Bryan, J., concurring in result, joined by Thomas, J., stating that an agreement to extend the time to hold a hearing should be considered an agreement to extend the time that a postjudgment motion can remain pending
How later courts described this case
- Bryan, J., concurring in result, joined by Thomas, J., stating that an agreement to extend the time to hold a hearing should be considered an agreement to extend the time that a postjudgment motion can remain pending
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
I respectfully dissent from the main opinion's finding that the parties' agreement *Page 451
in this case did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 59.1, Ala.R.Civ.P. I believe that the facts of this case are distinguishable from those in Ex parte Bodenhamer , 904 So.2d 294 (Ala. 2004), and Burge v. Hayes , 964 So.2d 672
(Ala.Civ.App. 2006). In Bodenhamer , the parties agreed only to extend "`the ninety (90) day period for the hearing. '" 904 So.2d at 295 . In Burge , one party's consent did not appear of record and what consent existed related only to "the hearing." 964 So.2d at 675 . Here, the parties expressly agreed, of record, to extend the time for the hearing "under Rule 59.1 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure." Rule 59.1 provides a means for the extension of the 90-day period that a postjudgment motion may remain pending before the trial court. By express reference to Rule 59.1, I believe that the parties clearly stated their consent and intent to extend the pendency of the postjudgment motion pursuant to that rule. I, therefore, dissent.