The opinion
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2022-3620
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HANNA KILCREASE,
Appellant,
v.
BLAKE RYAN BROWN,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
Tiffany M. Baker-Carper, Judge.
March 6, 2024
TANENBAUM, J.
The parties engaged in paternity litigation in Oklahoma. That
litigation produced, among other things, out-of-state court orders
on time-sharing and child support. The Oklahoma court also gave
the mother (the appellant in this action) permission to relocate
with the child to Florida. In her verified petition to register these
orders with the circuit court in Leon County, the mother
acknowledged that the Oklahoma court that rendered those orders
has “continuing jurisdiction.” Still, she sought the Florida circuit
court’s enforcement of the father’s child-support obligation under
the Oklahoma court’s order. The father responded with his own
motion for enforcement—of the timesharing plan put in place by
the same Oklahoma court.
There was much back-and-forth in the Florida circuit court
over whether the timesharing plan was temporary or permanent,
which, according to the parties, would affect what facts needed to
be proved to support modification of the plan. Meanwhile, the
Oklahoma court was still issuing one or more orders of its own
regarding the timesharing plan. The Florida circuit court
ultimately granted the mother’s motion to enforce the child-
support order and denied the father’s motion for enforcement
regarding the timesharing. She appeals; he does not.
Even though the mother obtained all the relief that she sought
in her motion, she expresses concern in her brief over one
paragraph in the order granting that motion: “The Court
Minutes/Notes filed in the District Court of Payne County, State
of Oklahoma . . . is found to be a temporary order, subject to
modification without [the] need for proving a substantial, material,
and unanticipated change.” This legal determination had no
relation to the relief granted to the mother, and she should rest
assured that the statement is a legal nullity.
This is so because there is no indication in the record that the
Florida circuit court comported with the requirements of section
61.519, Florida Statutes, for conducting “simultaneous
proceedings” on child-custody determinations—which includes
resolution of timesharing issues. Except in emergencies, that
statute prohibits a court of this state from exercising jurisdiction
in a proceeding to modify a child-custody order “if, at the time of
the commencement of the proceeding, a proceeding concerning the
custody of the child had been commenced in a court of another
state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this
part.” § 61.519(1), Fla. Stat. There are two exceptions to this
prohibition: when “the proceeding has been terminated” and when
the proceeding “is stayed by the court of the other state because a
court of this state is a more convenient forum under s. 61.520.” Id.;
cf. § 61.516, Fla. Stat. (prohibiting modification of “a child custody
determination made by a court of another state” except under some
limited circumstances, including when the “court of the other state
determines it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction
under s. 61.515 or that a court of this state would be a more
convenient forum under s. 61.520”). Neither exception appears to
apply in the proceeding in the circuit court below.
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Moreover, again except for in emergencies, the statute
requires
a court of this state, before hearing a child custody
proceeding, [to] examine the court documents and other
information supplied by the parties pursuant to s. 61.522.
If the court determines that a child custody proceeding
was previously commenced in a court in another state
having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with this
part, the court of this state shall stay its proceeding and
communicate with the court of the other state. If the court
of the state having jurisdiction substantially in
accordance with this part does not determine that the
court of this state is a more appropriate forum, the court
of this state shall dismiss the proceeding.
§ 61.519(2), Fla. Stat. A record must be made of the communication
between the two courts under this provision. See § 61.511(4), Fla.
Stat. Despite the mother’s disclosure in the verified information
she provided under section 61.522, Florida Statutes, that the
Oklahoma court had “continuing jurisdiction” regarding the child’s
custody, there is no record of communication between the two
courts and no record that the Oklahoma court determined the
Florida circuit court was the “more appropriate forum” for the
timesharing dispute.
Regardless of whether the paragraph of concern in the circuit
court’s order was simply irrelevant or, worse, unauthorized as a
modification of the Oklahoma court’s timesharing plan, it has no
legal effect to the detriment of the mother. Because the mother was
awarded complete relief on her motion to enforce, and the father’s
motion was denied in its entirety, there is no relief for her to claim
in this appeal, which then must be dismissed. The supreme court
explained it this way:
When a litigant succeeds in obtaining all [s]he asks in the
trial court having jurisdiction of the cause, [s]he no longer
has a grievance to be corrected by an appeal to a
reviewing court, whose chief duties are to correct abuses
in the trial court, whereby the rights of a litigant were
prejudiced and [s]he was thereby deprived of h[er] just
dues under the law. When [s]he has no such grievance,
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[s]he is not entitled by appeal to have the appellate court
approve the judgment in h[er] favor.
Credit Indus. Co. v. Remark Chem. Co., 67 So. 2d 540, 541 (Fla.
1953); see also Witt v. Baars, 18 So. 330, 330 (Fla. 1895) (dismissing
appeal where “no relief whatever having been granted against her,
or any liability adjudged against her or her estate”); Peterson v.
State ex rel. Harvey, 28 So. 2d 868, 870 (Fla. 1947) (“It appears to
be well settled, however, that a party to a cause may not appeal
from a judgment which [s]he has sought and caused to be entered,
unless the judgment has been so entered that the appellant has
sustained some injury by it or is one not authorized by law and can
in no way be enforced by legal process.”).
DISMISSED.
BILBREY and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Ashley D. Hall, Fournier Law, PLLC, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Eric D. Schab, Max Factor Law, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee.
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