holding that involuntary manslaughter, defined either as reckless or negligent, was not a crime of moral turpitude, because it was "based on unintentional conduct, in contrast to those crimes involving some form of evil intent. It is not an offense that is mala in se and, thus, does not fall within the definition of crimes involving moral turpitude."
How later courts described this case
- holding that involuntary manslaughter, defined either as reckless or negligent, was not a crime of moral turpitude, because it was "based on unintentional conduct, in contrast to those crimes involving some form of evil intent. It is not an offense that is mala in se and, thus, does not fall within the definition of crimes involving moral turpitude."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
I respectfully dissent from the majority's holding that an unintentional killing is not a crime involving moral turpitude. "Moral turpitude has been defined as ' "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general." ' " Meriwether v. Crown Investment Corporation , 289 Ala. 504 , 512 , 268 So.2d 780 (1972), quoting Lee v. Wisconsin State Board of Dental Examiners , 29 Wis.2d 330 , 139 N.W.2d 61 (1966). Rather than declaring that an unintentional killing is not a crime involving moral turpitude, I would hold that the specific conduct which resulted in the unintentional killing must be examined to determine whether the act involves moral turpitude. I can envision certain unintentional killings that would be considered mala in se. Therefore, I must dissent.