Wilkinson v. Garland

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

WILKINSON v. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 22–666. Argued November 28, 2023—Decided March 19, 2024

Congress gives immigration judges discretionary power to cancel the re-

moval of a noncitizen and instead permit the noncitizen to remain in

the country lawfully. 8 U. S. C. §§1229b(a)–(b). An IJ faced with an

application for cancellation of removal proceeds in two steps: The IJ

must decide first whether the noncitizen is eligible for cancellation of

removal under the statutory criteria. If the IJ finds the noncitizen

statutorily eligible, the IJ must then decide whether to exercise discre-

tion and grant relief. For determining eligibility, Congress has enu-

merated four statutory criteria, one of which requires the noncitizen

to “establis[h] that removal would result in exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship to [the noncitizen’s] spouse, parent, or child,” who is

a U. S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. §1229b(b)(1)(D).

Petitioner Situ Kamu Wilkinson was arrested and detained by Im-

migration and Customs Enforcement for remaining in the United

States beyond the expiration of his tourist visa. Wilkinson applied for

cancellation of removal based in part on hardship to his 7-year-old,

U. S.-born son, M., who suffers from a serious medical condition and

relies on Wilkinson for emotional and financial support. To meet the

hardship standard, Wilkinson had to show that M. “would suffer hard-

ship that is substantially different from or beyond that which would

ordinarily be expected to result from [his] removal.” In re Monreal-

Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 62. Considering all of the hardship fac-

tors presented by Wilkinson in the aggregate, the IJ held that M.’s

situation did not meet the statutory standard for “exceptional and ex-

tremely unusual” hardship and denied Wilkinson’s application. The

Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Third Circuit held that

it lacked the jurisdiction necessary to review the IJ’s discretionary

hardship determination. This Court granted certiorari to determine

2 WILKINSON v. GARLAND

Syllabus

whether the IJ’s “exceptional and extremely unusual” hardship deter-

mination is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under

§1252(a)(2)(D) or whether that determination is discretionary and

therefore unreviewable under §1252(a)(2)(B)(i).

Held: The Third Circuit erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to

review the IJ’s determination in this case. Pp. 7–16.

(a) The Third Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction on the basis of

§1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which makes unreviewable any “judgment[s] regard-

ing the granting of [discretionary] relief” under §1229b’s cancellation

of removal provision. Section 1252(a)(2)(D), however, restores juris-

diction to review “questions of law.” The interaction between these two

provisions is governed by two of this Court’s previous cases: Guerrero-

Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221, and Patel v. Garland, 596 U. S. 328.

In Guerrero-Lasprilla, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that whether a

noncitizen acted diligently in attempting to reopen removal proceed-

ings for purposes of equitable tolling was a question of fact, not a ju-

risdiction-restoring “questio[n] of law”. This Court reversed, holding

that “questions of law” in §1252(a)(2)(D) included mixed questions of

law and fact. 589 U. S., at 225. The Court rejected the Government’s

argument that “questions of law” referred only to mixed questions that

are primarily legal rather than primarily factual. Then, in Patel, this

Court affirmed an Eleventh Circuit holding that it lacked jurisdiction

to review an IJ’s factual credibility determinations that fell within

§1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s jurisdictional bar. In so doing, the Court held that

§1252(a)(2)(D) did not restore jurisdiction in the case because “ques-

tions of fact” are indisputably not “questions of law.” Pp. 7–11.

(b) Wilkinson argues that §1252(a)(2)(D) restores jurisdiction in this

case because the threshold question whether a noncitizen is statutorily

eligible for cancellation of removal requires a court to assess whether

an IJ correctly applied the statutory standard to a given set of facts.

Guerrero-Lasprilla compels the conclusion that the application of the

statutory “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard to a

given set of facts presents a mixed question of law and fact. A mixed

question may require “primarily legal or factual work,” and just be-

cause it may require a court to immerse itself in facts does not trans-

form the question into one of fact. U. S. Bank N. A. v. Village at Lak-

eridge, LLC, 583 U. S. 387, 396.

In this case, the application of the hardship standard—which re-

quires an IJ to evaluate a number of factors in determining whether

any hardship to a U. S. citizen or permanent-resident family member

is substantially different from what would normally be expected in the

removal of a close family member—concededly requires a close exami-

nation of the facts. As in Guerrero-Lasprilla, a mixed question that

requires close engagement with the facts is still a mixed question, and

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 3

Syllabus

therefore a “questio[n] of law” reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D). And

as in Patel, the IJ’s underlying factual determinations that Wilkinson

was credible or that M. had a serious medical condition would be un-

reviewable factual questions under §1252(a)(2)(D). Pp. 11–12.

(c) The Government’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. First,

nothing in Guerrero-Lasprilla or this Court’s other precedents limits

that case solely to judicially created standards like the “due diligence”

standard for equitable tolling. And this Court has frequently observed

that the application of a “statutory standard” presents a mixed ques-

tion of law and fact. See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S.

273, 289, n. 19. Second, the case of Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v.

United States, 277 U. S. 551, on which the Government relies, has no

relevance to the question presented here on §1252(a)(2)(D), and the

Government provides no basis for porting the interpretation of “excep-

tional hardship” in that case to this one. Nor is the Government’s ar-

gument from the statutory history of the “hardship requirement” any

more persuasive. Finally, the argument that a primarily factual mixed

question is a question of fact was previously rejected in Guerrero-

Lasprilla, and nothing in §1252(a)(2)(D) supports the Government’s

view that the phrase “questions of law” is so limited. Pp. 12–15.

Reversed in part, vacated in part and remanded.

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KAGAN,

GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. JACKSON, J., filed an

opinion concurring in the judgment. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dissenting

opinion. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ROBERTS, C. J.,

and THOMAS, J., joined.

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of

Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,

pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–666

_________________

SITU KAMU WILKINSON, PETITIONER v. MERRICK

B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[March 19, 2024]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

To be eligible for cancellation of removal and adjustment

to lawful permanent resident status, a noncitizen must

meet four statutory criteria. The last requires a showing

that the noncitizen’s removal would result in “exceptional

and extremely unusual hardship” to a U. S.-citizen or per-

manent-resident family member. 8 U. S. C.

§1229b(b)(1)(D). Petitioner Situ Kamu Wilkinson argues

that his removal would cause exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship to his U. S.-citizen son, who suffers from

a serious medical condition and relies on Wilkinson for emo-

tional and financial support. An Immigration Judge (IJ)

held that this hardship did not rise to the level required by

statute and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) af-

firmed. The Third Circuit dismissed Wilkinson’s petition

for review, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the

IJ’s hardship determination.

The question in this case is whether the IJ’s hardship de-

termination is reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D), which

gives Courts of Appeals jurisdiction to review “questions of

law.” This Court holds that it is. The application of a stat-

utory legal standard (like the exceptional and extremely

2 WILKINSON v. GARLAND

Opinion of the Court

unusual hardship standard) to an established set of facts is

a quintessential mixed question of law and fact. Guerrero-

Lasprilla v. Barr held that such questions are reviewable

under §1252(a)(2)(D). 589 U. S. 221, 225 (2020). Accord-

ingly, this Court reverses.

I

A

When an IJ finds a noncitizen removable for violating the

immigration laws, Congress provides several avenues for

discretionary relief. Relevant here, an IJ may “cancel re-

moval” of a noncitizen who meets certain statutory criteria.

Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 163, as added

and amended, 8 U. S. C. §§1229b(a)–(b). Cancellation of re-

moval permits a noncitizen to remain in the country law-

fully. An IJ deciding a noncitizen’s request for cancellation

of removal proceeds in two steps. First, the IJ must decide

whether the noncitizen is eligible for cancellation under the

relevant statutory criteria. Second, an IJ decides whether

to exercise his discretion favorably and grant the noncitizen

relief in the particular case.1 A noncitizen bears the burden

of proving that he both “satisfies the applicable eligibility

requirements” and “merits a favorable exercise of discre-

tion.” §1229a(c)(4)(A).

Congress enumerated certain statutory criteria to govern

the first step of an IJ’s cancellation-of-removal determina-

tion. For a noncitizen who never received lawful permanent

residence (i.e., a green card), those criteria are stringent.

He is eligible for cancellation of removal only if he meets

four requirements: (1) he “has been physically present in

the United States for a continuous period of not less than

10 years” before he applies; (2) he “has been a person of good

moral character during such period”; (3) he has not been

——————

1 This second step is not perfunctory. Congress has imposed a statu-

tory cap of 4,000 noncitizens each fiscal year who can have discretion

exercised in their favor. 8 U. S. C. §1229b(e).

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 3

Opinion of the Court

convicted of certain criminal offenses; and (4) he “estab-

lishes that removal would result in exceptional and ex-

tremely unusual hardship to [his] spouse, parent, or child,”

who is a U. S. citizen or lawful permanent resident.

§§1229b(b)(1)(A)–(D). After determining whether a noncit-

izen meets these criteria, an IJ proceeds to step two and

decides whether to exercise discretion to cancel the order of

removal in a particular case.

B

Wilkinson was born in Trinidad and Tobago. After police

officers beat, robbed, and threatened to kill him in 2003,

Wilkinson fled to the United States on a tourist visa. He

has remained in this country ever since, beyond the expira-

tion of his visa. In 2013, Wilkinson had a son, M., with his

girlfriend Kenyatta Watson. Both M. and Watson are U. S.

citizens.

Wilkinson lived in Pennsylvania and worked to support

M. and Watson. M. lived with Wilkinson and Watson for

the first two years of his life. Then, because Wilkinson

could not take care of his son and work at the same time,

he and Watson decided M. would have a better quality of

life in New Jersey with his mother and her mother. Wil-

kinson took the train to visit his son every weekend and

provided almost half his monthly wages ($1,200 per month)

in informal child support. M. suffers from severe asthma,

which requires hospital treatment multiple times a year.

Wilkinson helped M. with his inhaler and medications and

knew his regimen well. Watson suffers from depression and

does not work, so she also relies on Wilkinson’s financial

and childcare support.

Wilkinson worked as a handyman and a laborer in con-

struction. In 2019, police found drugs in a house where he

had been hired to work on repairs. Despite Wilkinson’s pro-

tests that neither the house nor the drugs were his, the po-

4 WILKINSON v. GARLAND

Opinion of the Court

lice arrested him. When Wilkinson appeared in a Pennsyl-

vania courthouse to contest the charges, he was arrested

and detained by federal immigration officers. The criminal

charges were ultimately withdrawn.

M. was seven years old when Immigration and Customs

Enforcement detained his father. Afterwards, M. began to

exhibit behavioral issues. M. became sad, acted out, and

broke things. M.’s teacher texted Watson every day saying

that M. was no longer focused and needed to talk to a coun-

selor. Wilkinson called his son every other day from immi-

gration detention. When M. hung up the phone, he cried

and said he wanted his father to come home.

C

Wilkinson conceded before the IJ that he was removable

under §1227(a)(1)(B) for overstaying his tourist visa. He

asked for relief from that removal, claiming eligibility for

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

Convention Against Torture. Relevant here, he also applied

for cancellation of removal based on hardship to his U. S.-

citizen son, M. The U. S. Department of Homeland Security

(DHS) stipulated that Wilkinson met the first three statu-

tory criteria for eligibility (namely, continuous physical

presence, good moral character, and lack of specific crimi-

nal bars) but contested the last: exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship to M. Wilkinson, Watson, and M.’s

grandmother all testified in support of Wilkinson’s applica-

tions for relief.

In evaluating Wilkinson’s applications, the IJ found Wil-

kinson credible (despite DHS’s attempts to impeach him),

and credited the testimonies of each witness in full. The IJ

then turned to cancellation of removal and recited the

standard for exceptional and extremely unusual hardship

adopted by the BIA. To meet this standard, a noncitizen

“must demonstrate that a qualifying relative would suffer

hardship that is substantially different from or beyond that

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 5

Opinion of the Court

which would ordinarily be expected to result from their re-

moval, but need not show that such hardship would be ‘un-

conscionable.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a (quoting In re

Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 62 (BIA 2021)). In

evaluating whether a noncitizen meets this standard, IJs

must consider a range of factors, including the age and

health of the qualifying family member. App. to Pet. for

Cert. 26a–27a (citing In re Andaloza-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec.

319, 323–324 (BIA 2002); Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N.

Dec., at 63). “[A]ll hardship factors should be considered in

the aggregate to determine whether the qualifying relative

will suffer hardship that rises to the level of ‘exceptional

and extremely unusual.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a (quot-

ing Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec., at 64).

The IJ then applied this standard to the established facts.

He found that M.’s asthma was a serious medical condition

and that Wilkinson provided emotional and financial care

to his son. He found that M. had been struggling since Wil-

kinson’s detention. Nevertheless, the IJ held that M. did

not meet the statutory standard for exceptional and ex-

tremely unusual hardship. The IJ reasoned that M. re-

ceived medical insurance from the government and that he

and his family might qualify for other public assistance if

necessary. Although Wilkinson provided emotional sup-

port, the IJ noted that M. had lived without Wilkinson’s

“daily presence” for most of M.’s life. App. to Pet. for Cert.

28a. The IJ recognized that M. and his mother would suffer

some financial hardship from Wilkinson’s removal. Yet the

IJ reasoned that Wilkinson had not provided evidence that

he would be unable to work and support his family from

Trinidad and Tobago. The IJ also noted that M.’s mother

was able to work even though she had primarily been caring

for M. He reasoned that M.’s grandmother, who had helped

care for M. before, could continue to do so.

Based on “the aggregate of the factors” that he “weighed,”

the IJ found that any financial or emotional hardship was

6 WILKINSON v. GARLAND

Opinion of the Court

not “beyond that which would normally be expected from

the removal of a parent and provider.” Id., at 29a (citing

Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec., at 65). Ultimately, the

IJ held that “the evidence of hardship” in the case did not

rise to the level of “exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 29a. Because he held that

Wilkinson was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of re-

moval, the IJ did “not reach determining whether or not to

exercise [his] discretion to grant the application for cancel-

lation of removal.” Ibid. The IJ denied Wilkinson’s appli-

cation. Wilkinson appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA.

The BIA affirmed without issuing an opinion.

Wilkinson petitioned the Third Circuit for review, argu-

ing that the court had jurisdiction to review the BIA’s hard-

ship determination as a mixed question of law and fact. The

Third Circuit held that because the hardship determination

was “discretionary,” it lacked jurisdiction to review it. Id.,

at 3a (citing §1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Patel v. Garland, 596 U. S.

328 (2022)). It therefore dismissed that part of Wilkinson’s

petition.

Wilkinson asked this Court to grant certiorari to resolve

whether the IJ’s “determination that a given set of estab-

lished facts does not rise to the statutory standard of ‘ex-

ceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ is a mixed ques-

tion of law and fact reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D) . . . or

whether this determination is a discretionary judgment call

unreviewable under §1252(a)(2)(B)(i).” Pet. for Cert. i. This

Court granted certiorari. 600 U. S. ___ (2023). The Courts

of Appeals are split on this question.2 This Court now holds

——————

2 Three Circuits have held that courts of appeals have jurisdiction over

hardship determinations because they are mixed questions of law and

fact. See Arreola-Ochoa v. Garland, 34 F. 4th 603, 610 (CA7 2022); Singh

v. Rosen, 984 F. 3d 1142, 1150 (CA6 2021); Gonzalez Galvan v. Garland,

6 F. 4th 552, 555 (CA4 2021). Six Circuits have indicated that courts of

appeals have no jurisdiction over the BIA’s hardship determinations.

See Gonzalez-Rivas v. Garland, 53 F. 4th 1129, 1132 (CA8 2022); Flores-

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 7

Opinion of the Court

that the application of the exceptional and extremely unu-

sual hardship standard to a given set of facts is reviewable

as a question of law under §1252(a)(2)(D).

II

Section 1252(a)(2)(D) provides that a court of appeals

may consider final orders of removal via petitions raising

“constitutional claims or questions of law.” In Guerrero-

Lasprilla, this Court held that “the statutory phrase ‘ques-

tions of law’ includes the application of a legal standard to

undisputed or established facts,” also referred to as mixed

questions of law and fact. 589 U. S., at 227. The statutory

criterion of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”

is a legal standard that an IJ must, at the first step, apply

to a set of established facts. This Court therefore holds that

it is a “questio[n] of law” over which §1252(a)(2)(D) provides

judicial review.

The hardship determination in this case was not discre-

tionary. Because the IJ held that M.’s hardship did not sat-

isfy the statutory eligibility criteria, he never reached the

second step and exercised his unreviewable discretion to

cancel or decline to cancel Wilkinson’s removal. The Third

Circuit therefore erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction

to review the IJ’s determination in this case.

A

Section 1252 generally grants federal courts the power to

review final orders of removal. §1252(a)(1). It then strips

courts of jurisdiction for certain categories of removal order.

——————

Alonso v. United States Atty. Gen., 36 F. 4th 1095, 1100 (CA11 2022)

(per curiam); Castillo-Gutierrez v. Garland, 43 F. 4th 477, 481 (CA5

2022) (per curiam); Aguilar-Osorio v. Garland, 991 F. 3d 997, 999 (CA9

2021) (per curiam); Hernandez-Morales v. Attorney Gen. U. S., 977 F. 3d

247, 249 (CA3 2020); Galeano-Romero v. Barr, 968 F. 3d 1176, 1183–

1184 (CA10 2020).

8 WILKINSON v. GARLAND

Opinion of the Court

§1252(a)(2). Finally, it restores jurisdiction to review “con-

stitutional claims or questions of law.” §1252(a)(2)(D).3

Relevant here, §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) strips courts of jurisdic-

tion over “judgment[s] regarding the granting of [discre-

tionary] relief under section . . . 1229b.” Section 1229b gov-

erns cancellation of removal. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)

therefore strips courts of jurisdiction over a “judgment” on

cancellation of removal. The Third Circuit held that it had

no jurisdiction over the part of Wilkinson’s petition related

to the hardship determination on this basis.

That holding ignores §1252(a)(2)(D), which restores juris-

diction to review “questions of law.” Two clear rules govern

the interaction between §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (which strips ju-

risdiction over judgments regarding discretionary relief )

and §1252(a)(2)(D) (which restores it for legal questions),

laid out in two of this Court’s previous cases: Guerrero-

Lasprilla and Patel. Guerrero-Lasprilla held that petitions

raising mixed questions of law and fact are always review-

able as questions of law under §1252(a)(2)(D). 589 U. S., at

225. Patel held that questions of fact underlying denials of

discretionary relief are unreviewable under both

§1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and §1252(a)(2)(D). 596 U. S., at 343, 347.

Those two rules resolve this case.

In Guerrero-Lasprilla, §1252(a)(2)(C) stripped courts of

jurisdiction over two noncitizens’ orders of removal via a

different provision targeting certain criminal convictions.

Those noncitizens had sought to reopen their immigration

——————

3 This scheme is the result of this Court’s decision in INS v. St. Cyr,

533 U. S. 289 (2001), which construed earlier versions of the jurisdiction-

stripping provisions as permitting review in habeas corpus proceedings

“to avoid the serious constitutional questions that would be raised by a

contrary interpretation.” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221, 232

(2020) (citing St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 299–305). Congress enacted

§1252(a)(2)(D) to ensure the constitutionality of its jurisdiction-stripping

provisions. See 589 U. S., at 232–234.

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 9

Opinion of the Court

cases after being removed because a change in the law re-

garding their criminal convictions rendered them newly el-

igible for discretionary relief. Although the 90-day time

limit to reopen their cases had expired, they argued that

the limit should be “equitably tolled.” 589 U. S., at 225–

226. The BIA denied their request, concluding that each

had failed to demonstrate the requisite due diligence.

When the noncitizens petitioned the Fifth Circuit for review

of that decision, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to

decide the question. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that

whether a noncitizen acted diligently in attempting to reo-

pen removal proceedings for purposes of equitable tolling

was a question of fact, not a “questio[n] of law” that would

restore jurisdiction under §1252(a)(2)(D).

This Court reversed. The Court held that “questions of

law” in §1252(a)(2)(D) included mixed questions of law and

fact. Guerrero-Lasprilla, 589 U. S., at 225. The “applica-

tion of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts”

is a mixed question. Ibid. Whether the BIA had correctly

applied the equitable tolling due diligence standard to the

facts was therefore a question of law reviewable by a court

of appeals.

In so doing, this Court rejected the Government’s pri-

mary argument that “questions of law” referred only to

mixed questions that are primarily legal rather than pri-

marily factual. Such an interpretation, the Court reasoned,

would “forbid review of any [BIA] decision applying a

properly stated legal standard, irrespective of how mis-

taken that application might be.” Id., at 236. This Court

also rejected the Government’s alternative argument that

“questions of law” should be limited to “ ‘pure’ ” questions of

law based on the statutory context, history, and relevant

precedent. Id., at 230–234. Finally, the Court rejected the

Government’s argument that interpreting “questions of

law” to cover all mixed questions would “undercut Congress’

efforts to severely limit and streamline judicial review.” Id.,

10 WILKINSON v. GARLAND

Opinion of the Court

at 235. Section 1252(a)(2)(D) had no effect on the unreview-

ability of factual determinations which, as the Court noted,

are “an important category in the removal context.” Ibid.

The issue of questions of fact came before this Court in

Patel. There, the noncitizen checked a box in his applica-

tion for a state driver’s license indicating that he was a U. S.

citizen when he was not. 596 U. S., at 333. Because of that

misrepresentation, he became statutorily inadmissible to

adjust his status to permanent resident. Later, in removal

proceedings, the noncitizen conceded he was removable but

argued that he mistakenly checked the box and lacked the

statutory mens rea. The IJ found him not credible, based

partly on the fact that he had a strong incentive to deceive

state officials about his citizenship status to obtain a state

driver’s license. The noncitizen appealed, arguing that the

basis for the credibility determination was clearly wrong:

Under state law, he was entitled to a driver’s license with-

out being a citizen. The BIA determined that the IJ’s fac-

tual findings were not clearly erroneous and dismissed the

appeal. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the petition for re-

view, holding that it lacked jurisdiction under

§1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which strips courts of jurisdiction to re-

view “ ‘any judgment regarding the granting of relief ’ ” un-

der the adjustment-of-status provision. Id., at 335. The

court concluded that both whether petitioner had testified

credibly and whether he had subjectively intended to mis-

represent himself as a citizen were factual determinations

that fell within §1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s jurisdictional bar.

This Court affirmed. The Court held that these factual

findings, which formed the basis for the denial of relief, fell

within §1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s jurisdiction-stripping provision.

Further, §1252(a)(2)(D) did not restore jurisdiction, because

“questions of fact” are indisputably not “questions of law.”

Ibid. Relying on Guerrero-Lasprilla, the Court noted that

questions of fact were the “major remaining category” for

which Congress could still strip courts of jurisdiction. 596

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 11

Opinion of the Court

U. S., at 339–340.

B

Wilkinson does not dispute that §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) gener-

ally strips courts of jurisdiction to review cancellation-of-

removal decisions. He argues, instead, that §1252(a)(2)(D)

restores jurisdiction in this case because the threshold

question whether a noncitizen is statutorily eligible for can-

cellation of removal requires a court to assess whether an

IJ correctly applied the statutory standard to a given set of

facts. This Court agrees that the application of the statu-

tory “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” stand-

ard to a given set of facts presents a mixed question of law

and fact. Guerrero-Lasprilla compels this conclusion.

Guerrero-Lasprilla held that “the statutory term ‘ques-

tions of law’ ” in §1252(a)(2)(D) “includes the application of

a legal standard to established facts.” 589 U. S., at 234.

That term included the application of the due diligence

standard for equitable tolling to a given set of facts. Simi-

larly, the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”

standard in §1229b(b)(1)(D) is a legal standard that an IJ

applies to facts. The standard may require an IJ to closely

examine and weigh a set of established facts, but it is not a

factual inquiry. It is, inescapably, a mixed question of law

and fact.

Mixed questions “are not all alike.” U. S. Bank N. A. v.

Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U. S. 387, 395–396 (2018).

A mixed question may require “primarily legal or factual

work.” Id., at 396. It may “require courts to expound on

the law . . . by amplifying or elaborating on a broad legal

standard.” Ibid. Or it may “immerse courts in case-specific

factual issues—compelling them to marshal and weigh evi-

dence.” Ibid. That a mixed question requires a court to

immerse itself in facts does not transform the question into

one of fact. It simply suggests a more deferential standard

of review.

12 WILKINSON v. GARLAND

Opinion of the Court

As interpreted by the BIA, the application of the “excep-

tional and extremely unusual hardship” standard requires

an IJ to evaluate a number of factors in determining

whether any hardship to a U. S.-citizen or permanent-resi-

dent family member is “substantially different from, or be-

yond, that which would normally be expected from the de-

portation” of a “close family membe[r ].” Monreal-Aguinaga,

23 I. & N. Dec., at 65. That application concededly requires

a close examination of the facts. Yet that was also true of

the due diligence standard in Guerrero-Lasprilla, which re-

quired a court to evaluate whether a noncitizen was ade-

quately conscientious in his pursuit of a filing deadline. A

mixed question that requires close engagement with the

facts is still a mixed question, and it is therefore a “ques-

tio[n] of law” that is reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D).

Under Patel, of course, a court is still without jurisdiction

to review a factual question raised in an application for dis-

cretionary relief. As in Patel, that would include the IJ’s

underlying factual determination that Wilkinson was cred-

ible, or the finding that M. had a serious medical condition.

When an IJ weighs those found facts and applies the “ex-

ceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard, how-

ever, the result is a mixed question of law and fact that is

reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D).

C

The Government’s counterarguments largely seek to re-

litigate Guerrero-Lasprilla. This Court is unpersuaded.

First, the Government argues that the statutory stand-

ard is not a legal standard at all. It asks this Court to limit

Guerrero-Lasprilla solely to judicially created standards

like the “due diligence” standard for equitable tolling.

Nothing in Guerrero-Lasprilla or this Court’s other prece-

dents supports such a distinction. This Court has fre-

quently observed that the application of a “statutory stand-

ard” presents a mixed question of law and fact. See, e.g.,

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 13

Opinion of the Court

Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 289, n. 19

(1982) (defining a mixed question as asking whether “the

historical facts . . . satisfy the statutory standard”); Ornelas

v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 696–697 (1996) (same);

U. S. Bank, 583 U. S., at 394 (same). Guerrero-Lasprilla

itself reflected this understanding. See 589 U. S., at 232

(reasoning that §1252(a)(2)(D) was intended to preserve the

kind of review traditionally available in a habeas proceed-

ing, including review of the “erroneous application or inter-

pretation of statutes” (emphasis deleted; internal quotation

marks omitted)). This Court sees no reason to treat the

statutory hardship standard here any differently from a ju-

dicially created “due diligence” standard.

Second, the Government argues that a 1928 case, Wil-

liamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 551, and

the statutory history of the hardship requirement preclude

review. In Williamsport, the Court evaluated a wartime

tax-relief provision that was in effect from 1919 to 1921.

That provision allowed the Internal Revenue Service Com-

missioner to use a “ ‘special method’ ” for determining a com-

pany’s tax burden if computation under the regular scheme

would work “ ‘an exceptional hardship.’ ” Id., at 558. The

statute granted the Commissioner power to act, for the

most part, without any justification. The Commissioner did

not have to make findings of fact, and had to create a “mea-

gre record” only if he ordered a special assessment. Id., at

559. This Court therefore concluded that the IRS’s “excep-

tional hardship” determination was a question of adminis-

trative discretion not subject to judicial review. Ibid.

Williamsport has no relevance to the question presented

here. The Government provides no basis for why this Court

should port the interpretation of “exceptional hardship”

from a 1919 tax-relief provision to a 1996 immigration-re-

lief provision. An IJ applying the “exceptional and ex-

tremely unusual hardship” standard must create an exten-

sive record of his decisionmaking, including detailed fact-

14 WILKINSON v. GARLAND

Opinion of the Court

finding and the application of BIA precedent. Additionally,

Williamsport did not evaluate the term “exceptional hard-

ship” against the background of a jurisdiction-restoring pro-

vision like §1252(a)(2)(D), enacted in 2005.

The Government’s argument from the statutory history

of the “hardship requirement” is no more persuasive. Brief

for Respondent 26. The precursor to cancellation of removal

was suspension of deportation. That relief was available

only to a “person whose deportation would, in the opinion of

the Attorney General, result in exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship” to the noncitizen himself or a qualifying

relative. §§244(a)(1)–(5), 66 Stat. 214–216 (emphasis

added). The Government argues that this Court should

read that discretion back into the current version of the

statute.

The Government’s request to reinstate statutory lan-

guage removed by Congress is particularly unavailing be-

cause Congress chose to retain similar language in provi-

sions governing other forms of discretionary relief subject

to §1252(a)(2)(B)’s bar on judicial review. See, e.g.,

§1182(h)(1)(B) (allowing relief “if it is established to the sat-

isfaction of the Attorney General that the [noncitizen’s] de-

nial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the

United States citizen”); §1182(i)(1) (allowing relief “if it is

established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that

the refusal of admission . . . of such [noncitizen] would re-

sult in extreme hardship to the citizen . . . spouse or par-

ent”); §1255(l)(1) (allowing relief if “in the opinion of the

Secretary of [DHS], in consultation with the Attorney Gen-

eral, as appropriate . . . the [noncitizen] would suffer ex-

treme hardship involving unusual and severe harm upon

removal”). Congress could have, but did not, do the same

with the hardship requirement in §1229b(b)(1).

The Government’s final argument is one this Court al-

ready rejected in Guerrero-Lasprilla: that a primarily fac-

tual mixed question is a question of fact. Such a rule would

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 15

Opinion of the Court

require a court of appeals evaluating its jurisdiction to de-

termine in every instance whether a particular legal stand-

ard presented a primarily factual or primarily legal inquiry.

Nothing in §1252(a)(2)(D) or its statutory context suggests

that “questions of law” is so limited. See 589 U. S., at 227–

228. This Court declined to require the courts of appeals to

engage in that complex line-drawing exercise in Guerrero-

Lasprilla, and it declines to do so here.

* * *

Today’s decision announces nothing more remarkable

than the fact that this Court meant what it said in Guer-

rero-Lasprilla: Mixed questions of law and fact, even when

they are primarily factual, fall within the statutory defini-

tion of “questions of law” in §1252(a)(2)(D) and are therefore

reviewable. That holding does not render §1252(a)(2)’s ju-

risdiction-stripping provisions meaningless. As this Court

said in Guerrero-Lasprilla and reiterated in Patel, those

provisions still operate to exclude “agency fact-finding from

review.” Guerrero-Lasprilla, 589 U. S., at 234–235; Patel,

596 U. S., at 339 (“[J]udicial review of factfinding is una-

vailable”). The facts underlying any determination on can-

cellation of removal therefore remain unreviewable. For in-

stance, an IJ’s factfinding on credibility, the seriousness of

a family member’s medical condition, or the level of finan-

cial support a noncitizen currently provides remain unre-

viewable. Only the question whether those established

facts satisfy the statutory eligibility standard is subject to

judicial review.4 Because this mixed question is primarily

factual, that review is deferential.

For these reasons, the Court reverses the Third Circuit’s

——————

4 Similarly, if the IJ decides a noncitizen is eligible for cancellation of

removal at step one, his step-two discretionary determination on

whether or not to grant cancellation of removal in the particular case is

not reviewable as a question of law.

16 WILKINSON v. GARLAND

Opinion of the Court

“jurisdictional” decision, vacates its judgment, and re-

mands the case for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 1

JACKSON, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–666

_________________

SITU KAMU WILKINSON, PETITIONER v. MERRICK

B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[March 19, 2024]

JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment.

The Immigration and Nationality Act plainly constrains

judicial review of discretionary-relief determinations. It

first strips courts of jurisdiction to review “any judgment

regarding the granting of relief ” under provisions including

8 U. S. C. §1229b, which governs cancellation of removal.

See §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Then, the Act restores judicial review

for only a subset of claims—“constitutional claims or ques-

tions of law” raised in a petition for review in the courts of

appeals. §1252(a)(2)(D). Through these provisions, Con-

gress made clear that courts should play a minimal role in

the discretionary-relief process.

In Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221 (2020), the

Court interpreted the phrase “questions of law” in

§1252(a)(2)(D) to include mixed questions of law and fact,

i.e., “the application of a legal standard to undisputed or es-

tablished facts.” Id., at 225. Today, the Court removes any

doubt that the phrase “questions of law” encompasses all

mixed questions, even those that are “primarily factual.”

Ante, at 15. Thus, an immigration judge’s determination

that a “noncitizen’s removal would result in ‘exceptional

and extremely unusual hardship’ ” presents a judicially re-

viewable mixed question. Ante, at 1 (quoting

§1229b(b)(1)(D)). Pointing to our precedent, the Court

holds that “Guerrero-Lasprilla compels this conclusion.”

2 WILKINSON v. GARLAND

JACKSON, J., concurring in judgment

Ante, at 11.

I am skeptical that Congress intended “questions of law”

as used in §1252(a)(2)(D) to sweep so broadly, given the

statutory scheme. The legislative history of the provision,

though not conclusive, provides additional evidence to the

contrary. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 109–72, p. 175 (2005)

(noting that “[t]he purpose” of the provision was “to permit

judicial review over . . . constitutional and statutory-con-

struction questions, not discretionary or factual questions”

(emphasis added)). As the dissent observes, under a maxi-

malist reading of “questions of law,” the exception to limited

judicial review is poised to swallow the rule. See post, at 2–

4 (opinion of ALITO, J.). If that reading is correct, Congress

went through an awful lot to achieve relatively little.

I had not yet joined the Court when it decided Guerrero-

Lasprilla. But I agree that Guerrero-Lasprilla controls this

case. The fundamental principle of stare decisis—“that to-

day’s Court should stand by yesterday’s decisions”—has

“enhanced force” when a decision interprets a statute. Kim-

ble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 455–456

(2015). Congress remains free to revise the statute, and it

should do so if we have strayed from its intent concerning

the scope of judicial review set forth in §1252(a)(2)(D).

I concur in today’s judgment with the understanding that

the jurisdiction-stripping provision is not “meaningless.”

Ante, at 15. When reviewing denials of discretionary relief,

courts should respect the choice of Congress, reflecting the

will of the People, to limit judicial interference. Courts can-

not review the facts underlying a hardship determination

in the cancellation-of-removal context, and they should

carefully distinguish between application of the “excep-

tional and extremely unusual hardship” legal standard,

such as it is, and those unreviewable facts.

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 1

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–666

_________________

SITU KAMU WILKINSON, PETITIONER v. MERRICK

B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[March 19, 2024]

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, dissenting.

I joined the opinion of the Court in Guerrero-Lasprilla v.

Barr, 589 U. S. 221 (2020), and continue to believe that it

was correctly decided. I agree with JUSTICE ALITO’s dissent

in this case, however, that the Court errs in reading the

language in Guerrero-Lasprilla “as broadly as possible,” in-

deed “to the outer limits of its possible reach.” Post, at 6, 5.

Nothing in Guerrero-Lasprilla requires such a reading, and

I accordingly join JUSTICE ALITO’s dissent.

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 1

ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–666

_________________

SITU KAMU WILKINSON, PETITIONER v. MERRICK

B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[March 19, 2024]

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and

JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting.

In the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant

Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009–546, Congress

sought to control illegal immigration and streamline the

procedures for removing illegal aliens who had been con-

victed of criminal offenses. A key provision of the Act is 8

U. S. C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which provides that “no court

shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment regard-

ing the granting” of certain forms of discretionary relief. Af-

ter IIRIRA’s enactment, this Court flagged a “substantial

constitutional questio[n]” that would arise if federal habeas

courts were stripped of jurisdiction to review “pure ques-

tion[s] of law.” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 300 (2001).

Congress responded by enacting an amendment clarifying

that §1252(a)(2)(B) did not “preclud[e] review of constitu-

tional claims or questions of law.” §1252(a)(2)(D).

I

In Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221 (2020), this

Court addressed the meaning of this amendment. The case

concerned two criminal aliens who were ordered removed

and then failed to ask to have their removal proceedings re-

opened by the 90-day statutory deadline. They argued,

however, that the deadline should be equitably tolled. The

2 WILKINSON v. GARLAND

ALITO, J., dissenting

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) rejected that argu-

ment, and the issue before us was whether the Court of Ap-

peals had jurisdiction to review such a decision under

§1252(a)(2)(B) and §1252(a)(2)(D).

The answer to that question depended on whether the

correctness of the BIA’s decisions was a “questio[n] of law”

within the meaning of §1252(a)(2)(D). The aliens urged us

to decide the case on “narrow grounds.” Brief for Petition-

ers in Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, O. T. 2019, No. 18–776

etc., p. 15. They did not dispute the relevant facts, see 589

U. S., at 226, but argued that the BIA had applied the

wrong legal test in holding that they had not acted with suf-

ficient diligence to justify equitable tolling—specifically,

that the BIA had demanded a demonstration of “ ‘maximum

feasible diligence’ ” rather than “ ‘reasonable diligence,’ ”

which they claimed was the right test. Brief for Petitioners

in Guerrero-Lasprilla, at 15.

The Court ruled for the aliens and in doing so stated

broadly that “questions of law” include all questions that

involve the application of the law to a particular set of facts.

589 U. S., at 228. Under this statement, the phrase “ques-

tions of law” has a stunning sweep. It encompasses all sorts

of discretionary rulings that depend almost entirely on the

relevant facts, as a few examples of mundane trial court

rulings illustrate. For one, take a trial court’s denial of a

request for a continuance or a decision about the length of

a trial day or the days of the week during which a jury is

required to sit. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U. S. 1, 11 (1983).

Such decisions are governed by a legal standard, albeit a

very permissive one: the decisions cannot be “unreasoning

and arbitrary.” Ibid. But in the rare case in which such a

decision is reversed on appeal, the appellate court is un-

likely to say that the trial court made an error of law be-

cause it mistakenly thought a continuance would be unrea-

sonable and arbitrary. Instead, the question on appeal

would almost certainly be based on an assessment of the

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 3

ALITO, J., dissenting

facts.

Here is another example. Under the broad language of

Guerrero-Lasprilla, juries decide questions of law whenever

they return a verdict in a criminal or civil case. If, for ex-

ample, a jury in a criminal case finds that a defendant vio-

lated a statute that requires “knowing” conduct, the jury

decides a question of law because it applies the law (as set

out in the court’s instructions on the meaning of “knowing”

conduct, see, e.g., 2B K. O’Malley, J. Grenig, & W. Lee, Fed-

eral Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal §70:07 (6th

ed. 2010), to the facts as they see them. Likewise, in a rou-

tine negligence case, the jury applies the law (as explained

in the court’s instructions on the meaning of “negligence,”

see, e.g., 3A id., Civil §155:30 (2012), to the facts shown at

trial.

When Congress responded to St. Cyr by enacting

§1252(a)(2)(D), did it mean to adopt this maximalist under-

standing of “questions of law”? St. Cyr never suggested that

Congress was obligated to go that far, and if Congress had

wanted to achieve the end that results from the Court’s

broad statements in Guerrero-Lasprilla, Congress might as

well have repealed §1252(a)(2)(B) outright. Under the

Guerrero-Lasprilla formulation, the net effect of

§1252(a)(2)(B) and §1252(a)(2)(D) is as follows. Before the

enactment of those provisions, pure findings of fact were

subject to review, but under a very deferential standard—

namely, they could be overturned only if “ ‘any reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the con-

trary.’ ” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. 573, 584 (2020). Af-

terwards, pure findings of fact were not reviewable at

all. Is it plausible that this pipsqueak of a change was

Congress’s cure for what it saw as undue delay in the con-

clusion of removal proceedings for criminal aliens? I hardly

think so.

4 WILKINSON v. GARLAND

ALITO, J., dissenting

II

I dissented in Guerrero-Lasprilla because I feared that

the Court’s sweeping language would lead to “absurd re-

sults in light of the statute’s structure” and would “trans-

form §1252(a)(2)(D)’s narrow exception into a broad provi-

sion permitting judicial review of all criminal aliens’

challenges to their removal proceedings except the precious

few that raise only pure questions of fact.” 589 U. S., at 238,

240 (THOMAS, J., joined by ALITO, J., dissenting). Under

this reading, “the exception” for “questions of law” “all but

swallows the rule.” Id., at 241.

We are permitted to exercise at least a modicum of “ ‘com-

mon sense’ ” when we interpret a statute, see West Virginia

v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 722 (2022), and Guerrero-Lasprilla’s

broad language defies common sense. If the Congress that

enacted §1252(a)(2)(D) had wanted to bring about the result

that the broad statements in Guerrero-Lasprilla suggest, it

could have simply repealed §1252(a)(2)(B) and stated in

§1252(a)(2)(D) that courts cannot review pure questions of

fact. Qualifying the broad prohibition in §1252(a)(2)(D) by

adding an exception that all but eliminates the prohibition

would have been a very odd way of achieving that result.

What the Court says that Congress did—combining the

broad prohibition in §1252(a)(2)(B) with the nearly congru-

ent exception in §1252(a)(2)(D)—would be the equivalent of

a city council adopting an ordinance banning all dogs from

a park with an exception for all dogs that weigh under 125

pounds. Or the council passes an ordinance prohibiting all

persons from riding a bicycle without a helmet but then

adopts an exception for all persons under the age of 90.

When Congress enacted §1252(a)(2)(D), it was not engaging

in such silliness.

III

Accepting of the judgment in Guerrero-Lasprilla—that

the BIA’s understanding of the scope of equitable estoppel

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 5

ALITO, J., dissenting

is a question of law—does not require that we take the lan-

guage in the Court’s opinion to the outer limits of its possi-

ble reach. But that is what the Court has now done. As

Justice Breyer, the author of the opinion in Guerrero-

Lasprilla, recognized in an earlier opinion for the Court, the

concept of a question of law does not always encompass all

applications of the law to a set of facts. In Merck Sharp &

Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 587 U. S. 299 (2019), the decision

hung on the question whether the Food and Drug Admin-

istration would have approved a change in a drug’s label.

The Court recognized that this question contained both le-

gal and factual elements, but the Court did not hold that

the question was one of law simply because it involved the

application of law to a set of facts. Id., at 316–318. Rather,

the Court considered which element was most likely to be

contested and asked whether the answer to the question

whether the FDA would have approved the change would

generally turn on a judgment about the law or the facts.

Ibid.

If that same mode of analysis is applied here, the answer

is clear—and it is the opposite of the one given by the

Court. Whether “removal would result in exceptional and

extremely unusual hardship” to the “spouse, parent, or

child” of the alien subject to removal is overwhelmingly a

question of fact. §1229b(b)(1)(D). The only legal component

consists of the meaning of the everyday terms “hardship,”

“exceptional,” and “unusual.”

The facts of this case illustrate the degree to which the

factual element involved in the question at hand over-

whelms the slim legal component. Below, petitioner argued

that the Immigration Judge misunderstood “the depth of

the emotional relationship between Petitioner and his

Child,” the amount of “care and support that Petitioner’s

Child would receive if Petitioner is removed,” and “the

Child’s uncommon and difficult situation, in light of his

family’s unwillingness to provide him access to care for his

6 WILKINSON v. GARLAND

ALITO, J., dissenting

mental health needs.” Brief for Petitioner in No. 21–3166

(CA3), pp. 16–17. All those issues are entirely factual, and

there is no legal principle that can help an immigration

judge, the BIA, or a court assess whether any “hardship”

resulting from petitioner’s removal would be “exceptional

and extremely unusual.” That question must be decided by

the application of what the decision-maker knows from ex-

perience about human nature and family relationships.

Consequently, the question should not be classified as a

“question of law” under §1252(a)(2)(D).

The Court, however, reads Guerrero-Lasprilla as broadly

as possible. As it sees things, all “[m]ixed questions” are

“questions of law,” even if they are “primarily factual.”

Ante, at 15. And since the question here is overwhelmingly

factual, what the Court seems to mean by “primarily” is an-

ything that falls short of 100%.

That is not what Congress meant when it enacted

§1252(a)(2)(B) and §1252(a)(2)(D), and I therefore respect-

fully dissent.