Opinion

Consolidated Stores, Inc. v. Gargis

  • 686 So. 2d 268
  • 1996 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 435
  • 1996 WL 292094
Court
Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama
Filed
May 31, 1996
Status
Published
Author
Monroe
On the bench
Crawley, Monroe
Cited by
34 cases

Overruled on other grounds by Bleier v. Wellington Sears Company, 2000 Ala. LEXIS 16 (2000)

holding that an employee who, for the purpose of obtaining Social Security disability benefits, asserted that he was disabled could not assert that he was not disabled, for the purpose of prosecuting his retaliatory-discharge claim

How later courts described this case

  • holding that an employee who, for the purpose of obtaining Social Security disability benefits, asserted that he was disabled could not assert that he was not disabled, for the purpose of prosecuting his retaliatory-discharge claim
  • noting that an implicit requirement for establishing a claim of retaliatory discharge is that the "employee must be willing and able to perform the job in order to assert a retaliatory discharge claim"
  • holding the doctrine applicable where prior inconsistent position was asserted in a Social Security disability hearing
  • judicial estoppel serves to protect the integrity of the judicial proceedings

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Overruled on other grounds by Bleier v. Wellington Sears Company, 2000 Ala. LEXIS 16 (2000)

    See Consolidated Stores, Inc. v. Gargis, 686 So.2d 268 (Ala.Civ.App.1996), overruled on other grounds, Bleier v. Wellington Sears Co., 757 So.2d 1163, 1171 (Ala.2000) (applying judicial estoppel in a retaliatory-discharge case based on an earlier statement made in a case before DIR).
    Supreme Court of AlabamaJan 21, 20004 citing opinionsother groundsRead it

The opinion

I agree that this cause is due to be reversed and remanded; however, I disagree with the majority's holding that the doctrine of inconsistent positions applies in this case. As the majority says, "All of the limitations of the doctrine of inconsistent positions are not met in the present case." Why, then, does the majority go on to conclude that the doctrine applies? Rather than distort the law in an attempt to apply the doctrine regardless of the facts, which, in my opinion, hardly "protect[s] the integrity of the judicial process," this court should hold that, because all of the limitations of the doctrine of inconsistent positions are not met, the doctrine does not apply.

Even so, the evidence of Gargis' prior inconsistent position tends to prove that Gargis was not willing and able to perform the necessary functions of his job, as he now claims. I agree that to prevail on a retaliatory discharge claim, an employee must show that he is willing and able to perform the job from which he was discharged. Because the evidence in this case shows that Gargis was unable to perform his job, I agree that this cause should be reversed and remanded. Therefore, I concur specially. *Page 278

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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