holding that because clude that the evidence is legally insufficient and render party's attorney appeared at trial, even though judgment in favor of the parent. Id. party did not, there was no default judgment; case was tried on the merits
How later courts described this case
- holding that because clude that the evidence is legally insufficient and render party's attorney appeared at trial, even though judgment in favor of the parent. Id. party did not, there was no default judgment; case was tried on the merits
- holding, when party’s attorney, but not party, appeared for trial and trial on merits was conducted, that “there was no default and no basis for applying Craddock”
- holding that because party’s attorney appeared at trial, even though party did not, there was no default judgment; case was tried on the merits
- stating that Craddock does not apply when party’s attorney appears and case is tried on merits
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional *Page 280
dimension. Stanley v. Illinois , 405 U.S. 645 , 652 (1972); Holick v. Smith , 685 S.W.2d 18 , 20 (Tex. 1985). The involuntary termination of parental rights involves fundamental constitutional rights that have been characterized as "essential," "basic civil rights," and "far more precious than property rights." Stanley , 405 U.S. at 652 ; Holick , 685 S.W.2d at 20 . A termination decree is complete, final, irrevocable and divests for all time that natural right. Holick , 685 S.W.2d at 20 . For this reason, termination proceedings must be strictly scrutinized. Id . "These statements are not mere form language to be included in appellate decisions — they are statements of principles of great constitutional and human dimension." In re M.A.N.M ., 75 S.W.3d 73 , 81 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (Stone, J., dissenting).
In recognition of the constitutional dimension of a parent's natural right, we previously held that the Craddock test should be applied in the event a parent's absence at a termination hearing deprived her attorney from presenting material evidence on her behalf. In re R.H ., 75 S.W.3d 126 , 130 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.); see also Nichols v. TMJ Co ., 742 S.W.2d 828 , 830 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no writ) (holding Craddock standards should apply "when a defendant who was represented at trial seeks a new trial because his absence prevented his attorney from presenting material evidence in his behalf"). The majority reverses our holding in In re R.H . citing LeBlanc v. LeBlanc , 778 S.W.2d 865 , 865 (Tex. 1989) (per curiam). Even as it relies on LeBlanc , however, the majority notes its distinguishing feature. See In re K.C ., No. 04-01-00580-CV, slip op. at p. 3 (asserting Texas Supreme Court has addressed precise issue "albeit in the divorce context"). LeBlanc involved an appeal from a judgment dividing property and awarding child support in a divorce proceeding, not an appeal from an order terminating parental rights. See LeBlanc , 778 S.W.2d at 865 .
In terminating parental rights, a trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 (2) (Vernon Supp. 2002). "The best interests of the child requires that the issues be as fully developed as possible." Sexton v. Sexton , 737 S.W.2d 131 , 133 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ). "[T]he court's duty to protect [a child's] best interests should not be limited by technical rules." C__ v. C__ , 534 S.W.2d 359 , 361 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ dism'd w.o.j.). "Pertinent facts which may directly affect the interests of [a child] should be heard and considered by the trial court regardless of the lack of diligence of the parties in their presentation of the information to the court." Id . The best interest of the child in a proceeding in which a parent's "essential" "basic" "precious" natural right is to be terminated should override a technical bright-line rule regarding when the Craddock test should be applied. See Little v. Little , 705 S.W.2d 153 , 153 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985, writ dism'd) (holding best interest of the child overrides strict application of Craddock test); see also Lohmann v. Lohmann , 62 S.W.3d 875 , 879 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2001, no pet.) (technical rules are of little importance compared to the best interest of the child); In re A.P ., 42 S.W.3d 248 , 254-55 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, no pet. h.) (holding appellate court should review complaint in parental termination case even when complaint is not technically preserved for appellate review).
Many well-established legal doctrines contain exceptions based on the public policy of the State when a child's best interest is at issue. See Hill v. Hill , 819 S.W.2d 570 , 572 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, writ *Page 281
denied). Where a parent can prove that her absence at the termination hearing deprived her attorney from presenting material evidence on her behalf, the Craddock test should be applied. In order for a true "trial on the merits" to be held in this context, the parent must be able to present all relevant material evidence tending to show that termination of his or her parental rights is not in the best interest of the child.