stating that substantive unconscionability relates to whether the substantive contract terms are unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party or whether they contravene the public interest or public policy
How later courts described this case
- stating that substantive unconscionability relates to whether the substantive contract terms are unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party or whether they contravene the public interest or public policy
- holding that it violates Alabama public policy for a party to contract away its liability for punitive damages, regardless of whether the provision was intended to operate in an arbitral or a judicial forum
- rejecting the argument that arbitration under the Commercial Rules was unconscionable "from a financial standpoint" because the plaintiff "d[id] not provide any evidence, such as her income, her family's expenses, or the estimated costs of the arbitration procedure"
- stating that plaintiff's one-document rule argument was "compelling as to Thick-lin's express-warranty and Magnuson-Moss Act violation claims”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Patriot Mfg., Inc. v. Jackson, 929 So. 2d 997 (2005)
824 So. 2d 723, 734-35 (Ala. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Patriot Mfg., Inc. v. Jackson, 929 So. 2d 997
The opinion
I would grant Sharon Thicklin's application for rehearing because, for the reasons I articulated in my dissent in Selma Medical Center, Inc. v. Fontenot, 824 So.2d 668 , 676 (Ala. 2001), I do not believe her claims in this case are subject to arbitration. I therefore dissent from the majority's decision to overrule Thicklin's application. *Page 739
For the same reasons that I dissent from the majority's denial of Thicklin's application for rehearing, I concur in the result as to its decision to overrule the defendants' applications for rehearing. Specifically, I concur with the holdings in the majority opinion (1) that arbitration should not be compelled as to Thicklin's express-warranty claim and her Magnuson-Moss Act claims, and (2) that the provision in the arbitration agreement prohibiting an award of punitive damages is void.