United States v. Harold McGhee

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-1615

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

HAROLD U. MCGHEE,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois.

No. 1:22-cr-10007-001 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 21, 2024 — DECIDED APRIL 11, 2024

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, BRENNAN, and KIRSCH, Circuit

Judges.

BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Harold McGhee challenges many

of the proceedings that led to his convictions and sentence for

drug trafficking. His arguments are without merit or waived,

so we affirm the district court in full.

2 No. 23-1615

I

In August 2021, a confidential source informed law en-

forcement that a drug dealer was distributing large amounts

of cocaine in Peoria, Illinois. The source said the dealer drove

a Chevy Malibu and supplied cocaine to a house on West

Millman Street. With this information, details from other in-

formants, and a tracking warrant obtained in state court, the

police learned that McGhee lived on LaSalle Street, drove a

Chevy Malibu, and delivered cocaine. From this, they reason-

ably suspected that the drug dealer was McGhee.

Law enforcement investigated McGhee further. Between

August and December 2021, they conducted three controlled

buys. At the third buy, performed near the LaSalle Street

house and recorded on video, a confidential source met with

McGhee directly and purchased 8.5 grams of cocaine.

Two months later, agents conducted a trash pull at the

LaSalle Street house. Two large garbage cans were set out for

that day’s collection in the alley fifty feet behind the house

and outside its fenced-in yard. The garbage and garbage cans

were covered in snow. Three kitchen size bags were sitting in

the cans on top of the snow. Officers opened the bags and

found rubber gloves and baggies with a white powdery resi-

due, which tested positive for cocaine.

Based on all of this evidence, law enforcement obtained a

search warrant for the LaSalle Street house, the Chevy

Malibu, McGhee’s person, and his electronic devices. The af-

fidavit supporting the warrant recounted details of the inves-

tigation and included statements by confidential sources,

McGhee’s history of drug trafficking convictions, and his af-

filiation with the LaSalle Street house. The affidavit described

No. 23-1615 3

that house as the “SUBJECT PREMISES” and did not use that

phrase for any other building. When the warrant was exe-

cuted, police discovered nearly a kilogram of various drugs,

including methamphetamine, heroin, fentanyl, marijuana,

and cocaine (powder and crack). Law enforcement also recov-

ered a handgun and other paraphernalia related to drug traf-

ficking. McGhee was later charged with five drug-related

counts and three firearm counts.

McGhee sought to suppress the evidence recovered at the

LaSalle Street house and moved for a hearing to challenge the

validity of the search warrant under Franks v. Delaware, 438

U.S. 154 (1978). He argued the affidavit’s use of “SUBJECT

PREMISES,” in reference to both the LaSalle Street house and

the Millman Street house, was impermissibly ambiguous. The

district court denied the motion. McGhee’s appointed counsel

then withdrew, and McGhee pursued his defense pro se until

this appeal.

McGhee later renewed his motion to suppress, raising

only a new argument that the trash pull was constitutionally

unreasonable because it was executed without a warrant. To

him, this constitutional infirmity poisoned the evidence re-

covered during execution of the federal search warrant. Based

in part on testimony from law enforcement about the location

of the trash bags, the court denied McGhee’s motion.

The government sought a number of pretrial rulings. Two

are relevant here. First, it asked the district court to prohibit

McGhee from challenging the lawfulness of the searches or

seizures or asking witnesses to identify the confidential

sources. Second, the government requested a pretrial ruling

that McGhee had three prior convictions qualifying him for a

mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years under the

4 No. 23-1615

Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). McGhee ob-

jected to the second motion, asserting that one of the underly-

ing convictions—which he committed as a minor—did not

qualify as a “violent felony.” But, he also acknowledged that

the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit the use of the juve-

nile conviction to enhance his sentence. The court granted

both motions.

Jury trial commenced. Despite the court’s instruction that

the controlled buys were off-limits, McGhee repeatedly at-

tempted to establish that he did not engage in them. So, the

government requested permission to show the jury a video

capturing the third controlled buy. The court granted that re-

quest and denied McGhee’s request to call the confidential

source (heard in the video’s audio) to the stand, as the video

was played only to show that the buy occurred. The govern-

ment introduced the video through the testimony of Officer

David Logan. McGhee stated, “No objection,” when the video

was admitted into evidence.

On recross-examination of Logan, McGhee asked why the

cocaine from the third controlled buy was not in court with

the rest of the evidence. Logan responded it was still being

tested.1 During a sidebar, McGhee asked for the cocaine to be

admitted into evidence. The court directed the government to

attempt to retrieve it from the drug lab. The next day the

government produced the cocaine, and it was received into

evidence. After further recross, McGhee again insisted at a

sidebar that the confidential source testify and persisted in his

attempts to prove that the controlled buy never happened.

1 McGhee was not charged with anything arising out of that specific

buy, so that cocaine was not originally brought to trial.

No. 23-1615 5

On the fifth and final day of trial, the jury found McGhee

guilty on all counts.

About three months later, McGhee moved for a new trial,

arguing that the cocaine from the third controlled buy was

fabricated and that the buy never occurred. McGhee

contended that he learned from a call with the laboratory re-

sponsible for testing the cocaine that (1) the laboratory only

received evidence from 2022, not from 2021 when the con-

trolled buy occurred, and (2) the cocaine would have included

a sticker with information pertinent to its testing. He asserted

the evidence submitted at trial had no date and no time on it.

The cocaine then, he argued, was fabricated. The district court

denied McGhee’s motion.

The court sentenced McGhee to 420 months’ imprison-

ment. This sentence was within the Guidelines range and

included the ACCA enhancement requested by the govern-

ment. In pronouncing McGhee’s sentence, the court discussed

the required 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and heard McGhee’s

objections to the presentence report. McGhee did not raise a

constitutional objection to the application of the ACCA en-

hancement.

II

On appeal, McGhee raises ten challenges to the criminal

proceedings resulting in his convictions and sentence. We

consider some of his arguments on the merits and resolve oth-

ers on procedural grounds.

A

Four of McGhee’s contentions have been properly ap-

pealed.

6 No. 23-1615

1. Franks determination. McGhee asserts the district court

erred by permitting the government to respond during a

hearing on his Franks motion without permitting cross-exam-

ination and by denying the motion. This court reviews a dis-

trict court’s decision denying a Franks hearing for clear error.

United States v. McMurtrey, 704 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2013).

The district court’s factual findings receive deference, and its

legal determinations are reviewed de novo. United States v.

Taylor, 63 F.4th 637, 650 (7th Cir. 2023).

Under Franks, a defendant must make a “substantial pre-

liminary showing” that the affidavit supporting a search war-

rant is problematic. 438 U.S. at 170, 171. The court may, at its

discretion, hold a hearing “to determine whether the prelimi-

nary showing could be met.” United States v. Sanford, 35 F.4th

595, 598 (7th Cir. 2022). In making that showing, a defendant

“need not disprove” “reasonable explanations for the omis-

sion of the information … before the Franks hearing itself.”

United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2014).

Though the government is entitled to respond to a defend-

ant’s Franks motion, the district court must not—should it

elect to hold a hearing on that motion—permit the govern-

ment to bolster the affidavit without giving the defendant “a

full opportunity to challenge or rebut that evidence.”

McMurtrey, 704 F.3d at 509.

The district court did not procedurally err by allowing the

government to respond to McGhee’s Franks motion. The gov-

ernment did not introduce new evidence or call witnesses.

And the district court restricted its analysis to McGhee’s at-

tempted showing and the proof he offered that the affidavit

contained false statements, without weighing possible alter-

natives.

No. 23-1615 7

The court correctly denied McGhee’s motion for a Franks

hearing. A defendant must make three substantial prelimi-

nary showings to earn such a hearing: “(1) the warrant affida-

vit contained false statements, (2) these false statements were

made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth,

and (3) the false statements were material to the finding of

probable cause.” Sanford, 35 F.4th at 597 (quotation marks

omitted). The second showing requires “an offer of proof.”

Franks, 438 U.S. at 171.

McGhee asserts he met his burden by showing that the af-

fidavit contained two false statements, both of which were

necessary for the probable cause determination. First, he says

the state tracker warrants were falsified because they were

never filed with the state clerk’s office. Second, he says the

federal search warrant contradicts the state tracker warrant

because it is ambiguous as to whether a November 16, 2021

controlled buy occurred at the Milmann Street or LaSalle

Street house.

These assertions are not enough. The fact that the tracker

warrants were never filed is not proof that they were falsified.

McGhee’s conclusory statement does not follow from his offer

of proof. See United States v. Johnson, 580 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir.

2009) (concluding that defendant failed to meet burden to

show falsity of warrant where he “provide[d] no evidentiary

basis” for that assertion).

McGhee’s second assertion fares no better. He alleges the

search warrant confused the address the state tracker war-

rants targeted with the one the affidavit sought to search. The

tracker warrants mention only the Millman Street house,

whereas the search warrant identified the LaSalle Street

House—the “SUBJECT PREMISES”—as the “Property to Be

8 No. 23-1615

Searched.” McGhee argues that two uses of “SUBJECT

PREMISES” in the affidavit refer to the Millman Street house,

not the LaSalle Street house, and thus constitute a falsehood.

These two uses are not problematic. The best McGhee can

say is the federal warrant is ambiguous. But this is a factual

determination, to which we defer to the district court. Taylor,

63 F.4th at 650. And as that court put it, ambiguity does not

mean falsity. We conclude that the district court did not

clearly err in denying McGhee a Franks hearing.

2. Motion to suppress. We review a district court’s denial of

a motion to suppress de novo as to legal conclusions and for

clear error as to factual findings. United States v. Correa, 908

F.3d 208, 214 (7th Cir. 2018).

A person does not possess a “reasonable expectation of

privacy in the inculpatory items that [he] discarded” in “plas-

tic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street.” Cali-

fornia v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40, 41 (1988). That principle

rings truer when the bags are left in this manner for trash

pickup. Id. In that case, the person leaves the bags “for the

express purpose” of having strangers take and “sort[]

through” the items within. Id. at 40. As to homes more gener-

ally, the lack of a warrant prevents the physical occupation of

“private property for the purpose of obtaining information.”

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012). But the shield of

the Fourth Amendment ends at the boundary of a home’s cur-

tilage. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2013).

The evidence McGhee seeks to suppress was recovered

from garbage bags, found in garbage cans, sitting in an alley

outside the curtilage of the LaSalle house, awaiting trash

pickup. Therefore, the search occurred outside the reach of

No. 23-1615 9

McGhee’s reasonable expectation of privacy and comported

with Greenwood. “What a person knowingly exposes to the

public … is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). The search com-

plied with the Fourth Amendment, so McGhee’s motion to

suppress was properly denied.

3. Confrontation of confidential source. We review eviden-

tiary rulings affecting a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights

de novo. United States v. Foster, 701 F.3d 1142, 1150 (7th Cir.

2012). McGhee asserts these rights were violated when the

district court denied his request for the confidential source,

whose voice is heard during the controlled buy video, to tes-

tify at trial.

The Confrontation Clause “does not bar the use of testi-

monial statements for purposes other than establishing the

truth of the matter asserted.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.

36, 59 n.9 (2004). “[S]tatements providing context for other ad-

missible statements … are not offered for their truth.” United

States v. Van Sach, 458 F.3d 694, 701 (7th Cir. 2006). Therefore,

“[t]he admission of recorded conversations between inform-

ants and defendants is permissible where an informant’s

statements provide context for the defendant’s own admis-

sions.” Foster, 701 F.3d at 1150.

The district court did not violate McGhee’s Confrontation

Clause right. The court permitted the playing of the video

only as proof that the controlled buy occurred because

McGhee’s own questioning had opened the door. Whether

the source’s statements are true “is … immaterial.” Id. at 1151.

McGhee had no right to confront the confidential source.

10 No. 23-1615

4. McGhee’s sentence. McGhee argues his within-Guide-

lines sentence of 420 months’ imprisonment was unreasona-

ble because of three facts he did not raise with the sentencing

court: (a) he was convicted of a nonviolent crime; (b) he did

not use or threaten to use a firearm; and (c) his age.

A challenge to the substantive reasonableness of a sen-

tence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v.

Williams, 85 F.4th 844, 847 (7th Cir. 2023). When a district court

imposes a within-Guidelines sentence, our “deference is at its

peak.” Id. When challenging such a sentence, the defendant

must “demonstrat[e] that his … sentence is unreasonable

when measured against the factors set forth in § 3553(a).”

United States v. Vallar, 635 F.3d 271, 279 (7th Cir. 2011) (cleaned

up). If a district court offers an “adequate statement of its rea-

sons,” the sentence is reasonable. United States v. Annoreno,

713 F.3d 352, 359 (7th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).

The district court considered the § 3553(a) factors at the

sentencing hearing and in its statement of reasons. The court

noted the sheer amount of drugs at issue; McGhee’s aware-

ness of the harm those drugs could cause and his decision to

sell them; his prior offenses; his parents’ absence during child-

hood and his decision to join a gang; his epilepsy and past

drug abuse issues; his desire to receive a GED; and the fact

that he was not a good candidate for rehabilitation. These rea-

sons track several of the § 3553(a) factors, including the nature

and circumstance of the offense, McGhee’s history and char-

acteristics, his educational and vocational training, and his

medical care. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(D). The record

shows that the district court was also cognizant of the need to

impose a sentence that “reflects the seriousness of the offense,

promotes respect for the law, provides just punishment …

No. 23-1615 11

[and] adequate deterrence, and takes note” of the applicable

Guidelines. See id. §§ 3553(a)(2)(A), (a)(4).

The facts McGhee points to do not persuade us that the

district court abused its discretion. His arguments amount to

an objection to how the court weighed the § 3553(a) factors.

But that does not mean his sentence is unreasonable. McGhee

cannot overcome the presumption that his within-Guidelines

sentence is reasonable by contesting the district court’s

weighing decision. See United States v. Melendez, 819 F.3d 1006,

1013 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting that district courts enjoy “discre-

tion in assigning weights to the § 3553(a) factors” and affirm-

ing within-Guidelines sentence.) McGhee’s within-Guide-

lines sentence was reasonable.

B

Problems arise for McGhee’s six remaining arguments. He

waived them, they are moot, he failed to comply with the ap-

plicable circuit and procedural rules in briefing them, or some

combination of these obstacles dispose of these challenges.

1. McGhee failed to make two arguments in the district court, so

he waived them. A defendant can waive arguments in proceed-

ings before the district court. “Waiver occurs when a party in-

tentionally relinquishes a known right,” and it “extinguishes

error and precludes appellate review.” United States v. Flores,

929 F.3d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 2019).2 We ask “whether the de-

fendant’s decision not to object was knowing and inten-

tional,” which is “often” the case “where the defendant

chose—as a matter of strategy—not to present” an argument.

2 “Before issuing” Flores, the panel “circulated it to all judges in active

service under Circuit Rule 40(e). No judge voted to hear [the] case en banc.”

929 F.3d at 450 n.1.

12 No. 23-1615

Id. at 448. Similarly, a defendant can waive an argument by

affirmatively disclaiming an objection at trial. United States v.

Ridley, 826 F.3d 437, 443 n.1 (7th Cir. 2016).

McGhee argues on appeal that the court violated the

Eighth Amendment by applying the ACCA enhancement

based in part on a juvenile predicate offense. In response to

the government’s motion in limine in the district court,

McGhee expressly acknowledged that his Eighth Amend-

ment argument was foreclosed by caselaw. See United States v.

Salahuddin, 509 F.3d 858, 864 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that the

Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the use of a juvenile

conviction to support application of the ACCA enhancement).

And at sentencing, McGhee lodged six objections to the PSR,

but none referenced the Eighth Amendment or Salahuddin.

McGhee also asserts the district court erred by playing the

unauthenticated video of the third controlled buy. But before

the video was admitted and played, McGhee affirmatively

stated “No objection.” Each of these knowing and strategic

choices constitute waiver. Flores, 929 F.3d at 447–48.

2. McGhee failed to develop three more arguments on appeal, so

he waived them. Even when arguments are properly preserved,

a defendant can waive them on appeal. “[P]erfunctory and

undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsup-

ported by pertinent authority, are waived (even where those

arguments raise constitutional issues).” Crespo v. Colvin, 824

F.3d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 2016). It is not this court’s responsibility

to do the work of researching and constructing legal argu-

ments for parties, particularly those with counsel. Nelson v.

Napolitano, 657 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 2011).

No. 23-1615 13

Relatedly, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure

28(a)(8)(A), the argument section of an appellant’s brief must

include “citations to the authorities and parts of the record”

on which he relies. “Litigants must bear in mind that the fail-

ure to properly argue their contentions may well result in a

finding of abandonment.” 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &

ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 3974.1 (5th ed. Apr. 2023 update). That result applies in our

circuit. United States v. Hamzeh, 986 F.3d 1048, 1052 n.4 (7th

Cir. 2021).

McGhee asserts: (1) the Second Amendment required the

dismissal of his charge under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); (2) the testi-

mony of Logan regarding the controlled buy video was inad-

missible hearsay; and (3) his motion for a new trial should

have been granted because there was new evidence that some

of the cocaine presented at trial was fabricated. On each of

these arguments, McGhee cites little or no caselaw, provides

only conclusory statements, and gives few or no record cita-

tions.3 They are “perfunctory and undeveloped” and thus

waived. Crespo, 824 F.3d at 674.

3. McGhee’s argument to dismiss the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) charge

is moot. McGhee claims that the charge against him for violat-

ing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), which prohibits the use, carrying,

or possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking

3 McGhee’s new trial argument can also be rejected as untimely. A

motion for new trial must be filed within fourteen days, unless it alleges

new evidence. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(1), (2). McGhee waited more than

three months before filing this motion, and neither it nor his appeal

contend that he has any new evidence. He submits only that the evidence

presented at trial was “fabricated” and trial exhibits contained “irregular-

ities.” But he does not share the new evidence he supposedly discovered.

14 No. 23-1615

crime, should have been dismissed because he did not “use”

the firearm. McGhee was charged and convicted under the

possession prong only. And the second superseding—and

controlling—indictment dropped any mention of the carry

and use prongs. So, this argument is moot.

C

One last matter. Rules govern the appendix accompany-

ing an appellant’s brief. “The appellant must prepare and file

an appendix” containing “relevant docket entries” from the

proceeding in the district court. FED. R. APP. P. 30(a)(1)(A).

Our court is more specific: “The appellant shall submit,

bound with the main brief, an appendix containing the judg-

ment or order under review and any opinion, memorandum

of decision, findings of fact and conclusions of law, or oral

statement of reasons delivered by the trial court.” CIR. R.

30(a). We also require the appellant to certify that he has pro-

vided those materials. CIR. R. 30(d). There are consequences

for failing to comply with Rule 30. See 16AA WRIGHT &

MILLER § 3976.2 (describing actions courts may take against

appellants for noncompliance, including sanctions against

counsel, summary affirmance, or refusal to address argu-

ments). In criminal cases, the appropriate penalty for non-

compliance is a fine imposed on counsel. United States v.

Evans, 131 F.3d 1192, 1194 (7th Cir. 1997).

McGhee failed to observe these rules. His appendix con-

tains only his notice of appeal and the district court’s judg-

ment. Absent are the relevant docket entries and the district

court’s rulings and reasons (written or transcribed) necessary

to review nearly all of McGhee’s appellate arguments. Never-

theless, counsel certified “that all the materials required by

Circuit Rule 30(a), (b) and (d) are contained” in the appendix.

No. 23-1615 15

We decline to impose a fine here, but we admonish McGhee’s

counsel, and remind the bar, to adhere to Federal Rule of Ap-

pellate Procedure 30 and Circuit Rule 30.

* * *

We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court in all re-

spects.