Ruth Adjartey v. Santander Bank, N.A.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-733

RUTH ADJARTEY

vs.

SANTANDER BANK, N.A.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Ruth Adjartey, appeals from the sua sponte

order dismissing a petition filed with the Superior Court that

sought to set aside a decision of the Housing Court and

permanently enjoin that judgment under equity principles. She

also appeals from the order denying her motion to reconsider the

dismissal. The plaintiff raises a variety of issues, all of

which amount to a collateral attack on the judgment of the

Housing Court. We affirm.

Discussion. Adjartey styled her "petition" to vacate the

Housing Court judgment as a motion pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P.

60 (b) (4), 365 Mass. 828 (1974), and we will treat it as such.

"It is well established as a general matter that denial of a

motion under rule 60 (b) will be set aside only on a clear

showing of an abuse of discretion." Wang v. Niakaros, 67 Mass.

App. Ct. 166, 169 (2006). We also review a decision on a motion

for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Kauders v. Uber

Techs., Inc., 486 Mass. 557, 568 (2021). "[A] judge's

discretionary decision constitutes an abuse of discretion where

we conclude the judge made a clear error of judgment in weighing

the factors relevant to the decision such that the decision

falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives" (citation

and quotation omitted). L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169,

185 n.27 (2014).

In 2019, the Housing Court granted summary judgment to

Santander Bank, N.A. (Santander) on its postforeclosure summary

process action, and judgment ultimately entered against

Adjartey. In an unpublished decision, Santander Bank, N.A. v.

Doku, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 1117 (2021), this court affirmed the

Housing Court judgment on direct appeal. Further appellate

review was denied. Santander Bank, N.A. v. Doku, 489 Mass. 1105

(2022).

Still determined to fight her eviction, Adjartey filed a

petition in the Superior Court, in which she asked for relief

from the Housing Court judgment on the ground that it is void

and asked the court to permanently enjoin the judgment against

her.1 In so filing, Adjartey relied on certain language in a

1 The record does not indicate that Santander was ever served

with the Superior Court petition. Santander has not filed a

2

footnote in the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion in Adjartey v.

Central Div. of the Hous. Court Dep't, 481 Mass. 830 (2019),

which affirmed an order of the single justice that denied

Adjartey and others' request for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.2

In relevant part, the footnote states:

"with regard to any potential claims under art. 114 of the

Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, the

Massachusetts Equal Rights Act (MERA), or the Americans

with Disabilities Act (ADA), the petitioners could have

initiated a separate action in a court of competent

jurisdiction or argued on direct appeal that they were

prejudiced by a judge's erroneous denial of a request for

reasonable accommodations."

Id. at 833 n.6. Adjartey claims that this language demonstrates

that the Superior Court is a "court of competent jurisdiction"

to vacate the Housing Court judgment and adjudicate the matters

already decided by the Housing Court. However, the issues that

were raised in the G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition that is the

subject of Adjartey, supra, are entirely separate from the

issues raised in the Superior Court petition that is before us.

In this petition, Adjartey has not raised any potential claims

she may have under art. 114 of the Amendments to the

brief in this appeal, and it is unclear whether it is even aware

of these proceedings.

2 The G. L. c. 211, § 3 petition raised numerous concerns

regarding summary process practices and procedures. See

Adjartey, 481 Mass. at 832. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed

the order of the single justice "[b]ecause the petitioners had

adequate alternative avenues to seek review of their claims."

Id. at 833.

3

Massachusetts Constitution, the MERA, or the ADA in the Superior

Court.

Rather, Adjartey's petition requests that the Superior

Court vacate the judgment of the Housing Court and permanently

enjoin enforcement of such a judgment against her. She raises

the same arguments that were already litigated in the Housing

Court against the same party, Santander, and in the direct

appeal that followed. These arguments include that the judgment

is void because the Housing Court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction due to Santander's lack of standing. The short

answer is, as the judge properly held, the Superior Court does

not have jurisdiction to vacate judgments of the Housing Court.

Even if the Superior Court could have addressed the claims,

Adjartey would fare no better.

"[T]he principle of res judicata requires that a valid and

final personal judgment rendered by a court of competent

jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter serve

as a bar to any further proceedings between the same

parties on the same claim. Furthermore, a party cannot

avoid this rule by seeking an alternative remedy or by

raising the claim from a different posture or in a

different procedural form."

Wright Mach. Corp. v. Seaman-Andwall Corp., 364 Mass. 686, 688

(1974).

As stated in this court's decision on her direct appeal,

"Adjartey is not helped by trying to recast her various

substantive arguments with respect to the underlying merits as

4

ones claiming that Santander lacks 'standing.'" Doku, 100 Mass.

App. Ct. 1117 n.6. Additionally, under the doctrine of claim

preclusion, the summary process judgment barred Adjartey from

asserting that the foreclosure was invalid in Superior Court.

"[A]lthough 'subject matter jurisdictional issues are

nonwaivable and can be raised at any time, . . . that does not

mean that subject matter jurisdictional issues can always be

raised in every context and in every forum.'" Bigelow v. Reem

Property, LLC, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 590, 595-596 (2023), quoting

Brown v. Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 481 Mass. 1036, 1037 (2019).

"The place to seek relief from a judgment as void for want of

subject matter jurisdiction . . . is the issuing court."

Bigelow, supra at 596. The issuing court was the Housing

Court -- not the Superior Court.3

In any event, the concept of a "void judgment," that is, a

"total want of jurisdiction[,] must be distinguished from an

error in the exercise of jurisdiction. A court has the power to

3 While Adjartey asserts she has been denied the opportunity to

be fully heard on her claims to date, the record reflects that

multiple relevant motions and oppositions filed by Adjartey were

decided after a hearing was held. This court also fully

considered her direct appeal from the Housing Court judgment in

Doku, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 1117. We also reject Adjartey's claim

that the Superior Court was obligated to conduct an evidentiary

review of the record, as her title and standing claims were

fully adjudicated by the Housing Court's denial of her motion to

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and granting of

summary judgment.

5

determine its own jurisdiction, and an error in that

determination will not render the judgment void. Only in the

rare instance of a clear usurpation of power will a judgment be

rendered void." Harris v. Sannella, 400 Mass. 392, 395 (1987),

quoting Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys., 453 F.2d 645, 649 (1st

Cir. 1972). From our review of the limited record, this is not

a rare instance of a clear usurpation of power that would render

a judgment void. Title challenges in a summary process

action -- including those based on alleged predatory lending and

discrimination -- and "housing problems" that may give rise to

an equal rights violation, fall squarely within the jurisdiction

of the Housing Court. G. L. c. 185C, § 3. See G. L. c. 151B,

§ 9; G. L. c. 183C, § 18 (a)-(b). See also Bank of Am., N.A. v.

Rosa, 466 Mass. 613, 623-626 (2013) (Housing Court has

jurisdiction in summary process proceeding to consider all

equitable challenges to title, including those that previously

had to be raised by independent Superior Court action).

Santander had asserted in the Housing Court that it had title to

the property by virtue of a foreclosure on Adjartey's mortgage.

"The action thus appeared to be a typical postforeclosure

summary process action of the sort regularly adjudicated by the

Housing Court." Bigelow, 102 Mass. App. Ct. at 596.

Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion in the Superior

6

Court's dismissal of the petition (rule 60 (b) motion) and

denial of the motion for reconsideration.

Order denying rule 60 (b)

motion affirmed.

Order denying motion for

reconsideration affirmed.

By the Court (Meade, Blake &

Desmond, JJ.4),

Assistant Clerk

Entered: March 7, 2024.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

7