State of Iowa v. Lawrence George Canady, III

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 22–0397

Submitted February 20, 2024—Filed March 22, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

LAWRENCE GEORGE CANADY, III,

Appellant.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Patrick H. Tott,

Chief Judge.

The State seeks further review of a court of appeals decision reversing the

defendant’s criminal convictions and remanding for a new trial based on errors

in the admission of evidence. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED;

DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

Mansfield, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices

joined.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender

(argued), Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven (argued), Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

Bridget E. Lavender and Emerson Sykes, New York, New York, for amicus

curiae American Civil Liberties Union Foundation.

2

Rita Bettis Austen, Des Moines, for amicus curiae ACLU of Iowa

Foundation Inc.

3

MANSFIELD, Justice.

I. Introduction.

A fatal nighttime shooting captured on video sets the stage for this case.

The defendant wasn’t the shooter, but he was beating the decedent with his fists

while another person delivered two fatal shots at close range. The defendant was

convicted of voluntary manslaughter as an aider and abettor, willful injury

causing bodily injury as a principal, and assault causing bodily injury. He now

appeals.

On appeal, the defendant argues that the district court committed several

errors, including when it admitted a brief cell phone video recorded on the other

individual’s phone about four days before the fatal shooting. The video shows

the defendant and the other person doing a rap song voiceover with a recorded

song in the background. At one point, the defendant and the other person sing

the lyrics, “Respect . . . you gotta earn,” followed by two names, one of which

appears to be the same as the decedent’s nickname, followed by the words, “They

got hit.”

The court of appeals concluded that the district court erred in admitting

this video as well as a Snapchat photo. It reversed and remanded for a new trial.

On further review, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion

in admitting this evidence, and that the defendant’s other assignments of error

are also without merit. Therefore, we vacate the court of appeals decision and

affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentence.

II. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Martez Harrison and Lawrence Canady had been friends for three or four

years. The pair had a history of physical altercations, but they had always made

up and never used weapons against each other. Harrison went by the nickname

“Tez” or “Tezzo.”

4

On the night of April 30–May 1, 2021, around 10:00 p.m., Harrison came

to Uncle Dave’s Bar in Sioux City for a party. His fiancée, Jessica Goodman,

dropped him off and planned to pick him up when the bar closed around

2:00 a.m. Those plans changed when a commotion broke out in front of the bar

after midnight.

A group of four young people, led by Canady, were trying to enter the bar

through its only entrance (in front). Two of the three others were male friends of

Canady, Dwight Evans and J.H, and the third, N.R., was Canady’s girlfriend.1

The bar’s bouncer was not allowing any of them inside.

Amanda Anderson, the bartender that evening at Uncle Dave’s, went out

to assist. Canady was very angry and yelling. He wanted to come into the bar to

“beat somebody up” who had “bashed his sister over the head with a beer bottle.”

Canady also said he had a gun. When Canady spotted Harrison inside the bar,

he called to him: “I’m going to see you out here. I’m waiting for you.”

After leaving Canady’s group waiting in front, Anderson reentered the bar

and spoke to Harrison. She told him that Canady claimed to have a gun, and

she urged Harrison not to go outside. Harrison said he would get a ride. Harrison

called Goodman and asked her to pick him up early because “L and them” were

“outside trying to jump him.” Goodman knew that “L” was Canady’s nickname.

Goodman arrived and parked outside the front door of the bar. As she got

out of the car, Canady’s group surrounded her. Canady told Goodman “to go get

[her] baby daddy out of the bar.” Canady commented that Harrison “should never

slap Mariah with a bottle.” Meanwhile, Canady leaned to Evans, touched him on

the chest, and told him to “go ahead and get that.” Goodman heard Canady’s

statement to Evans and responded, “[S]o we’re gun playing now? That’s what

1According to Goodman, Canady and Evans considered each other best friends.

5

we’re really doing? We’re playing with guns?” Evans walked a short distance from

the group and stood by some garbage cans.

Harrison, having now realized what was happening outside, emerged from

the bar. Canady attempted to land a blow on Harrison but missed and struck

Goodman in the face. N.R. sprayed mace at Goodman. Canady and Harrison and

N.R. and Goodman began fighting. These events were captured on a nearby

surveillance camera.

Canady moved to the middle of the street and Harrison moved with him.

After Canady had knocked Harrison flat on the ground and was still punching

him, Evans approached both men from behind and shot Harrison twice at close

range in the abdomen. Canady remained on top of Harrison after the first shot

and continued to punch him in the face. Even after the second shot, Canady

continued to assault Harrison, hitting him and kicking him in the face

repeatedly. Canady, Evans, J.H., and N.R. then fled the scene. Harrison was

immediately taken to the hospital where he died from his gunshot wounds.

Police stopped a white vehicle that had been reported leaving the scene

and found Canady, J.H., and N.R. in it. Canady denied he was involved and tried

to throw the officers off track by telling them they needed to be looking for a

Chrysler 300 rather than the Chevrolet Aveo they had stopped.

Evans, on foot, sought help from a group of local residents, telling them

that he was looking for his wallet and cell phone. One of them discovered a

revolver nearby and called the police. That revolver turned out to be the weapon

that had been used to kill Harrison. Evans was arrested about a block from

where the gun had been found.

On July 1, Canady was charged by trial information with murder in the

first degree, in violation of Iowa Code sections 707.2(1)(a), 703.1, and 703.2

(2021); willful injury causing bodily injury, in violation of Iowa Code section

6

708.4(1), 703.1, and 703.2; and assault causing bodily injury, in violation of

Iowa Code section 708.2(2).2

The case proceeded to a jury trial. The State’s theory was that Canady

decided to take revenge on Harrison after learning on April 30 that Harrison had

supposedly hit the girlfriend of Austin Rockwood in the face with a bottle.

Rockwood and Canady were close friends. Over Canady’s objection, the State

entered into evidence a recording of an April 30 phone call between Rockwood

and Canady. Rockwood made the call while detained at the Woodbury County

Jail. During the call, Rockwood informed Canady that “Tezzo” had hit

Rockwood’s girlfriend Mariah with a bottle. Canady responded that he would put

Harrison “on his fucking neck” and pick him up “and slam him dead on his

fucking head.” The pair then verbally agreed that it was “tax time.”

Also over Canady’s objection, the State offered into evidence a thirty-

second cell phone rap video, recorded on April 26 and extracted from Evans’s

cell phone, to show that Canady may have had an intent to harm Harrison even

before the jail phone call. The video lasts approximately thirty seconds and

shows Canady and Evans together doing a voiceover with a rap song playing in

the background. At one point, Canady and Evans rap the words, “Respect . . .

you gotta earn,” followed by two names, one of which sounds like “Tezzo,”

followed by the words, “They got hit.” The video contains other lyrics about

violence and also shows Canady and Evans rapping “gang, gang, gang,” Canady

displaying tattoos on his hand, and Evans fanning out cash in his hands.

Additionally, the district court over objection allowed the State to introduce

a Snapchat photo posted by Evans.3 The photo, posted on April 30 at around

2Evans was charged and tried separately.

3The Snapchat photo was posted as a “story,” which meant that it could be viewed for

twenty-four hours by anyone on Evans’s “friends” list, which included Canady and Goodman.

7

7:30 p.m., showed Evans and J.H. together standing face forward and J.H.

gesturing toward an object in Evans’s waistband that could be a revolver. The

caption read, “We bussing but don’t think shit sweat.” The caption included a

gun emoji. Goodman testified that she pulled up this photo on Evans’s Snapchat

account at around 3:30 a.m. on May 1 when she was waiting at the hospital

where Harrison had been taken.

While on the stand, Goodman also gave her interpretation of some of the

expressions used in the jail phone call and the Snapchat photo. Here too, Canady

mostly lodged timely objections. Goodman testified that “tax time,” as heard in

the jail call, meant “taking him for everything he gots; as in his pockets,

everything, fighting him, whatever it takes at this point. That’s what tax season

means.” Concerning the caption in the Snapchat photo, Goodman stated, “I’m

pretty sure he meant sweet. But, basically, [it means] they got the guns and

they’re not sweating shit.” She elaborated a moment later: “[I]t means that they

got guns and they’re going to shoot whoever. . . . They’re not scared of anything.”

Canady did not dispute at trial that he had physically assaulted Harrison

outside the bar. His defense was that he did not anticipate Evans shooting

Harrison. Canady’s defense, in other words, was that he did not intend for

anyone to kill Harrison that night and wanted only to fight him.

The jury ultimately acquitted Canady of murder, but found him guilty of a

lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, see Iowa Code § 707.4, willful

injury causing bodily injury, and assault causing bodily injury. Canady was

sentenced to ten years, five years, and one year imprisonment respectively, the

terms to be served consecutive to each other.

Canady appealed, and we transferred the case to the court of appeals.

Canady’s appeal primarily raises a series of evidentiary issues. He argues that

the district court erred in admitting the jail call from Rockwood, the cell phone

8

rap video, and the Snapchat photo. He also maintains that Goodman’s

interpretations of slang lacked the proper foundation and amounted to improper

expert testimony. Canady further contends that the evidence was insufficient to

sustain his voluntary manslaughter conviction, the voluntary manslaughter and

willful injury convictions should have merged, and the district court abused its

discretion in considering the minutes of testimony during sentencing and in

imposing consecutive sentences.

The court of appeals found merit to two of these arguments, and therefore

reversed and remanded for a new trial. Specifically, the court determined that

the cell phone rap video should have been excluded under Iowa Rule of

Evidence 5.403 because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice. In the court of appeals’ view, “the evidence actually

introduced at trial was devoid of anything suggesting Canady had the motive or

intent to kill Harrison before he received the phone call from Rock[wood] on

April 30.” Given that the video had been made on April 26, the court concluded

that it had “little to no probative value.” On the other hand, the risk of unfair

prejudice was high because the video “shows Canady rapping along to lyrics

involving violent imagery” and “may have suggested to the jury that Canady was

a member of a gang.”

In addition, the court of appeals concluded that the Snapchat photo

should have been excluded because it was not relevant and posed a high risk of

unfair prejudice. As the court of appeals explained, “Canady is not in the photo,

and there is no evidence he was ever even aware of its existence.” On the other

hand, the photo, especially with the benefit of Goodman’s interpretation,

conveyed a message that the group owned guns and was willing to use them.

We granted the State’s application for further review.

9

III. Standard of Review.

“We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.

Rulings on the admissibility of hearsay evidence are reviewed for correction of

errors at law.” State v. Thompson, 836 N.W.2d 470, 476 (Iowa 2013) (citation

omitted). “We review sufficiency of the evidence claims for correction of errors at

law.” State v. Crawford, 974 N.W.2d 510, 516 (Iowa 2022). Finally, “[w]e review

the district court’s sentence for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d

269, 272 (Iowa 2016) (quoting State v. Barnes, 791 N.W.2d 817, 827 (Iowa 2010)).

IV. Legal Analysis.

A. Admission of the Recorded Jail Phone Call. Canady contends that

the district court erred in admitting the recording of the phone call placed by

Rockwood from the Woodbury County Jail. He claims that the State failed to

establish proper foundation for the recording and that the call was inadmissible

hearsay.

At trial, the State used a belt-and-suspenders approach to lay foundation

for admission of the recording. A sergeant from the Woodbury County Jail

testified as to the process used by the jail for recording calls. He also testified

that Rockwood placed the call in question and to the actual phone number that

Rockwood dialed. Later, a detective testified that this particular phone number

belonged to Canady. Additionally, Goodman testified that she knew both

Rockwood and Canady, had spoken to both on the phone in the past, and would

be able to identify their voices in a recording. After listening to the recorded call

at trial, she confirmed that the pair were speaking to each other. All this was

more than enough to lay foundation for admission of the recorded call. See Iowa

R. Evid. 5.901(a), (b)(5)–(6) (requiring the proponent to “produce evidence

sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is”

and listing as examples opinions identifying a person’s voice and evidence that

10

a phone call was made to the number assigned to the person if circumstances

show the person answering was the one called).

Nor was there a hearsay problem. Canady’s statements on the call were

party admissions. See id. r. 5.801(d)(2)(A). Rockwood’s statements also fell

outside the hearsay rule. Most were not offered for the truth of the matter

asserted. See id. r. 5.801(c)(2). For example, it didn’t matter whether Harrison

had actually hit Rockwood’s girlfriend with a bottle. Other statements were

adoptive admissions. See id. r. 5.801(d)(2)(B). To illustrate, after Rockwood said

it was “tax time,” Canady agreed it was “tax time.” No error occurred in the

admission of the recorded phone call.

B. Admission of the Cell Phone Rap Video. Canady urges that the cell

phone rap video should have been excluded under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.403.

“Courts should use rule 5.403 sparingly since it allows for relevant evidence to

be excluded.” State v. Buelow, 951 N.W.2d 879, 889 (Iowa 2020). We first

consider the potential relevance of the video. “Iowa has adopted a broad view of

relevancy,” and it “is a legal question lying within the broad discretion of the trial

court.” State v. Thompson, 954 N.W.2d 402, 407 (Iowa 2021) (first quoting State

v. Scott, 619 N.W.2d 371, 375 (Iowa 2000) (en banc); then quoting State v. Tracy,

482 N.W.2d 675, 680–81 (Iowa 1992) (en banc)).

The State argues that the video was relevant because it showed Canady

may have had an intent and motive to kill Harrison that predated the jail phone

call with Rockwood on April 30. In the video, Canady and Evans together rap

lines about a “Tezzo” getting “hit.” As the prosecution put it in closing argument,

“[O]ut of all the rap songs on YouTube, Lawrence Canady chose that rap song

that talked about killing Tezzo.”

Canady questions the relevance of the video by noting that the original

song was a well-known rap song that already included a reference to a

11

“Teso/Tezzo.”4 He also points out that there was no other evidence that Canady

formed an intent to harm Harrison prior to April 30.

Canady’s arguments may diminish the relevance of the video, but they do

not undermine it. Evidence that Canady and Evans harbored animosity toward

Harrison on April 26 wasn’t necessarily inconsistent with, and indeed could have

bolstered, the State’s primary theory that they decided to go forward with killing

Harrison a few days later after the jail call with Rockwood. On the April 30 phone

call, Canady was very quick to agree with Rockwood that “tax time” had arrived,

as if there might be some other motive to harm Harrison lurking in the

background. After all, it wasn’t Canady’s girlfriend who had been hit with a

bottle.

Moreover, the fact that the original song referred to a “Tezzo” wasn’t

brought to the district court’s attention when it ruled on the objection. See

State v. Morrison, 323 N.W.2d 254, 256 (Iowa 1982) (defining an abuse of

discretion as “one clearly against the logic and effect of facts and circumstances

before the court” (emphasis added) (quoting Best v. Yerkes, 77 N.W.2d 23, 32

(Iowa 1956))). Even if it had been, the State was entitled to argue that Canady

and Evans decided to select that song for their short rap because it referenced a

“Tezzo.”

Of course, even if relevant, the cell phone video would still be inadmissible

“if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair

prejudice.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.403. “Weighing probative value against prejudicial

effect ‘is not an exact science,’ so ‘we give a great deal of leeway to the trial judge

who must make this judgment call.’ ” State v. Lacey, 968 N.W.2d 792, 807 (Iowa

2021) (quoting Thompson, 954 N.W.2d at 408).

4During Canady’s defense, the underlying video came into evidence. Canady proved that

the video referred to a “Teso” and that it had had approximately 650,000 views.

12

Canady and amicus American Civil Liberties Union argue that injecting

rap music into a criminal trial can be highly prejudicial. They contend, for

example, that jurors are more likely to treat a defendant’s recital of rap lyrics

literally and to associate rap music with criminal activity.

Other courts considering these risks have insisted on evidence tying the

rap music to the specific circumstances of the charged crime. See, e.g., United

States v. Sims, 11 F.4th 315, 323 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The general conclusion from

courts that have considered this type of evidence is that explicit rap videos are

probative and outweigh substantial prejudice when the defendant performs the

song, describes events closely related to the crime charged, and the evidence is

not cumulative.”); United States v. Pierce, 785 F.3d 832, 836, 840–41 (2d Cir.

2015) (holding that a rap video was properly admitted when the defendant was

charged with gang-related crimes and rapped in the video about his gang

association); United States v. Wiley, 610 F. Supp. 3d 440, 446 (D. Conn. 2022)

(“[S]tatements or images with offense-specific content tending to corroborate the

Government’s other evidence . . . will be admitted.”); Bey-Cousin v. Powell, 570

F. Supp. 3d 251, 255 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (setting forth “a presumption that artistic

expression is not factual,” and allowing “the proponent of evidence [to overcome

the presumption by] offer[ing] some preliminary indicia that the artistic

expression is a truthful narrative”); Wilson v. State, 883 S.E.2d 802, 813 (Ga.

2023) (“The video shows the defendants boasting about making money in a

violent drug trade, but they were charged with robbing a drug dealer shortly

before the video was made. This is not a question of evidence that could inflame

the passion of the jury for a reason that is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of

the defendant.”); Greene v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 76, 86–87 (Ky. 2006)

(determining that a video showing the defendant rapping about killing his wife

was admissible because he was on trial for her murder); Holmes v. State, 306

13

P.3d 415, 420 (Nev. 2013) (finding the probative value of rap lyrics was not

substantially outweighed by a risk of unfair prejudice where “only a single stanza

from [the defendant-authored rap] was admitted against [the defendant]—and

the stanza that was admitted relayed facts quite similar to the crime charged”).

Courts have concluded that rap music evidence should be excluded when

the link to the defendant or charged crime is attenuated. See, e.g., United

States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 493 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding the probative value

of a rap video to be low when the defendant was not in the video and there was

no evidence that he wrote the lyrics or he shared the views expressed in the

video); United States v. Johnson, 469 F. Supp. 3d 193, 221–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

(excluding rap evidence because “the Government ha[d] not demonstrated that

the lyrics contain any direct references to the [defendant’s supposed gang] or to

gang activity” where the defendant was charged with various gang-related

crimes); Hannah v. State, 23 A.3d 192, 195–96, 201–02 (Md. 2011) (holding that

rap lyrics “were probative of no issue other than the issue of whether [the

defendant] has a propensity for violence,” when the defendant’s lyrics focused on

gun violence in general rather than the specific shooting at issue);

Commonwealth v. Gray, 978 N.E.2d 543, 559–62 (Mass. 2012) (deciding that a

rap video should have been excluded when offered to prove the defendant’s gang

membership and “[t]he lyrics show[ed] no connection to the defendant that would

suggest they were biographical or otherwise indicative of his own motive or intent

at the time of the shooting”); State v. Skinner, 95 A.3d 236, 252 (N.J. 2014)

(“[A]bsent such a strong nexus to defendant’s charged crime, his fictional

expressive writings are not properly evidential.”); State v. Cheeseboro, 552 S.E.2d

300, 313 (S.C. 2001) (finding that rap lyrics should not have been admitted

because “[u]nlike [other evidence at trial that] contain[ed] identifying details of

the crimes committed, these lyrics contain[ed] only general references glorifying

14

violence”); In re Pers. Restraint of Quintero, 541 P.3d 1007, 1033–34 (Wash. Ct.

App. 2024) (“Because neither rap lyric has a strong factual nexus to the Walnut

Street murders, their prejudicial effect substantially outweighed their probative

value.”).

Here, any prejudice from the video must be viewed in the context of this

particular case. It wasn’t disputed at Canady’s trial that Canady beat up

Harrison while Evans fatally shot him. All of that was captured on video. The

issue was whether Canady knew or intended that Evans would kill Harrison. In

that regard, Canady’s counsel emphasized at closing argument that Harrison

was Canady’s friend and that they had had physical altercations before and

always made up their differences. He pointed out that Harrison and Evans were

not friends. Counsel also characterized the events as Canady and Harrison “got

into a fistfight on the street and . . . out of nowhere [Evans] approaches them

and . . . just shoots [Harrison].” Thus, the State’s case came down to showing

that Canady and Evans were collaborating that night against Harrison.

When the case is viewed through this prism, which is the one the trial

judge correctly applied, the prejudicial effect of the video goes down and its

probative value goes up. The tendency to infer that someone committed a

particular act of violence because that person rapped about acts of violence is

less of a concern when the acts of violence and who committed them are

undisputed. At the same time, the joint conduct and statements on the video

were helpful to rebut the notion that Evans acted alone in shooting “Tezzo”

without Canady’s knowledge or approval.

Likewise, while “gang, gang, gang” in other contexts could certainly be

highly prejudicial, here the State didn’t try to use any whiff of gang involvement

15

to prove motive or responsibility for these acts of violence.5 This case was more

straightforward because the acts and who committed them were recorded on

video. What mattered to the State was simply that the video showed the

defendant and the shooter jointly voicing a threat to “Tezzo.”

Finally, as the State notes, Canady was acquitted of murder. The jury

rejected both the State’s aiding and abetting and its joint criminal conduct

theories against Canady. Instead, Canady was convicted only of voluntary

manslaughter, on the basis that he aided and abetted the fatal shooting, but the

shooting occurred under sudden passion resulting from serious provocation.

That verdict suggests that the jury put aside any inference of advance planning

from the cell phone video. Rather, the jury must have determined that Canady

and Evans acted in concert outside the bar—a relatively straightforward

inference to make from the surveillance video, Anderson’s testimony, and

Goodman’s testimony—but that the situation was provoked by Harrison and

there was no advance plan to kill or harm him. We hold the district court did not

abuse its discretion in admitting the cell phone video.

C. Admission of the Snapchat Photo. Canady argues that the Snapchat

photo should not have been admitted because it was hearsay and any probative

value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Before

trial, the court reserved ruling on whether the Snapchat photo would be

admissible.6

5Nor did Canady ask for those words to be redacted. See State v. Fontenot, 958 N.W.2d

549, 563 (Iowa 2021) (discussing the defendant’s failure to request redactions from an otherwise

admissible exhibit).

6At the same time, the district court ruled that a number of other social media posts or

texts would not be admissible. These included a “death rap” modified by Evans at 8:13 p.m. on

April 30 that mentioned “someone gonna die” and indicated that “L” (Canady) was a participant,

photos showing Evans posing alone with the revolver used to kill Harrison, and a post by a

relative of Canady offering that revolver for sale about twelve hours before the killing.

16

The moment for that determination came in the midst of Goodman’s

testimony. The State made an offer of proof out of the presence of the jury.

Goodman testified that Canady and Evans both had Snapchat accounts and that

she was Snapchat “friends” with both of them. While at the hospital waiting for

the doctors attending to Harrison, Goodman pulled up the photo from Evans’s

account showing Evans posing with J.H. while J.H. was pointing to an object in

Evans’s waistband. The photo also contained a gun emoji and the caption read,

“We bussing but don’t think shit sweat.” A timestamp indicated that the video

had been posted approximately six hours before Evans shot Harrison. Goodman

also testified that when she accessed Canady’s Snapchat account, she learned

that he had been using Snapchat that evening. The district court ruled that the

Snapchat photo could come into evidence.

The district court allowed the Snapchat photo into evidence on the ground

it was the statement of a coconspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy. See

Iowa R. Evid. 5.801(d)(2)(E) (providing that “[a]n opposing party’s statement” is

not hearsay if it “is offered against an opposing party and . . . [w]as made by the

party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy”). It reasoned

that the State had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy

to harm Harrison existed by the time the photo was posted, after the Rockwood

phone call. We do not address this determination because we conclude that the

Snapchat photo was admissible anyway either as nonhearsay or as “[a]

statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind (such as motive, intent,

or plan).” Id. r. 5.803(3).

Putting aside the caption and the gun emoji, the photo itself appeared to

show Evans posing with a gun. This image wasn’t hearsay because it wasn’t a

statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See id. r. 5.801(c)(2).

17

Meanwhile, the caption and the gun emoji were, in effect, a statement of

intent or willingness to use a gun. See id. r. 5.803(3) (providing that “[a]

statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind” is “not excluded by the

rule against hearsay”); State v. Thompson, 982 N.W.2d 116, 119, 121–24 (Iowa

2022) (holding a victim’s statements on social media that she feared the

defendant admissible under the state-of-mind exception). So they weren’t

inadmissible hearsay, either.

And in any event, the point of the exhibit as a whole was not to show that

Evans had a gun and was willing to use it. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.801(c)(2). After

all, his use of a gun was not disputed at trial. The point of the exhibit was to

show that Canady would have known Evans had a gun and was willing to use it.

See id. So again, we do not view the Snapchat photo as hearsay. See id.

Of course, the Snapchat photo would still need to be relevant, id. r. 5.401,

and its ultimate admission would be subject to rule 5.403 balancing. We agree

with the State that it passed those screens. Canady and Evans were best friends

and both of them were active on Snapchat that night. Thus, a jury could infer

that Canady saw the Snapchat photo and thus would have been aware that

Evans had a gun and was ready and willing to use it. This would tend to rebut

Canady’s defense that he did not know Evans had a revolver or planned to use

it.

Additionally, there was little risk of unfair prejudice. See id. r. 5.403.

Canady was free to argue—and did argue—that the State failed to connect him

to the photo. As his attorney said in closing, “There’s no social media post or

photo showing [Canady] with a gun or [Canady and Evans] and the gun, you

know, even after all this forensic examination of their phones . . . .” Furthermore,

as noted, the evidence at trial was undisputed that Evans did in fact shoot and

kill Harrison a few hours after the Snapchat photo was posted. Thus, there was

18

no risk that jurors would give an unduly literal interpretation to a posting that

was not meant to be taken that way. For these reasons, we conclude there was

no error in the admission of the Snapchat photo.

D. Admission of Goodman’s Testimony on the Meaning of Various

Slang Phrases. Canady maintains that Goodman’s testimony on the meaning of

“tax time” from the jail phone call, and “[w]e bussing but don’t think shit sweat”

from the Snapchat photo, should not have been permitted. He contends it was

opinion testimony that lacked a proper foundation.

While we agree with Canady that the meaning of these terms may have

been beyond the ken of the average juror, that does not mean it was error for

Goodman to define them. Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.701 allows lay witnesses to

offer opinions based on their own perceptions if helpful to a jury. Iowa Rule of

Evidence 5.702 provides:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an

opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other

specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the

evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

Goodman knew Canady, Rockwood, and Evans. She knew Rockwood “very

well,” having taken care of him for a year and a half. Regarding “tax season” and

“tax time,” she testified based on her knowledge that Canady and Rockwood

meant “taking him for everything he gots . . . whatever it takes.” Goodman also

testified, initially without objection, that the caption on the Evans Snapchat

photo meant “they got the guns and they’re not sweating shit.” Later, over

objection, she testified that it meant to her that “they got guns and they’re going

to shoot whoever. . . . They’re not scared of anything.”

In our view, this testimony was proper lay testimony. Goodman wasn’t

testifying as an outside expert; rather, as someone who personally knew the

19

speakers, she was testifying as to what she believed they meant by certain slang

terms. See id. r. 5.701; see also United States v. Smith, 640 F.3d 358, 365 (D.C.

Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J.) (stating that the line between expert and lay testimony

in this regard should be drawn between “knowledge derived from previous

professional experience” and personal knowledge); United States v. Saulter, 60

F.3d 270, 276 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a drug dealer who was a member of

the same organization could offer his interpretation of terms used in recorded

conversations because “Rule 701 does not require that the witness actually have

participated in the recorded conversations. We believe it sufficient that the

witness has personal knowledge of the subject discussed and the persons

involved”). The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Goodman’s

interpretations of Canady’s, Rockwood’s, and Evans’s statements.

E. Sufficiency of the Evidence for the Voluntary Manslaughter

Conviction. Canady asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support a

guilty verdict on the voluntary manslaughter charge. When considering the

sufficiency of the evidence, the question is “whether, taken in the light most

favorable to the State, the finding of guilt is supported by substantial evidence

in the record.” Crawford, 974 N.W.2d at 516 (quoting State v. Kelso-Christy, 911

N.W.2d 663, 666 (Iowa 2018)).

Canady contends the evidence does not establish the element that he aided

and abetted Evans in the shooting of Harrison. We disagree. The jury was

instructed:

“Aid and abet” means to knowingly approve and agree to the

commission of a crime, either by active participation in it or by

knowingly advising or encouraging the act in some way before or

when it is committed. Conduct following the crime may be

considered only as it may tend to prove the defendant’s earlier

participation. Mere nearness to, or presence at, the scene of the

crime, without more evidence, is not “aiding and abetting.” Likewise,

20

mere knowledge of the crime is not enough to prove “aiding and

abetting.”

Canady told Rockwood on April 30 that he would “slam [Harrison] dead on

his fucking head.” That night, Canady and his friends arrived at Uncle Dave’s

Bar looking for Harrison. Canady was the leader and the spokesperson for the

group. Canady told the bartender he had a gun and told Harrison he was waiting

outside for him. Later Canady directed Evans to “just go ahead and get that”—a

statement that Goodman took as a reference to retrieving a gun. Soon, Canady

got into a physical altercation with Harrison and seemingly drew him out into

the street. When Evans fired the first shot at Harrison, Canady did not react and

continued to beat Harrison as Evans fired the second shot. Before leaving the

scene, Canady proceeded to kick Harrison as he lay on the street suffering from

two gunshot wounds.

Based on the foregoing, a jury could readily find that Canady aided and

abetted Evans’s shooting of Harrison.

F. Merger Issue. Canady argues that the sentencing court should have

merged the voluntary manslaughter and the willful injury causing bodily injury

convictions. For willful injury causing bodily injury, the State had to prove that

Canady “punched and kicked Martez Harrison,” that Canady “specifically

intended to cause a bodily injury to Martez Harrison,” and that Canady “caused

a bodily injury to Martez Harrison.” For voluntary manslaughter, the State had

to prove that Canady “aided and abetted Dwight Evans in shooting Martez

Harrison with a gun,” that “Harrison died as a result of being shot,” and that

“[t]he shooting was done solely by reason of sudden, violent and irresistible

passion resulting from serious provocation.”

We agree with the State that the offenses do not merge. The State cites

State v. Ceretti, 871 N.W.2d 88 (Iowa 2015). That case involved a fatal stabbing.

21

Id. at 89. The defendant was originally charged with first-degree murder but

accepted an agreement to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter, attempted

murder, and willful injury causing serious injury. Id. at 89–90. He appealed,

arguing that the three convictions should merge. Id. at 91.

We observed that “the elements plainly do not align” among the three

charges. Id. at 92. We specifically noted that “willful injury requires a specific

intent to injure, whereas voluntary manslaughter does not require any specific

intent.” Id. Ultimately, we vacated the plea agreement, but only because the

voluntary manslaughter and the attempted murder convictions could not coexist

under a variant of the one-homicide rule. Id. at 96–98.

This is an easier case for nonmerger than Ceretti because the voluntary

manslaughter count involved the defendant’s alleged aiding and abetting of

another person’s shooting of the victim, and the willful injury count involved the

defendant’s own alleged beating of the victim.

The defendant argues that his criminal conduct constituted a single

“continuous act,” with no “break in the action,” citing State v. Velez, 829 N.W.2d

572, 581–84 (Iowa 2013). But in Velez we were analyzing whether the defendant

could be convicted of “multiple violations of the same statute.” Id. at 581. That

isn’t the situation here. Here we have two different statutes, so the key question

to be answered is whether the elements of the offenses overlap.

The defendant also invokes State v. Walker, 610 N.W.2d 524 (Iowa 2000)

(en banc). There we held that the defendant, who had beaten and kicked the

decedent to death, could be convicted of both voluntary manslaughter and willful

injury. Id. at 526–27. We gave the following explanation for that outcome:

“Because the record establishes more than one assault, the court was authorized

to impose more than one sentence.” Id. at 527. Canady argues that Walker

dictates a different outcome here because there was only one assault. Even if the

22

explanation in Walker were still good law after Ceretti, the present case is

different because Canady was convicted of aiding and abetting Evans’s shooting

and committing his own willful injury as a principal.

G. Minutes of Testimony Referred to at Sentencing. Prior to actually

pronouncing sentence, the district court stated,

Before determining the appropriate sentence to impose in

these matters, the Court has considered all of the information

presented to it. It gives great consideration to the victim impact

statements presented here today, as well as all the information

contained in the court file, the minutes of testimony, the evidence

that was presented during the jury trial in this particular case. The

Court has considered all available sentencing options to it under

applicable law.

Canady seizes on the reference to “minutes of testimony” and argues that

resentencing is required because the court considered an improper sentencing

factor. See State v. Lovell, 857 N.W.2d 241, 242–43 (Iowa 2014) (per curiam).

“Information contained in the minutes of testimony is not a permissible

sentencing consideration if unproven.” Id. at 243. Of course, Canady is correct

that his case went to trial and the minutes themselves were not admitted to by

the defendant or put into evidence. However, it is the defendant’s burden to

affirmatively demonstrate that the sentencing court relied on an improper factor.

State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 106 (Iowa 2020). We conclude the defendant

has not met that burden.

In this case, the district court did not stop after making the statement

quoted above. It went on to pronounce sentence and then provided the following

explanation:

The Court finds that the foregoing sentences imposed would

provide for the maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the

defendant and also significantly to protect the community from

further offenses by the defendant and others. The Court has

considered the defendant’s age, the defendant’s prior record, which

is extensive in light of the fact that he’s only 21 years of age, the

23

nature of the offenses committed, the fact that force and a weapon

was involved in the commission of these crimes, and the Court,

again, orders that the foregoing sentences be ordered to be served

consecutively based upon the separate and serious nature of the

offenses as well as the fact that the offenses in FECR112015 were

committed while the defendant was on parole -- or excuse me,

probation in File FECR105921.

The court’s explanation is complete in itself and does not mention an

improper factor. We are not persuaded that the district court considered any

unproven facts in the minutes of testimony. We trust that sentencing courts will

“filter out” any improper or irrelevant material in victim-impact statements

absent clear evidence to the contrary. State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 764 (Iowa

1998). Likewise, despite what appears to have been a verbal slip of the tongue,

we trust that the district court, which did a thorough and careful job of presiding

over this trial, filtered out anything in the minutes of testimony that wasn’t

actually proved at trial.

H. Consecutive Sentences. Canady contends that the district court gave

inadequate reasons for imposing consecutive sentences. See Hill, 878 N.W.2d at

274–75 (holding that the sentencing court must state reasons for imposing

consecutive sentences, but the reasons can be the same as the reasons for the

underlying sentence). We disagree. The court stated that it was imposing

consecutive sentences “based upon the separate and serious nature of the

offenses as well as the fact that the offenses in FECR112015 were committed

while the defendant was on . . . probation.” This was an adequate explanation.

V. Conclusion.

For the reasons stated, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and

24

affirm Canady’s convictions and sentence.7

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT

AFFIRMED.

7We deny Canady’s motion to strike the State’s notice of additional authorities as allegedly

containing improper “argument.” See Iowa R. App. P. 6.908(5) (“No further argument may be

included in the notice.”). The State’s notice of authorities was filed in response to the amicus

brief. Both parties had previously been given leave to file a response to the amicus brief. The

State apparently chose to file its response in the form of a list of eight authorities, with either a

quotation or a descriptive parenthetical for each authority.