took place, and thus

exclude consideration of any ripple effect of the offending conduct, they

would have written the rule differently.

...

5. The Court finds that the Petition contains false allegations and other factual

contentions, specifically (i) that the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals “found” that

“holding J.H. in solitary confinement was excessive punishment and violated

his constitutional rights as a pre-trial detainee” and (ii) that Williamson

County appropriated funds used to pay for the criminal defense of Juan Cruz.

6. With respect to the untrue allegation about the 6th Circuit making a finding

regarding J.H. being held in solitary confinement in violation of his rights,

Ms. Reguli compounded her Rule 11.02 violation by fabricating a materially

misleading exhibit to the Petition. This exhibit was deceptively composed

for the purpose of ostensibly corroborating the untrue allegation.

7. With respect to the allegation that Williamson County paid for the criminal

defense of Juan Cruz, Ms. Reguli had six years available to her, within which

even the most rudimentary, informal investigation would have disclosed that

the allegation had no evidentiary support.

Addressing what would constitute an adequate informal investigation of the funding of Mr.

Cruz’s criminal defense, the trial court suggested Ms. Reguli should have familiarized

herself with the original criminal file prior to its expungement, inquired informally of the

firm that represents the County, and examined the County budget.

Having concluded that Ms. Reguli violated Rule 11, the trial court imposed

sanctions. The trial court imposed three distinct sanctions. For the first sanction, the trial

court dismissed Ms. Reguli’s Public Records Act Petition with prejudice. The County had

conceded, and the trial court confirmed, that Ms. Reguli would have been entitled to the

redacted records upon paying the costs under the terms of the trial court’s previous Order

prior to this dismissal. For the second sanction, the trial court noted that because the

County had not sought Rule 11 sanctions that it could not reimburse the County for any

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legal expenses. The trial court instead imposed what it characterized as a “financial

penalty.” Relying on the County’s testimony from the Rule 11 hearing regarding its costs

incurred in response to Ms. Reguli’s Petition as a benchmark, the trial court ordered Ms.

Reguli “to pay a penalty to the Chancery Court of Williamson County, Tennessee in the

total amount of $5,000.” The trial court explained its reasoning for imposing this penalty

as follows:

Ms. Reguli was sanctioned previously in other litigation, for violations of

Rule 11.02. She testified in this hearing, under oath, that she has complied

fully with the sanctions imposed on her by this Court in December 2014. The

County elected not to present any testimony in rebuttal. Therefore, the Court

relies on Ms. Reguli’s testimony that she has fully performed those

previously imposed sanctions of (i) additional ethics education, and (ii)

reimbursement to CASA of its reasonable attorney fees in the amount of

$3,145.50. Based on Ms. Reguli’s testimony, the Court finds that the

imposition of earlier sanctions failed to achieve the purpose of Rule 11.03;

which is to deter repetition of comparable conduct. Either the earlier

sanctions were insufficient or Ms. Reguli is impervious to correction.

Therefore, the Court finds that greater, more robust sanctions are justified;

had Ms. Reguli not complied with those earlier sanctions, the Court’s

sanctions today would by necessity be even greater.

As for the third sanction, the trial court ordered that “upon entry of this order, in all civil

actions in the 21st Judicial District in which Ms. Reguli is a self-represented party, Ms.

Reguli shall engage, at her expense, associate counsel, licensed to practice law in

Tennessee, for the limited purpose of ensuring compliance with Rule 11.02.”

Ms. Reguli filed a motion to alter or amend the trial court’s Order imposing

sanctions, and she set the motion for a hearing. However, Ms. Reguli did not follow the

procedure set forth in the Local Rules for Twenty-First Judicial District, which provide that

it is in a trial court judge’s discretion to set any hearings on motions to alter or amend, and

instead set a hearing on her motion unilaterally. The trial court denied Ms. Reguli’s motion.

In doing so, the trial rejected her arguments and declined to afford Ms. Reguli, who had

failed to comply with the Local Rules, a hearing upon her motion.

Ms. Reguli appeals from the trial court’s imposition of sanctions for violations of

Rule 11. On appeal before this court, Ms. Reguli asserts that the trial court erred by (1)

failing to recuse, (2) issuing Rule 11 sanctions for conduct that Ms. Reguli argues did not

violate Rule 11, (3) dismissing her Public Records Act Petition, (4) by imposing fines that

violate the United States and Tennessee Constitutions, (5) by imposing sanctions that deny

her access to the Courts, and (6) by denying her motion to alter or amend without holding

a hearing thereupon. The County contends that the trial court did not err and argues in

support of the trial court’s declining to recuse as well as its imposition of sanctions.

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II.

This court reviews a trial court’s ruling as to Rule 11 sanctions “under an abuse of

discretion standard.” In re Est. of Rogers, 562 S.W.3d 409, 428 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018)

(quoting Brown v. Shappley, 290 S.W.3d 197, 200 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008)). Appellate

courts will set aside a discretionary decision by a trial court “only when the court that made

the decision applied incorrect legal standards, reached an illogical conclusion, based its

decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employs reasoning that

causes an injustice to the complaining party.” Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cnty.

Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 358 (Tenn. 2008). A trial court “abuses its discretion if it

‘strays beyond the applicable legal standards.’” Ewan v. Hardison L. Firm, 465 S.W.3d

124, 139 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524

(Tenn. 2010)). This court reviews the trial court’s findings of fact with a presumption of

correctness. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). We review determinations as to questions of law de

novo with no presumption of correctness. Ewan, 465 S.W.3d at 139; Buckley v. Carlock,

652 S.W.3d 432, 440 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022).

III.

On appeal, Ms. Reguli argues the trial court judge should have recused himself. In

reviewing Ms. Reguli’s briefing on this matter, there are multiple deficiencies in Ms.

Reguli’s arguments. The most foundational problem is that Ms. Reguli has failed to

develop and support an argument in opposition to the procedural grounds noted by the trial

court in denying her motions to recuse. The trial court found procedural defects with both

motions including untimeliness as to the first motion and defects as to the required

assurances of good faith and purpose as well as improper timing of her second motion.

While these were not the only bases for the trial court’s ruling, having also found her

contentions to be lacking on the merits, they are an independent bases for the trial court’s

decision.

This court has previously confronted circumstances in which a trial

court’s ruling is supported by alternative independent bases but not all of

those bases have been challenged on appeal. In such circumstances, we have

explained that

[g]enerally, where a trial court provides more than one basis

for its ruling, the appellant must appeal all the alternative

grounds for the ruling. See 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review §

718 (“[W]here a separate and independent ground from the one

appealed supports the judgment made below, and is not

challenged on appeal, the appellate court must affirm.”); see

also Tower Oaks Blvd., LLC v. Procida, 219 Md. App. 376,

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392, 100 A.3d 1255, 1265 (Md. 2014) (“The law of appellate

review establishes that, ‘[w]hen a separate and independent

ground that supports a judgment is not challenged on appeal,

the appellate court must affirm.’”) (citation omitted); Prater v.

State Farm Lloyds, 217 S.W.3d 739, 740-41 (Tex. App. 2007)

(“When a separate and independent ground that supports a

ruling is not challenged on appeal, we must affirm the lower

court's ruling.”); Johnson v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 45 Va.

App. 113, 116, 609 S.E.2d 58, 60 (Va. 2005) (“[W]e join the

majority of jurisdictions holding that in ‘situations in which

there is one or more alternative holdings on an issue,’ the

appellant’s ‘failure to address one of the holdings results in a

waiver of any claim of error with respect to the court’s decision

on that issue.’”) (citation omitted).

Ramos v. Caldwell, No. M-2022-00222-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 1776243, at *3-4 (Tenn.

Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2023) (quoting Hatfield v. Allenbrooke Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC, No.

W2017-00957-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 3740565, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2018)).

Ms. Reguli fails to develop and support an argument that the trial court erred with

regard to the procedural bases of its decision. Where an independent alternative ground

for the ruling is unchallenged on appeal, a reasonable course for an appellate court is simply

to affirm the trial court’s ruling. See Ramos, 2023 WL 1776243, at *4. That is precisely

what we do in the present case, affirming the trial court’s denial of Ms. Reguli’s motions

to recuse.

IV.

There are two core actions by Ms. Reguli that the trial court found to be in

contravention of Rule 11.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and warranting of

sanctions. One action relates to a false statement in her Public Records Act Petition and a

related deceptive exhibit attached to her Petition. The second core action that formed a

basis for sanction is Ms. Reguli’s act of filing a Petition seeking public records. The trial

court concluded that the Petition was filed with inadequate inquiry having been done prior

to filing and that the Petition was filed for an improper purpose in relation to how Ms.

Reguli would make improper use of any public records she obtained. Ms. Reguli argues

that the trial court erred; she contends her actions were not sanctionable under Rule 11.

The County argues in support of the trial court’s conclusion that Ms. Reguli’s conduct was

properly subject to sanction.

A.

We turn first to the trial court’s finding of sanctionable conduct in relation to Ms.

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Reguli’s assertion of a false statement in her Petition and the accompanying deceptive

exhibit. The trial court concluded that Ms. Reguli made a false statement in her Petition

by falsely representing a Sixth Circuit decision involving J.H. Furthermore, the trial court

concluded that Ms. Reguli crafted an exhibit to her Petition in which she edited the slip

opinion of the Sixth Circuit in such a manner as to create a misleading impression of the

decision that was supportive of her false characterization. It is clear from the trial court’s

decision that it did not regard Ms. Reguli’s characterization of the Sixth Circuit’s decision

as reflecting a permissible lawyerly construction of the Sixth Circuit’s opinion or even a

simple misunderstanding of the decision by Ms. Reguli. To the contrary, it is apparent that

the trial court regarded her actions as purposefully misrepresenting the Sixth Circuit’s

decision. We note that the trial court expressly concluded that the exhibit in support of the

false statement was “deceptively composed.”

Ms. Reguli argues the trial court erred in determining that she violated Tennessee

Rule of Civil Procedure 11.02(3) by making a false statement regarding the Sixth Circuit’s

decision and by crafting a misleading exhibit in furtherance of the false statement in her

Petition. Ms. Reguli argues that the allegedly false statement regarding the Sixth Circuit

decision was not, in fact, false but instead a reasonable interpretation of the opinion. She

further contends that the purportedly false statement that caused concern for the trial court

was immaterial and that the trial court judge erred by determining the false statement was

a “fundamental predicate” of her petition.

We begin with the latter argument. Ms. Reguli argues on appeal that the trial court

“ruled that the sentence in question was used as a ‘fundamental predicate’ of the petition.”

She argues “[t]his is an error of law.” Ms. Reguli proceeds in her appellate brief to address

the meaning of the term “fundamental predicate” and to contend that the reference to the

Sixth Circuit decision was not actually a “fundamental predicate” for her petition.

Accordingly, she contends the trial court erred in ruling that her statement was a

“fundamental predicate.”

Our review of the record reveals, however, that the “fundamental predicate”

language which is characterized by Ms. Reguli as a ruling of the trial court appeared not as

part of the trial court’s ruling but instead in a question the trial court judge asked Ms. Reguli

regarding the purpose of why she placed a false statement regarding the Sixth Circuit

decision in her Petition. The trial court judge asked Ms. Reguli the following:

So coming back to that statement in paragraph one of the petition, I take it

from reading the petition that that establishes sort of a fundamental predicate

for the purposes of this request; am I right about that?

After Ms. Reguli disagreed with this description, the trial court judge noted that she had

put the statement regarding the Sixth Circuit opinion into her Petition for “some purpose.”

- 16 -

The irony is not lost on us that, as part of her argument the trial court erred by

concluding she misrepresented a decision of the Sixth Circuit, Ms. Reguli represented to

this court that language employed in a question from the trial court judge during a hearing

was instead a ruling of the trial court. Given that the trial court did not actually rule that

her statement was a “fundamental predicate” to her petition, the trial court certainly did not

err by ruling that her statement was a “fundamental predicate” to her petition.

The trial court did, however, determine that the exhibit that Ms. Reguli prepared

was “materially misleading,” a conclusion to which Ms. Reguli objects. She asserts that

the Sixth Circuit’s decision was of no consequence to her public records Petition. She

argues, therefore, that the trial court erred in characterizing her purported misrepresentation

as material. In Ms. Reguli’s view, Rule 11 is inapplicable because her allegedly false

statement was not a false statement as to a matter material to determining whether her

Petition under the Public Records Act should be granted. Ms. Reguli, however, provides

no authority to support her proposition that a knowingly false statement in a filing before

a trial court that is not material does not violate Rule 11. She has implicitly left the

researching and exploration of this legal question entirely to this court; we decline the

invitation and instead conclude that this argument is waived. See Sneed v. Bd. of Prof’l

Responsibility of Supreme Court, 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010) (“It is not the role of

the courts, trial or appellate, to research or construct a litigant’s case or arguments for him

or her, and where a party fails to develop an argument in support of his or her contention

or merely constructs a skeletal argument, the issue is waived.”).4

Ms. Reguli argues that her interpretation of the Sixth Circuit’s decision was

reasonable and that there was nothing improper with regard to her characterization of the

decision. To avoid losing the context of her statement in which she addressed a decision

of the Sixth Circuit in a case she had litigated, we produce the entirety of the paragraph in

which the sentence at issue appears, placing emphasis on the disputed sentence:

1. The petitioner, Connie Reguli, is a citizen of Williamson County and an

attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Tennessee. I am also the

attorney of record for J.H. who is the plaintiff in two civil lawsuits. Case

4

While we conclude that this issue has been waived, we do note that Rule 3.3 of the Tennessee

Rules of Professional Conduct provides a possible corollary of interest with regard to this Rule 11 question.

For ex parte proceedings, “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly . . . fail to inform the tribunal of all material facts

known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are

adverse.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 3.3(a)(3) (emphasis added). However, Rule 3.3 also provides that “[a]

lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8,

RPC 3.3(a)(1). With regard to false statements of fact or law to a tribunal, Rule 3.3 does not expressly limit

the prohibition to material false statements of fact or law as it does with regard to the disclosure of facts in

an ex parte proceeding where no false statement of fact or law has been made. Thus, textually, Tennessee

Rule of Professional Conducts 3.3 does not require materiality where a lawyer knowingly makes a false

statement of fact or law to a tribunal in order for a lawyer to run afoul of Rule 3.3 of the Rules of

Professional Conduct.

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3:14-2356 is a federal civil rights action and Case 2014CV- 588 is a state

court tort case. In both cases, Williamson County was a named defendant

but has been released from the cases on separate grounds. These cases arose

from the abusive and neglectful treatment of J.H. in the Williamson County

detention center in the winter of 2013. Fourteen-year-old J.H. was placed in

solitary confinement and was assaulted by a Williamson County employee.

The Sixth Circuit Court found that holding J.H. in solitary confinement

was excessive punishment and violated his constitutional right as a pre-

trial detainee. The perpetrator of the assault was Juan Cruz, a Williamson

County employee.

The context in which the case arose before the Sixth Circuit was an appeal of a

partial grant of summary judgment awarded by a federal district court. J.H. v. Williamson

Cnty., Tenn., 951 F.3d 709, 715-16 (6th Cir. 2020). In considering the appeal, the Sixth

Circuit noted that “[u]nder the first prong of our qualified immunity analysis, we ask

‘whether [J.H.]’s allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation.’” Id. at 717

(emphasis in original). In setting forth its holding, the Sixth Circuit expressly returned to

this qualification of its decision: “We therefore hold that, assuming J.H.’s allegations to

be true, his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights were violated when he

was held in solitary confinement from November 17 to December 8, 2013.” Id. at 720

(emphasis added).

In referencing this decision, Ms. Reguli did not in her Petition or as exhibit thereto

provide the published opinion of the Sixth Circuit or a citation to the Sixth Circuit’s

opinion. Ms. Reguli instead created an exhibit in which she provided four pages drawn

from the slip opinion rather than the published opinion. The pages provided by Ms. Reguli

did not include language indicating that the appeal before the Sixth Circuit was taken in

the context of a partial summary judgment awarded by a federal district court to a number

of the defendants in the case. The pages provided did not include portions of the opinion

indicating that the Sixth Circuit had ultimately upheld the grant of partial summary

judgment to these defendants. The pages provided did not include the Sixth Circuit’s

express indication that its analysis was addressed to answering the legal questions

presented if the facts asserted by J.H. were true. The pages provided in the exhibit also did

not include the Sixth Circuit’s express indication that its holding was predicated upon

“assuming J.H.’s allegations to be true.” Reviewing the exhibit Ms. Reguli provided, we

see no possible way for the trial court to be able to glean directly from the exhibit itself the

existence of critical limitations on the Sixth Circuit’s decision that run contrary to Ms.

Reguli’s characterization thereof. Additionally, the sentence in which the Sixth Circuit

expressly sets forth its “holding” with such limitation begins a mere ten words after the

final portion of the opinion provided by Ms. Reguli as an exhibit to the trial court cuts off.

Furthermore, in the published opinion in the Federal Reporter, 951 F.3d 709 (6th Cir.

2020), the above referenced “if true” limitation appears on page 717 which also includes

portions of the opinion that Ms. Reguli did provide as part of her exhibit. However, with

- 18 -

using the slip opinion instead, the “if true” limitation language appears on another page

from the content Ms. Reguli provided in support of her description of the Sixth Circuit’s

decision. In other words, by using the slip opinion rather than the published version, Ms.

Reguli’s exhibit supported her characterization of the Sixth Circuit’s decision by avoiding

revealing this critical limitation.

As noted above, the trial court judge concluded that Ms. Reguli made a false

statement in her representation of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in J.H.’s case and presented

an exhibit that she crafted in a deceptive manner to further this false statement. Ms. Reguli

insists that her reading was reasonable. We cannot agree with Ms. Reguli that she simply

presented a reasonable reading of the Sixth Circuit’s decision of a case that she had

litigated. The Sixth Circuit did not, in fact, find that J.H.’s constitutional rights were

violated. The Sixth Circuit found that if the facts were as J.H. alleged, which had not yet

been determined and was disputed, then J.H.’s constitutional rights were violated. Hearing

testimony and considering the matter before it, the trial court determined Ms. Reguli’s

actions were deceptive. In other words, the trial court did not find the statement in the

Petition to be a simple mistake or even aggressive lawyering within professional bounds.

From our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err in its conclusion

that Ms. Reguli set forth in her Petition a false statement or in its conclusion that the exhibit

was crafted in such a manner to deceptively advance this false statement. We find no error

in the trial court’s conclusion that these actions violated Rule 11.

B.

While the first core action forming a basis for sanctions in the present case related

to the above-discussed false statement, the second core action that the trial court found

sanctionable emerged from the act of Ms. Reguli filing the Petition at all. The trial court

concluded that Ms. Reguli did not make an adequate inquiry before filing and the Petition

had an improper purpose. Her sanctionable action was the act of filing the Petition under

these circumstances.

A foundational dispute between the County, arguing in support of the trial court

judge’s imposition of sanctions, and Ms. Reguli, arguing in opposition thereto, relates to

whether the context of this case is of consequence. The County argues that this court

should essentially ignore that the Petition, the act of filing which gave rise to Rule 11

sanctions, is a Public Records Act Petition. Ms. Reguli counters that the fact that the

Petition, the filing of which has led to her being sanctioned, is a Public Records Act Petition

is critical to understanding why the trial court was in error in sanctioning her in the present

case.

With regard to the false statement issue addressed above, it is of no consequence

that the false statement was made in the context of a petition under the Public Records Act,

rather than, for example, a tort or property suit or any number of other types of actions.

- 19 -

Lawyers are not free to knowingly make false statements in their filings to the trial court

simply because the statement is made in a petition under the Public Records Act. An

assertion to the contrary is nonsensical. However, with regard to sanctions related to the

reasonableness of her inquiry prior to filing and her likely use of any public records she

acquires as the bases for sanction, Ms. Reguli has the better argument. The sanctions

emerging from the act of filing of the Petition itself, given the sanctionable aspects

identified by the trial court and the circumstances of the present case, are inseparable from

the context of the filing being a Public Records Act Petition. It is that context and the

complexity generated thereby that reveals and forms the basis for the trial court’s error in

sanctioning Ms. Reguli for the filing of her Petition.

Accordingly, we turn to consider that context. Long before the General Assembly

enacted the Public Records Act, the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that there existed

a right of the public to access government papers. See State ex rel. Wellford v. Williams,

110 Tenn. 549, 75 S.W. 948, 958-59 (1903); see also Ballard v. Herzke, 924 S.W.2d 652,

661 (Tenn. 1996) (declaring that “it is beyond dispute that there exists in this country a

general right to inspect and copy public records and documents”); Swift v. Campbell, 159

S.W.3d 565, 570 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that “Tennessee’s courts have long

recognized the public’s right to examine governmental records”). The Tennessee General

Assembly in 1957 “codified this public access doctrine by enacting the Public Records

Act.” Schneider v. City of Jackson, 226 S.W.3d 332, 339 (Tenn. 2007).

“Public records under the Act are defined broadly. . . .” Tennessean v. Metro. Gov’t

of Nashville, 485 S.W.3d 857, 864 (Tenn. 2016). The Public Records Act defines public

records as “all documents, papers, letters, maps, books, photographs, microfilms,

electronic data processing files and output, films, sound recordings, or other material,

regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received pursuant to law or

ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by any governmental

agency.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503(a)(1)(A)(i) (effective May 4, 2021 to June 30,

2022); see also Griffin v. City of Knoxville, 821 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Tenn. 1991) (describing

the Act as an “all encompassing legislative attempt to cover all printed matter created or

received by government in its official capacity” (quoting Bd. of Ed. of Memphis City Sch.

v. Memphis Pub. Co., 585 S.W.2d 629, 630 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979))). With regard to the

availability of public records, the Act provides that “[a]ll state, county and municipal

records shall, at all times during business hours, . . . be open for personal inspection by any

citizen of this state, and those in charge of the records shall not refuse such right of

inspection to any citizen of this state, . . . unless otherwise provided by state law.” Tenn.

Code Ann. § 10-7-503(a)(2)(A).

Addressing statutory measures of the Public Records Act, the Tennessee Supreme

Court has indicated that they “create a presumption of openness and express a clear

legislative mandate favoring disclosure of governmental records.” Schneider, 226 S.W.3d

at 339–40. This is not to say that there are no or even only a few exceptions under the Act.

- 20 -

To the contrary, while there were initially only two exceptions to the Act,5 in a 2018 report,

the Tennessee Comptroller of the Treasury’s Office of Open Records Counsel reported to

the General Assembly that there are 538 exceptions to the Public Records Act.6 Despite a

narrowing of records available under the Act, “its intent has remained the same—to

facilitate the public’s access to government records.” Tennessean, 485 S.W.3d at 864.

Reflecting upon the Act, the Tennessee Supreme Court has observed “[t]he Public Records

Act has a noble and worthwhile purpose by providing a tool to hold government officials

and agencies accountable to the citizens of Tennessee through oversight in government

activities.” Id. The Act still provides for “a presumption of openness for government

records” and directs custodians of public records “to promptly provide for inspection of

any public record not exempt from disclosure.” Id.

The Public Records Act allows for inspection of public records by “any citizen of

this state.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503(a)(2)(A). Where his or her request has been in

whole or in part denied, “[a]ny citizen of Tennessee . . . shall be entitled to petition for

access to any such record and to obtain judicial review of the actions taken to deny the

access.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(a). This court has indicated that a citizen’s “motive

or reason for wishing to review” a public record is “immaterial.” Kersey v. Bratcher, 253

S.W.3d 625, 629 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). In the absence of express statutory limitations to

the contrary, state courts in other jurisdictions, addressing their respective state’s public

records laws, share this understanding. See, e.g., Hopkins v. City of Brinkley, 432 S.W.3d

609, 616 (Ark. 2014) (indicating that the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act “does not

direct itself to the motivation of the person who seeks public records”); Los Angeles Unified

Sch. Dist. v. Superior Ct., 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 90, 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (“The motive of

the particular requester in seeking public records is irrelevant. . . . Moreover, the purpose

for which the requested records are to be used is likewise irrelevant.”); Rameses, Inc. v.

Demings, 29 So. 3d 418, 421 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (“The motivation or purpose of the

person seeking disclosure of public records is irrelevant.”); News-Press Publ’g Co. v.

Gadd, 388 So. 2d 276, 278 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (“The hospital’s defense alleging

malicious motives for seeking the documents is likewise irrelevant. The Public Records

Act does not direct itself to the motivation of the person who seeks the records.”); Wade v.

Taylor, 320 P.3d 1250, 1260 (Idaho 2014) (“The purpose for which [the requester] sought

the records is irrelevant in analyzing whether or not the records were exempt from

disclosure.”); Censabella v. Hillsborough Cnty. Att’y, 197 A.3d 74, 77 (N.H. 2018) (“The

requester’s motives in seeking disclosure are irrelevant to the question of access.”); Gray

5

“When the Act was adopted in 1957, only two categories of records were excepted from

disclosure—medical records of patients in state hospitals and military records involving the security of the

nation and state.” Tennessean, 485 S.W.3d at 865.

6

Tennessee Comptroller of the Treasury, Statutory Exceptions to the Tennessee Public Records

Act 3 (2018), https://comptroller.tn.gov/content/dam/cot/orc/documents/oorc/2018-01-

19_ExceptionstotheTennesseePublicRecordsActFinal.pdf; see also Andrew C. Fels, Missing Footage:

Reforming Tennessee’s Law Enforcement Public Record Exception, 53 U. MEM. L. REV. 375, 390 (2022).

- 21 -

v. Salem-Keizer Sch. Dist., 912 P.2d 938, 943 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (indicating that “an

individual’s purpose or motivation for seeking public records is generally immaterial to

whether the documents are subject to disclosure”); Weaver v. Dep’t of Corr., 702 A.2d 370,

371 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (“[T]he right to examine a public record is not based on

whether the person requesting the disclosure is affected by the records or if his or her

motives are not pure in seeking them, but whether any person’s rights are fixed.”);

Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Agency of Transp., 816 A.2d 448, 454 (Vt. 2002) (stating

that “motive is irrelevant to the right of access under the Public Records Act”); cf. Burt v.

Wash. State Dep’t of Corr., 231 P.3d 191, 196 n.9 (Wash. 2010) (considering motive of

the requester but only in response to a statute that imposed an express limitation upon

public records sought by inmates and where the records were sought for purposes of

harassment of prison employees or their families).

We do raise one general note of caution before delving into the particulars of this

matter in the present case. Application of Rule 11 sanctions to a requester of public records

appears to be rare in state and federal courts. The Ohio Supreme Court, reflecting upon

the prudent caution needed in such cases, stated that “courts must be very careful before

imposing sanctions in a public-records case.” State ex rel. Bardwell v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd.

of Comm’rs, 937 N.E.2d 1274, 1277 (Ohio 2010). The Court reasoned that “[i]mposition

by a court of Civ. R. 11 sanctions upon a public-records requester in the absence of clear

evidence that he or she acted willfully and in bad faith has the potential to chill public-

records requests and reduce the transparency of government.” Id. There are textual

variances between Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 117 and Tennessee Rule of Civil

Procedure 11.02 that generate different standards, but the core point of the Ohio Supreme

Court’s analysis remains. That is, courts must be cautious in imposing Rule 11 sanctions

upon citizens seeking public records to avoid chilling such requests and, thereby, reducing

transparency in government. See id.

Turning to the particulars of the present case, insofar as she asked for public records

as to County expenditures related to the criminal defense of Mr. Cruz, the trial court

concluded that Ms. Reguli did not conduct an adequate inquiry prior to filing. The trial

court concluded that if she had conducted an adequate inquiry Ms. Reguli would have

learned that there were no such expenses prior to filing her Petition. The court found no

such records existed because the County did not, in fact, pay for Mr. Cruz’s criminal

defense. With regard to the adequacy of her pre-Petition inquiry, we note that the County

denied Ms. Reguli’s public records request, but significantly, the County did not do so

based upon the non-existence of such records but instead based upon another unrelated

ground.

When denying a request for public records from a citizen of the State of Tennessee,

Tennessee law requires that the custodian of the public records shall “[d]eny the request in

7

Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 11 imposes sanctions for a “[f]or a willful violation of this rule.”

- 22 -

writing or by completing a records request response form developed by the office of open

records counsel.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503(a)(2)(B)(ii). Whichever approach is taken,

“[t]he response shall include the basis for the denial.” Id. (emphasis added).

The County’s stated basis for denial in a letter written to Ms. Reguli was, “We are

currently unable to provide the requested information due to the motion for protective order

filed in the Federal case. Please see attached denial form.” On the form accompanying the

denial letter, the marked basis for denial is “Your request has been denied pursuant to the

following law: . . . Court Case: J.H., by Conservator Betty H[.] v. Williamson County, et

al. Motion for protective order filed February 21, 2022. The request is denied until the

motion for protective order is heard.” In seeking a protective order in the Federal Civil

Rights Case, Mr. Cruz had raised concerns regarding how Ms. Reguli may put public

records to use. Ms. Reguli referenced this motion and included a copy thereof as an exhibit

to her Petition. We note that despite referencing Ms. Reguli’s public records Petition and

raising concerns about Ms. Reguli’s campaign against the County funding his defense, Mr.

Cruz did not in his motion for protective order or supporting memorandum provide any

indication that he did not receive funding from the County related to his criminal defense.

What is noticeably not marked on the form provided to Ms. Reguli from the County

explaining the basis for denial of her request is the box appearing next to the reason “The

records do not exist.” In other words, the form sets forth among the potential bases for

denial of public records that the records do not exist, along with other potential reasons,

but that box was not marked by the County when fulfilling its statutory duty to set forth

the basis for denial of Ms. Reguli’s request. Accordingly, the County indicated that non-

existence of the records was not the basis for denial of the records she requested. In

addition to the form, there is no indication in the written denial letter sent to Ms. Reguli

that the records she requested did not exist. Nor is there any indication in the letter or on

the form that some records exist and others do not. To the contrary, the language of the

form provided to Ms. Reguli is most reasonably read as indicating the records exist, but

they cannot be provided currently because of the pending motion for a protective order.

At a minimum, the County’s communication indicates that non-existence of the records

can be a basis for denial of private records requests in general but that it is not the basis of

denial of Ms. Reguli’s public records request. The first time the County actually informed

Ms. Reguli that there were no such records because the County did not pay anything toward

Mr. Cruz’s criminal defense was in its Answer to her Petition. In the view of the trial court,

Ms. Reguli’s sanctionable conduct had already occurred by this point by filing her Petition.

Under the circumstances of the present case including the sanctioned conduct being

the filing of a petition under the Public Records Act, we conclude that the trial court erred

in finding that the deficiencies in Ms. Reguli’s inquiry prior to filing were such that they

rose to the level of being sanctionable. Under Rule 11.02, the inquiry required before filing

must be “reasonable under the circumstances.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11.02. There were a

number of circumstances that gave rise to Ms. Reguli’s inaccurate belief that the County

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might have provided some measure of funding for Mr. Cruz’s criminal defense. For one,

her client J.H. sued the County civilly in connection with its employee Mr. Cruz’s actions.

Furthermore, Ms. Reguli noted that Mr. Cruz, who evidently was an individual of limited

means, had three attorneys representing him concurrently for his criminal defense. She

also observed that the attorneys who were involved in the representation in the civil matter

were present in the courtroom during the criminal proceedings. In responding to Ms.

Reguli, counsel for the County represented to the trial court that individuals involved in

the civil representation of Mr. Cruz and the County, in fact, had been present in the

courtroom during the criminal proceedings. Counsel for the County also indicated that

“there was also the individual in the criminal case who assisted Mr. Cruz’s retained

criminal lawyer,” but noted that this person “did not charge the County.”

Regarding the inquiry that Ms. Reguli should have made, the trial court suggested

Ms. Reguli should have, prior to filing her Petition, reviewed the full original file from the

criminal case, examined the County budget, and also informally contacted the law firm that

represents the County. While the file in Mr. Cruz’s criminal case had been expunged, the

trial court judge suggested that Ms. Reguli should have reviewed the public record files

from the criminal case prior to expungement. Review prior to expungement of a record

that was expunged prior to the public records request requires anticipation of a subsequent

filing of a petition under the Public Records Act. We do not understand the Public Records

Act to require a party to take anticipatory actions months or even years before a public

records request so that he or she will know whether the public records actually exist with

the potential consequence of failure to do so being Rule 11 sanctions.

In further addressing the inquiry that Ms. Reguli should have made, the trial court

also suggested that Ms. Reguli should have contacted the law firm involved in representing

the County to determine if any funds had been expended on Mr. Cruz’s criminal defense

by the County prior to filing her Petition. The firm, however, is the same firm that handles

public records requests on behalf of the County and that had already responded to Ms.

Reguli’s public records request without indicating that the records as to County

expenditures for Mr. Cruz’s criminal defense did not exist. We further note that the record

reflects some confusion as to the source of funding of Mr. Cruz’s criminal defense.

Counsel for the County represented in its filing before the trial court that “[t]o the best of

[the] County’s knowledge, Mr. Cruz retained and paid his criminal attorney” while the trial

court seemed to be operating under an understanding that Mr. Cruz had been indigent with

the State paying for his representation.

Ultimately, it is the denial letter and accompanying form that are key to our

conclusion that the trial court erred with regard to imposing sanctions based upon failure

to conduct a reasonable inquiry prior to filing her Petition. As noted above, the context of

the Public Records Act is important in this case. Under the Public Records Act, there is a

statutory duty upon the government to provide the basis for denial. Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-

7-503(a)(2)(B)(ii). Citizens are, then, afforded a right to petition should their request for

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public records be denied in whole or in part. Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(a). Where a

citizen requesting a record is informed in her denial letter/form that non-existence of the

records requested is a basis upon which a public records request could be denied in general

but that is not the basis for denial of her request and instead the reason that her public

records request is being denied is some other unrelated reason, the citizen is entitled to

proceed in filing her statutorily authorized petition with an understanding that the basis of

denial is what the government has asserted it to be and not what the government has not

asserted it to be.8 Absent the citizen knowing the records do not exist, where the custodian

impliedly indicates the records exist and denial is instead on another basis, a citizen is not

subject to sanctions under Rule 11 for failing to inquire further whether the records exist

prior to filing a statutorily authorized petition under the Public Records Act. A contrary

approach threatens to undermine the structure and operation of the Public Records Act,

chilling the pursuit of public records and the transparency in government produced thereby.

The trial court’s finding of sanctionable conduct was also predicated upon Ms.

Reguli filing her petition for an “improper purpose” under Tennessee Rule of Civil

Procedure 11.02(1). In reviewing the record and the trial court’s order, there is a degree of

uncertainty with regard to how precisely the trial court is applying the “improper purpose”

limitation in the present case. We think the better understanding of the trial court’s ruling,

and the one that maintains a connection between the Petition, the filing of which Ms. Reguli

is being punished for, and the “improper purpose” identified by the trial court,9 is that the

improper purpose is the anticipated improper use of the public records that Ms. Reguli

would obtain if her Petition succeeded.

Read in this light, the trial court determined that Ms. Reguli, who was trying to

obtain expenditure amounts paid by the County for Mr. Cruz’s defense, would use this

information to further her ongoing argument against the continued funding of Mr. Cruz’s

defense by the County. The testimony and exhibits presented to the trial court reflect that

Ms. Reguli had previously complained publicly before elected bodies, in private

conversations with elected officials, and before voters in her campaign for elective office

about the County paying for Mr. Cruz’s defense. She had done so without these records,

and presumably would continue to do so with or without obtaining the expenditure records.

Ms. Reguli did not believe that the County was required to pay for Mr. Cruz’s defense and

did not believe that the County should be paying for Mr. Cruz’s defense. Ms. Reguli

believed that paying for Mr. Cruz’s defense is an improper use of public funds, and she

and her client’s mother in the J.H. litigation had argued publicly and privately that the

8

This proposition should not be understood as foreclosing the government from raising additional

grounds in litigation beyond those stated in the written denial of the public records request.

9

Under an alternative reading, the trial court would appear to be sanctioning Ms. Reguli for

generally improper conduct as an attorney. The filing of the Petition served as the act for which Ms. Reguli

is being sanctioned in the present case, and it is that Petition which must have been filed for an improper

purpose.

- 25 -

County should stop paying for it. They both believed the County paying for Mr. Cruz’s

defense was legally and morally improper. Additionally, there were also suggestions in

the questioning of Ms. Reguli raising concerns regarding Ms. Reguli having previously

made material that was under seal publicly available. Ultimately, the trial court was

concerned that Ms. Reguli would use the records obtained as further ammunition for her

public discourse in opposition to the County paying for Mr. Cruz’s defense.

Some state and federal courts have reached the conclusion that a meritorious filing

or well-founded complaint cannot be sanctioned for having been filed for an improper

purpose. While placing excessive or repetitive filings in a separate category, the Utah

Supreme Court, for example, indicated with regard to original filings that “[t]he filing of a

complaint with a good faith basis in law and fact cannot sustain sanctions on the grounds

of ‘being presented for an[] improper purpose.’” InnoSys, Inc. v. Mercer, 364 P.3d 1013,

1027 (Utah 2015). Federal courts have split over the question of whether sanctions are

available based upon an improper purpose for a meritorious filing or well-founded

complaint. David F. Herr & Roger S. Haydock, 1 Minn. Prac., Civil Rules Annotated §

11:22 (6th ed. 2023) (noting that federal “[c]ourts are divided regarding whether a claim

with merit can ever violate the improper purpose prong of Rule 11”); Jerold S. Solovy et

al., Sanctions under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11, C842 ALI-ABA 97, 160 (1993)

(“Courts are split over the question of whether a lawyer or party can be sanctioned for filing

a well-founded complaint for improper purposes.”).

The language of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11.02(1) sets forth a limitation

on filings for an “improper purpose” and notes as illustrations thereof “such as to harass or

to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” There is no

requirement of frivolousness under Rule 11.02 in Tennessee as a gateway to finding

“improper purpose.” Accordingly, while a filing being meritorious or a complaint being

well-founded certainly does not support a finding of improper purpose, they do not create

a protective shield barring a finding of improper purpose under Rule 11.02 in Tennessee.

See, e.g., Andrews v. Bible, 812 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Tenn. 1991) (emphasis added) (stating

that “[t]he certification which results from the attorney’s signature on a motion, pleading,

or other document is directed at the three substantive prongs of Rule 11: its factual basis,

its legal basis, and its legitimate purpose”); Hooker v. Sundquist, 107 S.W.3d 532, 535

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis added) (indicating that “[w]hen an attorney signs a

motion, document, or other paper submitted to the court, he certifies to the court that he

has read it, that he has reasonably inquired into the facts and law it asserts, that he believes

it is well-grounded in both fact and law, and that he is acting without improper motive”

(footnote omitted)). This variance between Tennessee and other jurisdictions is supportive

of the trial court’s ruling, but the critical question remains what constitutes an improper

purpose.

Interpreting language similar to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11.02, a number

of state and federal courts have explored precisely that question -- what constitutes an

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improper purpose for purposes of their respective versions of Rule 11. North Carolina

courts, interpreting language similar to Tennessee’s Rule 11,10 have repeatedly described

an improper purpose in terms of a pleading being filed for “any purpose other than one to

vindicate rights . . . or to put claims of right to a proper test.” See, e.g., Jonna v. Yaramada,

848 S.E.2d 33, 47 (N.C. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Mack v. Moore, 418 S.E.2d 685, 689

(1992)). Also addressing similar language to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11 with

regard to improper purpose filings,11 federal courts have observed that “[f]iling a lawsuit

to ‘vindicate rights’ through the judicial process . . . is almost always objectively

reasonable.’” See, e.g., Rivers v. Wynne, No. 6:22-CV-00034, 2023 WL 6432976, at *3

(W.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2023) (quoting Rivers v. United States (Bowman), No. 6:18cv61, 2020

WL 6880967, at *2 (W.D. Va. Nov. 23, 2020)). Where the underlying purpose of a filing

is to vindicate a client’s rights, the purpose is not improper. Coates v. United Parcel Servs.,

Inc., 933 F. Supp. 497, 501 (D. Md. 1996) (noting that if a complaint is filed to vindicate

rights as well as for another purpose, the conduct is not sanctionable so long as the

additional purpose is not taken in bad faith), aff’d sub nom. Davis v. United Parcel Serv.,

129 F.3d 116 (4th Cir. 1997). To show an improper purpose, a number of federal courts

have imposed a burden to “demonstrate that the filer lacked a sincere intent to pursue the

claim.” ContraVest Inc. v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., No. 9:15-CV-00304-DCN, 2018 WL

5793601, at *5 (D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2018) (quoting United States v. Henry, 2017 WL 1065820,

at * 1 (E.D. Va. Mar. 20, 2017)). Addressing federal court decisions regarding improper

purpose, commentators have observed that a proper purpose exists where the filing is

submitted with the purpose “to obtain the requested relief.” John P. Brumbaugh, J. Andrew

Pratt, and John C. Toro, 6 Bus. & Com. Litig. Fed. Cts. § 68:8 (5th ed. 2022). Furthermore,

“[t]he basic notion is that it is an improper purpose to engage in litigation for a purpose

10

Rule 11(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part, that

The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the

pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief

formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law

or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and

that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause

unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.

(Emphasis added).

11

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11:

(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other

paper--whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it--an attorney or unrepresented

party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an

inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:

(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary

delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation. . . .

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other than intending to obtain relief from the judicial action.” David H. Taylor, Defending

the Indefensible to Further A Later Case: Sanctioning Respondents in Illinois Domestic

Violence Cases, 23 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 403, 428-29 (2003).

Mixed motive cases can arise involving a mixture of proper and improper purposes.

In such circumstances, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded

that “[a] party should not be penalized for or deterred from seeking and obtaining warranted

judicial relief merely because one of his multiple purposes in seeking that relief may have

been improper.” Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 56 F.3d 450, 459 (2d Cir. 1995). The United

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated that “if a complaint is filed to vindicate

rights in court, and also for some other purpose, a court should not sanction counsel for an

intention that the court does not approve, so long as the added purpose is not undertaken in

bad faith and is not so excessive as to eliminate a proper purpose. Thus, the purpose to

vindicate rights in court must be central and sincere.” In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 518

(4th Cir. 1990). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that

“improper purpose cannot stand on its own if it lacks . . . but-for causative force” and,

accordingly, required that “a claim of improper purpose in the prosecuting of a claim

contain an element of causation—that the claim would not otherwise have been pursued.”

F.D.I.C. v. Maxxam, Inc., 523 F.3d 566, 583 (5th Cir. 2008).

In the present case, Ms. Reguli requested public records, as was her right as a citizen.

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503(a)(2)(A). She was denied on a basis that she did not

believe to be lawful, and she filed her Petition as authorized by statute in Tennessee to

obtain the public records that she had been denied. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(a).

There does not appear to be any dispute that Ms. Reguli was genuinely seeking to obtain

these public records and that she filed her Petition in order to obtain public records that she

had been denied in accordance with an express statutory authorization to do precisely that.

See id. In a conventional analysis of improper purpose, Ms. Reguli filing to obtain the

relief she sought in her Petition would in and of itself appear to indicate that Ms. Reguli’s

purpose was not improper. The trial court’s concern does not appear to be that Ms. Reguli

filed her Petition without actually caring about whether she obtained the records or was not

trying to obtain the records but instead was trying to harass, delay, or increase the cost of

litigation. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11.02(1). It is instead the anticipated use to which Ms.

Reguli intended to put these public records, should she prevail in her Petition, that formed

the basis for the trial court’s conclusion that Ms. Reguli’s Petition had an improper purpose.

In reaching a determination that the anticipated use of the public records rendered the

purpose of filing the Petition improper, the trial court moved from the center of what

constitutes an improper purpose under Rule 11.02(1).

The question then becomes whether in doing so the trial court reached beyond the

permissible boundaries of Rule 11.02(1). In considering that question, we turn to the matter

of Ms. Reguli’s anticipated use of information in the public records, information regarding

the amount of public expenditures on the defense of Mr. Cruz by the County. The

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anticipated misuse of the public records that concerned the trial court was Ms. Reguli’s

anticipated use of the public records as further ammunition in her public discourse in

opposition to such funding. It appears that the trial court was especially concerned with

Ms. Reguli speaking to elected officials and voters regarding what she believes to be a

misuse of public funds in paying for Mr. Cruz’s defense.

With regard to concerns about usage, the testimony before the trial court raised

serious questions about how Ms. Reguli handles materials under seal and whether she has

previously disseminated materials under seal publicly. Insofar as the trial court’s decision

may be related to a concern about disclosure of documents under seal, Ms. Reguli is not

seeking to gain access to records under seal via her Petition. She is not gaining access to

the records based on her status as an attorney in the course of litigation. The records she

is seeking are public records. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503(a)(1)(A). Any citizen of

the State of Tennessee has a right to access these records. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-

503(a)(2)(A). In fact, any citizen denied access to public records either in whole or in part

has a statutory right to petition for access to the records, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-

505(a), precisely the act which Ms. Reguli has been sanctioned for pursuing. As a general

matter, making publicly available documents that the public has a right to access under the

Public Records Act is not a sanctionable improper purpose of the filing of a petition under

the Public Records Act.

Preemptively sanctioning Ms. Reguli because of her anticipated use of documents

available to the public under the Public Records Act in communicating with public officials

regarding her disapproval of certain public expenditures raises serious problems with

running afoul of the Public Records Act. As noted above, this court has indicated that a

citizen’s “motive or reason for wishing to review” a public record is “immaterial.” Kersey,

253 S.W.3d at 629. The official Williamson County public records request form is

consistent with a view of the inconsequential nature of the motive or intended use of the

document. The form asks for neither the motive for which the public record is being sought

nor how the public record is going to be used.

Preemptive sanctioning of speech that has not yet been uttered also raises serious

questions related to constitutional safeguards against prior restraints upon speech. Ms.

Reguli is being sanctioned with denial of access to a document that all other Tennessee

citizens can obtain based upon what it is anticipated that she will say after the public records

are in her possession. She is also being sanctioned, including a monetary penalty, for

speech that she has not yet uttered. The United States Supreme Court has observed that

“prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable

infringement on First Amendment rights.” Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,

559 (1976). Prior restraints are prohibitions upon “speech before the speech is uttered or

otherwise disseminated.” McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 2015). “Courts

generally presume that restraining speech before it is uttered violates the First Amendment,

even when the speaker can be punished for the speech after it is made.” Christina M.

- 29 -

Mulligan, Perfect Enforcement of Law: When to Limit and When to Use Technology, 14

RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13, 45 (2008). With regard to public records, “attempting to dictate

how a requester uses a public record could run afoul of First Amendment prohibitions

against the ‘prior restraint’ of speech.” Frank D. LoMonte, Copyright versus the Right to

Copy: The Civic Danger of Allowing Intellectual Property Law to Override State Freedom

of Information Law, 53 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 159, 181 (2021). Addressing a public records-

related limitation, the Washington Court of Appeals concluded that “the publishing of

accurate and lawfully obtained public records is constitutionally protected speech” and a

prohibition upon such publication constitutes a “prior restraint.” Catlett v. Teel, 477 P.3d

50, 60 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020). We do not reach a conclusion as to whether the trial court’s

sanction order violated these constitutional safeguards; rather, we note these constitutional

safeguards would require careful consideration when imposing a sanction in such

circumstances.

There are also serious questions that arise related to the constitutional right to

petition in connection with the trial court’s sanctioning Ms. Reguli based upon her

anticipated speech. The anticipated speech that gave rise to the trial court’s concern

involved Ms. Reguli speaking to elected officials in opposition to continuing public

expenditures in support of Mr. Cruz’s defense, which she believed to be improper,

immoral, and unwarranted expenditure of public funds. Article I, section 23 of the

Tennessee Constitution states that

the citizens have a right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble together for their

common good, to instruct their representatives, and to apply to those invested

with the powers of government for redress of grievances, or other proper

purposes, by address or remonstrance.

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states via the

Fourteenth Amendment, similarly protects the right “to petition the Government for a

redress of grievances.” Sanctioning Ms. Reguli for speech to public officials in opposition

to existing government expenditures raises serious questions in relation to the right to

petition. As with prior restraints, we do not reach a conclusion as to whether the trial

court’s sanction order violated these constitutional safeguards; rather, we note these

constitutional safeguards would require careful consideration when imposing a sanction in

such circumstances.

We do not suggest that Ms. Reguli’s anticipated speech as to the public records

relating to the amount of the expenditures by the County is not problematic or that the trial

court’s concerns regarding usage were unwarranted. In fact, we do not suggest that Ms.

Reguli and her client J.H. are immune from any consequence should she actually engage

in such speech. Addressing attorney statements made in the context of representation while

a case is pending, the Tennessee Supreme Court has observed the following:

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Courts have let the government limit the speech of lawyers when the

speech pertains to a pending judicial proceeding or when it prejudices the

administration of justice. . . . “[L]awyers in pending cases [are] subject to

ethical restrictions on speech to which an ordinary citizen would not be.” . .

. Some courts reason that “an attorney, by the very nature of his job,

voluntarily agrees to relinquish his rights to free expression in the judicial

proceeding . . . .”

Gentile, for example, involved out-of-court statements by a lawyer

who represented a party to a pending proceeding in court. The United States

Supreme Court commented in that case that “the speech of lawyers

representing clients in pending cases may be regulated under a less

demanding standard” than the standard for regulation of the press. It

described a balancing process in such cases, in which the court “weighs the

State’s interest in the regulation of a specialized profession against the

lawyer’s First Amendment interest in the kind of speech that was at issue.” .

. . This balancing process gives appropriate weight to “the vital role that the

justice system plays in our society and the state’s unique interests in

regulating the legal profession.”

State courts that have addressed lawyer speech outside the courtroom

but in a pending case have reasoned that such speech “‘may be regulated

under a less demanding standard’ because the lawyer in that role is an officer

of the court.” . . . See also Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Weaver,

750 N.W.2d 71, 90 (Iowa 2008) (stating it is “well established that the speech

of lawyers may be curtailed in order to avoid improper influence on pending

cases ... to otherwise prevent the obstruction of justice.”). The U.S. Supreme

Court views the State’s interest similarly, noting that “[t]he interest of the

States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to

the primary governmental function of administering justice, and have

historically been ‘officers of the courts.’” . . .

To evaluate the lawyer’s interest in the Gentile balancing process, we

consider not only the context but also the purpose of the speech. For

example, “[l]awyer speech that advances client interests, checks

governmental power, or advocates on matters of public concern is provided

the utmost protection under the First Amendment.” . . .

In the balancing process, lawyer speech for such purposes would be

weighed heavily.

Manookian v. Bd. of Prof’l Resp. of Sup. Ct. of Tenn., No. M-2022-00075-SC-R3-BP, 2024

WL 658959, __S.W.3d __, at *27-28 (Tenn. Feb. 16, 2024) (citations omitted).

- 31 -

The problem in this case is not necessarily that Ms. Reguli or her client could never

suffer an adverse consequence should she persist. Instead, the problem is that the trial

court’s determination that Ms. Reguli’s anticipated use of the public record is sanctionable

conduct is a decision reached by the wrong court, in the wrong context, and at the wrong

time without the proper analysis of the constitutional considerations. There are any number

of tools, up to and including dismissal of her client’s suits against Mr. Cruz, that are

available to the courts overseeing the civil suits in state and federal courts to protect the

fairness of the proceedings before them. There are also any number of tools available to

the Board of Professional Responsibility to address violations of the Tennessee Rules of

Professional Conduct where an attorney violates those Rules. The trial court in this case,

however, is neither overseeing the civil suits against Mr. Cruz nor functioning as a

disciplinary board reviewing adherence to the Rules of Professional Responsibility and

imposing sanctions for violation thereof. The trial court’s role here is more limited, as is

this court’s role in considering the appeal. The trial court had before it Ms. Reguli’s

Petition asserting that she is entitled to certain records under the Public Records Act. This

court has before it the question of whether the trial court erred in imposing sanctions under

Rule 11 for Ms. Reguli’s act of filing her Petition under the circumstances of this case.

Neither the trial court nor this court is presented with the question of what the courts

overseeing the civil litigation by J.H. against Mr. Cruz should do in the respective cases

before them about Ms. Reguli’s questionable speech to elected officials and voters about

Mr. Cruz and the County’s paying for his representation.

Here, the action for which Ms. Reguli is subject to sanction is the act of filing a

petition under the Public Records Act. The context of this matter, a Petition under the

Public Records Act as well as the nature of speech being directed towards public officials

regarding what Ms. Reguli believes to be improper governmental expenditures, and the

timing, prior to the speech actually being uttered, significantly exacerbate the complexities

of an already complex case.

The circumstances and context create at least six complications with imposing

sanctions based upon Ms. Reguli’s anticipated speech regarding any public records that

she might obtain. One, courts should be particularly cautious about the dangers of

imposing sanctions in public records cases because of concerns about chilling the

vindication of citizens’ rights to access public records and, thereby, reducing the

transparency of government. Two, Ms. Reguli’s Petition was filed in order to obtain

records to which she was denied access and to which she believed herself to have a legal

right under Tennessee law. In other words, she was seeking through her Petition to

vindicate her right to the public records. In general, this is the definition of a proper

purpose, and there does not appear to be any dispute that Ms. Reguli genuinely wanted to

obtain these public records which she reasonably believed she had a legal right to access.

Three, the act of filing of the Petition itself was done with the goal of obtaining the relief

sought and not done to harass, delay, or increase costs. The improper purpose identified

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by the trial court instead arose in relation to the anticipated use to which Ms. Reguli would

put the public records if she prevailed in this litigation, that is, after obtaining the relief that

she sought. Application of the Rule 11 improper purpose limitation in these circumstances

stretches beyond the center of the Rule’s restriction.

Four, sanctioning in connection with the anticipated use of public records runs

squarely into the Public Records Act, which as a general matter is unconcerned with the

use to which the requester is going put the public records after having acquired them. In

this vein, this court has suggested that even inquiring into the requester’s motive in seeking

public records is improper, yet Ms. Reguli is being sanctioned for her ultimate intended

use. Five, sanctions imposed for speech not yet uttered raise serious questions in relation

to prior restraints upon speech that were not addressed by the trial court. Six, sanctions for

anticipated speech that involves raising grievances before elected officials about public

expenditures that one believes to be improper and unwarranted raises serious questions as

to the right to petition that were not addressed by the trial court.

Ultimately, we conclude that under the circumstances of the present case

sanctioning Ms. Reguli based upon her anticipated speech regarding a public record

transgresses the legal bounds of permissible Rule 11 sanctions. Therefore, while affirming

the trial court’s findings of sanctionable conduct as to the false statement in her Petition,

we conclude the trial court erred in imposing sanctions based upon Ms. Reguli’s act of

filing her Petition under the Public Records Act.

V.

Among the sanctions imposed by the trial court for Ms. Reguli’s violation of Rule

11 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure is a $5,000 penalty. Ms. Reguli challenges

the $5,000 penalty, arguing that it violates the Fifty-Dollar Fine Clause of Article VI,

Section 14 of the Tennessee Constitution.12 “Issues of constitutional interpretation are

questions of law, which we review de novo without any presumption of correctness given

to the legal conclusions of the courts below.” Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263

S.W.3d 827, 836 (Tenn. 2008).

Tennessee’s Fifty-Dollar Fine Clause is a unique constitutional provision. City of

Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248, 257 (Tenn. 2001). “[N]o other provision like it may

be found either in the Federal Constitution or in any other modern state constitution. . . .

12

Ms. Reguli also references the prohibition upon excessive fines in the Eighth Amendment to the

United States Constitution. The Eighth Amendment provides that “Excessive bail shall not be required,

nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” Because we conclude that Ms.

Reguli is entitled to relief pursuant to the Fifty-Dollar Fine Clause of the Tennessee Constitution, and

because Ms. Reguli fails to develop any argument showing how she would be entitled to any greater relief

under the Eighth Amendment, the Excessive Fines issue is pretermitted.

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Similar clauses did not appear in any colonial charter, in any early state constitution,

including the 1776 North Carolina Constitution, or in the Constitution of the State of

Franklin.” Id. Tennessee’s Fifty-Dollar Fine Clause guarantees that

No fine shall be laid on any citizen of this State that shall exceed fifty dollars,

unless it shall be assessed by a jury of his peers, who shall assess the fine at

the time they find the fact, if they think the fine should be more than fifty

dollars.

Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 14. “The fifty-dollar fine clause is substantially the same today as

it was when adopted as part of our state’s first constitution in 1796.” Barrett v. Tenn.

Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 284 S.W.3d 784, 787 (Tenn. 2009).13

The Tennessee Supreme Court has ruled that the Fifty-Dollar Fine Clause “applies

only to the judicial branch of government,” Barrett, 284 S.W.3d at 789-90, and has noted

that its “jurisprudence consistently has affirmed that the clause is intended to limit only the

power of the judiciary.” Id. at 788. The Tennessee Supreme Court cited the following

Tennessee precedent in addressing the rationale of the Fifty-Dollar Fine Clause:

[State v.] Martin, 940 S.W.2d [567,] 570 [(Tenn. 1997)] (“The prohibition

against a trial judge fixing fines exceeding $50 was intended to protect

citizens from ‘excessive’ fines fixed by a powerful judiciary.”); State v.

Bryant, 805 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tenn.1991) (“Distrust of a powerful judiciary

was said to have been the reason for . . . the constitutional provision.”);

Upchurch v. State, 153 Tenn. 198, 281 S.W. 462, 464 (1925) ( “The object

of the limitation . . . was to prevent judges from imposing unreasonable fines.

. . .”); Poindexter v. State, 137 Tenn. 386, 193 S.W. 126, 128 (1917) (“Were

it not for section 14 of article 6 of the Constitution, an impecunious defendant

upon whom a large fine had been imposed might be imprisoned for years at

the will of the judge alone who tried him.”).

Barrett, 284 S.W.3d at 788.

Not all monetary assessments imposed by trial courts are subject to the limitations

13

Article V, Section 11 of the Tennessee Constitution of 1796 provided that “No fine shall be laid

on any Citizen of this State that shall exceed fifty Dollars, unless it shall be assessed by a Jury of his Peers

who shall assess the fine at the time they find the Fact, if they think the fine ought to be more than fifty

Dollars.” The Tennessee Supreme Court has noted that “[a]t that time, article V was the judicial article.”

Barrett, 284 S.W.3d at 787 n.1. Article VI, Section 14 of the Tennessee Constitution of 1834 stated that

“No fine shall be laid on any citizen of this State, that shall exceed fifty dollars; unless it shall be assessed

by a Jury of his peers, who shall assess the fine at the time they find the fact, if they think the fine should

be more than fifty dollars.”

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of the Fifty-Dollar Fine Clause. City of Chattanooga, 54 S.W.3d at 259 (stating that “the

restriction on imposing ‘fines’ contained in Article VI, section 14 does not prevent a court

from imposing any monetary assessment in excess of fifty-dollars”). The Tennessee

Supreme Court has identified the original public meaning of the term “fine” in the Fifty-

Dollar Fine Clause to be “a payment to a sovereign as a punishment for some offense.” Id.

(quoting Browning–Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 265, 109

S.Ct. 2909, 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989)). The Tennessee Supreme Court has also indicated

that this constitutional provision applies to monetary assessments where “either the

intended purpose or the actual purpose or effect of the monetary assessment is to serve as

a punitive measure.” Id. at 251. The line of demarcation between constitutionally fair and

foul turns upon the remedial versus punitive nature of the monetary assessment. Barrett,

284 S.W.3d at 789 (noting that the test developed by the Tennessee Supreme Court

“focuses on the distinction between punitive and remedial monetary penalties”); Town of

Nolensville v. King, 151 S.W.3d 427, 433 (Tenn. 2004) (“We stress that our holding today

. . . applies only to punitive monetary sanctions and preserves . . . power to impose remedial

monetary assessments”).

Truly remedial purposes of a monetary assessment “include those that (1)

compensate for loss; (2) reimburse for expenses; (3) disgorge ‘ill-gotten’ gains; (4) provide

restitution for harm; and (5) ensure compliance with an order or directive, either through

the execution of a bond, or . . . through a prospectively coercive fine.” City of Chattanooga,

54 S.W.3d at 270. While acknowledging that remedial measures naturally have some

aspect of deterrence, the Tennessee Supreme Court determined that “when the predominant

purposes served by” the judicially imposed “penalty are to provide general and specific

deterrence and to ensure overall future compliance with the law, then the monetary penalty

should be deemed as serving punitive purposes,” which brings it into conflict with the

Fifty-Dollar Clause. Id. The Tennessee Supreme Court emphasized this point, reiterating

“that if the predominant ‘remedial’ purpose served by a monetary sanction is ensuring

deterrence against future wrongdoing, then the sanction more properly appears to be

punitive in actual purpose or effect.” Id. at 270 n.22.

Here, the trial court ordered Ms. Reguli “to pay a penalty to the Chancery Court of

Williamson County, Tennessee in the total amount of $5,000.”14 The trial court expressly

indicated its reason for the imposition of this penalty was “to deter repetition of comparable

conduct.” Addressing the deterrence rationale, the trial court stated in its order that

“[e]ither the earlier sanctions were insufficient or Ms. Reguli is impervious to correction.

Therefore, the Court finds that greater, more robust sanctions are justified; had Ms. Reguli

not complied with those earlier sanctions, the Court’s sanctions today would by necessity

14

We note this case does not involve what are seeming more remedial sanctions under Rule

11.03(2); for example, “an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys’

fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.” Here, the trial court disclaimed such a

purpose when it stated that it could not award the County its monetary costs associated with defending

against Ms. Reguli’s Petition because the County did not seek Rule 11 sanctions.

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be even greater.”

It is undeniable that “[a] fifty dollar fine in contemporary value lacks the weighty

and serious quality a fifty dollar fine would have had two hundred years ago.” Town of

Nolensville, 151 S.W.3d at 433. After all, even within the scope of an average lifetime,

changes in value and prices can be dizzying whether one considers substantial expenditures

like a home or automobile or everyday purchases at a grocery or convenience store.

Applied over an even longer scope of time, the changes become more pronounced.

Reflecting upon the inclusion of monetary figures in constitutions in the context of

fluctuations of price and value, the Tennessee Supreme Court, therefore, observed that

“[h]ad the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1796 known that the provision

would survive unchanged for more than 200 years, they likely would not have included a

precise monetary figure. Nonetheless, this Court is constrained to uphold the plain

language of the Tennessee Constitution.” Id. at 433-34. Under the plain language of the

Tennessee Constitution, the trial court’s imposition of a $5,000 penalty in the present case

transgresses the constitutional limitations of the Fifty-Dollar Fine Clause.

VI.

Ms. Reguli also argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to alter or

amend without holding a hearing thereupon. Noting Ms. Reguli’s failure to follow proper

procedure for having such hearings set under the Williamson County Local Rules, the trial

court denied the motion to alter or amend without a hearing in accordance with a Local

Rule. Ms. Reguli does not dispute that the trial court’s actions were in accordance with the

Local Rule. Instead, Ms. Reguli states that the denial of her motion without a hearing

created a “substantial injustice” and was, thus, impermissible. Ms. Reguli fails to develop

an argument or offer support for this proposition; therefore, we conclude this argument is

waived. See Sneed, 301 S.W.3d at 615 (“It is not the role of the courts, trial or appellate,

to research or construct a litigant’s case or arguments for him or her, and where a party

fails to develop an argument in support of his or her contention or merely constructs a

skeletal argument, the issue is waived.”)

VII.

To reiterate, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the trial court did not

err in determining that Ms. Reguli violated Rule 11 by advancing a false statement

regarding a decision of the Sixth Circuit and supporting this false statement with a

deceptively crafted exhibit. We conclude, however, that the trial court exceeded the

bounds of Rule 11 by finding under the circumstances of the present case that Ms. Reguli

engaged in sanctionable conduct through her act of filing her Petition under the Public

Records Act. We also conclude that the trial court’s imposition of a $5,000 penalty violated

the Fifty-Dollar Fine Clause of the Tennessee Constitution. Given these findings, we

conclude that the more appropriate course with regard to addressing the proper sanction in

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relation to Ms. Reguli’s conduct that did violate Rule 11 should be determined on remand

before the trial court. Accordingly, we vacate the imposition of the three sanctions imposed

by the trial court15 and remand for determination of an appropriate sanction or sanctions in

light of our decision in this case.

VIII.

Ms. Reguli also asks this court to consider post-judgment facts and provides a

number of documents that she requests we consider. Assuming for purposes of argument

that the facts she asks us to consider would be appropriate for such consideration, it is

unclear precisely how the facts advanced by Ms. Reguli assist in her appeal. These post-

judgment facts appear to reveal that the trial court became aware after entering its final

order, that is on appeal in the present case, that Ms. Reguli may have perjured herself in

testimony before the trial court during the Rule 11 related hearing. Specifically, Ms. Reguli

may have perjured herself in responding to questions regarding whether she had actually

previously paid a monetary sanction that she had been ordered to pay to the Williamson

County Court Appointed Special Advocates in response to a prior Rule 11 violation in

2014. She claimed to have paid this fine, but questions arose as to whether she actually

did so.

The post-judgment facts that she asks us to consider further reflect that the

Williamson County Grand Jury subsequently returned an indictment against Ms. Reguli

for one count of aggravated perjury, and the trial court judge in the present case has now

recused himself from any cases in which Ms. Reguli is a party. While this information

informs this court that on remand a different judge will now have the challenging

responsibility to determine the appropriate sanction based upon Ms. Reguli’s sanctionable

conduct, we fail to discern how these post-judgment facts indicate any error by the trial

court with regard to its ruling upon Ms. Reguli’s previous motions to recuse that are at

issue in this appeal. There is nothing in these post-judgment facts that is particularly

favorable for Ms. Reguli, and certainly nothing that suggests anything other than

responsible and prudent action by the trial court judge.

IX.

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and vacate in part

15

As noted above, the trial court imposed three distinct sanctions. For the first sanction,

the trial court dismissed Ms. Reguli’s Public Records Act Petition with prejudice. For the second

sanction, the trial court ordered Ms. Reguli “to pay a penalty to the Chancery Court of Williamson

County, Tennessee in the total amount of $5,000.” As for the third sanction, the trial court ordered

that “upon entry of this order, in all civil actions in the 21st Judicial District in which Ms. Reguli

is a self-represented party, Ms. Reguli shall engage, at her expense, associate counsel, licensed to

practice law in Tennessee, for the limited purpose of ensuring compliance with Rule 11.02.”

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the judgment of the Chancery Court for Williamson County. Costs of this appeal are taxed

equally to the Appellant, Connie Reguli, and the Appellee, Roger Anderson as Mayor of

Williamson County, Tennessee. The case is remanded for such further proceedings as may

be necessary and consistent with this opinion.

_________________________________

JEFFREY USMAN, JUDGE

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