United States v. Larry Brock

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 27, 2023 Decided March 1, 2024

No. 23-3045

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

LARRY RENDALL BROCK,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:21-cr-00140-1)

Charles Burnham argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Eric Hansford, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With him on the brief was Chrisellen R. Kolb,

Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: MILLETT and PILLARD, Circuit Judges, and

ROGERS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge MILLETT.

2

MILLETT, Circuit Judge: Larry Brock participated in the

violent January 6th riot at the United States Capitol that forced

the evacuation of members of Congress and their staff and

prevented Congress’s certification of the 2020 presidential

election until the next day. After a bench trial, the court

convicted Brock of six crimes, including corruptly obstructing

Congress’s certification of the electoral count under 18 U.S.C.

§ 1512(c)(2). At sentencing, the district court applied a three-

level sentencing enhancement to Brock’s Section 1512(c)(2)

conviction on the ground that Brock’s conduct resulted in

“substantial interference with the administration of justice[.]”

U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(2).

Brock challenges both the district court’s interpretation of

Section 1512(c)(2)’s elements and the sufficiency of the

evidence to support that conviction. He also challenges the

district court’s application of the three-level sentencing

enhancement for interfering with the “administration of

justice.” Because the law and the record in this case foreclose

Brock’s legal and sufficiency challenges, we affirm Brock’s

Section 1512(c)(2) conviction. As for Brock’s sentence, we

hold that the “administration of justice” enhancement does not

apply to interference with the legislative process of certifying

electoral votes. For that reason, we vacate Brock’s sentence

for his Section 1512(c)(2) conviction and remand to the district

court for resentencing.

I

A

In early January 2021, Brock traveled from his home in

Texas to Washington, D.C., where he participated in the

January 6th riot at the United States Capitol. In the months

leading up to January 6th, Brock made a series of Facebook

3

posts and exchanges regarding what he referred to as the

“stolen” and “fraud[ulent]” 2020 presidential election. J.A.

276, 279, 289. For example, Brock warned that, absent

intervention by the Supreme Court or Congress to overturn the

election, there would be “revolution[,]” “rebel[lion,]”

“[i]nsurrection[,]” “civil war[,]” and “blood.” J.A. 275, 293,

297, 302, 319, 487. In a private Facebook exchange with an

Army special forces veteran, Brock proposed a “[p]lan of

action if Congress fail[ed] to act on 6 January” that included

“[s]eiz[ing]” political leaders, “national media assets[,]” and

“key personnel”; “using [interrogation] measures we used on

Al Qaeda to gain evidence on the coup”; “[e]stablish[ing]

provisional government in rebellious states”; and granting a

“[g]eneral pardon for all crimes up to and including murder

[for] those restoring the Constitution and putting down the

Democratic Insurrection.” J.A. 309−311. Brock also outlined

“[r]ules of engagement[,]” including avoiding killing law

enforcement officers “unless necessary[,]” “[a]ttempt[ing] to

capture Democrats with knowledge of [the] coup[,]” and

“[s]hoot[ing] and destroy[ing] enemy communication nodes

and key personnel.” J.A. 311–312. Throughout these posts

and exchanges, Brock made repeated references to winning the

“IO war,” a reference to the use of information operations “to

shape the battlefield[.]” J.A. 289–290.

Brock attended then-President Trump’s “Stop the Steal

Rally” on the morning of January 6th, and then marched with

others to the United States Capitol. When he arrived, Brock

ascended the Upper West Terrace and entered the building

through the door to the Senate Wing. He entered the Capitol at

2:24 p.m.—approximately twelve minutes after the Senate

recessed, but five minutes before the House recessed. Once

inside, Brock—wearing a military-style helmet and tactical

vest—headed toward the Senate gallery doors, picking up a

pair of discarded flex-cuffs along the way. As Brock

4

approached the Senate gallery, he encountered a group of

rioters interfering with Capitol Police officers’ attempts to lock

the Senate gallery doors, with at least one of the rioters striking

an officer. Brock told the group to “calm down,” adding “that’s

not what we’re here for[.]” J.A. 227–228. Brock briefly

entered the Senate gallery. After exiting, he attempted to open

a set of secured doors marked “U.S. Senate” with an

unidentified set of keys. Brock ultimately reached the Senate

floor, where he spent approximately eight minutes walking

around and looking at paperwork on desks. During this time,

Brock told others not to sit in the Vice President’s chair or to

be disrespectful, explaining that the rioters could not afford to

“lose the IO war.” J.A. 403.

Brock left the Capitol at 3:02 p.m. On his way out, he

deescalated an altercation between another rioter and Capitol

Police officers and guided the rioter out of the Capitol. In total,

Brock spent approximately 38 minutes inside the building.

B

A federal grand jury indicted Brock on six counts: felony

obstruction of an official proceeding (18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2))

(including aiding and abetting liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2);

misdemeanor entering and remaining in a restricted building or

grounds (18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1)); misdemeanor disorderly and

disruptive conduct in a restricted building or grounds (18

U.S.C. § 1752(a)(2)); misdemeanor entering and remaining on

the floor of Congress (40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(A));

misdemeanor disorderly conduct in a Capitol building (40

U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(D)); and misdemeanor parading,

demonstrating, or picketing in a Capitol building (40 U.S.C.

§ 5104(e)(2)(G)). Brock waived his right to a jury trial.

5

Following a three-day bench trial, the district court

convicted Brock on all six charges. The district court noted

that there was “little dispute as to what * * * Brock said and

what he did on January 6th,” and that the questions before the

court “[we]re largely questions of [Brock’s] intent and whether

he acted knowingly in certain contexts.” J.A. 451. The district

court then proceeded to conduct an element-by-element

analysis of each count.

The only count of conviction relevant to this appeal is

Count One, obstruction of an official proceeding under 18

U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). For that offense, the district court found

four elements proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

First, the district court found that Brock “attempted to or

did obstruct or impede an official proceeding” because he

“obstructed Congress’ election certification.” J.A. 456. The

district court noted that Brock “was part of the large crowd of

demonstrators who breached the Capitol on January 6th during

the election certification proceedings[,]” and that “this breach

caused Congress to adjourn its session because it was no longer

safe for members of Congress to be in the Capitol.” J.A. 456.

The court noted that the Senate—but not the House—had

recessed before Brock entered the Capitol. The district court

then found that Brock was “part of the greater mob that

breached the Capitol, which caused the proceedings to be

adjourned and not to be continued in the short term[,]” J.A.

456, and that Brock’s presence in the Capitol “continued to

obstruct the proceeding by preventing Congress from

reconvening[,]” J.A. 457.

Second, the district court found that Brock “acted with the

intent to obstruct or impede the election certification when he

breached the Capitol building.” J.A. 458. In particular, the

district court found that Brock’s “Facebook messages show

6

that he intended to obstruct proceedings at the Capitol on

January 6th.” J.A. 458. The district court further found that

“Brock’s choice to outfit himself in tactical gear and a helmet

shows that he expected that events might get violent inside or

outside the Capitol on January 6th[,]” and that “there [wa]s no

evidence in the record that * * * Brock wore this gear to protect

himself from counter-protestors.” J.A. 460. The district court

also found it “implausible that * * * Brock’s intent was simply

to support Congress members in objecting to the election

results[,]” as such a purpose was not consistent with Brock’s

Facebook communications leading up to January 6th or with

his actions in breaching the Capitol, which prevented members

of Congress from objecting to or certifying the electoral votes.

J.A. 460–461. The district court added that “the law permits

the factfinder to infer that a person intends the natural and

probable consequences of their actions[,]” and that it “[wa]s

reasonable that * * * Brock would have expected that

breaching the Capitol during the election certification

proceedings would cause those proceedings to halt[.]” J.A. 461

(formatting modified).

Third, the district court found that Brock “acted

knowingly”—that is, “with awareness that the natural and

probable effect of his conduct would be to obstruct or impede

the official proceeding.” J.A. 461. Referring back to its intent

analysis, the court ruled that “it [wa]s reasonable to conclude

that * * * Brock was aware that his actions in entering the

Capitol would have the probable effect of obstructing the

election certification that day.” J.A. 461–462.

Fourth, the district court found that Brock “acted

corruptly.” J.A. 462. The district court explained that

“corruptly” “require[s] a showing of dishonesty, an improper

purpose, or consciousness of wrongdoing.” J.A. 462 (brackets

omitted) (quoting United States v. Puma, 596 F. Supp. 3d 90,

7

103 (D.D.C. 2022)). The district court concluded that “Brock’s

Facebook messages support that he knew obstructing the

election certification on January 6th was improper[,]” “he was

prepared to break the law to achieve his goals[,]” and he “knew

that some actions he contemplated were illegal[.]” J.A. 462.

The district court further noted that “Brock’s outfit of tactical

gear tend[ed] to show that he believed violence was a

possibility at the Capitol on January 6th.” J.A. 463. While

finding it “unlikely” that Brock intended to take all of the

actions referenced in his Facebook posts, the district court

found that Brock’s posts offered sufficient evidence “to

indicate that he clearly intended to take very purposeful actions

to interfere with any certification of the election, and even to

take actions that bordered on violent conduct and improper

steps to impede the Congressional action of certification of the

election.” J.A. 463.

Finally, with respect to a related element of another count,

the district court found that Brock acted “with the intent to

impede or disrupt the orderly conduct of government business

or official functions.” J.A. 470. In support of that finding, the

district court concluded that “Brock could look around and

realize that he was part of a mob[,]” and that “he knew that

Congress was certifying the election that day, a proceeding

which would not be open to the public, and that he was not

allowed on the Senate floor[.]” J.A. 469. The district court

further found that, although Brock was not himself involved in

any altercations, “and in fact the evidence show[ed] that he

tried to calm the protestors[,] he nevertheless continued to walk

through the Capitol with full knowledge that law enforcement

and the protesters were clashing at various points.” J.A. 470.

On that basis, the district court concluded that Brock acted with

“full awareness” that his actions would disrupt the electoral

certification process. J.A. 471.

8

C

At sentencing, the parties agreed that Section 2J1.2 of the

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines applied to Brock’s Section

1512(c)(2) conviction.1 Over Brock’s objection, however, the

district court added a three-level enhancement under Section

2J1.2(b)(2) for “substantial interference with the

administration of justice[.]” U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(2) (2021).2

The district court noted that the application comments to

Section 2J1.2 define “substantial interference with the

administration of justice” to include “the unnecessary

expenditure of substantial government resources.” J.A. 666;

see U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 cmt. n.1. The court concluded that “only

a general causal tie is necessary between the defendant’s

actions and the unnecessary expenditures by the

government[,]” and so “the government only has to show a

causal line from the [January 6th] mob * * * [to the]

unnecessary expenditure of substantial government resources.”

J.A. 667. The district court then applied the enhancement on

the basis that Brock was both “convicted of obstructing an

official proceeding” and “was part of the mob that caused

substantial damage at the Capitol and large expenditure of

government resources[.]” J.A. 668.

The district court rejected Brock’s argument that the

phrase “administration of justice” refers only to judicial

proceedings. The district court suggested that it would be

“odd” to interpret “‘administration of justice’ so narrowly as to

1

Although the sentencing transcript appears in the parties’ sealed

joint appendix, the transcript is publicly available and is not under

seal.

2

The U.S. Sentencing Commission issued a new Guidelines Manual

in 2023. All citations in this opinion are to the 2021 Guidelines

Manual in effect at the time of Brock’s sentencing.

9

be limited to judicial proceedings when all of the statutes

referred to and relevant to this provision of the guidelines go

well beyond that[.]” J.A. 660. Agreeing with the

“overwhelming view of the judges in [the district]” regarding

the applicability of Section 2J1.2(b)(2), J.A. 666, the district

court applied a three-level enhancement to Brock’s Section

1512(c)(2) sentence.

The district court subsequently sentenced Brock to

concurrent terms of imprisonment of twenty-four months for

his Section 1512(c)(2) conviction and six to twelve months for

each of his misdemeanor convictions, followed by twenty-four

months of supervised release.

II

The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

In general, we review questions of law de novo. United

States v. Verrusio, 762 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2014). But in

criminal cases, we review objections raised for the first time on

appeal only for plain error. United States v. Pasha, 797 F.3d

1122, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). We

review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo,

asking whether, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict, “any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” United States v. Boyd, 803 F.3d 690, 692 (D.C. Cir.

2015) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979));

see United States v. Bryant, 117 F.3d 1464, 1467 (D.C. Cir.

1997) (noting that this standard is the same for both jury and

non-jury cases). We also “review de novo [a] district court’s

interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines in calculating a

10

defendant’s Sentencing Guidelines range.” United States v.

Brown, 892 F.3d 385, 401 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (per curiam).

III

Brock challenges both the district court’s interpretation of

Section 1512(c)(2)’s actus reus and “corruptly” elements, and

the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction under

that statute. He separately argues that the district court

improperly applied a three-level enhancement to his Section

1512(c)(2) conviction under Section 2J1.2(b)(2) of the U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines.

While the law and the record in this case foreclose Brock’s

legal and sufficiency challenges to his Section 1512(c)(2)

conviction, the district court erred in treating Brock’s

obstruction of the electoral certification process as interfering

with the “administration of justice.”

A

1

Brock first challenges the district court’s interpretation of

Section 1512(c)(2)’s actus reus element. To violate Section

1512(c), a defendant must be found to have either (1)

“alter[ed], destroy[ed], mutilate[d], or conceal[ed] a record,

document, or other object, or attempt[ed] to do so, with the

intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in

an official proceeding[,]” or (2) “otherwise obstruct[ed],

influence[d], or impede[d] any official proceeding, or

attempt[ed] to do so[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c).

Brock argues that subsection (c)(2) applies only to

“obstructive acts [that] resulted in ‘evidence impairment[,]’” or

11

actions taken “with respect to a document, record, or other

object in order to corruptly obstruct, impede or influence an

official proceeding.” Brock Opening Br. 7 (quotation marks

omitted); see Brock Opening Br. 9–12.

Circuit precedent says otherwise. This court has already

held that Section 1512(c)(2) is not limited to evidence-related

acts. In United States v. Fischer, 64 F.4th 329 (D.C. Cir. 2023),

cert. granted, 2023 WL 8605748 (2023), we held that Section

1512(c)(2) prohibits “all forms of corrupt obstruction of an

official proceeding” that are not already captured by Section

1512(c)(1)’s prohibition against “‘corruptly’ tampering with ‘a

record, document, or other object’ to impair or prevent its use

in an official proceeding[.]” Id. at 336 (quoting 18 U.S.C.

§ 1512(c)(1)); see id. at 336–337; United States v. Robertson,

86 F.4th 355, 374–375 (D.C. Cir. 2023). Under Fischer, then,

Section 1512(c)(2) serves as a “catch-all” provision “that

covers otherwise obstructive behavior that might not constitute

a more specific offense involving documents, records, or

objects under [Section] 1512(c)(1).” Fischer, 64 F.4th at 337

(formatting modified).3

Fischer binds this panel and forecloses Brock’s proposed

evidence-impairment standard. See New York-New York, LLC

v. NLRB, 676 F.3d 193, 194–195 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“We are of

course bound by our prior panel decision[.]”). Brock himself

acknowledges as much, contending that he “advance[s] the

argument for an alternative definition of actus reus” in order

“to preserve the point for possible Supreme Court or en banc

review[.]” Brock Opening Br. 10–11. Because Brock does not

3

After oral argument in this case, the Supreme Court granted

certiorari in Fischer to determine whether Section 1512(c)(2)

prohibits obstructive acts unrelated to investigations and evidence.

See Fischer v. United States, No. 23-5572, 2023 WL 8605748 (Dec.

13, 2023) (mem.).

12

contest that the district court applied the interpretation of

Section 1512(c)(2)’s actus reus element set forth in Fischer,

and agrees that Fischer governs our review, see Brock Opening

Br. 8, 10–11, we reject this legal challenge.

2

Brock next argues that there was insufficient evidence to

show that his conduct resulted in evidence impairment. We

need not decide that question because, as we just explained,

circuit precedent holds that Section 1512(c)(2) encompasses

more conduct than just evidence impairment. Brock cannot

sidestep our precedent by repackaging his argument as a

sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. In United States v.

Reynoso, 38 F.4th 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2022), we held that “a

defendant cannot make out a sufficiency challenge as to

offense elements that the government had no requirement to

prove at trial under then-prevailing law.” Id. at 1091. That

holding is equally true as to elements that the law at the time of

appeal does not require the government to prove. See

Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 243–244 (2016).

Under Fischer, the government satisfied the actus reus element

by proving that Brock was part of the mob that breached the

Capitol on January 6th and caused Congress to adjourn its

electoral certification proceedings, which the district court

found beyond a reasonable doubt.4

4

The evidence of record may also satisfy Brock’s evidence-

impairment reading of Section 1512(c)(2). Central to Congress’s

electoral certification process “is the receipt, processing, and

verification of evidence”—that is, “the States’ certificates of the

votes cast for President by their respective electors.” United States

v. Brock, No. 23-3045, 2023 WL 3671002, at *2 (D.C. Cir. May 25,

2023) (Millett, J., concurring). Brock’s participation in the January

6th riot caused Congress to adjourn this evidentiary process and

13

B

1

Brock also argues that the district court applied the

incorrect legal standard for Section 1512(c)(2)’s requirement

that a defendant act “corruptly” because it did not require the

government to prove that Brock acted with an intent to procure

an unlawful benefit for himself or another. See Brock Opening

Br. 13–14.

Brock forfeited this unlawful-benefit argument by failing

to raise it before the district court. “A criminal defendant who

wishes a court of appeals to consider a claim that a ruling of a

trial court was in error must first make his objection known to

the trial-court judge.” Holguin-Hernandez v. United States,

140 S. Ct. 762, 764 (2020); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 51(b).

That is not an onerous task. “[A]ll a defendant need do to

preserve a claim of error is inform the district court and

opposing counsel of the ruling he wants the court to make and

the ground for so doing.” United States v. Tate, 630 F.3d 194,

197 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (formatting modified); see United States

v. Obuszewski, 334 F. App’x 330, 331 (D.C. Cir. 2009)

(applying Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51(b) in appeal

following a bench trial).

prevented members of Congress from accessing and reviewing the

certificates. As such, “Brock’s conduct necessarily obstructed the

handling, submission, processing, and congressional consideration

of the evidence of each State’s electoral votes. It did so just as much

as if Brock had grabbed a pile of state certificates and run away with

them.” Id. at *3. “In that way, Brock’s actions ‘impair[ed] the * * *

availability’ of the physical evidence of electoral votes ‘for use in an

official [congressional] proceeding[.]’” Id. (modifications in

original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1)).

14

Whether Brock acted corruptly as required by Section

1512(c)(2) was a key issue at trial. Yet at no point did Brock

proffer the definition of “corruptly” for which he now

advocates. Quite the opposite, in his closing statement,

Brock’s counsel argued that the statute required Brock “to

know that his conduct was corrupt, meaning wrongful.” J.A.

441; see J.A. 441 (further explaining that Brock “d[id]n’t have

to know he was violating 1512, but he had to have the specific

intent to act in a wrongful way”). That definition of “corruptly”

is consistent with the standard that the district court applied in

denying Brock’s motion for judgment of acquittal. See J.A.

462 (“Courts in this district have construed ‘corruptly’ to

require a showing of dishonesty, an improper purpose, or

consciousness of wrongdoing.”) (brackets omitted) (quoting

Puma, 596 F. Supp. 3d at 103).

Having himself argued for the same definition that he now

claims was error and having failed to raise before the district

court any objection to the district court’s interpretation of the

element, Brock has, at a minimum, forfeited his argument that

Section 1512(c)(2) requires a showing of unlawful benefit. See

Salazar v. District of Columbia, 602 F.3d 431, 436–437 (D.C.

Cir. 2010).

If a party does not properly preserve an error for review in

a criminal case, “appellate-court authority to remedy the error

* * * is strictly circumscribed.” Puckett v. United States, 556

U.S. 129, 134 (2009). Errors “not brought to the court’s

attention” are subject to review only if they are “plain[.]” FED.

R. CRIM. P. 52(b).

Under the “difficult” plain-error standard, this court will

reverse the district court only if that court committed a “clear

or obvious” error that affected a defendant’s substantial rights

15

and “seriously affects the fairness, integrity[,] or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135

(formatting modified). An error is not “clear or obvious” if it

is “subject to reasonable dispute.” Id. We evaluate the

plainness of an alleged error at the time of appellate review.

See United States v. Long, 997 F.3d 342, 359 (D.C. Cir. 2021)

(citing Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 279 (2013)).

Brock’s forfeited unlawful-benefit argument fails at the

first step of plain-error review because the district court’s

definition of “corruptly” did not constitute a “clear or obvious”

error. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135. Recently, in United States v.

Robertson, 86 F.4th 355 (D.C. Cir. 2023), we held that “there

are multiple ways to prove that a defendant acted

‘corruptly[,]’” id. at 368, including by “establishing that the

defendant acted with a corrupt purpose[,]” id. at 367, or acted

with “consciousness of wrongdoing[,]” id. at 368 (quotation

marks omitted). While we noted in Robertson that proof a

defendant intended to procure a benefit for himself or another

may be sufficient to establish that he acted “corruptly,” we held

that such proof is not necessary to satisfy Section 1512(c)’s

“corruptly” requirement. See id. at 371–374.

Given Robertson, and the lack of any contrary authority in

this circuit or from the Supreme Court, the district court’s

application of the “corruptly” requirement survives plain-error

review. The district court stated that “corruptly” “require[s] a

showing of dishonesty, an improper purpose, or consciousness

of wrongdoing.” J.A. 462 (brackets omitted) (quoting Puma,

596 F. Supp. 3d at 103). Because each of these showings may

be sufficient to establish that Brock acted “corruptly” under

Section 1512(c), see Robertson, 86 F.4th at 373 n.8

(dishonesty); id. at 367 (corrupt purpose); id. at 369 n.5

(consciousness of wrongdoing), the district court’s

16

interpretation was not plainly erroneous, see Puckett, 556 U.S.

at 135.

2

Brock also raises two sufficiency challenges—one under

his proposed unlawful-benefit standard for “corruptly” and one

under the standard the district court applied. See Brock Br. 14–

18. The unlawful-benefit challenge is not preserved, and

Brock’s repackaging of the same argument as a sufficiency-of-

the-evidence argument fails because the government was not

required to prove at trial (under either then- or now-prevailing

law) that Brock acted to procure an unlawful benefit for himself

or another. See Musacchio, 577 U.S. at 243–244.

As for Brock’s argument that there was not sufficient

evidence to satisfy the district court’s definition of “corruptly,”

the evidence shows otherwise. Specifically, the evidence in

this case and the fact findings by the district court establish that

Brock acted with both an improper purpose and consciousness

of wrongdoing. The evidence showed that Brock participated

in a riot that sought to overturn the 2020 presidential election

by force, and that he was himself prepared to take violent action

to achieve that goal. In his social media communications

leading up to January 6th, Brock warned that there would be

“revolution[,]” “rebel[lion,]” “[i]nsurrection[,]” “civil war[,]”

and “blood[,]” J.A. 275, 293, 297, 319, 487, if the Supreme

Court or Congress did not take action to address the “rigged”

election, J.A. 294. He stated that he “want[ed] to actively

rebel[,]” J.A. 302, encouraged others to prepare their weapons

and body armor, J.A. 300, and proposed a military-like “[p]lan

of action if Congress fail[ed] to act on 6 January[,]” J.A. 309.

That plan included “[s]eiz[ing]” political leaders, “national

media assets[,]” and “key personnel”; “using [interrogation]

measures we used on Al Qaeda to gain evidence on the coup”;

17

“[e]stablish[ing] provisional government in rebellious states”;

and granting a “[g]eneral pardon for all crimes up to and

including murder [for] those restoring the Constitution and

putting down the Democratic Insurrection.” J.A. 309−311. He

outlined “[r]ules of engagement[,]” including avoiding killing

law enforcement officers “unless necessary[,]” “[a]ttempt[ing]

to capture Democrats with knowledge of [the] coup[,]” and

“[s]hoot[ing] and destroy[ing] enemy communication nodes

and key personnel.” J.A. 311–312. Brock’s actions on January

6th also confirm that “he expected that events might get

violent[.]” J.A. 460. Specifically, while inside the Capitol,

Brock wore a military-style helmet and tactical vest, and he

picked up and carried a pair of flex-cuffs throughout the

building.

The evidence further shows that Brock entered without

permission an area that he knew was closed off to the public in

an effort to halt the electoral count. The district court found

that Brock’s social media posts established that “he knew any

attempts to enter the Capitol would require ‘storming’ it, which

would, of course, be illegal.” J.A. 463. To that same point, the

district court found that there was “no question” that Brock

“would have observed the toppled barricades, including snow

fences, bike racks, and the broken police lines that were

protecting the perimeter of the Capitol grounds on January 6th

as he approached the building.” J.A. 465 (discussing 18 U.S.C.

§ 1752(a)(1) count). The district court further found that, once

Brock “reached the Capitol building, he entered through doors

that had been forced open,” that “there were other

demonstrators entering through the broken glass windows on

either side of him as he entered through the door that had also

been broken open[,]” and that police officers were attempting

to prevent entry. J.A. 465–466 (discussing 18 U.S.C.

§ 1752(a)(1) count). Also, once inside, Brock attempted to

open a set of secured doors marked “U.S. Senate” with an

18

unidentified set of keys. Finally, the district court determined

that, although Brock was not himself involved in any

altercations, “he nevertheless continued to walk through the

Capitol with full knowledge that law enforcement and the

protesters were clashing at various points.” J.A. 470

(discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(2) count).

That evidence suffices to show that Brock acted with both

an improper purpose and consciousness of wrongdoing. While

merely attempting to “imped[e]” or “obstruct[]” an official

proceeding does not necessarily “proceed from corrupt

motives[,]” Robertson, 86 F.4th at 368 (quoting United States

v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1990)); see id. at 370–

371, such an attempt may be corrupt if it is done with a

“depraved, evil, or wrongful” purpose, id. at 367 (quoting

North, 910 F.2d at 942 (Silberman, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part)). On January 6th, Brock participated in a

riot that sought to overturn the result of the 2020 presidential

election by force. His social media communications leading up

to that day and actions while in the Capitol “indicate that he

clearly intended to take very purposeful actions to interfere

with any certification of the election, and even to take actions

that bordered on violent conduct and improper steps to impede

the Congressional action of certification of the election.” J.A.

463. “Using force to obstruct, influence, or impede a

congressional proceeding is plainly wrongful and therefore

corrupt.” Robertson, 86 F.4th at 370. Where a defendant

announces his intent to use violence to obstruct a congressional

proceeding, comes equipped for violence, and then actually

obstructs that proceeding, the evidence supports a finding that

he acted with an impermissible purpose or knowledge of the

wrongfulness of his actions. That finding suffices to establish

that Brock acted corruptly under Robertson.

19

C

Apart from those challenges to his conviction, Brock

argues that the district court improperly applied a three-level

enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines to his Section

1512(c)(2) conviction for “substantial interference with the

administration of justice.” U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(2); see Brock

Opening Br. 18–21. More specifically, Brock argues that

“substantial interference with the administration of justice” as

used in Section 2J1.2(b)(2) is limited to “judicial type

proceedings” and does not encompass the legislative electoral

certification process he was convicted of obstructing. Brock

Opening Br. 19; see Brock Opening Br. 18–19. The

government responds that “‘administration of justice’ * * *

refers to the proper administration of law by all three branches

of government.” Gov’t Br. 42; see Gov’t Br. 51

(“[O]bstruction of the Electoral College certification vote on

January 6 falls comfortably within the meaning of

‘administration of justice’ as used in Section 2J1.2 because it

involved Congress’s performance of duties required by law.”).

Several of our district courts have agreed with the

government’s view. See United States v. Wright, No. 21-cr-

341, 2023 WL 2387816, at *1 (D.D.C. March 4, 2023) (stating

that “the vast majority of judges in the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia” have held that “the phrase

‘administration of justice’ in [Section 2J1.2] includes the

Electoral College certification”); id. at *7 (collecting cases).

But see United States v. Seefried, 639 F. Supp. 3d 8, 10 (D.D.C.

2022) (holding that Section 2J1.2 “d[id] not apply because the

electoral certification does not involve the ‘administration of

justice’”).

With great respect to our district court colleagues’

thoughtfully reasoned efforts to apply this Guideline, we hold

20

that, for purposes of Sentencing Guideline 2J1.2, the phrase

“administration of justice” does not encompass Congress’s role

in the electoral certification process. Instead, Section 2J1.2’s

text, context, and commentary show that “administration of

justice” refers to judicial, quasi-judicial, and adjunct

investigative proceedings, but does not extend to the unique

congressional function of certifying electoral college votes.

1

The plain, natural, and ordinary meaning of the phrase

“administration of justice” is the governmental process of

investigating, determining, and enforcing the legal rights of

persons.

For nearly a quarter of a century, Black’s Law Dictionary

has consistently defined the phrase “administration of justice”

as “[t]he maintenance of right within a political community by

means of the physical force of the state” or “the state’s

application of the sanction of force to the rule of right.”

Administration of Justice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 45 (7th

ed. 1999); Administration of Justice, BLACK’S LAW

DICTIONARY 47 (8th ed. 2004); Administration of Justice,

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 50 (9th ed. 2009); Administration

of Justice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 53 (10th ed. 2014);

Administration of Justice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 54 (11th

ed. 2019). And it further defines “due administration of

justice” as “[t]he proper functioning and integrity of a court or

other tribunal and the proceedings before it in accordance with

the rights guaranteed to the parties.” Due Administration of

Justice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 54 (11th ed. 2019).

Black’s Law Dictionary similarly defines “obstructing the

administration of justice” and “interfering with the

administration of justice” as “[t]he skewing of the disposition

21

of legal proceedings, as by fabricating or destroying evidence,

witness-tampering, or threatening or intimidating a judge[.]”

Perverting the Course of Justice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

1383 (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added); see id. (cross-

referencing these phrases). In fact, definitions for “obstructing

justice” and “obstruction of justice” have long focused on the

disruption of judicial and quasi-judicial administrative

processes. See Obstructing Justice, BLACK’S LAW

DICTIONARY 1228 (4th ed. 1968) (“Impeding or obstructing

those who seek justice in a court, or those who have duties or

powers of administering justice therein.”); Obstruction of

Justice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1105 (7th ed. 1999)

(“Interference with the orderly administration of law and

justice, as by giving false information to or withholding

evidence from a police officer or prosecutor, or by harming or

intimidating a witness or juror.”); Obstruction of Justice,

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1107 (8th ed. 2004) (same);

Obstruction of Justice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1183 (9th

ed. 2009) (same); Obstruction of Justice, BLACK’S LAW

DICTIONARY 1246 (10th ed. 2014) (same); Obstruction of

Justice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1296 (11th ed. 2019)

(same); see also Obstruction of Justice, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S

DICTIONARY OF LAW 337 (1996) (defining “obstruction of

justice” as “the crime or act of willfully interfering with the

process of justice and law[,] esp[ecially] by influencing,

threatening, harming, or impeding a witness, potential witness,

juror, or judicial or legal officer or by furnishing false

information in or otherwise impeding an investigation or legal

process”) (emphasis added); Obstructing Justice, BLACK’S

LAW DICTIONARY 972 (5th ed. 1979) (“Impeding or

obstructing those who seek justice in a court, or those who have

duties or powers of administering justice therein. The act by

which one or more persons attempt to prevent, or do prevent,

the execution of lawful process. The term applies also to

obstructing the administration of justice in any way—as by

22

hindering witnesses from appearing, assaulting process

server[s], influencing jurors, obstructing court orders or

criminal investigations. Any act, conduct, or directing agency

pertaining to pending proceedings, intended to play on human

frailty and to deflect and deter [a] court from performance of

its duty and drive it into compromise with its own unfettered

judgment by placing it, through medium of knowingly false

assertion, in wrong position before public, constitutes an

obstruction to administration of justice.”); Obstructing Justice,

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1077 (6th ed. 1990) (same).

Those definitions show that the “administration of justice”

commonly involves the operations of a judicial or quasi-

judicial tribunal that applies the force of the state to determine

the legal rights of individuals and entities, as well as to related

investigations conducted by government officials.

The commentary to Section 2J1.2 underscores that

“administration of justice” refers to judicial, quasi-judicial, and

adjunct investigative proceedings that apply the force of the

state to determine or maintain the legal rights of individuals and

entities. The commentary explains that “‘[s]ubstantial

interference with the administration of justice’ includes a

premature or improper termination of a felony investigation; an

indictment, verdict, or any judicial determination based upon

perjury, false testimony, or other false evidence; or the

unnecessary expenditure of substantial governmental or court

resources.” U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 cmt. n.1 (emphasis omitted).

Each of these examples centers the Guideline on judicial,

quasi-judicial, or related investigatory proceedings—

proceedings that apply the force of the state to determine or to

maintain individual legal rights. “And the commentary to the

Guidelines, unless it is inconsistent with the Guidelines’ plain

23

text (which no one argues here), is authoritative.” Long, 997

F.3d at 355.

Other provisions of the Guidelines’ commentary bolster

this interpretation. Section 3C1.1—entitled “Obstructing or

Impeding the Administration of Justice”—applies to

defendants who “willfully obstruct[] or impede[], or attempt[]

to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect

to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the * * *

offense of conviction” when “the obstructive conduct related

to (A) the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant

conduct; or (B) a closely related offense[.]” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1

(emphasis added). Every example in the commentary to

Section 3C1.1 involves conduct that obstructs a judicial or

related investigative proceeding. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt.

n.4. Other uses of the term throughout the Guidelines are

similarly cabined to judicial, quasi-judicial, and investigative

proceedings. See, e.g., id. § 2J1.3 (“Perjury or Subornation of

Perjury; Bribery of Witness”); id. § 2J1.5 (“Failure to Appear

by Material Witness”).

Courts too have adopted that same natural understanding

of “administration of justice” when applying other legal

provisions. See Pugin v. Garland, 599 U.S. 600, 620 (2023)

(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“‘[A]dministration of justice,’

both historically and currently, refers to court proceedings.”);

id. at 603–607 (majority opinion) (concluding that a provision

of the Immigration and Nationality Act regarding crimes

“relating to obstruction of justice” can apply in the absence of

a pending investigation or proceeding, as long as it has “a

connection with” investigative and adjudicatory matters).

For example, Section 1503 of Title 18 prohibits certain

acts that “influence[], obstruct[], or impede[], or endeavor[] to

influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of

24

justice[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a). The Supreme Court has held

that, to violate Section 1503, “[t]he action taken by the accused

must be with an intent to influence judicial or grand jury

proceedings[,]” evidenced by “a relationship in time, causation,

or logic with the judicial proceedings.” United States v.

Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995). “In other words,” the

Supreme Court has explained, “the endeavor must have the

natural and probable effect of interfering with the due

administration of justice.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). In

interpreting this provision, the Fifth Circuit has similarly held

that “obstructing the due administration of justice means

‘interfering with the procedure of a judicial hearing or trial.’”

United States v. Richardson, 676 F.3d 491, 502–503 (5th Cir.

2012) (quoting United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1336

n.9 (5th Cir. 1978)). And the Eleventh Circuit has

characterized Section 1503 as “employ[ing] the term ‘due

administration of justice’ to provide a protective cloak over all

judicial proceedings[.]” United States v. Brenson, 104 F.3d

1267, 1280 (11th Cir. 1997).

Similarly, Section 401 of Title 18 empowers federal courts

to punish “[m]isbehavior” of any person in or near the court

that “obstruct[s] the administration of justice[.]” 18 U.S.C.

§ 401(1). Circuit courts interpreting this power have broadly

stated that “obstruction of the administration of justice requires

* * * some act that will interrupt the orderly process of the

administration of justice, or thwart the judicial process.”

United States v. Warlick, 742 F.2d 113, 115–116 (4th Cir.

1984); see American Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 968

F.2d 523, 532 (5th Cir. 1992) (similar); Vaughn v. City of Flint,

752 F.2d 1160, 1167 (6th Cir. 1985) (similar).

These statutes are not unique—Congress routinely uses

“administration of justice” in contexts involving courts and

court proceedings. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1507 (prohibiting

25

“picket[ing] or parad[ing] in or near a building housing a court

of the United States” “with the intent of interfering with,

obstructing, or impeding the administration of justice”); 22

U.S.C. § 7513(a)(5)(B)(ii) (authorizing the President “to

provide assistance for Afghanistan” to support “improvements

in the capacity and physical infrastructure of the justice system

in Afghanistan, such as for professional training * * * to

improve the administration of justice, for programs to enhance

prosecutorial and judicial capabilities and to protect

participants in judicial cases, for improvements in the

instruction of law enforcement personnel (including human

rights training), and for the promotion of civilian police roles

that support democracy”); 26 U.S.C. § 7456(c)(1)

(empowering the Tax Court to punish “misbehavior of any

person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the

administration of justice”); 28 U.S.C. § 333 (empowering the

chief judge of each circuit to hold judicial conferences “for the

purpose of * * * advising means of improving the

administration of justice within such circuit”); 28 U.S.C.

§ 620(b)(6) (empowering the Federal Judicial Center “to

cooperate with and assist agencies of the Federal Government

and other appropriate organizations in providing information

and advice to further improvement in the administration of

justice in the courts of foreign countries”); see also 28 U.S.C.

§ 453 (setting forth the judicial oath of office, including the

affirmation that the justice or judge “will administer justice”

fairly and evenhandedly).

2

Congress’s certification of electoral college votes does not

fit the “administration of justice” mold.

26

a

To start, the congressional certification of electoral votes

must be set in context. Congress’s counting of the electoral

votes on January 6, 2021, was only one discrete step in a

lengthy, multi-stage process that involves state legislatures and

officials, as well as prescribed legislative processes within

Congress.

The electoral college vote-counting process begins with

the appointment of electors on Election Day. See 3 U.S.C. § 1;

U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 1, cl. 2.5 All 50 states and the District of

Columbia appoint electors through a popular-vote process in

which a vote for a party’s presidential candidate in the general

election is a vote to appoint electors supporting that candidate.

See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON HOUSE ADMIN., 117TH CONG., REP.

ON THE ELECTORAL COUNT ACT OF 1887: PROPOSALS FOR

REFORM 2 & n.7 (2022). “[A]s soon as practicable after the

conclusion of the appointment of the electors,” the governor of

each state must send the Archivist of the United States a

certificate of the electors appointed. 3 U.S.C. § 6.

The electors of each state meet on “the first Monday after

the second Wednesday in December” to vote by ballot for

President and Vice-President at a location determined by state

law. 3 U.S.C. § 7; see U.S. CONST. Art. II., § 1, cl. 3; U.S.

CONST. Amend. XII. After the electors have voted within their

State, they “make and sign six certificates of all the votes given

by them,” attaching to each certificate a list of the electors

provided to them by the Governor of the State. 3 U.S.C. § 9.

5

Congress amended the Electoral Count Act in 2022. See

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-328, 136

Stat. 4459, 5233–5241 (2022). All citations in this opinion are to the

pre-amendment statute in force at the time of the events underlying

Brock’s conviction.

27

The electors then seal the certificates and certify that each

certificate contains “all the votes of [the] State” given for

President and Vice President. Id. § 10. The electors send one

certificate to the President of the Senate, two to the secretary of

their respective States, two to the Archivist of the United

States, and one to the judge of the district in which the electors

assembled to give their vote. Id. § 11.

States may adopt procedures for resolving disputes

regarding the appointment of electors. 3 U.S.C. § 5. Congress

has afforded such procedures deference by treating them as a

“safe harbor” for election disputes: If, prior to election day, a

state passes laws providing for the “final determination of any

controversy or contest concerning the appointment of all or any

* * * electors[,]” and the process established by those laws

yields a “final determination” of a controversy or contest at

least six days before the national electors meet, that

determination “shall be conclusive” on Congress. Id.

Once the States’ electoral college votes are submitted, the

Senate and House of Representatives meet to count the

electoral votes in a joint session on January 6th following the

presidential election. 3 U.S.C. § 15. At that meeting, the

President of the Senate opens “all the certificates and papers

purporting to be certificates of the electoral votes” in

alphabetical order by State, and then hands the certificates to

four previously appointed tellers to read them aloud in the

presence of both Houses. Id. The tellers also make a list of the

votes received. Id.

After each certificate is read, the President of the Senate

“call[s] for objections[.]” 3 U.S.C. § 15. When all objections

to a State’s certificates have been made, the Senate and House

of Representatives must withdraw to their chambers to decide

upon the objections. Id.; see id. § 17; CONG. RSCH. SERV.,

28

RL32717, COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES: AN OVERVIEW OF

PROCEDURES AT THE JOINT SESSION, INCLUDING OBJECTIONS

BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 6–9 (2020).

Both chambers reconvene “immediately” after they have

voted, and the presiding officer then announces the decision on

the objection(s). 3 U.S.C. § 15. Congress may not proceed to

consideration of the next State’s votes “until the objections

previously made to the votes or papers from any State shall

have been finally disposed of.” Id. Congress does not dissolve

the joint session “until the count of electoral votes [is]

completed and the result declared[.]” Id. § 16.

Considered in context, Congress’s counting and

certification of electoral votes is but the last step in a lengthy

electoral certification process involving state legislatures and

officials as well as Congress. Taken as a whole, the multi-step

process of certifying electoral college votes—as important to

our democratic system of government as it is—bears little

resemblance to the traditional understanding of the

administration of justice as the judicial or quasi-judicial

investigation or determination of individual rights.

The certification process, we note, could be said to involve

“[t]he maintenance of right within a political community”

insofar as Congress ensures that the certified votes are

reviewed and counted in the manner prescribed by the

Constitution and by statute. Administration of Justice,

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 54 (11th ed. 2019). But that is only

half the definition of administration of justice. Congress

imposes neither “the physical force of the state” nor “the

sanction of force to the rule of right” in certifying the electoral

votes. Id. To the extent that law enforcement is present, it is

there to protect the lawmakers and their process, not to

investigate individuals’ rights or to enforce Congress’s

29

certification decision. After all, law enforcement is present for

security purposes for a broad variety of governmental

proceedings that do not involve the “administration of

justice”—presidential inaugurations, for example, and the

pardoning of the Thanksgiving Turkey.

Similarly, while Congress could be conceived of as a

tribunal deciding the validity of electoral votes, it is not acting

in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity to adjudicate the legal

rights of any “parties” before it. Due Administration of Justice,

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 54 (11th ed. 2019). To be sure,

Members of Congress consider, review, and act upon evidence

in the form of the state certifications. But, in so doing,

Congress does not adjudicate the right of the President-elect to

be President, or the right of voters to have their elected

candidate declared President. Its role is limited to resolving

disputes regarding the evidence of electoral votes by

congressional vote.6

b

The government does not contend that Congress’s

certification of electoral college votes fits the normal or

dictionary understanding of “administration of justice.”

6

In debating the Electoral Count Act as originally enacted, one

legislator explained that Congress would need to “judge” the legality

of electoral votes and considered “[t]he power to judge of the legality

of the votes [to be] a necessary consequent of the power to count.”

18 Cong. Rec. 30 (1886) (statement of Rep. Caldwell). That

legislative history, however, underscores that the power exercised

here is “to count[,]” not to administer justice to parties. Id.

Furthermore, that statement does not speak to the contours or scope

of “administration of justice” as used in the sentencing guidelines,

and the government has offered no argument based on that legislative

history.

30

Instead, the government engages in definitional divide and

conquer, dissecting the phrase “administration of justice” and

then invoking the most favorable meaning of each word in

isolation. See Gov’t Br. 42–43.

The government starts by defining “justice” as including

“‘the fair and proper administration of laws,’” and “obstruction

of justice” as “‘interference with the orderly administration of

law and justice.’” Gov’t Br. 42–43 (brackets omitted) (quoting

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1033, 1296 (11th ed. 2019)). The

government then puts those two definitions together to

conclude that “administration of justice” means any and every

“performance of acts required by law in the discharge of duties

[by government actors.]” Gov’t Br. 43 (quoting United States

v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 641 (5th Cir. 1977)). There are

multiple problems with that approach.

To start, the government selectively truncates its

quotations. The full definition of “obstruction of justice” reads:

“Interference with the orderly administration of law and

justice, as by giving false information to or withholding

evidence from a police officer or prosecutor, or by harming or

intimidating a witness or juror.” Obstruction of Justice,

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1296 (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis

added). The excluded material contemplates that the

interference in question will occur in the context of an

investigation or adjudicative proceeding. And the government

similarly drops qualifying language from its quotation of

United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1977). The full

quote from Partin, which itself was quoting without fully

embracing a jury instruction, reads: “The administration of

justice it should be pointed out means the performance of acts

required by law in the discharge of duties such as appearing as

a witness and giving truthful testimony when subpoenaed.” Id.

at 641 (emphasis added). That language suggests a more

31

cabined understanding of the term “administration of justice”

than the government urges here.

By carving language out of context in that manner, the

government effectively rewrites “administration of justice” to

mean “administration of laws.” That reading would vastly

expand the sentencing enhancement beyond the bounds of its

normal textual connotation and interpretive commentary. It

would, for example, make the State of the Union address,

which is required by the Constitution, U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 3,

the administration of justice. Likewise, the government’s

reading would sweep within the “administration of justice” the

Social Security Administration’s monthly issuance of Social

Security checks pursuant to statute, see 42 U.S.C. § 402, and

the Postal Service’s receipt and delivery of mail, see 39 U.S.C.

§ 403(a).

Relatedly, the government’s textual argument fails to read

the relevant language—“administration of justice”—as a

unitary phrase. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER,

READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 356

(2012) (“Adhering to the fair meaning of the text * * * does not

limit one to the hyperliteral meaning of each word in the text.”).

Courts “do not read statutes in little bites.” Kircher v. Putnam

Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 643 (2006). That is because “words

together may assume a more particular meaning than those

words in isolation.” FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 406

(2011). Here, “justice” “does not stand alone[,]” ZF Auto. US,

Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., 596 U.S. 619, 628 (2022), and the entire

phrase “administration of justice” connotes more than the sum

of its verbal parts, cf. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. at 406.

The government admits as much, acknowledging that “the

term ‘administration of justice’ is more commonly used * * *

to refer to ‘interference with the pendency of some sort of

32

judicial proceeding.’” Gov’t Br. 43 (quoting In re Kendall, 712

F.3d 814, 828 (3d Cir. 2013)). The government points to

nothing in the text of Section 2J1.2(b)(2) or its commentary

that suggests the Sentencing Commission chose to depart from

that ordinary understanding of “administration of justice” and

broadly sweep in the “administration of laws” by all three

branches of government.

The government counters that the commentary’s list of

judicial, quasi-judicial, and investigative activities covered by

Section 2J1.2(b)(2) is not exclusive. Gov’t Br. 48, 55–56.

True. But the Commission made the list illustrative by

prefacing it with “includes.” See Christopher v. SmithKline

Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 162 (2012) (introducing a

definition “with the verb ‘includes’ instead of ‘means,’ * * *

makes clear that the examples enumerated in the text are

intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive”); Dong v.

Smithsonian Inst., 125 F.3d 877, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he

word ‘includes’ normally does not introduce an exhaustive list

but merely sets out examples of some general principle.”)

(quotation marks omitted). Said another way, the illustrative

list illustrates what type of conduct is encompassed by the

definition, and so other unlisted forms of conduct must fit that

same mold. Expanding the phrase “administration of justice”

to capture the administration of all governmental actions

required by law breaks that mold.

c

The government separately points to the list’s concluding

reference to “the unnecessary expenditure of substantial

governmental or court resources.” U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 cmt. n.1.

“‘[G]overnmental’ resources,” the government argues,

“includes congressional resources.” Gov’t Br. 48. That may

well be correct in a generic sense. And congressional resources

33

expended on an adjudicatory or quasi-adjudicatory process like

impeachment or contempt proceedings may well fall within

Section 2J1.2(b)(2)’s compass (an issue we need not

definitively resolve). Cf. Contempt, BLACK’S LAW

DICTIONARY 313 (7th ed. 1999) (suggesting that contempt of

the legislature “interferes with the administration of justice”).

But we must read the tail end of the commentary

consistently with the rest of the commentary’s illustrative

references. And those references indicate that the term

“governmental resources” is limited to the expenditure of

investigative, prosecutorial, or judicial resources in relation to

a potential or pending investigation or a judicial or quasi-

judicial proceeding. See, e.g., United States v. Amer, 110 F.3d

873, 885 (2d Cir. 1997) (applying the Section 2J1.2(b)(2)

enhancement to the sentence of a defendant convicted of

unlawfully abducting his children from the United States

because “th[e] act prevented proper legal proceedings from

occurring by taking matters completely outside the purview of

the administration of justice”).

Certainly nothing in the commentary’s wrap-up reference

to the expenditure of governmental or court resources suggests

that it was meant to sweep in all unnecessary expenditures of

government resources associated with the routine

administration of laws. A cybercriminal who hacks into the

State Department’s computer system, necessitating the swift

and substantial expenditure of governmental funds to protect

sensitive diplomatic communications, will no doubt have

broken many laws, but that person’s conduct, without more,

cannot be described as interfering with the administration of

justice.

34

d

Finally, the government argues that Section 2J1.2’s

context favors a broad reading of “administration of justice” to

cover the administration of all laws. See Gov’t Br. 44–45. The

government notes in particular that “Section 2J1.2 applies to an

array of obstruction statutes, including many that do not

involve the ‘administration of justice’ in the narrow sense[.]”

Gov’t Br. 44 (citing U.S.S.G. Appendix A). But each of the

statutes the government cites includes a broad range of conduct

that sometimes could and sometimes will not include

investigations or judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. See

Gov’t Br. 44–45 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 551 (prohibiting both

concealing or destroying documents relating to imported

merchandise and concealing or destroying such documents

“for the purpose of suppressing any evidence of fraud

therein”); id. § 665(c) (prohibiting obstructing or impeding an

investigation under the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity

Act); id. § 1505 (prohibiting obstructing congressional

investigations); id. § 1511 (prohibiting conspiring to obstruct

state criminal law to facilitate illegal gambling); id. § 1516

(prohibiting obstructing a federal auditor); id. § 1519

(prohibiting destroying documents in agency investigations);

26 U.S.C. § 7212 (prohibiting interfering with the

administration of internal revenue laws)). Contrary to the

government’s reading then, see Gov’t Br. 44–45, Section

2J1.2(b)(2)’s three-level sentencing enhancement would apply

to these statutes when the violative conduct implicates the

administration of justice. We hold only that it need not apply

to every form of obstruction under the pertinent statutes.

That, after all, is the point of a sentencing enhancement.

Section 2J1.2’s base-offense level already covers all offenses

chargeable under the relevant statutes. The whole purpose of

Section 2J1.2(b)(2)’s sentencing-enhancement provision then

35

is to identify those offenses within the broader Section 2J1.2

class that merit greater punishment than those covered by the

base-offense level because of their particular circumstances or

harm inflicted. See U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b) (enhancement applies

only to crimes under 2J1.2 having “specific offense

characteristics”) (capitalization modified). What matters under

the Guidelines is that some violations of the covered statutes

could trigger the 2J1.2(b)(2) enhancement, not that every

violation do so.

Said another way, if we read every conviction punishable

under Section 2J1.2 to necessarily involve “interference with

the administration of justice,” Section 2J1.2(b)(2)’s three-level

enhancement would be applicable to all Section 2J1.2 offenses

so long as the resulting interference is “substantial.” But if that

were the Commission’s goal, it could have specified that courts

should apply a three-level enhancement to all convictions

under Section 2J1.2 resulting in serious or substantial harm.

There would have been no reason to further specify that the

enhancement applies only in cases of interference with the

“administration of justice.”

The government also notes that Part J of Chapter 2 of the

Guidelines is entitled “Offenses Involving the Administration

of Justice.” Gov’t Br. 42. The government, though, does not

develop this point further. It apparently reads the title as

indicating that all offenses to which Part J applies must involve

the administration of justice and reasons that, because Section

2J1.2 applies to convictions under Section 1512(c)(2),

convictions under Section 1512(c)(2) must necessarily involve

the administration of justice.

That is not how the Sentencing Guidelines work. While

the title of a specific part or guideline may serve as an

interpretive tool, see United States v. Flores, 945 F.3d 687, 728

36

(2d Cir. 2019); United States v. Torrealba, 339 F.3d 1238,

1245 (11th Cir. 2003), it cannot stretch a guideline’s reach

beyond its textual bounds.

Finally, the government objects that “[t]here is no sound

basis for assigning a significantly higher offense level to

someone who violently interferes with a court proceeding than

someone who violently interferes with a congressional

proceeding.” Gov’t Br. 46–47. Maybe. But that is a policy

argument the government can present to the Commission. It is

textually indisputable that the Guidelines confine the Section

2J1.2(b)(2) enhancement to those offenses that interfere with

the “administration of justice,” not the administration of

everything Congress does, or the administration of

government, or the administration of all laws broadly. We

must apply the Guideline as written, and Brock’s interference

with one stage of the electoral college vote-counting process—

while no doubt endangering our democratic processes and

temporarily derailing Congress’s constitutional work—did not

interfere with the “administration of justice.”

* * *

Because Section 2J1.2’s text, commentary, and context

establish that the “administration of justice” does not extend to

Congress’s counting and certification of electoral college

votes, the district court erred in applying Section 2J1.2(b)(2)’s

three-level sentencing enhancement to Brock’s Section

1512(c)(2) conviction.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Brock’s conviction

under 18 U.S.C § 1512(c)(2), but we vacate Brock’s sentence

for his Section 1512(c)(2) conviction and remand to the district

37

court for resentencing without the application of Section

2J1.2(b)(2)’s sentencing enhancement.

So ordered.