William Martin v. Mauricio Duran

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-10841

____________________

WILLIAM MARTIN,

MICHAEL MARTIN,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

versus

MIAMI DADE COUNTY,

a Florida County and Political Subdivision

of the State of Florida,

Defendant,

MAURICIO DURAN,

Miami-Dade County Police Officer

in his individual and official capacity,

BRIDGET DOYLE,

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Miami-Dade County Police Officer

in her individual and official capacity,

Defendants-Appellants.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-22107-PAS

____________________

Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

HULL, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs-Appellees Michael and William Martin (the

“Martins”) filed an amended complaint alleging claims of false

arrest, excessive force, and malicious prosecution against

Defendants-Appellants Officers Mauricio Duran and Bridget Doyle

(the “Officers”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Officers moved to

dismiss based on qualified immunity, which the district court

denied. This is the Officers’ appeal.

After review and with the benefit of oral argument, we

(1) affirm the denial of qualified immunity as to the Martins’ false

arrest and excessive force claims; (2) reverse the denial of qualified

immunity as to the Martins’ malicious prosecution claims; and

(3) remand for further proceedings.

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I. AMENDED COMPLAINT

At this motion-to-dismiss stage, we accept the facts alleged

in the amended complaint as true and construe them in the light

most favorable to the Martins. See Ounjian v. Globoforce, Inc., 89

F.4th 852, 856 (11th Cir. 2023). The amended complaint also refers

to Officer Doyle’s body camera video of the incident. As to the

video, we construe ambiguities in favor of the Martins but accept

the video’s depiction to the extent it “is clear and obviously

contradicts the [Martins’] alleged facts.”1 See Baker v. City of

Madison, 67 F.4th 1268, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2023); see also Scott v.

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007) (stating a court should view the

facts in the light depicted by the video where it “utterly discredit[s]”

a party’s version of events). Applying those standards, we recount

the facts in the light most favorable to the Martins.

A. Facts

Plaintiffs Michael and William Martin are brothers. Just

before 3:00 a.m. on January 10, 2018, the Martins were walking

from a gym through a parking lot headed to their car in a separate

parking lot. The incident took place in the first parking lot, which

we refer to as “the parking lot.”

The Martins were dressed in gym attire—hoodies and

basketball shorts—and carried backpacks, and Michael carried a

water bottle. In the parking lot, Officer Duran approached the

1 The parties agree this video was incorporated by reference into the amended

complaint.

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Martins as they were walking through the lot to their car. Shortly

thereafter, Officer Doyle arrived and activated her body camera

video (the “video”), which had audio too.

The video begins with Officer Doyle walking through an

alley and arriving in the parking lot where Officer Duran and the

Martins are. The video shows (1) no cars in the parking lot, save

Officer Duran’s police car with its emergency lights activated,

(2) the Martins are attempting to walk across the lot toward their

car and are engaged in no other activity, and (3) Officer Duran is

walking closely behind the Martins.2 The arrests occur in the next

38 seconds of the video.

The first 27 seconds of that 38 seconds of the video show

Officer Duran grabbing William’s arm twice and then taking

Michael down to the ground. Specifically, as the Martins walk,

Officer Duran grabs William’s arm, preventing him from walking

and crossing the lot. Michael then tells Officer Duran to “get your

hands off of him,” “this is assault,” and “do not touch him.”

William pulls away from Officer Duran’s grasp, and the Martins

continue walking toward their car.

Officer Duran then states that the Martins are “in the wrong

place.” Michael states, “What have I done besides walk to my car?”

Officer Duran asks, “Do you have a car here? Where’s your car at?”

2 At the time Officer Doyle arrives, there is some audio noise but she is not

close enough at first to the location of Officer Duran and the Martins for the

audio to clearly capture what was said at her arrival.

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Michael responds, “That’s my business,” and William responds,

“I’m walking to it.” Officer Doyle replies to Michael, “It’s not [your

business]; it’s ours.”

Officer Duran then grabs William’s arm a second time and

says, “I’m telling you to stop.” At this point, the body camera video

becomes obscured by Officer Duran, but Michael can be heard

saying, “Yo, if you touch him again, that’s assault.” After this

statement, Officer Duran performs a take-down maneuver on

Michael, sweeping out his legs and slamming him into the ground.

Before the takedown, Officer Duran had not said or even hinted

that Michael was under arrest.

The next 15 seconds of the video show the tasing of

William. As Officer Duran pins Michael to the ground, William

approaches and says, “Get off my brother,” “you’re assaulting

him,” and “he didn’t do anything wrong and you know it.” From

the ground, Officer Duran instructs Officer Doyle to tase William,

which she does.

As Officer Duran continues to pin Michael to the ground,

both brothers state that their car is nearby and they have the keys.

Officer Doyle says to Michael, “We asked you to stop walking and

did you fucking stop? No.” Michael responds, “We don’t have to

stop.”

Eventually, additional police officers respond and the

brothers are charged with loitering or prowling, battery on a law

enforcement officer, and resisting an officer with violence. At their

criminal trial, the jury acquitted the Martins.

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B. Police Report

After the Martins’ arrests, the Officers prepared a police

report about the incident. The Martins’ amended complaint

quotes several statements the Officers wrote in the police report.

That police report, as quoted in the amended complaint, states

Officer Duran (1) watched the Martins to “see their intent” “due to

the time of night,” (2) approached the Martins because he

“observed both black males walking slowly looking into the parked

county vehicle and officers’ personal cars inside the station parking

lot,” and (3) “due to their unorthodox behavior and the time of

night, [] requested additional units to assist in stopping both males

to question their intentions in the area.”

The Officers argue we must accept the statements in the

police report as true and that they established reasonable suspicion

for Officer Duran to stop the Martins by grabbing William’s arm

twice and then taking down Michael. We disagree. The amended

complaint did quote the police report’s statements but also alleged

that the police report was “materially false” and was contradicted

by Officer Doyle’s body camera video. Moreover, before Officer

Duran’s grabbing of William’s arm twice, the video shows no

conduct by the Martins other than their walking through the

parking lot and both saying they were walking to their car. The

amended complaint also alleged, and the video confirms, that

Officer Duran approached the Martins in an empty parking lot

devoid of cars. The video shows only Officer Duran’s police car.

And the amended complaint also contained statements that

contradict those in the police report, including that the Martins

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were walking casually through the parking lot without cars and

“were not engaged in any apparent criminal activity, as they were

walking to their vehicle.”

Given the amended complaint alleges the police report is

materially false and the video and amended complaint taken

together contradict the police report, we cannot consider the police

report as true for the purposes of this appeal of the motion to

dismiss. See Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1270 (11th Cir. 2014)

(stating, where a civil rights plaintiff alleges the contents of a police

report are false, “the contents of the report cannot be considered

as true for the purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss”).

Therefore, under the amended complaint’s allegations and

the video in the light most favorable to the Martins, Officer Duran

encountered the Martins, two Black males, at 3:00 a.m. while they

were walking from a gym across the parking lot to their car and

engaging in no other conduct. Officer Duran followed them and

forcibly grabbed William’s arm twice while William was walking.

Michael verbally objected twice when Officer Duran grabbed

William’s arm. Officer Duran then slammed Michael into the

ground. William then verbally objected and was tased by Officer

Doyle. With this version of events, we turn to qualified immunity.3

See Ounjian, 89 F.4th at 856; Baker, 67 F.4th at 1277-78.

3 The Officers’ brief relies heavily on the police report’s statement that Officer

Duran observed “both black males walking slowly looking into the parked

County vehicle and officer[s’] personal cars inside the station parking lot.” As

outlined above, the Martins’ amended complaint contradicts that statement,

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II. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

“Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing

room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open

legal questions.” Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 243 (2014) (quotation

marks omitted). If an official was acting within his discretionary

authority, the plaintiff must establish that the official is not entitled

to qualified immunity by showing the official’s conduct (1) violated

a constitutional right (2) that was clearly established at the time of

the official’s conduct. Roberts v. Spielman, 643 F.3d 899, 904 (11th

Cir. 2011). For a constitutional right to be clearly established,

“existing precedent must have placed the statutory or

constitutional question confronted by the official beyond debate.”

Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014) (quotation marks

omitted).

It is undisputed that the Officers were acting within their

discretionary authority. So we evaluate whether the Martins have

shown the Officers’ conduct violated clearly established

constitutional rights.4

and the video, which starts at Officer Doyle’s arrival, does not show any cars

other than Officer Duran’s in the parking lot where the Martins and Officer

Duran are standing. So that disputed fact is a key issue in the case and for the

jury to determine.

4 We review de novo the district court’s denial of qualified immunity at the

motion-to-dismiss stage. Est. of Cummings v. Davenport, 906 F.3d 934, 939 (11th

Cir. 2018).

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III. FALSE ARREST

“Under the Fourth Amendment, an individual has a right to

be free from ‘unreasonable searches and seizures.’” Skop v. City of

Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007). To conduct a brief

investigatory stop consistent with the Fourth Amendment, an

officer must have “a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal

activity is afoot.” Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1165 (11th Cir.

2000) (quotation marks omitted). The question “is not whether

reasonable suspicion existed in fact, but whether the officer had

‘arguable’ reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory stop.”

Id. at 1166.

In addition, “an arrest is a seizure of the person.” Skop, 485

F.3d at 1137. “Probable cause to arrest exists when law

enforcement officials have facts and circumstances within their

knowledge sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that the suspect

had committed or was committing a crime.” Id. (quotation marks

omitted). In the qualified immunity context, an officer need not

have actual probable cause; arguable probable cause will suffice. Id.

At the time of the Officers’ conduct in 2018, it was clearly

established that a stop made without arguable reasonable suspicion

and an arrest made without arguable probable cause violate the

Fourth Amendment. See id. at 1143; Sauls, 206 F.3d at 1166. Under

the Martins’ version of events, the Officers lacked both arguable

reasonable suspicion to stop and arguable probable cause to arrest

the Martins. In 2018, any reasonable police officer would know

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that he or she could not stop and arrest the Martins for merely

walking through a parking lot at night.

That Michael verbally objected to Officer Duran’s grabbing

William’s arm twice, and that the two Martin brothers walked

away from Officer Duran, also do not show arguable reasonable

suspicion to stop or arguable probable cause to arrest. The

freedom of individuals to verbally object to police action without

thereby risking arrest was well established and well known in 2018.

See Skop, 485 F.3d at 1139. “[W]hen an officer, without reasonable

suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the

individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business.

And any refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the

minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or

seizure.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (quotation

marks and citation omitted). While police officers enjoy the liberty

to address questions to other persons in public spaces, the person

addressed ordinarily “has an equal right to ignore his interrogator

and walk away.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980)

(quotation marks omitted).

The Officers also argue they obtained probable cause for the

arrest due to the Martins’ resistance conduct after Officer Duran

swept out Michael’s legs and threw him to the ground. But the

Martins’ post-arrest conduct cannot supply the probable cause

necessary to initiate the arrest. See Davis v. City of Apopka, 78 F.4th

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1326, 1333 n.3 (11th Cir. 2023) (“Probable cause is measured at the

time of the arrest, not at some time before or after.”).5

The Officers further argue they had “at least arguable

probable cause to arrest Michael for assault” because a “reasonable

officer could have interpreted Michael saying ‘Yo, if you touch him

again—’ as a threat.” What Michael actually said—plain as day on

Officer Doyle’s body camera video—was “Yo, if you touch him

again, that’s assault.” Despite our typical deference to police

officers’ discretion in fast-paced situations, see Gates v. Khokhar, 884

F.3d 1290, 1298 (11th Cir. 2018), we must, of course, credit the

5 The Officers suggest Officer Duran had reasonable suspicion to stop the

Martins merely because they were walking at night, in dark-colored clothing,

through the parking lot of a closed establishment. The Officers’ cited Eleventh

Circuit cases, however, involved additional factors not present here. See, e.g.,

United States v. Hernandez, 418 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting

Hernandez was found speeding in her car at night in severe weather, gave an

implausible excuse for speeding, told conflicting accounts of her trip’s length

and purpose, did not know the trip’s destination, was traveling between two

main source cities for narcotics, and exhibited abnormal nervousness); United

States v. Hardy, 806 F. App’x 718, 721-22 (11th Cir. 2020) (noting Hardy wore

all black clothing at night, was found in a high-crime area near where a 911

call about a “prowler” had just been made, and gave the officer an “unlikely”

story for his presence in the area); United States v. Ligon, 2022 WL 2091598, at

*2-3 (11th Cir. 2022) (noting Ligon was found in black clothing, walking in a

roadway at night in a high-crime area near where a murder had recently

occurred, and matched a description of the murder suspect); United States v.

Briggman, 931 F.2d 705, 709 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting Briggman was in a parked

car at 4:00 a.m. in a high-crime area where the nearby commercial

establishments were closed, wore “suspicious clothing,” and attempted to

evade police prior to the stop).

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Martins’ version of the statement, which is supported by the

footage, not the Officers’. No reasonable officer could construe “if

you touch him again, that’s assault,” as a threat to do bodily harm

to the Officers. Thus, this statement cannot provide arguable

probable cause to arrest Michael for assault. See Fla. Stat.

§ 784.011(1) (“An ‘assault’ is an intentional, unlawful threat by word

or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled with an

apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which creates a

well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is

imminent.”).

As to William, the Officers argue they had arguable probable

cause to arrest him for battery because (1) after the takedown,

William moved toward Officer Duran and said, “Get off my

brother,” and (2) when Officer Doyle reached out to grab William,

William turned around and pushed her. But this push is not alleged

in the complaint, and it is not visible on the body camera video.

Given the amended complaint and the body camera video

together, the Officers did not have arguable probable cause to arrest

William for battery. See Fla Stat § 784.03(1)(a) (stating battery

occurs when one “[a]ctually and intentionally touches or strikes

another person against the will of the other”).

Accordingly, we affirm the denial of qualified immunity on

the Martins’ false arrest claims.

IV. EXCESSIVE FORCE

The Martins alleged two alternative theories for their

excessive force claims: (1) the Officers’ use of force was excessive

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because they lacked arguable probable suspicion/cause to detain or

arrest them, so any force at all was excessive; and

(2) “[a]lternatively,” even if the Officers’ detention and arrest of the

Martins was lawful, the force used in effectuating the arrest

remains excessive. 6

A. Artificial Claim

The Martins’ first theory is an “artificial” excessive force

claim—a claim that any force used was excessive because the stop

and arrest were unlawful. See Richmond v. Badia, 47 F.4th 1172, 1180

(11th Cir. 2022). It is true that “if a stop or arrest is illegal, then

there is no basis for any threat or any use of force[.]” Sauls, 206 F.3d

at 1171 (emphasis added). However, an “artificial” excessive force

claim is not a discrete claim and is subsumed within a false arrest

claim. Id.

While the Martins’ “artificial” excessive force claims fail to

state independent excessive force claims, they remain relevant to

any subsequent determination of damages on their false arrest

claims, as they may recover “damages suffered because of the use

of force in effecting the arrest.” See Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155,

6 It is well-settled that plaintiffs may assert alternative and contradictory

theories of liability. Adinolfe v. United Techs. Corp., 768 F.3d 1161, 1175 (11th

Cir. 2014); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2). At oral argument, the Officers suggested

that the Martins failed to plead alternative theories for their excessive force

claims. We disagree because the Martins’ pleading was sufficient to satisfy

Rule 8(d)(2).

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158 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Motes v. Myers, 810 F.2d 1055, 1060 (11th

Cir. 1987) (“It is obvious that if the jury finds the arrest

unconstitutional, the use of force and the search were

unconstitutional and they become elements of damages for the

§ 1983 violation.”).

B. Genuine Claim

The Martins’ second theory is a “genuine” excessive force

claim because it “relates to the manner in which an arrest was

carried out, independent of whether law enforcement had the

power to arrest.” See Richmond, 47 F.4th at 1180 (quotation marks

omitted). When a false arrest claim and a “genuine” excessive force

claim stem from the same incident, the two claims “must be

analyzed independently.” Id. at 1181 (quotation marks omitted).

Taking the amended complaint’s allegations and the video

in the light most favorable to the Martins, we cannot say that the

Martins fail to state plausible “genuine” excessive force claims. The

Officers’ uses of force—slamming Michael into the ground and

tasing William—were not “reasonably proportionate to the need

for that force” given the totality of the circumstances facing the

Officers prior to that force. See Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1251

(11th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). While the audio does

capture some verbal objection to Officer Duran’s conduct, there is

no clear or obvious physical aggression or resistance shown by

either Martin brother prior to the Officers’ use of force. At most,

the video becomes obscured and unclear at that point, and we must

construe any ambiguities in the Martins’ favor.

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Further, it was clearly established at the time of the Officers’

conduct that a gratuitous use of force is excessive when a suspect

is not resisting arrest. See Saunders, 766 F.3d at 1267 (characterizing

as gratuitous force an officer slamming a non-resisting suspect’s

head into the ground); see also Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272,

1292 (11th Cir. 2011) (stating it is clearly established that using a

taser “is excessive where the suspect is non-violent and has not

resisted arrest”).

Thus, we affirm the denial of qualified immunity on the

Martins’ “genuine” excessive force claims.

V. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

We first distinguish between false arrest and malicious

prosecution claims and the distinct seizures required for each

claim. Under the Fourth Amendment, a claim of false arrest

concerns a seizure without legal process, such as the warrantless

arrests here. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389-90 (2007) (stating

false arrest claims cover seizures without legal process); Williams v.

Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1158 (11th Cir. 2020) (“A claim of false arrest

or imprisonment under the Fourth Amendment concerns seizures

without legal process, such as warrantless arrests.”); Sylvester v.

Fulton Cnty. Jail, 94 F.4th 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2024) (stating “[a]

‘false arrest’ claim challenges as constitutionally deficient an

officer’s on-the-spot determination of probable cause” without

legal process).

In contrast, a claim of malicious prosecution requires a

seizure pursuant to legal process. See McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. ----,

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139 S. Ct. 2149, 2157 (2019) (“Looking first to the common law, . . .

malicious prosecution permits damages for confinement imposed

pursuant to legal process.” (quotation marks omitted)); Nieves v.

Bartlett, 587 U.S. ----, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1726 (2019) (“At common law,

false imprisonment arose from a detention without legal process,

whereas malicious prosecution was marked by wrongful institution

of legal process.” (quotation marks omitted)); Luke v. Gulley, 975

F.3d 1140, 1143 (11th Cir. 2020) (stating malicious prosecution “is

shorthand for a claim of deprivation of liberty pursuant to legal

process” (quotation marks omitted)); Williams, 965 F.3d at 1158

(“Malicious prosecution . . . requires a seizure pursuant to legal

process.” (quotation marks omitted)); Kingsland v. City of Miami,

382 F.3d 1220, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating a malicious prosecution

claim must be based on an unlawful seizure “in relation to the

prosecution”), abrogated on other grounds by Williams, 965 F.3d at

1159. Seizures pursuant to legal process may include a

warrant-based arrest and arrests following arraignment,

indictment, or a probable cause hearing. Williams, 965 F.3d at 1158;

see, e.g., Sylvester, 94 F.4th at 1330 (“A ‘malicious prosecution’ claim

is that an officer used a constitutionally deficient legal process to

effectuate an arrest—here, an allegedly defective warrant.”).

Here, the Martins presented no allegation of an unlawful

seizure pursuant to legal process, nor are there facts from which

we can draw a reasonable inference of such a seizure. While the

Martins argue their warrantless arrests may support their malicious

prosecution claims, the precedent above shows otherwise. Simply

put, the Martins’ warrantless arrests were not seizures pursuant to

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legal process and cannot support their malicious prosecution

claims. See Williams, 965 F.3d at 1158. And the Martins failed to

allege any subsequent unlawful seizure pursuant to legal process.

We recognize that the Martins argue, and the district court

concluded, that this Court’s Kingsland decision was abrogated by

the Supreme Court in Nieves and this Court in Williams. Nieves and

Williams, however, did not abrogate Kingsland’s holding about the

legal process requirement; if anything, they confirmed it, as

outlined above. Indeed, Williams expressly recognized that a

warrantless arrest constitutes a seizure without legal process and

will not support a malicious prosecution claim. Williams, 965 F.3d

at 1158.

Williams also carefully explained how Nieves undermined

Kingsland only to the extent Kingsland turned to modern Florida tort

law to determine the common law elements of malicious

prosecution. See Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1234 (stating that, in addition

to an unlawful seizure pursuant to legal process, a plaintiff alleging

malicious prosecution must establish the common law elements of

malicious prosecution, and turning to modern Florida tort law for

those common law elements); Williams, 965 F.3d at 1159

(addressing Kingsland and stating that Nieves “clarified that the

relevant common-law principles are those that were ‘well settled at

the time of [section 1983’s] enactment,’” not those developed by

modern state tort law (quoting Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1726)).

For completeness, we note that the district court also relied

on three other decisions to conclude that the Martins’ warrantless

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arrests could support their malicious prosecution claims: Grider v.

City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2010); Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d

872 (11th Cir. 2003); and Manners v. Cannella, 891 F.3d 959 (11th Cir.

2018). But tellingly, Grider and Wood both concerned malicious

prosecution claims stemming from warrant-based arrests—i.e.,

seizures pursuant to legal process. See Grider, 618 F.3d at 1249;

Wood, 323 F.3d at 876; Williams, 965 F.3d at 1164 (noting Wood

“considered only [a] seizure[] pursuant to a warrant”). They

cannot be read as holding that warrantless arrests, i.e. seizures

without legal process, can support a malicious prosecution claim.

See Williams, 965 F.3d at 1158.

Additionally, although Manners analyzed a malicious

prosecution claim stemming from a warrantless arrest, this Court

ultimately concluded that the claim failed because the officer had

probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. Manners, 891 F.3d at 969, 975.

In any event, the precedent in Wallace, McDonough, Nieves, and

Kingsland control, not Manners. See also Williams, 965 F.3d at 1159

(explaining how Manners relied on “the erroneous premise that a

seizure without legal process . . . could sustain a claim of malicious

prosecution”).

We conclude that the district court erred in denying the

Officers qualified immunity on the Martins’ malicious prosecution

claims because their warrantless arrests were on-the-spot seizures

and without legal process.

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VI. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we (1) affirm the denial of qualified

immunity as to the Martins’ false arrest and excessive force claims,

(2) reverse the denial of qualified immunity as to the Martins’

malicious prosecution claims, and (3) remand for further

proceedings.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.