United States v. Everett Jerome Tripodis

USCA11 Case: 22-12826 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 1 of 10

[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-12826

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

EVERETT JEROME TRIPODIS,

a.k.a. Everett Tripodis,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-00240-TWT-LTW-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12826

Before WILSON, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

Wilson, Circuit Judge:

Everett Tripodis appeals his sentence from the Northern

District of Georgia. First, Tripodis argues that the government vi-

olated his negotiated plea agreement by requesting imposition of

supervised release when none was contemplated within the four

corners of the agreement. Second, because the agreement is bind-

ing on the government and the court once it is accepted, he also

claims that the court erred in imposing supervised release as an ad-

ditional punishment not considered in the plea agreement. After

reviewing the record, and with the benefit of oral argument, we

affirm.

I. Background

Tripodis was engaged in a coordinated scheme of stealing

and reselling luxury vehicles, including Audis, Bentleys, and Cor-

vettes. To resell the vehicles without being caught, Tripodis would

obtain vehicle registration information (VIN) for similar automo-

biles to the ones that were stolen. Tripodis would use those VINs

to gain access to the similar vehicles’ associated titles. These titles

would then be presented with the stolen vehicles to legitimize

them for selling.

Tripodis was ultimately caught, and a grand jury returned a

superseding indictment charging Tripodis with five counts: (1) one

count of general conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; (2) three

counts of interstate transport of a stolen vehicle in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 2321; and (3) one count of tampering with a VIN in

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22-12826 Opinion of the Court 3

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 511(a). After many pre-trial proceedings,

Tripodis pled guilty to the conspiracy offense pursuant to a negoti-

ated plea agreement. In exchange, the government agreed to dis-

miss the remaining charges in the indictment.

The plea agreement included a binding sentencing recom-

mendation under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C),

requiring the district court to imprison Tripodis for 60 months “as

the appropriate total custodial sentence in this case” if the court

accepted the plea agreement. The agreement contained stock lan-

guage regarding the statutory penalties that Tripodis was subject

to under 18 U.S.C. § 371, including a supervised release penalty not

to exceed three years. However, no other mention of supervised

release was contained within the agreement. 1

At the plea hearing, the court established that Tripodis knew

he was under oath and must answer truthfully, that he was enter-

ing a knowing and voluntary plea, and he would ask the court ques-

tions if he did not understand. During questioning, Tripodis was

asked if he understood that the plea agreement contained a waiver

1 As is standard, the plea agreement contained a standard limited appeal

waiver. The waiver states that Tripodis waives the right to appeal his convic-

tion and sentence and to collaterally attack the same on any ground, except if

(1) the district court conducted an upward variance in sentencing, or (2) his

counsel was ineffective. Tripodis signed the agreement twice, confirming

there were no other understandings or agreements outside the written plea

agreement.

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12826

of appeal. Tripodis responded that he did and acknowledged that

he was waiving his right to appeal.

The court repeatedly notified Tripodis during the plea hear-

ing that Tripodis could potentially receive supervised release as a

part of his sentence. Regarding the statutory penalties, the court

specifically asked if Tripodis understood that the court could sen-

tence him to a three-year supervised release term. Tripodis af-

firmed he understood. The court inquired again: “Do you under-

stand that you may be sentenced to a term of supervised release,

and that, if you violate the conditions of release, you can be sent to

prison for the entire term of supervised release?” Tripodis again re-

sponded in the affirmative. The court further clarified that it was

only bound by the 60-month imprisonment condition within the

plea agreement through the following exchange:

THE COURT: Other than the provision of the Plea

Agreement which gives you the right to withdraw

your guilty plea if I should sentence you to more than

60 months in prison, do you understand that if the

sentence is more severe than you expect it, you will

still be bound by your plea of guilty and will have no

right to withdraw it?

TRIPODIS: Yes, sir.

...

THE COURT: Do you understand that if I do not ac-

cept the sentencing recommendations in your Plea

Agreement, you will still be bound by your plea of

guilty and will have no right to withdraw it?

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22-12826 Opinion of the Court 5

TRIPODIS: Yes, sir.

Tripodis’ counsel interjected that, because the plea was

binding, the court must accept the government’s recommendation

or allow Tripodis to withdraw the plea. The court responded:

“That’s as to the 60-month sentence only, though,” to which Trip-

odis’ counsel replied, “Yes, Your Honor. I’m sorry. I thought that’s

what you asked.” Nothing more was mentioned regarding super-

vised release at the plea hearing.

At sentencing, the government argued for imposition of a

three-year supervised release term. In response, Tripodis’ counsel

requested foregoing supervised release since Tripodis was already

receiving the statutory maximum prison sentence. Tripodis’ coun-

sel gave no indication that it believed the government was breach-

ing the plea agreement by requesting supervised release, or that the

district court would be breaching the plea agreement by imposing

such a sentence; counsel simply argued for no term of supervised

release. Ultimately, the court decided to impose the maximum su-

pervised release term of three years. After sentencing, Tripodis’

counsel stated that Tripodis objected “simply on the basis that the

binding plea did not contemplate supervised release,” which was

overruled. Tripodis timely appealed.

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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12826

II. Analysis

Whether the terms of a plea agreement have been breached

is reviewed de novo. United States v. Horsfall, 552 F.3d 1275, 1281

(11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 2

A. Government Breach of Plea Agreement

To evaluate whether the government breached a plea agree-

ment, we “determine the scope of the government’s promises” and

ask “whether the government’s actions [were] inconsistent with

what the defendant reasonably understood when he entered his

guilty plea.” United States v. Copeland, 381 F.3d 1101, 1105 (11th Cir.

2004) (quotations omitted). While plea agreements are interpreted

in the same vein as contracts, we do not apply a “hyper-technical

reading” or “a rigidly literal approach in the construction of the lan-

guage.” United States v. Jefferies, 908 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir. 1990)

(quotations omitted). Notably, a plea agreement’s silence on an is-

sue does not bind the government to any promise. In re Grand Jury

Proceedings, 819 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1987). 3

2 The government moved to dismiss this appeal based on the appeal waiver in

Tripodis’ plea agreement. An appeal waiver does not bar a defendant’s claim

“that the government breached the very plea agreement which purports to

bar him from appealing.” United States v. Puentes-Hurtado, 794 F.3d 1278, 1284

(11th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, we deny the motion.

3 The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) support this reading, stat-

ing that in a binding plea agreement, “the government and defense have actu-

ally agreed on what amounts to an appropriate sentence or have agreed to one

of the specified components.” (emphasis added); see Horenkamp v. Van Winkle &

Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 1129, 1132 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[I]nterpretations in the

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22-12826 Opinion of the Court 7

When the plea agreement language is ambiguous, it is con-

strued against the government. Id. at 1105–06. We do so because a

plea agreement is a “waiver of substantial constitutional rights re-

quiring that the defendant be adequately warned of the conse-

quences of the plea.” Jefferies, 908 F.2d at 1523 (internal quotations

omitted). We examine extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent to

help dispel the ambiguity and interpret the plea agreement lan-

guage. Copeland, 381 F.3d at 1106. Therefore, we must first ask

whether the agreement is ambiguous and, if so, we must decide

whether to impose the agreement on the defendant. Id.

If the district court accepts a plea agreement and a defendant

is denied the benefit of his bargained-for agreement, he is constitu-

tionally entitled to relief. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,

262 (1971) (“[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a

promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be

part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be ful-

filled.”). Relief follows in one of two forms: (1) specific perfor-

mance of the plea agreement, or (2) the ability to withdraw the

plea. United States v. Yesil, 991 F.2d 1527, 1532–33 (11th Cir. 1992).

Tripodis argues that his reasonable understanding was that

the government would recommend what was written in the plea

agreement—60 months’ imprisonment (and his alleged underlying

assumption that there would be no supervised release). Thus,

when the government recommended more than what was

Advisory Committee Notes are nearly universally accorded great weight in

interpreting federal rules.” (quotation omitted)).

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8 Opinion of the Court 22-12826

contemplated in the agreement, this constituted breach. For relief,

Tripodis requests vacatur of his sentence and remand for specific

performance of his plea agreement. In response, the government

claims that the plea agreement was unambiguous as it only bound

the parties to jointly recommend a “total custodial sentence,” and

therefore should not be construed against it. The government fur-

ther disclaims any breach because it followed through on its prom-

ise of recommending 60 months’ imprisonment.

Tripodis’ argument ultimately fails. The plea agreement was

unambiguous as to the government’s promises, thereby satisfying

first prong of our inquiry and foreclosing the second, dooming

Tripodis’ argument. Even if we were to find the agreement ambig-

uous, the record demonstrates Tripodis understood his plea agree-

ment did not bar the government from recommending supervised

release.

Here, the plea agreement was unambiguous: the govern-

ment promised to recommend a total custodial sentence of 60

months. There is no promise within the plea agreement regarding

supervised release. The agreement’s silence did not bind the gov-

ernment to any promise regarding supervised release. Therefore,

the government was free to recommend a supervised release term.

Further, relevant extrinsic evidence demonstrates Tripodis’

recognition that he could be subject to supervised release. Tripodis’

and his counsel’s statements, both at the initial entry of the plea

and at sentencing, evince that understanding. Importantly, the

court asked Tripodis if he understood that the court could sentence

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22-12826 Opinion of the Court 9

him to a three-year supervised release term, which Tripodis stated

he understood. The court clarified that it was only bound by the

60-month recommendation for imprisonment. Further, when the

government argued for supervised release at sentencing, counsel

merely argued that Tripodis should not receive supervised release

since he was serving the statutory maximum prison sentence. No-

tably, counsel’s arguments were void of accusations that the gov-

ernment was acting nefariously or breaching an agreed-upon un-

derstanding.

While the question of breach here is not frivolous, both

Tripodis’ affirmations at the plea entry stage and the arguments

brought by his counsel indicate that Tripodis understood (1) the

consequences of pleading guilty and (2) that he could be subject to

supervised release. If the government had stated in the plea agree-

ment that it would not recommend supervised release, the recom-

mendation of the same would qualify as breach. However, in the

absence of a supervised release provision in the plea agreement,

there was no obligation for the government to breach. Therefore,

Tripodis’ claim fails.

We pause to note that, in the future, the government should

make it clear in these circumstances what it is promising—and

what it is not—to the defendant. We have previously observed

that, unfortunately, defendants can be “unintentionally misled”

when the government does not explicitly state in the plea agree-

ment the extent of its promises to or requirements of the defend-

ant. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 819 F.2d at 986; United States v. Al-

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10 Opinion of the Court 22-12826

Arian, 514 F.3d 1184, 1193 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). As the gov-

ernment is the drafter of the plea agreement, it should dispel any

alleged ambiguities by clearly indicating whether it intends to rec-

ommend supervised release.

B. District Court Breach of Plea Agreement

The district court’s factual findings regarding the scope of a

plea agreement will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous.

Al-Arian, 514 F.3d at 1191. In addition to the government and the

defendant, the negotiated plea agreement is binding on the court.

Yesil, 991 F.2d at 1532.

Tripodis argues that the 60-month total custodial sentence

was binding on the court, and the court impermissibly modified

the plea agreement by adding a term of supervised release.

For the reasons established above, Tripodis’ argument fails.

As the district court noted in its questioning of Tripodis, it was only

bound to impose the 60-month custodial sentence. Because super-

vised release was not contemplated within the plea agreement, the

government was free to recommend it. Similarly, because the dis-

trict court was not bound by a supervised release provision within

the plea agreement, it was within the court’s discretion whether to

impose supervised release. Therefore, the district court did not

clearly err, and Tripodis’ claim fails.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Tripodis’ sentence.

AFFIRMED.