Tabatha Washington v. City of Chicago

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-2467

TABATHA WASHINGTON and DONTE HOWARD,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:20-cv-00442 — Manish S. Shah, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED OCTOBER 24, 2023 — DECIDED APRIL 15, 2024

____________________

Before ROVNER, WOOD, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. This case presents claims for

unlawful pretrial detention under the Fourth Amendment

and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with state-law claims for

malicious prosecution. Plaintiffs Tabatha Washington and

Donte Howard claim that defendants, Chicago Police

Department detectives Vincent Alonzo, Adrian Garcia, and

Demosthenes Balodimas, deliberately misled judges and a

grand jury to secure judicial determinations of probable cause

2 No. 22-2467

to detain plaintiffs on charges of first-degree murder. After

over a year in custody, Washington and Howard were tried

and acquitted on all charges. They then filed this suit. The

district court granted summary judgment to the defendants,

and plaintiffs have appealed.

Fourth Amendment claims for unlawful pretrial detention

can survive a judicial determination of probable cause. See

generally Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357 (2017) (Manuel

I). “[P]retrial detention is a ‘seizure’—both before formal legal

process and after—and is justified only on probable cause.”

Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2019), citing

Manuel I, 580 U.S. at 366–67. “[I]f the proceeding is tainted—

[such as] by fabricated evidence—and the result is that

probable cause is lacking, then the ensuing pretrial detention

violates the confined person’s Fourth Amendment rights….”

Manuel I, 580 U.S. at 369 n.8.

The existence of probable cause is a defense to both Fourth

Amendment and malicious prosecution claims. Young v. City

of Chicago, 987 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 2021). Consequently, this

case turns on whether probable cause existed to detain

Washington and Howard in advance of their trials. In civil

litigation like this case, a rebuttable presumption of probable

cause arises after a judicial determination of probable cause.

See Lewis, 914 F.3d at 477. To overcome this presumption,

plaintiffs must show “that the officer who sought the warrant

[1] ‘knowingly or intentionally or with a reckless disregard

for the truth, made false statements to the judicial officer, and

[2] that the false statements were necessary to the judicial

officer’s determination that probable cause existed for the

arrest.’” Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2010)

(alterations omitted), quoting Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville,

No. 22-2467 3

320 F.3d 733, 742–43 (7th Cir. 2003), citing in turn Franks v.

Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978). 1

Here, undisputed facts show that plaintiffs cannot rebut

this presumption. Even if we assume plaintiffs’ list of the de-

tectives’ alleged misrepresentations and omissions is correct,

plaintiffs cannot meet the second prong of the test in Beau-

champ: establishing that those false statements or deliberately

misleading omissions were “necessary” to the judicial offic-

ers’ determinations of probable cause. This is so for two inde-

pendent reasons. First, the State’s Attorney’s Office conducted

its own independent fact-gathering before deciding to file

charges. Second, and again, assuming that plaintiffs’ list of

misrepresentations and misleading omissions is correct, the

remaining undisputed facts would still show probable cause

to detain plaintiffs for first-degree murder. Because plaintiffs

cannot overcome the presumption of probable cause that

arises after a judicial determination, we affirm summary judg-

ment for the defendants.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Factual History

In the evening of May 30, 2018, plaintiffs Tabatha

Washington and Donte Howard, along with Washington’s

cousin Carlton White, all engaged in physical altercations

with Kim Edmondson outside Washington’s apartment in

Chicago. When the conflict ended, Edmondson left the area

and walked about half a mile north. There he encountered

three of his friends, Anthony Beard, Khadijah Hill, and Larry

1 Because Beauchamp was the first case in which we set out this two-

prong test, we refer to it as the Beauchamp test in this opinion. See 320 F.3d

at 742–43.

4 No. 22-2467

Nelson, in a parking lot. Edmondson was shirtless and

bleeding from his lip and chest. He told his friends that he had

been jumped by two men and one or two women with a pole.

He then walked behind a nearby dumpster to urinate. Soon

after that, someone else told Beard, Hill, and Nelson that

Edmondson had collapsed. They walked over and saw him

behind the dumpster lying on his back, not breathing, with

blood pooling around his head. They called 911 and flagged

down nearby police officers, but first responders were unable

to revive Edmondson. He was pronounced dead at the scene.

The medical examiner later concluded that Edmondson died

from blunt-force trauma to the back of the head.

Chicago Police Department detectives Vincent Alonzo,

Adrian Garcia, and Demosthenes Balodimas arrived to inves-

tigate. The three parking-lot witnesses each told them of Ed-

mondson’s wounds to the chest and lip, and they told the de-

tectives Edmondson’s story about being beaten up by several

of his neighbors. One of the parking-lot witnesses knew

where Edmondson had lived and led detectives to the apart-

ment building, about a half-mile away—the same building

where Washington lived.

The detectives canvassed the building to see if anyone

knew about an altercation with Edmondson. Detective

Balodimas later said that, when he was standing outside

Washington’s apartment, he heard her say, “F*** that b**** he

got what he deserved,” and “he ain’t gonna get my gun.”

Balodimas also said he heard White say, “You gotta protect,

you gotta fight.” Plaintiffs dispute all of these assertions. A

detective knocked on the door of Washington’s apartment

and Washington, White, and Howard opened the door. How-

ard at first told the detectives they could not enter without a

No. 22-2467 5

warrant. The detectives asked if everything was alright, and

Washington told them “there was an altercation earlier, with

some guy that had been evicted from this building.” She also

said, “He was trying to fight me.”

Washington then allowed the detectives to enter her apart-

ment. She and White spoke to detectives in one room while

Howard and another friend, Cynthia Cage, sat on a couch

nearby. White explained that there was an altercation with a

man who had been evicted from the building who “kept com-

ing around trying to fight,” and White was defending himself.

Washington added “he tried to hit me,” saying she hit him to

defend herself. Detective Garcia told the group that they

needed to come to the police station to straighten everything

out. Washington said that Cage had not been involved in the

altercation and that Howard had just gotten there. Howard

told detectives falsely that his name was Jeremiah Johnson

and claimed that he had just arrived at the apartment.

The detectives handcuffed Washington and White, placed

them in separate squad cars, and took them to the police

station for further investigation. Once at the station and just

after midnight on May 31, Detectives Garcia and Alonzo

began separately interrogating Washington and White.

During the various overnight interrogations, White and

Washington recounted a variety of sometimes contradictory

details about their encounter with Edmondson. The district

court’s order granting summary judgment provides a

thorough account of their various explanations during these

interrogations. Washington v. City of Chicago, No. 20-cv-442,

2022 WL 2905669 (N.D. Ill. July 22, 2022).

White told detectives that Edmondson had attacked him a

week earlier and had left a cut on his face. White said the

6 No. 22-2467

altercation earlier that evening started when Edmondson—

clearly high on cocaine or other drugs—approached him and

Cage and repeatedly called Cage a b****. When White tried to

calm him down, Edmondson swung at him. White ducked the

punch and hit Edmondson once. White eventually indicated

that Washington came out from her apartment with a gray,

non-wooden stick and hit Edmondson “probably three”

times—in the chest, arm, and lip—telling him, “stop playing

with my cousin.”

After being told that Washington had identified a third

man involved in the fight, White ultimately confirmed that

the other man in the fight had been Howard, whom the

detectives had spoken to in Washington’s apartment but who

had given the detectives a false name and falsely said he had

just arrived there. White said that Howard was tussling in the

street with Edmondson but that they were not really fighting.

White repeatedly told detectives that neither Howard nor

Edmondson landed a punch on the other and that

Edmondson left after the fight with Howard. It was then,

according to White, that Washington ran up and hit

Edmondson with the little stick. According to White,

Edmondson then said, “I’ll be back,” and walked away, and

White thought it was over. White was adamant that no one

ever hit Edmondson on the top of the head and that

Edmondson had no head injury when he left the scene of the

altercation.

In separate interrogations the same night, Washington at

first denied having any negative history with Edmondson.

She admitted to hitting Edmondson in the chest with a stick

or a pole after he tried to hit her, and she said White had

stepped in and begun to fight Edmondson. She also admitted

No. 22-2467 7

that after she had tried to break up the fight between White

and Edmondson, a third man had gotten involved, at first say-

ing that she did not know his identity but ultimately identify-

ing him as plaintiff Howard, the second man in her apartment

earlier that evening. The detectives told her they did not be-

lieve she was physically capable of causing the fatal damage

to Edmondson’s head. Washington eventually told the detec-

tives three times that Howard had struck Edmondson twice

in the head with a pole. She apologized to the detectives for

lying and insisted that she did not know how hard Howard

had hit Edmondson.

Later that morning, May 31, detectives went back to

Washington’s apartment to speak to her friend Cage. Cage

told the detectives that White and Edmondson started

arguing in front of the building and that White punched

Edmondson while the two were arguing. Cage said that

during the altercation between White and Edmondson,

Washington had approached with a pole in her hand and had

hit Edmondson with it several times. Then, Cage continued,

Howard began to fight with Edmondson in the middle of the

street, landing some punches before Edmondson walked

away toward the parking lot where he encountered his

friends Beard, Hill, and Nelson. She said Edmondson was

bleeding from the mouth but otherwise appeared fine when

he left.

Later that same day, a prosecutor from the Cook County

State’s Attorney’s Office, Assistant State’s Attorney Patrick

Waller, began re-interviewing witnesses. ASA Waller

interviewed the parking-lot witnesses (Beard, Hill, and

Nelson) at the police station. The witnesses repeated that

Edmondson had walked up to them with cuts on his chest and

8 No. 22-2467

lip and said that a couple of guys and a woman jumped him

with a pole or a pipe. Edmondson had then walked off and

collapsed behind a dumpster. Hill also said that she had

observed Edmondson only from the front and did not see any

leaking or dripping blood down his back. None of the three

witnesses told detectives or the state’s attorneys that they saw

Edmondson bleeding from the top or back of his head.

Later that night, ASA Waller then re-interviewed White

and Washington separately. White told ASA Waller that he

had been with Cage, Washington, and Howard, and that

Edmondson had tried to force his way into Washington’s

apartment. That was when Washington had threatened

Edmondson with a pole. Edmondson had backed away but

started to yell and got “into White’s face” before White struck

him. Howard had then approached and started fighting with

Edmondson in the street. Washington had gone into the

house, come out with a little gray aluminum stick, and hit

Edmondson multiple times in the chest, arm, and lip.

Shortly after, ASA Waller reinterviewed Washington. She

told Waller that she had been outside with Cage, White, and

Howard when Edmondson approached and got in her face.

At that point, she said, she found a light metal pole on the

ground and swung it at him three times. She said she struck

Edmondson on the left side of his lip first and then on his

chest after he jumped at her again, but that the third swing

missed because Edmondson had jumped back.

ASA Waller asked Washington about Howard’s involve-

ment. Washington said he and Edmondson had thrown only

a few punches and then Edmondson had left. When Waller

asked whether she, Cage, Howard, and White were discuss-

ing the altercation in the apartment later that night,

No. 22-2467 9

Washington told Waller that she could not remember specifics

but said everybody had been talking loudly about what had

happened. ASA Waller confronted Washington about her pre-

vious statements about Howard striking Edmondson in the

head with the pole. Washington responded that she had been

talking fast and was scared and nervous. Washington said

that she had not meant to say Howard had hit Edmondson

with the pole. Howard “was hitting him with his fists,” Wash-

ington said, and “that’s why I said I don’t see how his head

got bust[ed].” Washington repeatedly insisted that she had

never hit Edmondson in the head.

Edmondson’s autopsy was performed the morning of

May 31. The medical examiner concluded that the cause of

death was blunt-force trauma to the head. The autopsy

revealed a 1.25-inch by .75-inch laceration on the top, back,

right side of Edmondson’s head; a hole in his skull that was

about one inch by one inch, and fragments of bone within the

brain. Other injuries included lacerations and contusions to

Edmondson’s left lip, an abrasion to his left ear, a laceration

to the center of his chest, and multiple contusions on both

arms. The examiner concluded that Edmondson’s death was

a homicide based on the investigator’s report of assault and

her own examination of Edmondson’s injuries, which were

consistent with an assault. The examiner spoke with

defendant Alonzo about the results of her autopsy.

Washington gave consent to search her apartment to locate

the pole she had used on Edmondson. At her apartment,

Detectives Alonzo and Balodimas recovered four silver metal

poles that appeared to be one inch in diameter, which they

submitted to the Illinois State Police crime lab for processing.

At that point, ASA Waller designated the investigation as

10 No. 22-2467

continuing and advised another ASA, Laura Ayala-Gonzalez,

of all the information he had learned during his investigation.

B. Procedural History in State Court

The next day, on June 1, ASA Ayala-Gonzalez approved a

first-degree murder charge against Washington. This charge

was the subject of Washington’s pretrial detention hearing. At

the time, Howard had not yet been arrested. The Felony

Minutes form—created and signed by Detective Alonzo for

use in a probable-cause detention hearing and approved by

ASA Ayala-Gonzalez—stated: “The facts briefly stated are as

follows: The defendant, Washington, was arrested after inves-

tigation determined that the victim Kim Edmondson was

struck on and about the head with a metal object several times

by Washington. The victim Edmondson subsequently expired

due to the injuries received.” Detective Alonzo spoke with

ASA Ayala-Gonzalez when she approved the charges for

Washington and rejected charges for White.

At Washington’s hearing on June 2, the Circuit Court of

Cook County denied bail, finding “that the proof is evident

and presumption great that [Washington], along with some

other uncharged co-defendants as of yet, committed the of-

fense.” Immediately after this determination of probable

cause, the prosecutor informed the court that he had amended

the charge to “felony murder based upon [mob] action,”

which is a first-degree murder charge in Illinois. Defense

counsel waived any objection to this change. 2

2 The hearing transcript reads “felony murder based upon action” and

the insertion of “mob” is suggested by the defendants here. We believe

this is the most likely reading of the transcript.

No. 22-2467 11

Howard was taken into custody on June 4. On June 6, ASA

Ayala-Gonzalez approved the first-degree murder charge

against him. At the start of Howard’s pretrial detention

hearing before a Cook County judge on June 7, the complaint

against him was amended to add a violation of probation. In

the remainder of his hearing, the court found probable cause

to detain Howard without bail on both the murder and

probation violation charges until the “murder case” with

Washington was to be heard three weeks later.

On June 28, 2018, Washington and Howard were indicted

by a grand jury for the offenses of felony mob action and first-

degree murder. The grand jury heard testimony from

defendant Detective Alonzo, as well as Washington’s friend

Cage, and the parking-lot witnesses, Nelson, Beard, and Hill.

Washington and Howard were indicted under all three

prongs of Illinois’s first-degree murder statute, including on

a felony murder theory premised on the underlying felony of

mob violence. Over a year later, after a one-day bench trial, a

Cook County judge found Washington and Howard not

guilty on all counts.

C. Federal Proceedings

Washington and Howard then filed this suit against De-

tectives Alonzo, Garcia, and Balodimas, and the City of Chi-

cago for unlawful pretrial detention under the Fourth

Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for malicious prosecu-

tion under Illinois law. The defendants moved for summary

judgment.

The district court began its analysis “with the offenses of

mob action and first-degree murder—the charges brought by

prosecutors and on which the grand jury indicted plaintiffs.”

12 No. 22-2467

2022 WL 2905669, at *10. The district court considered the

existence of probable cause for pretrial detention premised on

a felony-murder theory with mob violence as the underlying

felony, though plaintiffs had also been indicted on other

theories of first-degree murder. After identifying the elements

of the felony-murder and mob violence offenses, the district

court held that “at the time of plaintiffs’ … detention,

defendants possessed probable cause to believe that plaintiffs

had acted as part of a group that engaged in violence against

Edmondson.” Id. Per the district court, “undisputed facts

demonstrate that, at the time of plaintiffs’ … detention … [i]t

was reasonable, given these facts, for defendants to believe

that plaintiffs had engaged in criminal conduct.” Id. “The facts

known to defendants reasonably suggested that plaintiffs …

were part of a group engaged in physical violence against

Edmondson.” Id. The district court said that this “was enough

to support the … detention of plaintiffs while prosecutors

weighed specific charges.” Id. The court granted summary

judgment to the defendant detectives and the City of Chicago

on all claims and terminated the case. Washington and

Howard filed this appeal.

II. Standard of Review

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary

judgment. Young v. City of Chicago, 987 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir.

2021). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is en-

titled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

“We draw ‘all justifiable inferences’ in the favor of the non-

moving party.” Flexible Steel Lacing Co. v. Conveyor Accessories,

Inc., 955 F.3d 632, 643 (7th Cir. 2020), quoting Anderson v.

No. 22-2467 13

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). We have applied

this standard in our account of the facts.

III. Analysis

A. Fourth Amendment: Pretrial Detention Without Probable

Cause

Section 1983 authorizes suits against police officers and

others who violate federal constitutional or statutory rights

while acting under the color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiffs’ suit under section 1983 alleges that the City of

Chicago and three of its police detectives violated their Fourth

Amendment rights. To prove a Fourth Amendment violation,

a plaintiff must show first that a seizure occurred, and then, if

so, that the seizure was unreasonable. Carlson v. Bukovic, 621

F.3d 610, 618 (7th Cir. 2010).

“[P]retrial detention is a ‘seizure’—both before formal legal

process and after….” Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 477

(7th Cir. 2019), citing Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 366–

67 (2017) (Manuel I). The Fourth Amendment “establishes ‘the

standards and procedures’ governing pretrial detention” in

criminal cases. Manuel I, 580 U.S. at 360, quoting Gerstein v.

Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975). The standard of reasonableness

required to justify “pretrial detention is probable cause, that

is, official knowledge of ‘facts and circumstances sufficient to

warrant a prudent [person] in believing’ the detainee has

committed a criminal offense.” Williams v. Dart, 967 F.3d 625,

632 (7th Cir. 2020) (alteration in original), quoting Gerstein,

420 U.S. at 111. Plaintiffs Washington and Howard argue that

the defendant detectives violated their Fourth Amendment

right against unreasonable seizures by causing them to be

14 No. 22-2467

detained before trial without probable cause. See Manuel I,

580 U.S. at 364–69. 3

B. The Presumption of Validity for Judicial Determinations of

Probable Cause

Judicial determinations of probable cause are ordinarily

entitled to a presumption of validity, Lewis, 914 F.3d at 477,

and “an indictment is prima facie evidence of probable

cause,” Coleman v. City of Peoria, 925 F.3d 336, 351 (7th Cir.

2019). But this presumption is rebuttable. In Manuel I, the

Supreme Court taught that Fourth Amendment claims

sometimes survive a judicial determination of probable cause.

580 U.S. at 368–69 (plaintiff may seek relief for violations of

Fourth Amendment rights “not merely for his (pre-legal-

process) arrest, but also for his (post-legal process) pretrial

3 In the district court, the parties debated whether, to sustain pretrial

detention, a finding of probable cause must relate to the charged offense,

or whether a generic finding of probable cause to believe the detainee

committed any criminal offense is sufficient. In its order granting sum-

mary judgment, the district court implied that Washington and Howard

could have been lawfully detained in advance of their trial for first-degree

murder and mob action because probable cause existed for other crimes

under the Illinois code, such as battery, aggravated battery, disorderly

conduct, and obstruction. Washington and Howard challenge this portion

of the district court’s ruling, arguing that, because plaintiffs’ probable-

cause hearings had been directed specifically to the charges of murdering

Edmondson, probable cause for pretrial detention could not be premised

on “other hypothetical charges.” On appeal, the defendants seem to have

conceded this point, admitting that pretrial detention required “probable

cause to believe that Washington and Howard killed Edmondson,” and

waiving any argument that probable cause related to any criminal conduct

would have been sufficient. Because we find the undisputed facts support

probable cause for first-degree murder and mob action, we need not de-

cide this issue here.

No. 22-2467 15

detention.” (footnote omitted)). The Supreme Court

explained:

The Fourth Amendment prohibits government

officials from detaining a person in the absence

of probable cause. That can happen when the

police hold someone without any reason before

the formal onset of a criminal proceeding. But it

also can occur when legal process itself goes

wrong—when, for example, a judge’s probable-

cause determination is predicated solely on a

police officer’s false statements. Then, too, a per-

son is confined without constitutionally ade-

quate justification. Legal process has gone for-

ward, but it has done nothing to satisfy the

Fourth Amendment’s probable-cause require-

ment. And for that reason, it cannot extinguish

the detainee’s Fourth Amendment claim….

Manuel I, 580 U.S. at 367 (citations omitted).

Manuel I “clarified that the constitutional injury arising

from a wrongful pretrial detention rests on the fundamental

Fourth Amendment principle that a pretrial detention is a

‘seizure’—both before formal legal process and after—and is

justified only on probable cause.” Lewis, 914 F.3d at 476–77,

citing Manuel I, 580 U.S. at 366–67. In this sort of claim, “the

constitutional right in question is the ‘right not to be held in

custody without probable cause,’” which gives rise to a

Fourth Amendment claim under section 1983 since “the es-

sential constitutional wrong is the ‘absence of probable cause

that would justify the detention.’” Lewis, 914 F.3d at 479, quot-

ing Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018)

(Manuel II). “Put another way, the initiation of formal legal

16 No. 22-2467

process ‘did not expunge [plaintiff’s] Fourth Amendment

claim because the process he received failed to establish what

that Amendment makes essential for pretrial detention—

probable cause to believe he committed a crime.’” Lewis, 914

F.3d at 477, citing Manuel I, 580 U.S. at 368–69.

C. Overcoming the Presumption of Validity

Plaintiffs argue they were detained before trial without

probable cause in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights

as set out in Manuel I. 580 U.S. at 366–67. Both plaintiffs re-

ceived judicial determinations of probable cause pursuant to

legal process: Washington and Howard were separately

brought before the Circuit Court of Cook County for bail

hearings. The court found probable cause to detain both with-

out bail. A few weeks later, Washington and Howard were in-

dicted by a grand jury on charges of first-degree murder, in-

cluding a felony-murder theory premised on felony mob ac-

tion. Under Manuel I, these judicial determinations of proba-

ble cause do not automatically bar plaintiffs’ Fourth Amend-

ment claims for wrongful pretrial detention, regardless of

whether the judicial determinations of probable cause were

made in a bail hearing or through an indictment. Manuel I, 580

U.S. at 369 n.8 (“Nothing in the nature of the legal proceeding

establishing probable cause makes a difference for purposes

of the Fourth Amendment….”).

Thus, plaintiffs must overcome the presumption of valid-

ity created by the judicial determinations of probable cause at

their bail hearings and in their indictment. “[T]his presump-

tion is premised on an ‘assumption … that there will be a

truthful showing’ of probable cause.” Whitlock v. Brown, 596

F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original), quoting

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164–65 (1978). We have thus

No. 22-2467 17

held that “the presumption may give way on a showing

[1] that the officer who sought the warrant ‘knowingly or in-

tentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made

false statements to the judicial officer, and [2] that the false

statements were necessary to the judicial officer’s determina-

tion that probable cause existed for the arrest.’” Whitlock, 596

F.3d at 410 (alterations omitted), quoting Beauchamp v. City of

Noblesville, 320 F.3d 733, 742–43 (7th Cir. 2003), citing in turn

Franks, 438 U.S. at 155–56. The second half of the test in Beau-

champ follows logically from the requirement that, “[t]o estab-

lish personal liability in a section 1983 action, the plaintiff

must show that the officer ‘caused the deprivation of a federal

right.’” Ortiz v. City of Chicago, 656 F.3d 523, 539 (7th Cir. 2011),

quoting Luck v. Rovenstine, 168 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1999),

quoting in turn Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). We discuss

each prong in turn.

1. Prong One: False Statements Made to Judicial Officer

To satisfy the first prong of Beauchamp, plaintiffs Washing-

ton and Howard argue that the police detectives deliberately

misrepresented certain inculpatory evidence and omitted ex-

culpatory evidence in their communications to the prosecu-

tors, the bail hearing courts, and the grand jury. Plaintiffs

identify the following conduct by defendant detectives as in-

stances of false statements or omissions:

False Statements

(1) oral statements to prosecutors that Washing-

ton hit Edmondson on the “head” when refer-

ring to her blow to his lip;

(2) written statements on the Felony Minutes

form submitted in Washington’s pretrial

18 No. 22-2467

detention hearing that she struck Edmondson

“on and about the head with a metal object sev-

eral times” and that Edmondson “subsequently

expired due to the injuries received”;

(3) oral statements to prosecutors that either

plaintiff hit Edmondson in the back of the head

with any weapon, causing Edmondson’s fatal

wound in the back of his skull;

(4) statements to judicial officers that Detective

Balodimas overheard incriminating statements,

which plaintiffs claim he unilaterally invented.

Omissions

(1) failure to share with prosecutors or judicial

officers video evidence showing Edmondson

walking half a mile after the altercation;

(2) failure to tell prosecutors that no witness

saw a wound on the back of Edmondson’s head

prior to his fall near the dumpster;

(3) failure to tell prosecutors that White and

Washington had reported that Edmondson was

the aggressor in the altercation, not Washington

or Howard.

We begin with the purported false statements. We are

reviewing a grant of summary judgment to defendants,

which requires us to give plaintiffs the benefit of any genuine

disputes of material fact and any reasonable favorable

inferences, but we do not draw inferences that are supported

by only speculation or conjecture. King v. Hendricks County

Comm’rs, 954 F.3d 981, 984 (7th Cir. 2020). Items (1) and (2),

No. 22-2467 19

the defendants’ statements to judicial officers and on the

Felony Minutes form that Washington hit Edmondson on the

head, referring to the wound she caused on his lip, might be

true in a technical sense. As one of the defendants reminded

plaintiffs’ counsel in a deposition, “[t]he lip … is part of the

head.” A jury could reasonably deem such statements

intentionally misleading, though, since defendants knew that

Washington admitted to hitting him in the lip while

Edmondson died from blunt-force trauma to the back of his

head. This is especially true of the statements on the Felony

Minutes form, which asserted that Washington’s blows

caused Edmondson’s death.

As to statement (3), the detectives did have an admission

from Washington herself that Howard had hit Edmondson on

the head with a metal pipe, so we do not believe a reasonable

jury could find any statement to that effect was knowingly or

recklessly false. But (4), the incriminating statements purport-

edly overheard by defendant Balodimas, are also disputed

material facts. Because we construe facts in favor of the non-

moving parties on summary judgment, we must assume they

were invented by Balodimas. Thus, for the purposes of sum-

mary judgment, we find that statements (1), (2), and (4) were

false statements made intentionally, knowingly, or with at

least reckless disregard for their truth, satisfying the first

prong of Beauchamp.

We also consider the asserted misleading omissions. As to

omission (1), it remains disputed whether prosecutors had

access, before plaintiffs’ initial bail hearings, to the security

footage of Edmondson walking half a mile after his altercation

with Washington and Howard. On May 31, before the first

bail hearing, defendant Alonzo reviewed footage of

20 No. 22-2467

Edmondson entering the parking lot and showing no obvious

signs of distress. On June 6, several days after Washington’s

bail hearing but the day before Howard’s bail hearing, Alonzo

also obtained video from Edmondson’s half-mile walking

route between the site of the altercation and the location of the

dumpster. It remains in dispute whether defendants ever

turned these videos over to the State’s Attorney’s Office for

consideration in their charging decisions. We assume for

purposes of summary judgment that defendants did not. The

trial judge relied on these videos in her acquittal, and we

agree that these videos are material and exculpatory. We find

that a reasonable jury could infer that defendants exhibited at

least reckless disregard for the truth in failing to turn over the

parking-lot video. Its exculpatory value was self-evident, and

defendants had access to it well in advance of both plaintiffs’

bail hearings. This omission satisfies the first prong of

Beauchamp.

For omissions (2) and (3), a reasonable jury could not infer

that the omissions were made with intentional, knowing, or

reckless disregard for the truth. The defendants knew that

ASA Waller had independently re-interviewed Washington,

White, and the parking-lot witnesses because a detective sat

in on each of these interviews. In those interviews,

Washington told ASA Waller that Edmondson was the one

who started cursing at her and threatening a physical

confrontation. White told ASA Waller that the confrontation

started when Edmondson tried to force his way into

Washington’s apartment. And each of the parking-lot

witnesses told ASA Waller the location of the wounds they

saw on Edmondson’s body prior to his death, with none

mentioning the back of his head. Consequently, no reasonable

jury could find that defendants’ failure to inform prosecutors

No. 22-2467 21

that no parking-lot witness saw a wound on the back of

Edmondson’s head, and their failure to report Washington

and White’s statements that Edmondson had been the

aggressor, were done with intentional, knowing, or reckless

disregard for the truth. Omissions (2) and (3) do not satisfy

the first prong of Beauchamp.

In sum, for purposes of summary judgment, we treat state-

ments (1), (2), and (4), as well as omission (1), as false state-

ments made to a judicial officer “knowingly or intentionally

or with a reckless disregard for the truth,” satisfying the first

prong of Beauchamp’s test for overcoming the presumption of

validity of judicial determinations of probable cause. 320 F.3d

at 742. We next assess this bundle of arguable misstatements

and omissions under Beauchamp’s second prong.

2. Prong Two: Misrepresentations Necessary to Judicial

Finding of Probable Cause?

The second prong of Beauchamp requires “that the false

statements were necessary to the judicial officer’s

determination that probable cause existed.” 320 F.3d at 742.

We begin with a threshold issue: what sort of causation is

required between the false statements and the judicial

determination of probable cause to overcome the

presumption of validity? Defendants argue for but-for

causation, grounded in Beauchamp’s use of “necessary” to

describe the causal relationship. Id. Plaintiffs, meanwhile, rely

on Manuel’s use of the word “tainted” to argue for a lesser

standard, which they claim is akin to “proximate cause.” 4

4 Plaintiffs do not explain why they think proximate causation, which

is usually defined more narrowly than factual, but-for causation, would

be an easier standard to meet. But we take it that plaintiffs are actually

22 No. 22-2467

The relevant line in Manuel I says that “if the proceeding

is tainted—as here, by fabricated evidence—and the result is

that probable cause is lacking, then the ensuing pretrial de-

tention violates the confined person’s Fourth Amendment

rights.” Manuel I, 580 U.S. at 369 n.8. When the Supreme

Court’s statement is read in context, it becomes clear that de-

fendants’ but-for standard is the correct one. Even the line ref-

erencing a “tainted” proceeding requires that, as a result of the

taint, “probable cause is lacking.” Id.; see also Burrage v.

United States, 571 U.S. 204, 214 (2014) (calling it a “traditional

background principle[]” of law that “a phrase such as ‘results

from’ imposes a requirement of but-for causation”). This

tracks with our use of “necessary” in Beauchamp. See 320 F.3d

at 742; see also United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 948 (7th

Cir. 2010) (“necessary condition” is another way of naming a

“but-for” cause); Ramos v. City of Chicago, 716 F.3d 1013, 1019

(7th Cir. 2013) (civil plaintiff must show not only that deten-

tion was based on false evidence but also that his “seizure

would lack probable cause without that false evidence”).

Thus, the second prong of Beauchamp requires us to determine

whether the evidence permits a reasonable inference that the

arguably false statements and misleading omissions were col-

lectively a but-for cause of the judicial determinations of prob-

able cause to detain plaintiffs on first-degree murder charges.

In this case, two independent reasons bar a finding of but-

for causation. First, the State’s Attorney’s Office conducted its

arguing for something akin to “substantial factor” causation, which ap-

plies in the “rare” situation where “multiple sufficient causes inde-

pendently, but concurrently, produce a result,” and under which strict

but-for causation is not required. See Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204,

214–15 (2014).

No. 22-2467 23

own independent fact-gathering before filing charges, rather

than relying on the allegedly misleading statements of the

defendant detectives. Second, “when the lies are taken out

and the exculpatory evidence is added in,” the remaining

undisputed evidence still sufficed to support probable cause.

Rainsberger v. Benner, 913 F.3d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 2019). Each

reason alone would be sufficient to affirm summary

judgment. We discuss each in turn.

a. Independent Investigation by Prosecutors Elimi-

nates But-For Causation

First, plaintiffs fail to overcome the causation problem

posed by prosecutors’ own factual investigation in this case.

Because the State’s Attorney’s Office did an independent in-

vestigation into the facts before approving charges and pre-

senting the case to the bail courts and the grand jury, any mis-

statements and/or omissions by the defendant detectives re-

garding those same facts were not necessary to the judicial

determinations of probable cause.

Plaintiffs admit that ASA Waller, the prosecutor originally

assigned to determine whether charges should be filed, inde-

pendently “spoke to Defendants and re-interviewed wit-

nesses.” Waller re-interviewed Washington and White, as

well as the three parking-lot witnesses, Nelson, Beard, and

Hill. From these interviews, as the district court noted,

[T]he State’s Attorney’s Office knew … that no

one claimed that Washington hit Edmondson

on the top or back of his head or reported seeing

Edmondson bleeding from the top or back of his

head before his collapse. The prosecutor had

access to the medical examiner and all the

24 No. 22-2467

relevant witnesses and underlying source

material. Waller also knew that Washington had

gone back on her story about Howard hitting

Edmondson in the head with a pole (because

Washington told Waller this).

2022 WL 2905669, at *12. When a different prosecutor, ASA

Ayala-Gonzalez, was assigned to the case, ASA Waller told

her all he had learned from his independent fact-gathering.

ASA Ayala-Gonzalez evaluated that evidence and then ap-

proved charges of first-degree murder against Washington

and Howard. Plaintiffs are correct that there were different

prosecutors at the two bail hearings, but this only makes clear

that the State’s Attorney’s office collectively investigated the

case. We agree with the district court that plaintiffs presented

“no evidence that any defendant duped the State’s Attorney

into seeking pretrial detention or pursuing grand-jury indict-

ments.” 2022 WL 2905669, at *12. Like the district court, we

find that “[t]he only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from

the undisputed evidence is that the State’s Attorney main-

tained control over plaintiffs’ prosecution.” Id.

The independent fact-gathering by the State’s Attorney’s

Office, leading to an independent decision to prosecute plain-

tiffs, rendered superfluous any lies, misleading statements, or

omissions by defendants relating to those independently

gathered facts. See Coleman, 925 F.3d at 351 (overcoming pre-

sumption of probable cause requires “evidence that law en-

forcement obtained the indictment through improper or

fraudulent means”). If plaintiffs believed the prosecutors had

also knowingly or recklessly made false or misleading state-

ments about material evidence, they might have tried to sue

those prosecutors. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259,

No. 22-2467 25

273–74 (1993) (absolute prosecutorial immunity does not ex-

tend to prosecutor acting in an investigatory capacity “before

he has probable cause to have anyone arrested”).

The prosecutor’s independent investigation alone is suffi-

cient reason to affirm summary judgment. It renders the pur-

ported misstatements and omissions by the detective defend-

ants unnecessary to any judicial officer’s determination of

probable cause. Beauchamp, 320 F.3d at 742–43. We address

next a second, independent reason that but-for causation is

lacking between the misstatements and omissions and the ju-

dicial determinations of probable cause.

b. Sufficient Evidence Remained to Support Probable

Cause

Even if the prosecutors had relied exclusively on the police

detectives’ descriptions of events, which we assume included

the misrepresentations and omissions discussed above, there

remained enough uncontested, reliable evidence to support

probable cause as a matter of law. This is a second reason

why, under Beauchamp, the misstatements and omissions

raised by plaintiffs were not a necessary but-for cause of any

judicial officer’s determination of probable cause. This point

supplies an independent ground for affirming summary

judgment.

“Probable cause is a common-sense inquiry requiring only

a probability of criminal activity; it exists whenever … a court

has enough information to warrant a prudent person to be-

lieve,” that, in this case, Washington and Howard killed Ed-

mondson. Young, 987 F.3d at 644, quoting Whitlock, 596 F.3d

at 411; see also Doe v. Gray, 75 F.4th 710, 719 (7th Cir. 2023)

(“The existence of probable cause … depends, in the first

26 No. 22-2467

instance, on the elements of the predicate criminal offense(s)

as defined by state law.” (alterations in original; internal cita-

tion omitted)). Probable cause “deals with probabilities and

depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Maryland v.

Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). It “requires only a probability

or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual show-

ing of such activity,” so it “is not a high bar.” District of Co-

lumbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018) (internal quotations

omitted).

Probable cause is “‘assessed objectively’ based on ‘the con-

clusions that the … officer reasonably might have drawn from

the information known to him.’” Young, 987 F.3d at 644, quot-

ing Holmes v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 511 F.3d 673, 679 (7th

Cir. 2007). “In determining whether information submitted to

a judicial officer in support of a warrant application was suf-

ficient to establish probable cause, we look only at what the

officer knew at the time he sought the warrant, not at how

things turned out in hindsight.” Beauchamp, 320 F.3d at 743.

Probable cause existed if, at the time of plaintiffs’ pretrial de-

tention hearings, “the facts and circumstances within [the of-

ficer’s] knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustwor-

thy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent person

in believing that [plaintiffs] had committed the crimes.” Id.

Here, the judicial officers were presented with sufficient

undisputed facts to establish probable cause to believe that

Washington and Howard killed Edmondson. Both plaintiffs

were admittedly in a physical altercation with Edmondson a

short time before he died. Washington admitted that she hit

Edmondson with a metal pole on his chest and his lip.

Detectives located a pole matching the description given by

witnesses in Washington’s apartment. A short time later,

No. 22-2467 27

Edmondson died from a serious wound to the head. Before he

died, Edmondson told the parking-lot witnesses that he had

been beaten by people who lived in his building, which is

where Washington lived. The detectives had no evidence that

Edmondson encountered any other person who might have

caused his death, which the autopsy determined was due to

blunt-force trauma to Edmondson’s head. And Washington

and Howard had been deceptive and evasive with defendant

detectives upon arrest. Howard gave the detectives a false

name, and Washington initially denied knowing the identity

of the other person involved in the altercation with

Edmondson, even though she knew and later admitted it was

Howard.

Washington did not admit to dealing the fatal blow to the

back of Edmondson’s head, of course, but the detectives were

not required to assume that no such blow took place. Bridewell

v. Eberle, 730 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Police are entitled

to draw on eyewitness descriptions without being required to

assume that witnesses got every detail right, or that every

omission from a description must establish that the omitted

fact did not occur.”). Far from it. Given Washington’s admit-

ted strike to Edmondson’s face with a pipe, no reasonable jury

could have found it unreasonable for the detectives to infer

that Washington dealt an additional blow to the back of Ed-

mondson’s head with the same weapon. See Williamson v.

Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 441 (7th Cir. 2013) (“When presented

with a credible report of criminal behavior, an officer ‘is under

no constitutional obligation to exclude all suggestions that the

witness or victim is not telling the truth.’”), quoting Reynolds

v. Jamison, 488 F.3d 756, 762 (7th Cir. 2007). This is especially

true where suspects exhibit “evasive and deceptive” behav-

ior, as both Washington and Howard had by lying in their

28 No. 22-2467

initial interrogations. United States v. Reed, 443 F.3d 600, 603

(7th Cir. 2006).

Plaintiffs make much of the detectives’ statements in

Washington’s interrogation that she “couldn’t have done” the

“damage that was done to [Edmondson’s] head,” and that

they did not believe Washington was “strong enough to do

the damage that [Edmondson] … sustained.” The state was

not required to prove as an element of the charges whether

Washington or Howard dealt the fatal blow; either or both of

them could be convicted under a theory of felony murder.

Second, the interrogators’ statements occurred in an attempt

to lead Washington to reveal the identity of the third person

involved in the altercation. Law enforcement officers are not

bound to be truthful when trying to elicit information, includ-

ing the identities of others involved in the offense. Johnson v.

Pollard, 559 F.3d 746, 754 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The fact that an of-

ficer misrepresents the strength of the evidence against a de-

fendant is insufficient, standing alone” to render a resulting

confession unreliable). Indeed, the detectives’ interrogation

on this point was fruitful. Washington eventually told the de-

tectives that Howard hit Edmondson on the back of the head.

It is true that Washington later retracted this statement

while being questioned by ASA Waller. But neither ASA Wal-

ler nor the detectives were obliged to believe Washington’s

recantation. See Spiegel v. Cortese, 196 F.3d 717, 724 (7th Cir.

1999) (“Many putative defendants protest their innocence,

and it is not the responsibility of law enforcement officials to

test such claims once probable cause has been established.”);

see also Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 835 (7th Cir. 2016)

(summarizing Sang Ken Kim v. City of Chicago, 858 N.E.2d 569,

578–79 (Ill. App. 2006), as a case “affirming summary

No. 22-2467 29

judgment because probable cause existed at time of arrest de-

spite later recantation of accusation and allegedly coercive in-

terrogation”).

We recognize that some facts known to detectives at the

time weighed against a conclusion that Washington and

Howard committed the murder. Washington is physically

small in stature, and the pipe recovered from her home was a

lightweight silver pole one inch in diameter originally

thought to be a table leg but later identified as part of a feed-

ing tube machine for her children. None of the parking-lot

witnesses said that they had seen any blood coming from

what must have been a serious wound on the back of Ed-

mondson’s head, even when he turned and walked away

from them. And Edmondson had been able to maintain a con-

versation with those witnesses, describing to them the alter-

cation that had just occurred. There is also security footage

showing Edmondson walking half a mile after his altercation

with the plaintiffs without any visible distress or blood. We

assume for purposes of summary judgment that the detec-

tives had access to that video before plaintiffs’ probable cause

hearings.

These serious factual discrepancies contributed heavily to

plaintiffs’ eventual acquittal, and for good reason. But proba-

ble cause demands much less than proof beyond a reasonable

doubt. United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1022 (7th Cir.

2011) (probable cause determination “does not require evi-

dence sufficient to support a conviction, nor even evidence

that it is more likely than not that the suspect committed a

crime” (internal citation omitted)). Probable cause existed as

a matter of law even when we give the plaintiffs the benefit of

factual disputes.

30 No. 22-2467

Plaintiffs rely on other cases finding a lack of probable

cause to support pretrial detention, but they are distinguish-

able. Hurt v. Wise is a post-Manuel I case reversing a grant of

summary judgment on a wrongful pretrial detention claim.

880 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2018), overruled on other grounds by

Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2019). In Hurt,

the “only source of probable cause” to arrest and detain the

plaintiff was his supposed confession, “so everything turn[ed]

on it.” 880 F.3d at 837 (emphasis in original). But the supposed

confession was “replete with easily verified and contempora-

neous evidence of inaccuracy and unreliability.” Id. “Several

critical ‘facts’ that [plaintiff] offered were facially impossible.

For example, if [plaintiff’s] account of where he and his sib-

lings had dumped [the victim’s] body … was true, the body

would have had to float upstream four to six miles to have ar-

rived at the location where it was found.” Id. (emphasis in

original). This, plus other facts in the confession that were

plainly contradicted by physical or documentary evidence,

led us to conclude that probable cause could not be estab-

lished as a matter of law. Id. at 841–42.

In another post-Manuel I case, Rainsberger v. Benner, we

again found that probable cause could not be resolved as a

matter of law, affirming a denial of qualified immunity on a

standard of review identical to that for summary judgment.

913 F.3d at 643. There, the defendant Officer Benner had filed

a probable cause affidavit for the arrest of plaintiff

Rainsberger on the theory that he murdered his mother, Ruth.

After charges were dropped against Rainsberger, he filed a

section 1983 suit alleging that Officer Benner had lied in his

affidavit. In our analysis, we “eliminate[d] the alleged false

statements, incorporate[d] any allegedly omitted facts, and

then evaluate[d] whether the resulting ‘hypothetical’ affidavit

No. 22-2467 31

would establish probable cause.” Id. at 647, quoting Betker v.

Gomez, 692 F.3d 854, 862 (7th Cir. 2012). We said that the

remaining “package of facts” supporting probable cause

boiled down to these:

Ruth’s murderer might have been someone she

knew, because the attack was not necessarily

connected to a burglary. Some drawers had

been opened and her purse and medication

were missing; at the same time, there was no

sign of a forced entry, and Ruth’s checkbook,

credit cards, and some cash were still in the

apartment. Rainsberger had a key to her apart-

ment, and cell phone records did not rule out

the possibility that he was in the vicinity of her

apartment complex when the attack happened.

Shortly before he found his mother and called

911, Rainsberger stopped at a Kroger across the

street from his mother’s apartment to buy an

iced tea. He walked in plain view through the

Kroger parking lot carrying a piece of trash,

which he threw away in a receptacle by a

Redbox machine on his way into the store. He

correctly described Ruth’s injury as a blow to

the head, even though he had not removed the

blanket to see the wound. In contrast, the first

responder, who did remove the blanket, ini-

tially thought that Ruth had been shot. Rains-

berger and his two siblings would inherit about

$33,000 apiece if his mother died. When Benner

brought the Rainsberger children to the police

station under false pretenses, Rainsberger and

his brother refused Benner’s request that they

32 No. 22-2467

take a polygraph test. A week later, they volun-

tarily gave fingerprints and submitted to a DNA

buccal swab.

Rainsberger, 913 F.3d at 648.

Many of these facts, we noted, “would be true of most chil-

dren of aging parents …. These unremarkable facts would be

reason to suspect Rainsberger only if other information cast

them in a suspicious light.” Id. But “[t]he totality of these cir-

cumstances support[ed] nothing more than bare suspi-

cion….” Id. at 649. “If probable cause exists here, then anyone

who experiences the tragedy of discovering a murdered fam-

ily member—and who correctly assesses the cause of the in-

jury and recently threw something away in a public trash

can—can be arrested for murder. Probable cause is a low bar,

but this evidence does not clear it.” Id.

Hurt and Rainsberger look nothing like the bundle of facts

that remain to support probable cause to detain Washington

and Howard, even with the purported “lies stripped and the

omissions added.” Id. at 648. Washington’s admission that

both plaintiffs were involved in a physical altercation with the

victim and had struck him with fists and a metal pole shortly

before he was found dead are hardly “unremarkable facts”

requiring “other information [to] cast them in a suspicious

light.” Id. Nor would a belief that Washington and Howard

killed Edmondson contradict the laws of nature, as in Hurt.

See 880 F.3d at 837. The defendant detectives had no evidence

that anyone else had encountered Edmondson between the

altercation and his death, except for the parking-lot witnesses

who reported open wounds on Edmondson’s face and chest.

Prior to arrest and during initial questioning, Washington and

Howard were evasive and deceptive toward the detectives.

No. 22-2467 33

And even if the detectives did not believe Washington alone

was capable of dealing the fatal blow, the charged felony-

murder theory did not require that she did.

Consequently, after eliminating the alleged misrepresen-

tations and adding in the omissions, undisputed facts show

that probable cause would have still existed to detain Wash-

ington and Howard pending their trials. No reasonable jury

could conclude otherwise. Thus, even if we assume that the

prosecutors, judges, and grand jury relied on the asserted

false statements and omissions by the defendant detectives,

Washington and Howard cannot show that such false state-

ments were “necessary” to the judicial determinations of

probable cause as required to overcome the presumption of

validity. Beauchamp, 320 F.3d at 742–43. Consequently, the ju-

dicial determinations of probable cause are presumed to be

valid, and the pretrial detention of Washington and Howard

did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Manuel I, 580 U.S. at

367.

D. Malicious Prosecution Claim

Plaintiffs’ claims for malicious prosecution fail for the

same reason that their Fourth Amendment claims fail—the

detectives and courts had probable cause to detain them. See

Young, 987 F.3d at 646, citing Martinez v. City of Chicago, 900

F.3d 838, 849 (7th Cir. 2018) (“To state a claim for malicious

prosecution under Illinois law, a plaintiff must allege that: (1)

he was subjected to judicial proceedings; (2) for which there

was no probable cause….”). Because plaintiffs’ pretrial

detention was supported by probable cause based on the

prosecutors’ independent fact-gathering and even if the

purported lies and omissions are accepted as true, the district

34 No. 22-2467

court properly granted summary judgment on their malicious

prosecution claims.

The district court’s grant of summary judgment to

defendants is AFFIRMED.