Elizabeth Cox v. Kyle Vaughan

04/10/2024

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs March 1, 2024

ELIZABETH COX V. KYLE VAUGHAN

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Carter County

No. C14486 Suzanne Cook, Judge

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No. E2023-00930-COA-R3-CV

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The pro se plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her legal malpractice action against

her former attorney. The trial court found that the plaintiff failed to offer any proof in

support of her claim of negligence against the defendant attorney. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. STEVEN STAFFORD,

P.J., W.S., and JEFFREY USMAN, J., joined.

Elizabeth Cox, Elizabethton, Tennessee, pro se.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

On October 27, 2014, Elizabeth Cox (“Plaintiff”) was involved in a motor vehicle

accident in Washington County, Tennessee with her motor home and another vehicle.

Plaintiff took her motor home to Chaparral Buick GMC for repairs (“GMC”). GMC

completed the repairs and returned the motor home. Plaintiff discovered several issues

with the job completed by GMC. Plaintiff employed attorney Kyle Vaughan

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Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee provides:

This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse

or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion

would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall

be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall not be published, and shall not be

cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.

(“Defendant”)2 to represent her in an action she sought to file against Farm Bureau

Insurance Company, State Farm Insurance Company, GMC, and the other driver involved

in the accident. Plaintiff provided Defendant with a $2,000 retainer and executed a retainer

agreement on October 20, 2015. The agreement limited Defendant’s representation to his

pursuit of an action against GMC.

Defendant never filed any action on Plaintiff’s behalf and avoided communication

with her. Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Tennessee Board of Professional

Responsibility in September 2018. The Board complaint was resolved by placing

Defendant on diversion, pending his completion of a practice and professional

enhancement program. Defendant ultimately returned the $2,000 retainer.

On January 31, 2019, Plaintiff filed this civil action against Defendant, alleging

negligence relating to his legal representation, i.e., legal malpractice. Plaintiff asserted the

statute of limitations had expired on a number of her claims as a result of Defendant’s

failure to file her claims as promised. Defendant denied liability and moved for summary

judgment, arguing that the retainer agreement limited the scope of his representation to her

claims against GMC for breach of contract of implied and express warranties, which carry

a six-year statute of limitations. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-109(a)(3) (providing that

causes of action based upon contract must be commenced within six years after the cause

of action accrued). Defendant asserted that Plaintiff’s claims against GMC had not yet

expired. Defendant noted that he had also refunded Plaintiff’s money, thereby establishing

that Plaintiff had not been harmed by any alleged negligence.

On June 23, 2020, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment,

holding that genuine issues of material fact remained including (1) the scope of

Defendant’s representation as a result of any oral representations made and (2) whether the

repairs made by GMC were sufficient to make Plaintiff whole or whether the damages

claimed were caused by the accident or an unrelated cause. The court set the action for a

hearing on October 30, 2020.

Defendant moved for a continuance, citing his unavailability as a result of his

incarceration on a one-year sentence, beginning July 21, 2020. The court reset the action

for September 14, 2022. Defendant did not appear, and Plaintiff requested a continuance,

citing the unavailability of her witnesses. The court reset the action once more for June 5,

2023, cautioning Plaintiff that this continuance would be the last continuance provided.

The court advised that the matter would be dismissed with prejudice if Plaintiff was not

prepared with witnesses and evidence on that date.

On June 5, 2023, Plaintiff appeared for the hearing. Defendant did not appear. The

court dismissed the action with prejudice, holding that Plaintiff failed to offer any proof as

2

Defendant no longer practices law and was permanently disbarred on April 21, 2022.

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to (1) negligence by Defendant; (2) breach of duty by Defendant; (3) legal causation of

alleged damages; and (4) damages.

Plaintiff timely filed this appeal, arguing that she was present on the day of the

hearing with the owner of Danny’s Auto Glass and Upholstery, who was prepared to testify

concerning the damages to her motor home. She provided that she never spoke of

Defendant’s negligence “because that was NOT what this court was scheduled for.” She

believed that she merely had to establish her damages because Defendant failed to appear

at the prior hearing.

“Trial courts possess inherent, common-law authority to control their dockets and

the proceedings in their courts. Their authority is quite broad and includes the express

authority to dismiss cases for failure to prosecute or to comply with the Tennessee Rules

of Civil Procedure or the orders of the court.” Hodges v. Attorney Gen., 43 S.W.3d 918,

921 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). We review such decisions under an abuse of discretion

standard. Id. “A trial court abuses its discretion only when it ‘applie[s] an incorrect legal

standard, or reache[s] a decision which is against logic or reasoning that cause[s] an

injustice to the party complaining.’” State v. Shirley, 6 S.W.3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 1999).

The abuse of discretion standard does not allow an appellate court to substitute its judgment

for that of the trial court. Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d 920, 927 (Tenn. 1998).

The record reflects that the court set the hearing to address Plaintiff’s claim of legal

malpractice against Defendant and any alleged damages as a result of his malpractice. A

plaintiff in a legal malpractice action must establish the following elements:

(1) that the accused attorney owed a duty to the plaintiff, (2) that the attorney

breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered damages, (4) that the breach

was the cause in fact of the plaintiff’s damages, and (5) that the attorney’s

negligence was the proximate, or legal, cause of the plaintiff’s damages.

Gibson v. Trant, 58 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Tenn. 2001) (citations omitted); Shearon v. Seaman,

198 S.W.3d 209, 214 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (listing the same elements). “In order to prove

damages in a legal malpractice action, a plaintiff must prove that [s]he would have obtained

relief in the underlying lawsuit, but for the attorney’s malpractice; consequently, the trial

of a legal malpractice claim becomes, in effect, a ‘trial within a trial.’” Shearon, 198

S.W.3d at 214 (quoting Gibson, 58 S.W.3d at 108). While the damages to her motor home

were a relevant issue, Plaintiff did not offer evidence concerning Defendant’s negligence

in his representation or whether his negligence was the proximate cause of her damages.

We believe that the aforementioned misunderstanding was due, in part, to Plaintiff’s

status as a pro se litigant. This court “must not excuse pro se litigants from complying with

the same substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are expected to observe.”

Young v. Barrow, 130 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Edmundson v. Pratt,

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945 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)). It is well-settled that “[w]hile a party who

chooses to represent himself or herself is entitled to the fair and equal treatment of the

courts, [p]ro se litigants are not . . . entitled to shift the burden of litigating their case[s] to

the courts.” Chiozza v. Chiozza, 315 S.W.3d 482, 487 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (internal

citations omitted).

Plaintiff failed to set forth any evidence concerning Defendant’s negligence. We

cannot task the trial court with the responsibility of litigating Plaintiff’s claim on her behalf.

With all of the above considerations in mind, we affirm the decision of the trial court. The

case is remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary. Costs of the appeal

are taxed to the appellant, Elizabeth Cox.

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JOHN W. MCCLARTY, JUDGE

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