Katelyn Taylor v. State of Tennessee

03/08/2024

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

January 3, 2024 Session

KATELYN TAYLOR v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Benton County

No. 20CR123PC J. Brent Bradberry, Judge

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No. W2022-01739-CCA-R3-PC

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Petitioner, Katelyn Taylor, pleaded guilty to two counts of first degree murder in exchange

for concurrent sentences of life imprisonment. Petitioner then filed a pro se petition for

post-conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, and that her guilty pleas

were not knowingly and voluntarily. After appointing counsel and holding an evidentiary

hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, which Petitioner appealed. After

review, we conclude that Petitioner failed to prepare a sufficient brief in compliance with

Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(7) and Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals

Rule 10(b), therefore, her issues are waived. Additionally, after our review of the record,

we conclude Petitioner’s claims are without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment

of the post-conviction court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

MATTHEW J. WILSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. ROSS DYER and

JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., JJ., joined.

Jasmine McMackins Hatcher, McKenzie, Tennessee, for the appellant, Katelyn Taylor.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Richard D. Douglas, Senior Assistant

Attorney General; Neil Thompson, District Attorney General; and Jennifer Hedge,

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural History

The Benton County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Petitioner charging

her with two counts of first degree murder. She subsequently pleaded guilty to both counts.

The facts of this case, as established from the record, are as follows.

On Sunday, March 22, 2020, at about noon, Petitioner contacted her friend John

Bart Johnson and requested him to pick her up at a laundromat. When Mr. Johnson met

with Petitioner, he noticed a cut on her finger. Mr. Johnson stated that Petitioner told him

that she got into an argument with her grandmother and that her grandmother “came at her

with a knife, so [Petitioner] got cut.” Mr. Johnson took Petitioner to a hospital the next

morning.

On March 23, 2020 Celeste McDaniel failed to arrive at her job. Ms. Maness, her

co-worker, described Mrs. McDaniel as “very dependable” and stated that “she never

missed” work. Worried, Ms. Maness tried to reach Mrs. McDaniel on her cellphone and

Eugene McDaniel, her husband, on their house phone. Unable to reach them, Ms. Maness

then went to visit their home, and after seeing their cars still there, she knew something

was wrong. At 7:58 a.m., Ms. Maness called 911 and requested a welfare check for the

McDaniels.

Camden police then proceeded to the McDaniel home and, after inspecting the

exterior of the house and announcing their presence, entered it through a back door. Once

inside, they immediately discovered the bodies of the victims, Mr. and Mrs. McDaniel,

who were Petitioner’s grandparents. Petitioner, who lived with the victims at the time, was

absent. Police found two bullet holes on the front of the house, a revolver on the floor in

the kitchen, and several guns in a gun cabinet next to the kitchen. They also found a large

kitchen knife with a broken tip in a dish rack. A neighbor gave police a bullet fragment

that another neighbor had found while feeding her dog outside directly across the victims’

residence. Another neighbor reported hearing “a loud boom similar to a gunshot noise” on

Saturday, March 21, 2020, around 10:30 p.m.

Officers developed Petitioner as a suspect in the victims’ deaths. Ms. Maness

explained that Petitioner’s grandmother used to give Petitioner money, but once the

grandmother found out that Petitioner was using drugs, she stopped giving her money and

they began getting into arguments that often became physical.

Officers later located Petitioner at her friend Mr. Johnson’s home. Petitioner had

“reddish[,] brown stains on her shoes,” and officers found a “purple ladies medium t-shirt

with reddish, brown stains on the right sleeve inside a purse.” Also, within the purse, they

found Petitioner’s Social Security card.

Petitioner was arrested for the victims’ deaths. She initially denied shooting the

victims and claimed they were alive when she left the house; however, after Petitioner was

incarcerated, she made multiple incriminating statements to fellow inmates with details

that only the perpetrator could have known. To one inmate, Petitioner claimed she got into

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an argument with her grandmother. When her grandmother tried to take Petitioner’s phone,

she shot both victims and “finished them off” with a knife.

Guilty Plea

On December 17, 2020, Petitioner pleaded guilty as charged to both counts of first

degree murder pursuant to a plea agreement with the State. In exchange for her guilty

pleas, Petitioner received concurrent sentences of life imprisonment with the possibility of

parole. The trial court conducted a plea colloquy with Petitioner, and placed her under

oath. Petitioner stated that she understood her right to plead not guilty and proceed to trial,

her right to confront witnesses and cross-examine the witnesses at trial, and her right

against self-incrimination. Petitioner assured the trial court that she was waiving those

rights. Petitioner stated she was freely and voluntarily entering pleading guilty, and that

she had discussed the matter and possible legal defenses fully and thoroughly with her

counsel. Petitioner acknowledged the plea agreement she reached with the State, and that

she knew the range of sentencing that she faced. The State said the following as a factual

basis for the guilty pleas:

The State is prepared to prove that if we went to trial, on, or about,

March 23[] of 2020, here in Benton County, in Camden, Tennessee, that

[Petitioner] did intentionally kill Celeste Holland McDaniel, thereby

committing the offense of First Degree Murder, in violation of [Tennessee

Code Annotated section] 39-13-202.

And the State would expect to prove, if we went to trial, that on, or

about, March 23[], 2020, in Camden, Benton County, Tennessee, that

[Petitioner], did intentionally kill with premeditation, Eugene McDaniel,

thereby committing the offense of First Degree Murder, in violation of

[Tennessee Code Annotated section] 39-13-202.

Petitioner agreed that the State’s factual recitation was essentially true and correct, and the

trial court accepted her guilty pleas. Petitioner was nineteen years old when she pleaded

guilty.

Less than six months after pleading guilty, Petitioner timely filed a pro se petition

for post-conviction relief, claiming she received the ineffective assistance of counsel, and

that her guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary made. After finding that Petitioner

had alleged a colorable claim in her petition, the post-conviction court appointed counsel

to represent Petitioner and conducted a hearing on her claims.

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Post-Conviction Hearing

At the post-conviction hearing, the two attorneys who represented Petitioner in the

trial court, Counsel and Co-counsel, testified. At the time of the hearing, Counsel had been

with the public defender’s office since 1992, and in 2017, he was appointed as the

Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Public Defender. Counsel testified that his office was

appointed to represent Petitioner on March 25, 2020.

Petitioner was originally charged in March 2020 with criminal homicide via an

arrest warrant, and Counsel said that the warrant did not specify the particular homicide

offense that Petitioner was accused of committing. Counsel thought that the reference to

the general offense of homicide was “odd,” but he believed that the issue with the charges

“would kind of work itself out in a preliminary hearing.” Counsel (and later Co-Counsel)

said that it was not uncommon to see charging instruments amended from the time of the

original arrest to the time of the indictment. Counsel also explained that in these types of

cases, it is common to have defendants evaluated for competency, and Petitioner was no

exception. Counsel read the results of Petitioner’s competency evaluation into the record,

in which the doctor opined, “at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the

[offense], [Petitioner] was able to appreciate the nature of wrongfulness of such acts.”

Counsel said Petitioner wrote letters to him, the District Attorney General, and the

editor of the local newspaper. Counsel went “[n]umerous times” with Co-Counsel to visit

Petitioner and told her “to stop communicating” with people not part of her legal team,

because the communications were not “privileged.” On November 27, 2020, Petitioner

wrote to Counsel acknowledging that she understood she was charged “with two counts of

first degree murder.” Noting that the “holidays” were near and that she wanted closure for

herself and her family, Petitioner said that she would “agree to a plea agreement of guilty

on an insanity plea” in exchange for a sentence of “life with parole.” Petitioner

acknowledged that she would “be sent to prison,” and she hoped to “help save” the costs

of a trial by pleading guilty. She said that she would be “writing to the [District Attorney

General’s] office in a couple of weeks” unless Counsel contacted her. Around the same

time, Petitioner wrote to TBI Special Agent Joseph Hudgins and said she was “willing to

answer any and all questions regarding [her] case” if she received “a life with parole offer.”

Petitioner then asked for a “plea agreement in writing” and said that she would “cooperate

100%.” Counsel was informed of this letter.

Eventually, the State sent a written plea offer for Petitioner to plead guilty to two

counts of first degree murder. Counsel explained Petitioner’s “sentence would be life with

the possibility of parole and that she would proffer” a truthful account of what happened

on the night of the incident. The plea offer also dictated that if Petitioner “tried to sell the

rights” to her story, any “profit” that she made “would go to St. Jude’s.” Counsel visited

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Petitioner in jail and “discussed that offer with [Petitioner], the pros, the cons, everything

about it, and [Petitioner] was adamant that that’s what she wanted to do.” 1 Regarding a

discussion of the death penalty, Counsel explained:

I was very clear with her the ranges that she stood in that day, on a

Friday, and again, I said it on the record the day she pled. I was very clear

with her, she was not subject to the death penalty, as she stood that day.

Whether it was First or Second, it didn’t matter. She was not—It was not a

death penalty case at that time.

The State did not file a notice to seek the death penalty. Counsel recalled telling

Petitioner that the death penalty “was never on our table,” and said that he never intended

to make Petitioner believe that the State intended to seek the death penalty.

Counsel said Petitioner signed the plea agreement on December 11, 2020, and she

pleaded guilty on December 17, 2020. Counsel explained that the gap between her signing

the agreement and pleading guilty provided her with time to fully reflect on her decision.

Counsel testified Petitioner did not appear fearful, distraught, or emotional on the date that

she pleaded guilty. He said there was nothing concerning about her demeanor or behavior,

and she did not appear to be under the influence of drugs.

Co-counsel testified that in April 2020, Petitioner obtained Co-counsel’s cell phone

number and began sending him text messages while she was incarcerated. Some of the

things that Petitioner texted Co-counsel made him “question her motives,” and he felt

uncomfortable being alone with her “not knowing what she later might possibly say

occurred in that room when there w[ere] no other witnesses.” In one of Petitioner’s text

messages she stated, “Pretty sure you are my ex-boyfriend.” He, therefore, stopped going

to visit Petitioner alone.

Co-counsel testified that he represented Petitioner at the preliminary hearing in June

2020 where the general sessions court found probable cause to bind over charges of second

degree murder against Petitioner to the Grand Jury. The State later obtained an indictment

against Petitioner in October 2020 charging her with two counts of first degree murder.

Co-counsel stated that the defense team considered multiple defense theories to

pursue, including a theory that someone else was responsible for the crime. Co-counsel

explained that when he and Counsel learned of the statements Petitioner had made to other

inmates, it was “extremely devastating” to the defense. Co-counsel said that he never had

a conversation with the State about the possibility of the State seeking the death penalty,

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Counsel testified that he visited Petitioner alone because, at the time, Co-counsel was on vacation.

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and he “never discussed the death penalty” with Petitioner. He testified that Petitioner

never asked about the possibility of receiving the death penalty and never seemed

concerned about the issue. Rather, he said that Petitioner never appeared concerned about

anything “[o]ther than getting out of jail.”

Special Agent Joseph Hudgins, Jr. testified that he began working for the TBI in

April of 2018. He obtained search warrants for the victims’ home, cell towers, cell phone

records, and Mr. Johnson’s camper. Agent Hudgins, along with another TBI agent, also

conducted two interviews with Petitioner on March 23, 2020. The first interview was at

12:40 p.m. and Petitioner declined to sign the Miranda waiver and refused to speak without

an attorney. A few hours later, around 3:45 p.m., Agent Hudgins served Petitioner with

her arrest warrants and read the affidavit to her with no “intention” to “interview her

further,” but she began making voluntary statements to him. Agent Hudgins stated that he

did not advise Petitioner of her rights again and explained “[s]he knew her Miranda rights

at that point. She had already seen her rights, read the form, and she agreed to stay and

make voluntary statements to us. We told her over and over, you’d asked for an attorney

earlier, and she still kept making statements.” He stated that during this time, Petitioner

“understood the severity of the situation, and she was trying to present scenarios for

possible outcomes of every situation that she brought up.” Petitioner made a number of

inconsistent statements and comments during the second interview. For example,

Petitioner initially stated that she had no idea what happened to the victims, adding she

“did not know they were dead,” but later stated, she killed them in self-defense. She also

alleged that she had been diagnosed with methamphetamine psychosis, but when asked

about her drug use, Petitioner replied, “I don’t shoot up or anything like that[.] I’m not a

junkie by any means.” Finally, Petitioner first denied having handled a firearm within the

past ten years before admitting to the shootings.

On November 27, 2020, Agent Hudgins was forwarded a text message from

Petitioner that stated:

This is [Petitioner] could you please let TBI agent Joe Hugins [sic] Jr know

I would like to speak with him about the murders of [the victims]. I am still

in jail in Benton County. Thank you and God bless[.]

Agent Hudgins stated that once he received the message, he notified the district

attorney general’s office and asked the Benton County jail supervisor to inform Petitioner

that he, Agent Hudgins, would not speak with her in person because she was represented

by counsel, and if she wanted to make voluntary statements, she could write a letter to him

from the jail. When Petitioner received the agent’s message, she “wrote down a two-page

statement requesting a plea agreement.” That letter was immediately provided to the

prosecutor and Counsel. Agent Hudgins sent another message, the contents of which were

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approved by the prosecutor, to the jail supervisor and instructed him to relay the message

to Petitioner:

[Petitioner], this is TBI agent Joe Hudgins. I’ve asked Sergeant Pinion to

read you this message. Due to COVID 19, I can’t meet with you in person.

I have received your letter and have showed it to Assistant District Attorney

who has sent a copy of it to your attorney, [Counsel], the Assistant Public

Defender that represents you. I cannot promise you a plea agreement. Under

the law, your attorney, the DA, and the Judge all have to review that. The

district attorney is going to see what the [victims’] family thinks about the

idea of it. I will tell you that if you are looking for any hope from the family

to agree to life in prison then the best thing you can do is to write down the

whole truth about what happened that day and pray the family is better able

to understand the real and whole truth about why and how you killed [the

victims]. Anything short of that I’m not interested in, and I am going to

prove with forensic and electronic evidence at a jury trial. The family

deserves to hear you say it. You need to do the right thing as a human being

and allow the family to know the truth and why they had not one, not two,

but three people missing from Thanksgiving this year including you. They

deserve to know it. Write down the truth, however bad that may be, and pray

the family will give you mercy. I will not contact you outside of your

attorney but you can initiate any further contact with me by writing letters.

Do the right thing.

Agent Hudgins made it clear that while Petitioner was asking for his assistance with a plea

offer, he did not extend an offer to her. He stated that at no point did he instruct Petitioner

as to the type of offer she should ask for.

Petitioner also testified at the hearing. She said that she had completed “[s]ome

college” and “studied paralegal studies” until she switched to study psychology. Petitioner

said she had worked around attorneys for “about a year” and was familiar with what goes

on in a law office. Petitioner’s competency was then discussed, and when asked about her

“methamphetamine psychosis,” she explained that the “records are definitely out there,”

but she acknowledged that no record confirming psychosis had been introduced. Petitioner

discussed undergoing a forensic evaluation while she was incarcerated and explained that

she “pretended” she was not under methamphetamine psychosis because her drug usage

and mental health are “extremely embarrassing.” She also admitted to lying about being

married to a public defender, lying about never having handled guns inside the victims’

house, and lying to the forensic examiner about her drug use.

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Petitioner said that on the day she pleaded guilty, she “told the truth about anything

[she] was asked,” and she understood the charges to which she was pleading guilty. She

explained, however, that the reason she stated in her petition for post-conviction relief that

she was coerced was because Counsel told her that the State “was 100[%] going to come

for [her] with the death penalty, so that’s what led to all [her] actions.” She stated, “I was

advised by my counsel to say yes to all of the judge’s questions so that the plea could be

accepted so that I could avoid the death penalty.” Petitioner conceded that the transcript

of her plea colloquy reflected that Counsel had informed her that the State was not seeking

the death penalty, but she claimed that Counsel had previously told her that the State was

certain to seek the death penalty unless she pleaded guilty. She acknowledged that both of

her attorneys had testified that she never asked about the death penalty, and Petitioner

claimed that both attorneys were lying in their testimony.

The post-conviction court denied Petitioner’s claims in a detailed written order. The

court credited the testimony of Counsel and Co-counsel and described them as “competent

attorneys.” The court described Petitioner’s testimony as “self-serving,” and ultimately

“unpersuasive.” The court found that Petitioner was “intelligent enough” and “familiar

enough with the criminal justice system to fully understand her guilty plea.” The court

listed twelve reasons given by Petitioner to show that she had “numerous reasons to enter

the plea.” The court found that Petitioner “failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence

that her plea was not knowing and voluntary.” Additionally, the court found that at no time

did Petitioner present “alternative theories or defenses for her attorneys to investigate.”

Consequently, Petitioner failed to show that “but for the alleged errors by [Counsel] and

[Co-counsel], she would have insisted on going to trial.” The court concluded that Counsel

and Co-counsel did not act in a deficient or ineffective manner because “it was objectively

reasonable for [them] to present the State’s offer to [Petitioner], to inform the State that she

accepted the offer, and to explain the process to [Petitioner] before and during entry of her

guilty plea.” Further, the court reasoned that even if it concluded that counsels’

performance was deficient, Petitioner failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that

she was prejudiced.

Petitioner’s timely appeal of the post-conviction court’s order followed.

II. Analysis

Petitioner argues that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel and contends

that her guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily made. The State argues that

Petitioner has waived these claims because she has not cited to the record in support of her

arguments. We agree with the State.

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Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(7) provides that a brief shall contain

an argument setting forth “the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues

presented, and the reasons therefor, including the reasons why the contentions require

appellate relief, with citations to the authorities and appropriate references to the

record . . . relied on.” (emphasis added). Our court’s rules say the same: “Issues which

are not supported by argument, citation to authorities, or appropriate references to the

record will be treated as waived in this court.” Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b) (emphasis

added).

Our appellate review is “frustrated” by a failure to follow these rules. Abbott v.

State, No. M2020-00500-CCA-R3-PC, 2022 WL 102607, at *18 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan.

11, 2022). Our court routinely has held that the failure to make appropriate references to

the record or comply with the rules results in a waiver of the issue. State v. Killebrew, 760

S.W.2d 228, 231-33, 35 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988) (waiving issues for failure to make

appropriate references to the record); Bledsoe v. State, No. W2023-00361-CCA-R3-PC,

2024 WL 127028, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 11, 2024) (waiving the defendant’s issues

for failing to make a single reference to the record in the argument section and for failing

to argue how the applicable law applies to the facts of his case); State v. Moss, No. M2021-

00043-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 1117795, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2023)

(explaining that when a defendant “cites some applicable law in his brief, [but] he makes

not a single reference to the record in the argument section, or anywhere else in his brief,”

he has “waived appellate consideration” of his issues), no perm. app. filed; State v. Lynch,

No. E2019-00195-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 1899611, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17,

2020) (waiving issues for failure to include a relevant statement of facts, and failing to cite

to authority). “[C]ompliance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure is expected.” Bledsoe,

2024 WL 127028, at *5 (first quoting Lynch, 2020 WL 1899611, at *3; and then citing

Moss, 2023 WL 1117795, at *2).

Throughout Petitioner’s twenty-page brief, she repeatedly refers to the proceedings

below over a span of twelve pages, yet she does not cite to the record a single time. As

noted by the State in its brief and conceded by Petitioner at oral argument, the record is

voluminous, containing more than 700 pages of transcribed testimony and multiple

volumes of exhibits. When the State’s brief addressed possible waiver of Petitioner’s

issues because of her failure to cite to the record, Petitioner did not file a reply brief or any

other pleading which included the appropriate citations. We recognize the gravity of this

case, but weigh this consideration against the consequences of disregarding adherence to

the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and the rules of this court. In our compliance

with those rules, we find Petitioner’s brief inadequate. Consequently, we conclude that she

has waived appellate consideration of her issues. Having concluded that Petitioner failed

to comply with the applicable rules, she has waived the issues.

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Despite Petitioner’s waiver, our review of the record and applicable law reveal that

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on the merits of her claims. A trial court’s findings of

fact underlying a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed on appeal under a

de novo standard, accompanied with a presumption that those findings are correct unless

the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Henley v.

State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997). However, a trial court’s conclusions of law—

such as whether counsel’s performance was deficient or whether that deficiency was

prejudicial—are reviewed under a purely de novo standard, with no presumption of

correctness given to the trial court’s conclusions. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458

(Tenn. 2001).

Here, Petitioner raises two claims on appeal: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to conduct an appropriate investigation; and (2) Petitioner’s plea was not knowing

and voluntary. Concerning Petitioner’s claim that counsel was ineffective in investigating

her case, the post-conviction court found that Petitioner “had ample time to confer with

[trial counsel] about her options” and Petitioner created “any shortage of time by directly

soliciting a [plea] offer from the TBI.” Additionally, Petitioner failed to present any

witnesses, experts, or evidence that trial counsel could have discovered or used and,

therefore, cannot meet the burden required of her. See Black v. State, 794 S.W.2d 752, 758

(Tenn. 1990).

Finally, as it relates to Petitioner’s claim that her plea was not knowing and

voluntary, Petitioner testified under oath at her plea hearing that understood the rights she

was waiving and was freely and voluntarily pleading guilty. A petitioner’s representations

and statements under oath that his guilty plea is knowing and voluntary create “a

formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings [because] [s]olemn

declarations . . . carry a strong presumption of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63,

74 (1977). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

III. Conclusion

In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment of the

post-conviction court is affirmed.

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MATTHEW J. WILSON, JUDGE

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