Muldrow v. City of St. Louis

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MULDROW v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 22–193. Argued December 6, 2023—Decided April 17, 2024

Sergeant Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow maintains that her employer, the

St. Louis Police Department, transferred her from one job to another

because she is a woman. From 2008 through 2017, Muldrow worked

as a plainclothes officer in the Department’s specialized Intelligence

Division. In 2017, the new Intelligence Division commander asked to

transfer Muldrow out of the unit so he could replace her with a male

police officer. Against Muldrow’s wishes, the Department approved

the request and reassigned Muldrow to a uniformed job elsewhere in

the Department. While Muldrow’s rank and pay remained the same

in the new position, her responsibilities, perks, and schedule did not.

After the transfer, Muldrow no longer worked with high-ranking offi-

cials on the departmental priorities lodged in the Intelligence Division,

instead supervising the day-to-day activities of neighborhood patrol of-

ficers. She also lost access to an unmarked take-home vehicle and had

a less regular schedule involving weekend shifts.

Muldrow brought this Title VII suit to challenge the transfer. She

alleged that the City, in ousting her from the Intelligence Division, had

“discriminate[d] against” her based on sex “with respect to” the “terms

[or] conditions” of her employment. 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1). The

District Court granted the City summary judgment. The Eighth Cir-

cuit affirmed, holding that Muldrow had to—but could not—show that

the transfer caused her a “materially significant disadvantage.” 30 F.

4th 680, 688. Muldrow’s lawsuit could not proceed, the court said, be-

cause the transfer “did not result in a diminution to her title, salary,

or benefits” and had caused “only minor changes in working condi-

tions.”

Held: An employee challenging a job transfer under Title VII must show

2 MULDROW v. ST. LOUIS

Syllabus

that the transfer brought about some harm with respect to an identi-

fiable term or condition of employment, but that harm need not be sig-

nificant. Pp. 5–11.

(a) Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to

hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate

against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-

tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . .

sex.” §2000e–2(a)(1). Both parties agree that Muldrow’s transfer im-

plicated “terms” and “conditions” of Muldrow’s employment. The ap-

plicable statutory language thus prohibits “discriminat[ing] against”

an individual “with respect to” the “terms [or] conditions” of employ-

ment because of that individual’s sex.

That language requires Muldrow to show that her transfer brought

about some “disadvantageous” change in an employment term or con-

dition. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U. S. 75, 80.

The words “discriminate against,” the Court has explained, refer to

“differences in treatment that injure” employees. Bostock v. Clayton

County, 590 U. S. 644, 681. In the typical transfer case, that worse

treatment must be “with respect to” employment “terms [or] condi-

tions.” §2000e–2(a)(1). The “terms [or] conditions” phrase is not used

“in the narrow contractual sense”; it covers more than the “economic

or tangible.” Oncale, 523 U. S., at 78; Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.

Vinson, 477 U. S. 57, 64. Still, the phrase circumscribes the injuries

that can give rise to a suit like this one. To make out a Title VII dis-

crimination claim, a transferee must show some harm respecting an

identifiable term or condition of employment.

What the transferee does not have to show is that the harm incurred

was “significant” or otherwise exceeded some heightened bar. “Dis-

criminate against” means treat worse, here based on sex. See, e.g.,

Bostock, 590 U. S., at 657. Neither that phrase nor any other estab-

lishes an elevated threshold of harm. To demand “significance” is to

add words to the statute Congress enacted. It is to impose a new re-

quirement on a Title VII claimant, so that the law as applied demands

something more than the law as written. That difference can make a

real difference for complaining transferees. By asking whether the

harm to the transferee is significant, appellate courts have disre-

garded varied kinds of disadvantage. Pp. 5–7.

(b) The City’s three main arguments—based on statutory text, prec-

edent, and policy—do not justify the use of a “significance” standard.

The Court rejects the City’s textual claim, which invokes the

ejusdem generis canon—the idea that a general phrase following an

enumeration of things should be read to encompass only things of the

same basic kind. Applying that canon to the text of Title VII’s anti-

discrimination provision, the City claims that because refusing to hire

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 3

Syllabus

or discharging a person causes a significant disadvantage, the “other-

wise to discriminate against” phrase can apply only to things causing

an equal level of harm. But the statutory text itself provides a differ-

ent shared trait: Each kind of prohibited discrimination occurs by way

of an employment action—whether pertaining to hiring, or firing, or

compensating, or (as here) altering terms or conditions through a

transfer. That is a more than sufficient basis to unite the provision’s

several parts and avoid ejusdem generis problems.

Contrary to the City’s view, there is also no reason to import a

significant-harm requirement from this Court’s decision in Burlington

N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U. S. 53. The Court there held that

Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision—which prohibits an employer

from taking action against an employee for bringing or aiding a Title

VII charge—applies only when the retaliatory action is “materially ad-

verse,” meaning that it causes “significant” harm. Id., at 68. White

adopted that standard for reasons peculiar to the retaliation context.

The test was meant to capture those employer actions serious enough

to “dissuade[ ] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a

charge of discrimination.” Ibid. An action causing less serious harm

will not deter Title VII enforcement and so falls outside the purposes

of the ban on retaliation. But that reasoning does not apply to the

anti-discrimination provision, which flatly “prevent[s] injury to indi-

viduals based on” protected status, id., at 63, without distinguishing

between significant and less significant harms.

Finally, there is reason to doubt the City’s prediction that employees

will flood courts with litigation in the absence of a significant-injury

requirement. Courts retain multiple ways to dispose of meritless Title

VII claims challenging transfer decisions. But even supposing the

City’s worst predictions come true, that would be the result of the stat-

ute Congress drafted. This Court will not add words to the statute to

achieve what the City thinks a desirable result. Pp. 8–10.

(c) The courts below applied the wrong standard to Muldrow’s suit.

Muldrow need show only some injury respecting her employment

terms or conditions. Her allegations, if properly preserved and sup-

ported, meet that test with room to spare. The Court recognizes, how-

ever, that the decisions below may have rested in part on issues of for-

feiture and proof. The Court leaves such matters for the courts below

to address on remand under the proper Title VII standard. Pp. 10–11.

30 F. 4th 680, vacated and remanded.

KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,

and SOTOMAYOR, GORSUCH, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. THOMAS,

J., ALITO, J., and KAVANAUGH, J., each filed an opinion concurring in the

judgment.

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of

Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,

pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–193

_________________

JATONYA CLAYBORN MULDROW, PETITIONER v.

CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[April 17, 2024]

JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Sergeant Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow maintains that her

employer, the St. Louis Police Department, transferred her

from one job to another because she is a woman. She sued

the City of St. Louis under Title VII, alleging that she had

suffered sex discrimination with respect to the “terms [or]

conditions” of her employment. 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1).

The courts below rejected the claim on the ground that the

transfer did not cause Muldrow a “significant” employment

disadvantage. Other courts have used similar standards in

addressing Title VII suits arising from job transfers.

Today, we disapprove that approach. Although an em-

ployee must show some harm from a forced transfer to pre-

vail in a Title VII suit, she need not show that the injury

satisfies a significance test. Title VII’s text nowhere estab-

lishes that high bar.

I

From 2008 through 2017, Sergeant Muldrow worked as a

plainclothes officer in the St. Louis Police Department’s

specialized Intelligence Division. During her tenure there,

she investigated public corruption and human trafficking

2 MULDROW v. ST. LOUIS

Opinion of the Court

cases, oversaw the Gang Unit, and served as head of the

Gun Crimes Unit. By virtue of her Division position, Mul-

drow was also deputized as a Task Force Officer with the

Federal Bureau of Investigation—a status granting her,

among other things, FBI credentials, an unmarked take-

home vehicle, and the authority to pursue investigations

outside St. Louis. In 2017, the outgoing commander of the

Intelligence Division told her newly appointed successor

that Muldrow was a “workhorse”—still more, that “if there

was one sergeant he could count on in the Division,” it was

Muldrow. 2020 WL 5505113, *1 (ED Mo., Sept. 11, 2020).

But the new Intelligence Division commander, Captain

Michael Deeba, instead asked the Department to transfer

Muldrow out of the unit. Deeba wanted to replace Mul-

drow—whom he sometimes called “Mrs.” rather than the

customary “Sergeant”—with a male police officer. See id.,

at *1–*2. That officer, Deeba later testified, seemed a bet-

ter fit for the Division’s “very dangerous” work. Id., at *2;

App. 139. The Department approved the transfer against

Muldrow’s wishes. It reassigned her to a uniformed job in

the Department’s Fifth District.

While Muldrow’s rank and pay remained the same in the

new position, her responsibilities, perks, and schedule did

not. Instead of working with high-ranking officials on the

departmental priorities lodged in the Intelligence Division,

Muldrow now supervised the day-to-day activities of neigh-

borhood patrol officers. Her new duties included approving

their arrests, reviewing their reports, and handling other

administrative matters; she also did some patrol work her-

self. Because she no longer served in the Intelligence Divi-

sion, she lost her FBI status and the car that came with it.

And the change of jobs made Muldrow’s workweek less reg-

ular. She had worked a traditional Monday-through-Fri-

day week in the Intelligence Division. Now she was placed

on a “rotating schedule” that often involved weekend shifts.

2020 WL 5505113, *2.

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 3

Opinion of the Court

Muldrow brought this Title VII suit to challenge the

transfer. Her complaint alleged that the City, in ousting

her from the Intelligence Division, had “discriminate[d]

against” her based on sex “with respect to” the “terms [or]

conditions” of her employment. §2000e–2(a)(1). In later

deposition testimony, Muldrow set out her view of what the

transfer had cost her. She had been moved out of a “premier

position [in] the Police Department” into a less “prestigious”

and more “administrative” uniformed role. App. 105, 114,

120. She had fewer “opportunities” to work on “important

investigations,” as well as to “network” with commanding

officers. Id., at 104. And she lost material benefits—her

weekday work schedule and take-home car. Or as she sum-

marized the situation: “I went from straight days, weekends

off with a take-home car and more visibility and responsi-

bility within the Department to a rotating schedule with

few weekends off, assigned to . . . uniformed patrol,” with

“responsibilities being limited to that of administrative

work” and “supervising officers on patrol.” Id., at 120. Title

VII, Muldrow asserted in her suit, prevented the City from

making those changes to her employment because of her

sex.

The District Court, viewing the matter differently,

granted the City summary judgment. Under Circuit prece-

dent, the court explained, Muldrow needed to show that her

transfer effected a “significant” change in working condi-

tions producing “material employment disadvantage.”

2020 WL 5505113, *8–*9. And Muldrow, the court held,

could not meet that heightened-injury standard. “[S]he ex-

perienced no change in salary or rank.” Id., at *9. Her loss

of “the networking [opportunities] available in Intelligence”

was immaterial because she had not provided evidence that

it had harmed her “career prospects.” Id., at *8. And given

her continued “supervisory role,” she had not “suffered a

significant alteration to her work responsibilities.” Id., at

*9. Finally, the District Court concluded that the switch to

4 MULDROW v. ST. LOUIS

Opinion of the Court

a rotating schedule (including weekend work) and the loss

of a take-home vehicle could not fill the gap. Although men-

tioning those changes “in her statement of facts,” Muldrow

had not relied on them in “her argument against summary

judgment.” Ibid., n. 20. And anyway, the court stated, they

“appear to be minor alterations of employment, rather than

material harms.” Ibid.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. It

agreed that Muldrow had to—but could not—show that the

transfer caused a “materially significant disadvantage.” 30

F. 4th 680, 688 (2022). Like the District Court, the Eighth

Circuit emphasized that the transfer “did not result in a

diminution to her title, salary, or benefits.” Id., at 688–689.

And the Circuit, too, maintained that the change in her job

responsibilities was “insufficient” to support a Title VII

claim. Id., at 689. In the Fifth District, the court reasoned,

Muldrow still had a “supervisory role” and participated in

investigating serious crimes. Id., at 688. So the court

thought Muldrow’s view of the new job—“more administra-

tive and less prestigious”—was unsupported by record evi-

dence and not “persuasive.” Ibid. The court did not address

Muldrow’s new schedule or her loss of a car, apparently

thinking those matters either forfeited or too slight to men-

tion. Overall, the court held, Muldrow’s claim could not pro-

ceed because she had experienced “only minor changes in

working conditions.” Ibid.

We granted certiorari, 600 U. S. ___ (2023), to resolve a

Circuit split over whether an employee challenging a trans-

fer under Title VII must meet a heightened threshold of

harm—be it dubbed significant, serious, or something sim-

ilar.1 We now vacate the judgment below because the text

——————

1 Compare, e.g., 30 F. 4th 680, 688 (CA8 2022) (case below) (“materially

significant disadvantage”); Caraballo-Caraballo v. Correctional Admin.,

892 F. 3d 53, 61 (CA1 2018) (“materially changes” employment condi-

tions in a manner “more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an al-

teration of job responsibilities”); Williams v. R. H. Donnelley, Corp., 368

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 5

Opinion of the Court

of Title VII imposes no such requirement.

II

A

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or re-

fuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to

discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-

pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,

because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or na-

tional origin.” §2000e–2(a)(1). Muldrow’s suit, as described

above, alleges that she was transferred to a lesser position

because she is a woman. That transfer, as both parties

agree, implicated “terms” and “conditions” of Muldrow’s

employment, changing nothing less than the what, where,

and when of her police work. See Brief for Muldrow 19;

Brief for City 1, 45–46. So the statutory language applica-

ble to this case prohibits “discriminat[ing] against” an indi-

vidual “with respect to” the “terms [or] conditions” of em-

ployment because of that individual’s sex.

That language requires Muldrow to show that the trans-

fer brought about some “disadvantageous” change in an em-

ployment term or condition. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore

Services, Inc., 523 U. S. 75, 80 (1998). The words “discrim-

inate against,” we have explained, refer to “differences in

treatment that injure” employees. Bostock v. Clayton

County, 590 U. S. 644, 681 (2020). Or otherwise said, the

——————

F. 3d 123, 128 (CA2 2004) (“materially significant disadvantage”); James

v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F. 3d 371, 376 (CA4 2004) (“signifi-

cant detrimental effect”); O’Neal v. Chicago, 392 F. 3d 909, 911 (CA7

2004) (“materially adverse”); Sanchez v. Denver Public Schools, 164 F. 3d

527, 532 (CA10 1998) (“significant change”); and Webb-Edwards v. Or-

ange Cty. Sheriff ’s Office, 525 F. 3d 1013, 1033 (CA11 2008) (“serious and

material change”), with Chambers v. District of Columbia, 35 F. 4th 870,

872, 876–877 (CADC 2022) (en banc) (overruling precedent that de-

manded an “objectively tangible harm” and rejecting a “material adver-

sity” requirement).

6 MULDROW v. ST. LOUIS

Opinion of the Court

statute targets practices that “treat[ ] a person worse” be-

cause of sex or other protected trait. Id., at 658. And in the

typical transfer case, that “worse” treatment must pertain

to—must be “with respect to”—employment “terms [or] con-

ditions.” §2000e–2(a)(1). The “terms [or] conditions”

phrase, we have made clear, is not used “in the narrow con-

tractual sense”; it covers more than the “economic or tangi-

ble.” Oncale, 523 U. S., at 78; Meritor Savings Bank, FSB

v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57, 64 (1986). Still, the phrase circum-

scribes the injuries that can give rise to a suit like this one.

To make out a Title VII discrimination claim, a transferee

must show some harm respecting an identifiable term or

condition of employment.

What the transferee does not have to show, according to

the relevant text, is that the harm incurred was “signifi-

cant.” 30 F. 4th, at 688. Or serious, or substantial, or any

similar adjective suggesting that the disadvantage to the

employee must exceed a heightened bar. See supra, at 4,

and 4–5, n. 1. “Discriminate against” means treat worse,

here based on sex. See, e.g., Bostock, 590 U. S., at 657–658,

681. But neither that phrase nor any other says anything

about how much worse. There is nothing in the provision

to distinguish, as the courts below did, between transfers

causing significant disadvantages and transfers causing

not-so-significant ones. And there is nothing to otherwise

establish an elevated threshold of harm. To demand “sig-

nificance” is to add words—and significant words, as it

were—to the statute Congress enacted. It is to impose a

new requirement on a Title VII claimant, so that the law as

applied demands something more of her than the law as

written.

And that difference can make a real difference for com-

plaining transferees. Many forced transfers leave workers

worse off respecting employment terms or conditions. (Af-

ter all, a transfer is not usually forced when it leaves the

employee better off.) But now add another question—

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 7

Opinion of the Court

whether the harm is significant. As appellate decisions re-

veal, the answers can lie in the eye of the beholder—and

can disregard varied kinds of disadvantage. Take just a few

examples from the caselaw. An engineering technician is

assigned to work at a new job site—specifically, a 14-by-22-

foot wind tunnel; a court rules that the transfer does not

have a “significant detrimental effect.” Boone v. Goldin,

178 F. 3d 253, 256 (CA4 1999). A shipping worker is re-

quired to take a position involving only nighttime work; a

court decides that the assignment does not “constitute a sig-

nificant change in employment.” Daniels v. United Parcel

Serv., Inc., 701 F. 3d 620, 635 (CA10 2012). And a school

principal is forced into a non-school-based administrative

role supervising fewer employees; a court again finds the

change in job duties not “significant.” Cole v. Wake Cty. Bd.

of Educ., 834 Fed. Appx. 820, 821 (CA4 2021) (per curiam).

All those employees suffered some injury in employment

terms or conditions (allegedly because of race or sex). Their

claims were rejected solely because courts rewrote Title VII,

compelling workers to make a showing that the statutory

text does not require.2

——————

2 JUSTICE THOMAS’s concurring opinion appears to disagree in two re-

spects. He initially disputes that courts have applied a heightened-harm

requirement in demanding that a plaintiff show something like “materi-

ally significant disadvantage.” See post, at 1 (opinion concurring in judg-

ment). And as a corollary, he denies that courts will have to change their

treatment of Title VII claims once they start to apply the simple injury

standard set out in this opinion. See post, at 2–3. In light of those views,

we underscore two points. First, this decision changes the legal standard

used in any circuit that has previously required “significant,” “material,”

or “serious” injury. It lowers the bar Title VII plaintiffs must meet. Sec-

ond, because it does so, many cases will come out differently. The deci-

sions described above are examples, intended to illustrate how claims

that failed under a significance standard should now succeed. And as we

will discuss, the decision below is another such example, putting to one

side case-specific issues of forfeiture and proof. See infra, at 10–11.

8 MULDROW v. ST. LOUIS

Opinion of the Court

B

The City, in defense of that added requirement, makes

three main arguments—one about the text, one about our

precedent, and one about policy. None justifies the use of a

“significance” standard.

The textual claim invokes the ejusdem generis canon—

the idea that a general phrase following an enumeration of

things should be read to encompass only things of the same

basic kind. Recall the prohibition at issue here: An em-

ployer may not, based on sex, “fail or refuse to hire” or “dis-

charge” any person or “otherwise . . . discriminate against

[her] with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions,

or privileges of employment.” §2000e–2(a)(1); see supra, at

5. Refusing to hire or discharging a person, the City notes,

causes a significant disadvantage; so the subsequent “oth-

erwise” phrase, the City claims, can apply only to things

causing an equal level of harm. See Brief for City 16, 25–

27. But the City fails to explain why the presence of signif-

icant disadvantage must be part of the list’s common de-

nominator. The text itself provides a different shared trait.

Each kind of prohibited discrimination occurs by way of an

employment action—whether pertaining to hiring, or fir-

ing, or compensating, or (as here) altering terms or condi-

tions through a transfer. That is a more than sufficient ba-

sis to unite the provision’s several parts and avoid ejusdem

generis problems. There is no need for courts to introduce

a significant-harm requirement.

The City’s argument from precedent fares no better. It

relies on Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v.

White, 548 U. S. 53 (2006), which addressed Title VII’s sep-

arate anti-retaliation provision. Under that section, an em-

ployer may not take action against an employee for bringing

or aiding a Title VII charge. See §2000e–3(a). The Court

held that the provision applies only when the retaliatory

action is “materially adverse,” meaning that it causes “sig-

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 9

Opinion of the Court

nificant” harm. Id., at 68. The City thinks we should im-

port the same standard into the anti-discrimination provi-

sion at issue. See Brief for City 18–19. But that would cre-

ate a mismatch. White adopted the standard for reasons

peculiar to the retaliation context. The test was meant to

capture those (and only those) employer actions serious

enough to “dissuade[ ] a reasonable worker from making or

supporting a charge of discrimination.” 548 U. S., at 68. If

an action causes less serious harm, the Court reasoned, it

will not deter Title VII enforcement; and if it will not deter

Title VII enforcement, it falls outside the purposes of the

ban on retaliation. See id., at 63, 68. But no such (frankly

extra-textual) reasoning is applicable to the discrimination

bar. Whether an action causes significant enough harm to

deter any employee conduct is there beside the point. White

itself noted the difference: The anti-discrimination provi-

sion, we explained, simply “seeks a workplace where indi-

viduals are not discriminated against” because of traits like

race and sex. Id., at 63. The provision thus flatly “pre-

vent[s] injury to individuals based on” status, ibid., without

distinguishing between significant and less significant

harms.

Finally, the City’s policy objections cannot override Title

VII’s text. In the City’s view, a significant-injury require-

ment is needed to prevent transferred employees from

“swamp[ing] courts and employers” with insubstantial law-

suits requiring “burdensome discovery and trials.” Brief for

City 45, 49 (capitalization and boldface omitted). But there

is reason to doubt that the floodgates will open in the way

feared. As we have explained, the anti-discrimination pro-

vision at issue requires that the employee show some in-

jury. See supra, at 5–6. It requires that the injury asserted

concern the terms or conditions of her employment. See

ibid. Perhaps most notably, it requires that the employer

have acted for discriminatory reasons—“because of ” sex or

10 MULDROW v. ST. LOUIS

Opinion of the Court

race or other protected trait. §2000e–2(a)(1). And in ad-

dressing that issue, a court may consider whether a less

harmful act is, in a given context, less suggestive of inten-

tional discrimination. So courts retain multiple ways to dis-

pose of meritless Title VII claims challenging transfer deci-

sions. But even supposing the City’s worst predictions come

true, that would be the result of the statute Congress

drafted. As we noted in another Title VII decision, we will

not “add words to the law” to achieve what some employers

might think “a desirable result.” EEOC v. Abercrombie &

Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U. S. 768, 774 (2015). Had Congress

wanted to limit liability for job transfers to those causing a

significant disadvantage, it could have done so. By con-

trast, this Court does not get to make that judgment.

III

In light of everything said above, the Court of Appeals’

treatment of Muldrow’s suit cannot survive. The court re-

quired Muldrow to show that the allegedly discriminatory

transfer out of the Intelligence Division produced a signifi-

cant employment disadvantage. See supra, at 4. As we

have explained, that is the wrong standard. Muldrow need

show only some injury respecting her employment terms or

conditions. The transfer must have left her worse off, but

need not have left her significantly so. And Muldrow’s al-

legations, if properly preserved and supported, meet that

test with room to spare. Recall her principal allegations.

She was moved from a plainclothes job in a prestigious spe-

cialized division giving her substantial responsibility over

priority investigations and frequent opportunity to work

with police commanders. She was moved to a uniformed job

supervising one district’s patrol officers, in which she was

less involved in high-visibility matters and primarily per-

formed administrative work. Her schedule became less reg-

ular, often requiring her to work weekends; and she lost her

take-home car. If those allegations are proved, she was left

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 11

Opinion of the Court

worse off several times over. It does not matter, as the

courts below thought (and JUSTICE THOMAS echoes), that

her rank and pay remained the same, or that she still could

advance to other jobs. See supra, at 3–4; post, at 2. Title

VII prohibits making a transfer, based on sex, with the con-

sequences Muldrow described.

We recognize, however, that the decisions below may

have rested in part on issues of forfeiture and proof. The

District Court noted, for example, that Muldrow had failed

to discuss in her argument against summary judgment the

changes in her work schedule and vehicle access; and per-

haps following that lead, the Court of Appeals did not ad-

dress those harms. See supra, at 3–4. In addition, both

courts suggested that some of the allegations Muldrow

made about the nature of the work she did in her old and

new jobs lacked adequate evidentiary support. See ibid.

We leave such matters for the courts below to address. All

we require is that they use the proper Title VII standard,

and not demand that Muldrow demonstrate her transfer

caused “significant” harm.

We accordingly vacate the judgment of the Court of Ap-

peals for the Eighth Circuit and remand the case for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 1

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–193

_________________

JATONYA CLAYBORN MULDROW, PETITIONER v.

CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[April 17, 2024]

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment.

I agree with JUSTICE ALITO that the Courts of Appeals all

appear to articulate the same principle, but with slightly

varying verbal formulations: A plaintiff bringing a claim

under 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1) must show harm that is

more than trifling. Post, at 1–2 (opinion concurring in judg-

ment). And, there is little practical difference between that

principle and the Court’s holding. Ante, at 1 (holding that

an employee “must show some harm”).

I am not convinced, however, that the Court accurately

characterizes the Eighth Circuit’s decision. I do not read

the Eighth Circuit to have necessarily imposed a height-

ened-harm requirement in the form of a “significance” test.

The Eighth Circuit defined an adverse employment action

as “a tangible change in working conditions that produces

a material employment disadvantage.” 30 F. 4th 680, 688

(2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). It further ex-

plained that “minor changes in duties or working condi-

tions, even unpalatable or unwelcome ones, which cause no

materially significant disadvantage, do not rise to the level

of an adverse employment action.” Ibid. (alteration and in-

ternal quotation marks omitted). In other words, a plaintiff

must have suffered an actual disadvantage as compared to

minor changes—i.e., more than a trifling harm. That stand-

ard aligns with the Court’s observation that a plaintiff must

2 MULDROW v. ST. LOUIS

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

show “some ‘disadvantageous’ change in an employment

term or condition.” Ante, at 5 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner

Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U. S. 75, 80 (1998)).

The Court insists that the Eighth Circuit must have de-

manded more given the weight of Muldrow’s allegations.

Specifically, the Court underscores Muldrow’s claims that

the City of St. Louis “moved [her] from a plainclothes job in

a prestigious specialized division” with a take-home car and

a regular schedule, to a “uniformed job supervising one dis-

trict’s patrol officers,” with no take-home car and an irreg-

ular schedule. Ante, at 10. But, most of those allegations

are forfeited or attributable to a nonparty, the Federal Bu-

reau of Investigation. See 2020 WL 5505113, *9, n. 20 (ED

Mo., Sept. 11, 2020) (observing that Muldrow did not raise

arguments based on “having to return her take-home [car],”

“changes to her schedule, including having to work week-

ends,” or “having to work in plain clothes”); 30 F. 4th, at 689

(concluding that “the FBI had the sole authority to revoke”

Muldrow’s plainclothes and take-home car privileges). Be-

fore the Eighth Circuit, Muldrow argued only that the City

moved her to a job that was “more administrative and less

prestigious.” Id., at 688. Her “only evidence” in support of

that argument was “her own deposition testimony,” which

neither the District Court nor the Eighth Circuit found per-

suasive. Ibid. And, Muldrow’s testimony certainly did not

establish any “proof of harm resulting from [her] reassign-

ment.” Ibid. After the transfer, Muldrow’s “pay and rank

remained the same, she was given a supervisory role, and

she was responsible for investigating violent crimes, such

as homicides and robberies.” Ibid. Muldrow even conceded

that the transfer “did not harm her future career pro-

spects.” Ibid. At most, then, Muldrow “expresse[d] a mere

preference for one position over the other.” Id., at 689.

Muldrow failed to prove that there was any nontrifling

change in her job’s prestige—which was her lone theory of

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 3

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

harm. Id., at 688–689. The Eighth Circuit rejected Mul-

drow’s adverse employment action claim accordingly. I fail

to see how the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning—that a plaintiff

must offer colorable evidence of harm—is equivalent to the

heightened-harm requirement the Court concludes the

Eighth Circuit applied. Ante, at 10 (agreeing that “[t]he

transfer must have left [Muldrow] worse off ”).

All that said, I recognize that the terms “material” and

“significant” can (but do not always) imply a heightened-

harm requirement. Although I find it unlikely, it is possible

that the Eighth Circuit had such a stringent test in mind

when it stated that a plaintiff must show a “ ‘materially sig-

nificant disadvantage.’ ” 30 F. 4th, at 688. I thus agree to

vacate and remand to the extent the Eighth Circuit’s anal-

ysis is inconsistent with a more-than-trifling-harm require-

ment.

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 1

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–193

_________________

JATONYA CLAYBORN MULDROW, PETITIONER v.

CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[April 17, 2024]

JUSTICE ALITO, concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the judgment in this case. Assuming without

deciding that all the facts mentioned by the Court are rele-

vant and properly presented, petitioner’s transfer altered

the “terms” or “conditions” of her employment, 42 U. S. C.

§2000e–2(a)(1), and therefore she can prevail if she can

prove that she was transferred because of her sex.

I do not join the Court’s unhelpful opinion. For decades,

dozens of lower court judges, with a wealth of experience

handling Title VII cases, have held that not every un-

wanted employment experience affects an employee’s

“terms” or “conditions” of employment. The lower courts

have used various verbal formulations to express this point,

and the Court, dubious about the words they had selected,

granted review to provide guidance. Now, after briefing

and argument, that guidance is as follows: Title VII plain-

tiffs must show that the event they challenge constituted a

“harm” or “injury,” but that the event need not be “signifi-

cant” or “substantial.” See ante, at 10–11.

I have no idea what this means, and I can just imagine

how this guidance will be greeted by lower court judges.

The primary definition of “harm” is “physical or mental

damage,” and an “injury” is defined as “an act that dam-

ages, harms, or hurts: an unjust or undeserved infliction of

2 MULDROW v. ST. LOUIS

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

suffering or harm.” Webster’s Third International Diction-

ary 1034, 1164 (1976). These definitions incorporate at

least some degree of significance or substantiality. We do

not typically say that we were harmed or injured by every

unwanted experience. What would we think if a friend said,

“I was harmed because the supermarket had run out of my

favorite brand of peanut butter,” or, “I was injured because

I ran into three rather than the usual two red lights on the

way home from work”?

I see little if any substantive difference between the ter-

minology the Court approves and the terminology it doesn’t

like. The predictable result of today’s decision is that care-

ful lower court judges will mind the words they use but will

continue to do pretty much just what they have done for

years.

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 1

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–193

_________________

JATONYA CLAYBORN MULDROW, PETITIONER v.

CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[April 17, 2024]

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring in the judgment.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful

for an employer “to discriminate against any individual

with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,

color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e–

2(a)(1). The question presented in this case is whether

transferring an employee—for example, changing an

employee’s job responsibilities or job location—on the basis

of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin violates Title

VII. The answer is yes.

I therefore agree with the straightforward opinion jointly

authored by Judge Tatel and Judge Ginsburg for the en

banc D. C. Circuit. See Chambers v. District of Columbia,

35 F. 4th 870 (2022). As that court explained, even when a

transfer does not change an employee’s compensation, a

transfer does change the employee’s terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment. See id., at 874–879. Therefore,

a transfer made on the basis of the employee’s race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin violates Title VII. See id.,

at 874–875.

As I see it and as the D. C. Circuit saw it, the issue here

is not complicated. Suppose that an employer says to an

employee in the Columbus office: “We are transferring you

2 MULDROW v. ST. LOUIS

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in judgment

to the Cincinnati office because you are black. But your

compensation will not change.” Does that violate Title VII?

Of course it does. To begin with, the employer has treated

the employee differently because of race. To be sure, the

fact that a transfer may not involve a change in

compensation can affect the amount of any damages, as

Muldrow’s attorney acknowledged. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 41–

42. But a transfer changes the terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment. Therefore, a discriminatory

transfer violates the statute. “The plain text of Title VII

requires no more.” Chambers, 35 F. 4th, at 875.1

Unlike the D. C. Circuit, some Courts of Appeals have

held that discriminatory transfers are not prohibited by

Title VII unless the transfer also causes significant

employment disadvantage. Ante, at 4–5, n. 1. Today, this

Court definitively rejects those rulings. Ante, at 6, 7, n. 2.

I fully agree with the Court on that point.

But the Court’s opinion then goes on to require that a

plaintiff in a discriminatory-transfer case show at least

“some harm” beyond the harm of being transferred on the

basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Ante,

at 6. I disagree with the Court’s new some-harm

requirement. No court has adopted a some-harm

requirement, and no party or amicus advocated that

requirement to this Court. More to the point, the text of

Title VII does not require a separate showing of some harm.

The discrimination is harm. The only question then is

whether the relevant employment action changes the

——————

1 To be sure, the employment action in a transfer case must actually be

a transfer (or denied transfer), which requires a change (or denied

change) in the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment. See Brief for District of Columbia et al. as Amici Curiae

17–18. There may be edge cases about what qualifies as a transfer. But

as the Solicitor General notes, a change in an employee’s job location or

job responsibilities readily qualifies. See Brief for United States as

Amicus Curiae 11, 22.

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 3

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in judgment

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment. A transfer does so. Therefore, as the D. C.

Circuit explained, a transfer on the basis of race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin is actionable under Title

VII. Chambers, 35 F. 4th, at 874–879.

All of that said, the Court’s new some-harm requirement

appears to be a relatively low bar. Importantly, the Court

emphasizes that “some harm” is less than significant harm,

serious harm, or substantial harm. Ante, at 6. Therefore,

anyone who has been transferred because of race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin should easily be able to show

some additional harm—whether in money, time,

satisfaction, schedule, convenience, commuting costs or

time, prestige, status, career prospects, interest level,

perks, professional relationships, networking

opportunities, effects on family obligations, or the like. So

even though I respectfully disagree with the Court’s new

some-harm requirement, I expect that the Court’s approach

and my preferred approach will land in the same place and

lead to the same result in 99 out of 100 discriminatory-

transfer cases, if not in all 100.