holding that " 'Davis was limited to a post-waiver ambiguous invocation of rights,' " and that " 'an officer faced with an ambiguous response to an initial advisement of Miranda rights, i.e., at the pre-waiver stage, is limited to posing questions designed to clarify the suspect's ambiguous response' " (citations omitted)
How later courts described this case
- holding that " 'Davis was limited to a post-waiver ambiguous invocation of rights,' " and that " 'an officer faced with an ambiguous response to an initial advisement of Miranda rights, i.e., at the pre-waiver stage, is limited to posing questions designed to clarify the suspect's ambiguous response' " (citations omitted)
- holding that “[bjeeause [the defendant] did not waive her Miranda rights before she asked the questions about obtaining a lawyer, the ambiguity of her questions re *807 quired the interrogating officer to ask follow-up questions to clarify the ambiguity”
- holding that ‘[bjecause [the defendant] did not waive her Miranda rights before she asked the questions about obtaining a lawyer, the ambiguity *1121 of her questions required the interrogating officer to ask follow-up questions to clarify the ambiguity’
- holding that '[b]ecause [the defendant] did not waive her Miranda rights before she asked the questions about obtaining a lawyer, the ambiguity of her questions required the interrogating officer to ask follow-up questions to clarify the ambiguity'
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
My review of the videotape of the appellee's statement indicates that the officer read the appellee her Miranda rights and specifically advised her that she had the right to counsel before she was interrogated; that the appellee indicated her understanding of those rights by her subsequent statements and questions; that the officer responded to the appellee's questions by presenting the waiver-of-rights form to her; and that the appellee read the waiver-of-rights form and signed it. Under these facts, there was not any ambiguity as to whether the appellee wanted to talk to an attorney. Rather, the appellee was fully advised of, unambiguously understood, and voluntarily waived her Miranda rights. Accordingly, the trial court improperly granted the appellee's motion to suppress, and I respectfully dissent.